


THE HISTORY OF GREECE



THE
HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM
ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
GREEK NATION

BY
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TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

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IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOL. IV

THE GRAECO-MACEDONIAN AGE, THE PERIOD OF THE KINGS AND
THE LEAGUES, FROM THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER DOWN
TO THE INCORPORATION OF THE LAST MACEDONIAN
MONARCHY IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE

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PREFACE

THE attempt which I have made in the present volume to describe for the first time the whole course of Greek life and thought in Europe and beyond the Mediterranean, from the death of Alexander down to the battle of Actium, is a direct consequence of the inclusion of Alexander in the history of Greece, which seemed to me necessary, and I believe that Grote would have arrived at the same conclusion if he had not already treated the great King, with whom he was out of sympathy, reluctantly and almost against his will. My decision not to end with the year 146, as I originally intended, will be justified by the narrative. It is precisely the larger compass, both in point of time and space, thus given to my history which has enabled me, as I believe, to approximate more closely to an important result, viz. a proper estimate of the character of the Greek world in this period and in particular of the civic life of the independent cities. The relations between Rome and the Greeks also seemed to me not to have been always correctly appreciated; I have not been able to substantiate my own views on this subject without combating those of distinguished scholars.

In other respects too a good deal that is new will be found in this volume. The special attention which I have devoted to Asia Minor is intended to meet the demands of the present day. For chapters 25-27 Th. Reinach's narrative has served me as a guide, his *Mithridate Eupator* being one of the few works on ancient history which fully come up to the required standard, not only in scholarship but in descriptive skill. On the other hand, I have endeavoured to reduce the importance of Alexandria to more modest dimensions. Finally, I may point out that the self-government of the Greeks under the supremacy of the Kings and the Romans, on which I have laid stress, is a historical fact of some importance, and that consequently the study of this section of ancient history may be more profitable than some authorities of our day seem to think.

There are many points which I have had to treat more briefly than they deserved, but the period after Alexander was not entitled to more space than that of the heyday of Greece.

A. H.

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
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INTRODUCTION

THE fourth and last volume of my history of Greece deals with the Graeco-Macedonian period, the period of the Kings and of the Leagues, from the death of Alexander up to the incorporation of the last Macedonian monarchy in the Roman Empire. This period has never been connectedly narrated as a part of the history of Greece, and yet it deserves such a narration in a high degree. True, it is not an easy matter to treat the subject historically; for we have to deal with empires and communities which were completely independent of each other, with countries which were only partly inhabited by Greeks. Fortunately Greek civilization, with which they were all more or less saturated, gives them an internal unity, and it is precisely in tracing the gradual diffusion of this civilization that lies the main charm of the period on which we are now entering. Of course I do not mean by this that the history of civilization is to be our sole topic. The conception of a history of Greece would prohibit such a limitation, and in point of fact the Greek world still retained its political side. Its subsequent achievements, in an age when it had lost all political power and was only an ideal force, do not fall within the scope of our task. This is why the year 30 B.C. marks the close of this work. No doubt Greek republics, especially Rhodes, continue to enjoy their old freedom. But they are exceptions. The political configuration of the world

is in no way changed by a state which stood in the same relation to the Roman Empire as San Marino now stands to Italy. For this very reason, however, the last section of the epoch we are about to describe may be treated more briefly than the earlier ones. For when Pompey gives the finishing blow to the tottering empire of the Seleucids, the main interest lies in the achievements of the Roman general, and these are related in sufficient detail in the history of Rome. Of still less value would it be for our purpose to relate at length the political events of the government of the last Cleopatra. On the other hand, Mithridates Eupator, although a Persian by extraction, is also by his culture and his aspirations an interesting figure for Greek history, and for this reason we have narrated his career at some length. To what extent the difficult problem of tracing, throughout the period from 323 down to 30 B.C., the complete development of the States with Greek civilization which were created by the Macedonian conquests or which held their ground in spite of them, has been solved in this volume, may be left to the judgment of others; at all events it was worth while to make the attempt.

I should like at starting to indicate the course which, in my opinion, the development of the Greek world, both external and internal, takes in this period. A huge medley of forces and currents of a political, national and civilizing nature confronts us. In the field of politics we observe the conflict between the monarchical and the republican principle, in national aspirations that between the East and the West, and this last contrast coincides in the main with that presented by civilization in general. Then in many districts the Greek element is very mixed. All this must be taken into consideration. Although these conditions differed greatly in different countries at one and the same time, yet in spite of this certain currents may be traced which give the particular periods a definite character, permeating the whole Greek world from Sicily to the Indus. Following these currents I would divide Greek

history between 323 and 30 B.C. into three periods of development.

I. Growing importance of the Greeks, especially from an intellectual point of view, 323-220 B.C. The period of the Diadochi, of Pyrrhus, Aratus, Cleomenes.

II. Appearance and increasing importance of the Romans as decisive factors in the Greek world, from 220 B.C. onwards. Here we meet with the figures of a Titus Quinctius, a Philopoemen, an Aemilius Paullus, a Polybius.

III. Revival of the importance of the East, from 146 B.C. onwards. The greatest figure in this period is Mithridates.

I deal with period I. in chaps. i.-xiv. ; with period II. in chaps. xv.-xxiv. ; with period III. in chaps. xxv.-xxix. of this volume.

Going more into detail, we find that the first period, which may be described as purely Greek, has two divisions.

(1) Predominance of the monarchical principle, owing to the achievements of Alexander, 323-280 B.C. After the death of the great ruler this principle appears as the incarnation of egoism. Chaps. i.-iii.

(2) Reaction of the Greek principle of freedom, facilitated in Asia by the inroads of the Gauls, which weaken the power of the Seleucids, while in European Greece the Leagues exert a similar influence. Yet this movement towards liberty in European Greece is checked and to a certain extent crushed by Macedonia. 280-220 B.C. Chaps. iv.-xiv.

In the second period, the Roman, we again find two divisions.

(3) The Romans enter the field as opponents of Macedonia, and their influence dislodges the Macedonian. They leave Greece her liberty. 220-197 B.C. The attempt of Antiochus III. to revive the Macedonian monarchical principle in Asia Minor and Greece fails ; the Romans now get a firm footing in Asia Minor as well. 197-189 B.C. Chaps. xv.-xvii.

(4) The conflict with Macedonia leads Rome into a conflict with and to the conquest of independent Greek states, which

naturally resist the intervention of a power which seems to aim at taking the place of Macedonia. In the East Greek civilization is further diffused as an element of culture by Antiochus IV., but not everywhere with success. 189-146 B.C. Chaps. xviii.-xxiv.

The third period, the Eastern, also falls into two divisions.

(5) First of all ensues a political reaction on the part of the East, which, however, in point of civilization still takes almost all its inspiration from Greece, and is really hostile only to Rome. But Rome wins the day. 146-63 B.C. Chaps. xxv.-xxvii.

(6) The great achievements of Caesar are followed by an attempt on the part of Antony to erect a Graeco-Oriental, and then perhaps a Romano-Oriental empire on the unstable foundations of Greek mud. But under Augustus Rome asserts her position as mistress of the whole civilized world, and Greece remains for centuries only an element of culture. 63-30 B.C. Chaps. xxviii.-xxix.

We thus find in the period under consideration the action and reaction of different forces; we see the conflict of antagonistic principles and note its varying results. In the first, the purely Greek period, we have the action of the monarchical principle (division 1, chaps. i.-iii.) and the reaction of that of liberty (division 2, chaps. iv.-xiv.); in the second, the Roman, the action of Rome (division 3, chaps. xv.-xvii.) and the reaction of the Greeks (division 4, from a political, chaps. xviii., xix., as well as from an intellectual point of view, chaps. xx.-xxiv.); in the third, the Oriental, the exertions of the East (division 5, chaps. xxv.-xxvii.) and the victorious counter-efforts of Rome (division 6, chaps. xxviii., xxix.)

The course followed by purely intellectual civilization in the whole of this period is more complicated. The subject-matter and the form of the intellectual production of the Greeks do not always correspond. From 200 B.C. onwards literature, which up to that time was in a flourishing con-

dition, declines, and with special rapidity in point of form. Polybius, in many respects the ablest thinker among Greek writers of the second century, writes bad Greek, so far as we are able to judge. In many branches of literature production ceases altogether. The times were too hard. But when the die is cast, when it is clear to all that the cities of Greece have lost their political importance for ever, the interest taken by the Greeks in literature revives, and their mastery of form also reappears. But we can barely take note of the beginnings of this revival, as the new bloom of Greek literature belongs to the age of Imperial Rome. Art developed on a grand scale after the death of Alexander, more no doubt in Asia than in Greece, until finally in the last century B.C. the old centre of the Greek world once more becomes of importance in this branch. In all these fields a brisk activity is observable among the Greeks throughout the whole of the period extending from 323 down to 30 B.C., the designation of which I discuss in a note below.

We now pass to the narrative of particular events. Here we are confronted at the outset by a scene of almost boundless confusion, which slowly gives way to a more or less permanent state of affairs.

NOTE

Designation of the whole section of Greek history from 323-30 B.C.—For some time the expressions, ‘Hellenistic period,’ ‘Hellenism,’ were in common use; Alexandrian period seems to be now more popular. The former appellations owe their adoption to Droysen’s authority. Grote disapproves of them (close of chap. 94); as do others, *e.g.* Pottier, *Statuettes de terre cuite*, Paris, 1890, p. 115. They are not well chosen: *ἑλληνιστικός* is not a Greek word, and *ἑλληνισμός* means Greek civilization in general. The history of Hellenism cannot be used to denote the history of a period before which Hellenism had existed for centuries in a high state of perfection. Consequently the rightly-formed substantive is now silently dropped, while the barbarous adjective is retained. Hellenistic is said to be the Hellenic element influenced by

barbarian elements, and therefore Greek civilization after Alexander's time can, it is supposed, be appropriately called Hellenistic. But apart from the arbitrary formation of the word, its alleged meaning does not coincide with the principal manifestations of the life of that time. For Greek literature was but little influenced by the barbarian element after Alexander, and Greek art still less so, and Athenian life and character not at all. There is therefore no reason for calling Greek civilization after Alexander not Hellenic but Hellenistic. The word 'Hellenistic' could be used only of a Greek civilization with an Oriental alloy, such as that of Syria, for instance; but the culture of a native of Damascus is not the standard of that of the Greeks of that age in general. Schürer (*Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes*, 2, 26) rightly describes Hellenistic contrasted with Hellenic civilization as a cosmopolitan culture which has assimilated the serviceable elements of all foreign cultures. According to this view neither Aratus nor Polybius, nor Epicurus or Menander, nor Theocritus or the creator of the Pergamum frieze have anything Hellenistic about them; they are pure Hellenes. Under these circumstances the arbitrary formation of the word is after all of some importance as regards its acceptance or rejection. The Greeks no more formed ἑλληνιστικός than ἀττικιστικός or ἀρχαϊστικός, although there were such words as ἑλληνιστί, ἀττικιστί and ἀρχαϊστί, and if the expression 'archaistic' at all events represents a clear conception, viz. new which assumes the semblance of old, the word 'Hellenistic,' directly it is used not merely for the language of the Septuagint, etc., where as a matter of fact words and subject-matter are alike semi-barbarian, has no such justification, for Theocritus, who is supposed to be Hellenistic, is just as Hellenic as Euripides for instance, and this holds good of all the great names in art and literature and in political life. ἑλληνιστικός has evidently been formed from ἑλληνιστής, which means a Greek-speaking Jew; but the word ought to have been left to Oriental learning, which created it; in Greek history it is simply misleading. In Droysen's case too the use of the word 'Hellenismus' is in contradiction with the special titles and the contents of vols. 2 and 3. The special titles suit the contents; Droysen gives us the history of reigning sovereigns. To judge, however, by the general title 'Hellenismus,' he ought to have given a detailed account of culture, at all events of that of Alexandria, and this he has not done. In his history the word 'Hellenismus' has no connection whatever with the subject-matter. What different meanings are attached to the word Hellenism appears from the fact that for the Emperor Julian Hellenism and Paganism have the same meaning, Boissier, *La fin du paganisme*, 1, 93.—A correct perception

that Greek civilization after the year 323 ought not to be disparaged by the term 'Hellenistic,' has led many writers, *e.g.* Christ and Susemihl, to prefer 'Alexandrian' as a designation of the epoch. The explanation is given by R. Volkmann, among others, in Pauly's R. E. I, 744. According to him, Alexandria takes the lead in the intellectual life of the period. But this is a great mistake. R. Volkmann admits himself that philosophy, rhetoric and historiography were without importance in Alexandria, and that as regards poetry generally it was only distinguished in one branch, and besides this only in the natural sciences and in grammar. Consequently, if considerable results were achieved elsewhere in the departments in which Alexandria accomplished nothing, how can we say that Alexandria took the lead and name the epoch after it? The Comedy has so little connection with Alexandria that Christ treats it before the Alexandrian period in spite of the chronology. Polybius too has nothing Alexandrian about him, and the most important of the poets who lived in Alexandria, Theocritus, has very little intrinsic connection with that city. The importance of Alexandria has been, as we shall see, generally much over-estimated. It made its mark only in the history of pure science. But as science is not the sole characteristic of Greek life in the period extending from 323 down to 30 B.C., this does not justify the expression 'Alexandrian epoch.' There is this special reason for rejecting it that its acceptance is connected with an incorrect view of the general character of the period under consideration. Alexandria is not only the representative of science, but also of the monarchical principle, the activity of which is most marked in that city. If this principle had really dominated the age—and that not in externals only—and set its stamp upon it, then there would be more reason for calling the period Alexandrian. But this is not the case. Even at that time the republican principle resists the monarchical principle with some measure of success, and in the end it actually obtains the victory over it. Besides, the monarchical principle in those days is directed essentially towards the material side of life, towards power and enjoyment. If this tendency had predominated in the republics as well, then there might have been a certain justification for calling the whole period Alexandrian, and Volkmann actually maintains that such a predominance existed. But this again is a mistake. The truth is that the lofty spirit of freedom prevailing among the republican Greeks opposes a bold front to the monarchical tendencies of Alexandria, which end in utter degeneracy as early as 200 B.C. The expression 'Alexandrian period' is therefore unjustifiable from this point of view too; it leads only to unjust conclusions. See also below, chap. xiv. note 1.—What designation

then are we to choose? We might say 'Macedonian epoch.' We know that Alexander's successors wished to remain Macedonians; Antigonus III. calls himself one in Delos, Ditt. 205; so did the Ptolemies, Paus. 10, 7. This term is better than the one just discussed, because it includes the more able Seleucids, but it also denotes only one side, that of the monarchical tendency. On the other side the characteristic feature is the formation of permanent and temporary leagues. The period might therefore be called that of the Kings and the Leagues. We might also say: the period of the Graeco-Macedonian state-system. I would sum up the foregoing remarks as follows: if science, court poetry, industrial art, luxury, absolutism and immorality form the distinguishing mark of the whole of Greek life from 323-30 B.C., then this period may be styled 'Alexandrian'; if, on the other hand, as this volume will show, philosophy, national poetry, real art, industrious habits, self-government and a striving after moral improvement still exist among the Greeks during this epoch, then the proper name for it is 'Graeco-Macedonian period,' or the 'period of the Kings and the Leagues.'—Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, London, 1892, says: 'Post-Alexandrian Greece,' but this would not sound so well in German.—With the year 146 B.C. a kind of transition period sets in, as from that time forward Rome incorporates the remnants of the Graeco-Macedonian state-system with greater rapidity.

I cannot cite authorities in detail for chaps. i. and ii., for which I refer the reader to Droysen's and Niese's works, distinguished alike for their accuracy and completeness. I confine myself to a selection of special points which seem to me of importance.

CHAPTER I

THE SUCCESSORS OF ALEXANDER DOWN TO THE DEATH OF EUMENES (323-316 B.C.)

THE death of Alexander had come too early for the empire which he founded. He had endeavoured to blend its component parts one with another, but such an attempt required much time to be successful, and even then the success could only be of a qualified description. In Europe, apart from the Greeks who followed against their will, the mother-country of Macedonia was increased by the motley crowd of the peoples of Thrace, but in Asia and Africa by at least five highly-developed centres of civilization: the Greek in a large section of Asia Minor; the Semitic in Phoenicia, Syria, Babylonia and Assyria; the Aryan in Media, Persia and Bactria; the Indian in the Punjab; and lastly the Egyptian, not to mention the peoples which were akin to without being quite identical with the Greeks, Semites or Aryans, such as the Lycians, Lydians, Phrygians and Cilicians. What was to be done to give this empire an internal unity, without which its continued existence seemed hardly conceivable? A whole containing such widely different parts could not be kept together merely by external force, but required some spiritual element of union. Of these civilizations was one to predominate, or was each perhaps to remain supreme in its own sphere, or again was a blending of several of them to be attempted? The genius of Alexander, to whom Aristotle and other Greeks

were ready to give advice, would probably have furnished a valuable contribution to this branch of practical politics. The problem was beyond the powers of his successors,—if they had any notion that it was a problem for them to solve, a hypothesis which can only be maintained to a certain extent of one of them, Seleucus, the youngest and the nearest to Alexander in point of age.

But no attempt even was made at a solution, for the empire fell to pieces at once, not so much through the revolts of its various peoples as through the want of unity among the men who were now masters. These were the generals who survived their king and on whom power devolved, as there was no suitable heir available and no member of the royal family who enjoyed general popularity. If Roxana gave birth to a son, he would be Alexander's heir, but what a long interval must elapse before the boy could come to the throne. What was to happen in the meantime had to be decided by the generals in concert with the army. But the unexampled success of their career had given the generals such an idea of their own importance that it was impossible for them to work together, and besides they were in no way prepared for the task which had to be accomplished, for nobody could have expected that Alexander would die so early. True, none of them had at first any intention to partition the empire. But to carry on the government in the spirit of Alexander was still less likely to occur to any one of them. For although some of them had comprehended Alexander's great ideas, yet none of them possessed the authority of the defunct monarch. Alexander had been a conqueror and an organizer. Conquest was now at an end, with but few exceptions, but organization, which was not yet finished, was not continued. The immediate and particular object of each of the generals was to obtain a sphere of power for himself, with the determination of carrying out his own, *i.e.* his selfish plans in it.

The problem, however, which pressed for solution and which

was obvious to all was the external continuance of the government of the whole empire. The resolutions adopted for this purpose were taken with tumultuous haste. Six of the leading generals, Perdicas, Leonnatus, Ptolemaeus, Lysimachus, Peithon and Aristonous, promptly decided, in concert with the aristocratic cavalry, that if Roxana should have a son, Perdicas and Leonnatus should be his guardians in Asia, and Antipater and Craterus in Europe. As to what was to be done immediately, they seem to have prudently expressed no opinion. None was willing to submit to the other; each hoped that his own influence would exceed that of his colleagues. And was the above decision adequate for the future only? Possibly there would be no king at all, and if there was one, assuredly no united government. There was a prospect of an aristocracy of generals, perhaps even of a partition of the empire. This was not to the taste of the infantry of the phalanx, who were less aristocratic and at any rate more monarchical in their views. They wanted a king of Philip's house at once, and thought that for the present this position might be taken by the semi-idiotic Arrhidaeus, a half-brother of Alexander, who had figured in political combinations before the accession of Alexander to the throne. This at all events presented the possibility of keeping the whole fabric together. These discordant views and demands actually led to a disgraceful scuffle over the corpse of Alexander. The generals sent a leading Macedonian, Meleagrus, to negotiate with the phalanx, but he went over to its side. Another bloody conflict seemed to be impending when Eumenes brought about a compromise. As Alexander's minister he had assimilated the idea of unity more than others, and was unable and unwilling to claim anything for himself. The Macedonians, it is true, detested the clever Greek, but they agreed provisionally to his proposal. In accordance with it the wishes of the phalanx were taken into account, and Arrhidaeus was recognized as king under the name of Philip.

Perdiccas received the supreme military and political command as chiliarch. Alexander was supposed to have delivered him his signet-ring on his deathbed, and in so doing entrusted him with the defence of the empire. This arrangement supplied a better guarantee for the unity of the empire than that originally suggested by the generals, for there was now a single person at the head of affairs. The first act of the new chiliarch was to put to death Meleagrus. He then, to secure his own position, endeavoured to satisfy his colleagues.¹ He took the title of protector of the kingdom, by which he vaguely hinted at supreme power, and left the chiliarchy to Seleucus, who received Cassander, the son of Antipater, as his colleague. The other generals were appeased by receiving provinces to administer; in this way they were more independent than before, and yet Perdiccas was less in their way for the moment. Ptolemy asked for and received Egypt. He had shrewdly selected the province which was easiest to defend, and for this reason had warmly commended the division of the provinces to Perdiccas. He was wise enough not to aspire, like most of the others, to the possession of the whole empire or even to that of the greater part of it. Syria was assigned to Laomedon, Cilicia to Philotas, Greater Phrygia to Antigonus, who had been administering it for some time, Hellespontine Phrygia to Leonnatus, Thrace to Lysimachus, and Cappadocia and Paphlagonia to Eumenes, who had become a close adherent of Perdiccas. But Cappadocia was not yet in the possession of the Macedonians; it had to be wrested from its native sovereign Ariarathes. Macedonia with the supervision of Greece was left to Antipater as strategus with Craterus as protector (*prostates*) of the kingdom. The eastern section of the empire remained on the whole under the old governors. The army which Alexander had with him at his death came under the supreme command of Perdiccas. But the Macedonian governors of the various provinces also received military contingents, and to an extent which had not been

tolerated by Alexander. This placed them formally in the position of Persian satraps, but in reality the departure from unity was much greater, for Alexander's generals were Macedonians with Macedonian soldiers under their orders.

This possibility of a division in the command of the Macedonian army was really the first step in the break-up of the empire; to keep it together, it was necessary to begin by subduing the new satraps.

In the meanwhile Roxana, who had put to death the other lawful wife of Alexander, Statira, the daughter of Darius, had given birth to a son, who was now proclaimed king under the name of Alexander and therefore took his place by the side of Philip. That an empire composed of a hundred different elements and ruled over by a man of weak intellect and an infant in arms could not continue to exist, was self-evident. It was not till after these events, apparently, that the funeral ceremony of the great king was celebrated.

The death of Alexander had been interpreted as an encouragement to revolt by one nation only, by the Greeks, and in the East as well as in the West. In the East 20,000 infantry and 300 cavalry, whom Alexander had planted in the territory of the Oxus and the Jaxartes, rose in arms. They marched in a westerly direction, wishing to return home. Perdicas sent Peithon to oppose them, with the order to put them all to the sword. Peithon defeated them, but when he was about to spare their lives, in order to use them for his own personal ends, his Macedonian soldiers, who did not want to lose the booty, fell upon them and slew them.²

The rising of the Greeks in Greece itself was more dangerous. Athens and Aetolia headed the malcontents, the two states which were most affected by the return of the exiles which Alexander had recently ordered and which injured their interests, and at the same time the two which had the strongest love of liberty for opposite reasons, the Aetolians instinctively as semi-barbarians, the Athenians deliberately as the most

civilized of the Greeks, and from memories of their former greatness. Things were not altogether unfavourable for Greece after the death of the great king, and Athens especially had more resources for waging war than in the last few decades. An Athenian of the name of Leosthenes had led a large force of Greek mercenaries from Asia back to Europe, and had taken them provisionally to the promontory of Taenarum, which was a rendezvous for men of this class. He placed himself at the disposal of his native city for the war against Macedonia, and Athens was able to recruit mercenaries, as she possessed a war-fund, though not a large one, in the balance of the money left by Harpalus, the return of which had after all not been demanded. Eight thousand experienced soldiers were consequently enlisted, whom Leosthenes led by way of Aetolia, where he was joined by 7000 more, to Thermopylae to fight against Macedonia. Besides this, the Athenians took up arms themselves and summoned all the Greeks to a combat for liberty. At first many northern Greeks joined their standard. The war, which was not unjustifiably called the Hellenic war, had some prospect of success for the special reason that Antipater possessed a force of only about 15,000 men. He expected aid from Craterus, who, however, was still on the way from Asia (vol. iii. p. 362). Antipater's strength lay solely in his fleet and his abundant money resources. All went well at the start. The Boeotians, who were adherents of the Macedonians, tried to stop the Athenians in their march northwards with 5500 citizens and 2000 mercenaries; but Leosthenes hurried up from Thermopylae, and defeated them at Plataea, and the united army now took up a position at Thermopylae. The small force with which Antipater here opposed the Greeks was defeated—his Thessalian cavalry had gone over to the Greeks either before or after the battle—and Antipater was forced to take refuge in the fortress of Lamia in the valley of the Spercheius. He defended it well, and at first prevented the farther advance of his opponents

northwards. Up to this point the Greeks had achieved signal successes; now, they thought, those who had held aloof from the revolt must be inclined to join it. Athenian envoys tried to persuade the Peloponnesians to take this course, and, supported by the eloquence of the exiled Demosthenes, they obtained a favourable decision. But the good-will was not converted into deeds. On this occasion too, as at the battle of Chaeronea, the Peloponnesians did not put in an appearance; the Macedonian garrison of Acrocorinthus probably seemed to them a formidable obstacle. Leosthenes tried to take Lamia by repeated assaults, but without success, and he himself lost his life in the fighting. The Athenians passed over Phocion, who would have been the most suitable man for the post, and appointed a certain Antiphilus in his place, and they also recalled Demosthenes from banishment. The orator met with a solemn reception on disembarking, and the fine which he still had to pay was remitted in this form, viz. that the expenditure of the amount on the decoration of the altar of Zeus Soter for the festival of the god was officially assigned to him. From this point the war did not proceed with success. First of all Leonnatus came to the rescue of Antipater, who had thought it better to march to Lamia instead of conquering Cappadocia for Eumenes, as Perdiccas had ordered. Leonnatus himself fell in the cavalry attack which the new-comers at once delivered, but Antipater took over his troops, and was now in sufficient strength to venture outside the walls of Lamia and defend Thessaly and Macedonia in the open field. On the arrival of Craterus also in Antipater's camp with his force, the latter outnumbered the enemy and he accepted a battle near Crannon, in which the Thessalian cavalry fighting on the side of the Greeks defeated the Macedonian cavalry, but the Macedonian phalanx repulsed the attack of the Greek (322 B.C.). It was a check, but it might be repaired; in any event there was no reason why the Greeks should lose heart. But they thought it advisable to open

6. Crannon
322 B.C.

negotiations for peace, and when Antipater shrewdly declared that he would not recognize a league of the Greeks but was prepared to treat with the individual states, the league was dissolved and the various contingents returned home. Thessaly became Macedonian, part of it reluctantly and part voluntarily, and the others sued for peace separately. The Athenians did the same. They had in the meanwhile even been scared by a landing at Rhamnus of the Macedonian fleet, which had defeated the Greek fleet off the Echinadae opposite the mouth of the Achelous. Phocion was sent to Antipater as their envoy; the president of the Academy, Xenocrates of Chalcedon, a man held in high esteem by the Macedonians also, took part in a second embassy. The terms demanded by Antipater were hard: the surrender of the leading opponents of Macedonia and the reorganization of the Athenian constitution at his discretion. Athens submitted. The statesmen specified by Antipater took to flight. In September 322 Macedonian troops entered Attica and occupied the fortress of Munychia. The refugees were condemned to death by the Athenians, and Antipater undertook to carry out the sentence. Some, among them Hyperides, were seized in Aegina at the sanctuary of Aeacus and executed in Cleonae. Demosthenes fled to Calauria. Here he was followed by the actor Archias of Thurii as the minion of Antipater. Archias tried to persuade Demosthenes by promises and threats to follow him. Demosthenes taunted him with his useless skill as an actor and took poison, of which he shortly died. Thus a clearance was made of the men who had kept alive the feeling of independence and of hatred of Macedonia among the Athenians, and who, now that Macedonia was no longer fulfilling a mission of civilization as under Philip and Alexander, were pursuing a thoroughly noble and laudable policy. The change in the Athenian constitution prescribed by Antipater was to the effect that henceforth civil rights were to be enjoyed only by Athenians who possessed property to the amount of 20 minae

(2000 drachmae). Some of those who were thus deprived of their political rights (it was called a restoration of the Solonian constitution) emigrated to Thrace. Of her foreign possessions Athens lost Oropus, Imbros and Samos, to which their lawful owners now returned. She was allowed to keep Lemnos. Thus the magnanimous attempt of the Greeks to turn the knowledge of war they had gained in the last few decades to account against Macedonia failed, and that not through military but through political incapacity. Their unity had not outlasted even a single unsuccessful attack. The most energetic and the most eloquent foes of Macedonia had been put out of the way. Antipater had coolly calculated that the death of his most famous opponents would ensure his own security. The conquerors contracted closer ties with one another, Craterus marrying Phila, the daughter of Antipater.³

The Aetolians, who refused to submit, were now to be attacked, but the affairs of Asia and the question of supremacy among the generals themselves absorbed the whole attention of the conquerors. The struggle among the holders of power, which had only been deferred, now broke out. Perdikkas wanted to emphasize the unity of the empire, of which he was the representative, more than the other generals liked, and he thus came into conflict with the two most powerful of them, who had installed themselves as independent rulers in the provinces assigned to them, and were not disposed to concede more than a nominal authority to the administrator of the empire. These were Antigonos of Phrygia and Ptolemy of Egypt. The former refused to furnish Eumenes with troops for the conquest of Cappadocia. Eumenes now drew still closer to Perdikkas than before, and communicated to him some ambitious plans of Leonnatus which the latter had confided to Eumenes. Leonnatus, it appeared, had not proceeded to Europe simply because Antipater had appealed to him for aid, but for the special reason that the sister of Alexander the Great, Cleopatra, the widow of Alexander of Epirus, who

wished to play a part in politics, had secretly besought him to marry her. These were the plans which Leonnatus revealed in confidence to Eumenes, evidently to excuse himself for not having assisted him in the conquest of Cappadocia. Eumenes, instead of helping Leonnatus either directly or indirectly, had forthwith made his escape to Perdiccas with a handful of soldiers and a large sum of money, rightly assuming that it would be of great importance for Perdiccas to know the designs of Cleopatra and Leonnatus. The husband of Cleopatra might of course become a highly influential person. As a matter of fact Perdiccas was very grateful to Eumenes for this service and consulted him henceforward on all matters. They subdued Ariarathes, the aged ruler of Cappadocia, together, and then Eumenes remained for the present with Perdiccas in Cilicia, in the year 322 B.C. When Leonnatus met with his death, Perdiccas summoned Antigonus to appear before the court of the Macedonians, *i.e.* the army commanded by Perdiccas, to answer for his contumacy, and, in order to secure his route to Phrygia, he took possession of the cities of Laranda and Isaura, which had hitherto remained independent. He then engaged in enterprises of a more complicated kind, which introduced a fresh element of disunion among the Macedonians.

Hitherto the generals had been the sole masters of the situation, always at variance no doubt, but not receiving impulses from any other quarter. The royal family now reappeared on the scene. It would indeed have been surprising if it had continued to remain inactive. Cleopatra's invitation to Leonnatus to marry her was a first step in this direction. This attempt was evidently prompted by Olympias. After the death of Leonnatus the old queen appeared openly on the political stage. She offered Cleopatra's hand to Perdiccas. It happened that Perdiccas had just married Nicaea, Antipater's daughter, but this was of course no bar to the acceptance of Olympias' proposal, which could not help appearing advantageous to him in every respect. But before he could proceed

to the realization of the plan, there was another obstacle to be overcome. Olympias and Cleopatra were not the only ambitious women of the royal house. Cynane, Philip's daughter, the widow of her cousin Amyntas, who might have laid claim to the Macedonian throne in 359 after the death of his father Perdiccas, wished to make her daughter, the extremely enterprising Eurydice, queen by marrying her to Philip Arrhidaeus. In that event her own daughter would be more than the daughter of Olympias, even if the latter married Perdiccas. Perdiccas of course would not consent to this alliance, for if the semi-idiotic king married an energetic wife he might become dangerous. Consequently when Cynane brought Eurydice with troops through Thrace to Asia, Perdiccas instigated his brother Alcetas to attack her, and Cynane was cut to pieces. But his success ended there; his soldiers compelled him to consent to the marriage of Eurydice with the king. This made him cling all the more firmly to his own matrimonial plans, and he betrothed himself to Cleopatra, who was living in Sardes. The daughter of Antipater was sent to her own home.

These events increased and intensified the antagonism among the Macedonians. The quarrels of the generals were reinforced by the quarrel in the royal house, and if the former subsided for a time, the latter would be sure to revive them. In the royal family Olympias and Eurydice, representatives of two different lines, confronted each other as bitter adversaries; among the generals Perdiccas was the opponent of all the others, with the exception of Eumenes. Perdiccas now made an alliance with Olympias, while Eurydice became the wife of Arrhidaeus. This at first strengthened the position of Perdiccas, who had put Cynane forcibly out of the way, to such an extent that Antigonus gave up the contest for the moment and fled to Antipater, the opponent of Olympias. The effect of this again was that Perdiccas grew more confident, and came to the conclusion that as he had disposed of one of

his adversaries, he would be able to overcome the other. The satrap of Egypt—this was the title given to Ptolemy—had become so powerful that he had actually conquered Cyrene (see chap. v.). This was all the more reason for humbling him. But what pretext could be found for making war on him? The prudent Ptolemy had given less cause for complaint than Antigonus. Perdicas invented a grievance, which would have done little credit to his sagacity, if he had not been determined to attack and destroy Ptolemy at all hazards. It had been decided, amid general approval, to inter the remains of Alexander in the oasis of Zeus Ammon belonging to the satrapy of Ptolemy, and the latter had managed after long delay to get the decision so far carried out that the body was brought to Egypt. It had been conveyed there in solemn procession. Perdicas now asserted that Ptolemy had in so doing obtained an undue advantage over all his colleagues, for the country in which the remains of the great king reposed would together with its ruler take a higher position in general estimation than all the other countries and generals. He pretended to believe that the army would share this view, but discovered other grievances of a similar nature. He formally accused him before the army, probably thinking that Ptolemy would not put in an appearance and so place himself in an awkward position. Ptolemy came however and defended himself, and the army acquitted him. Thereupon Perdicas thought in his folly that he could conquer Egypt with this same army, and he marched to the Nile, leaving the defence of Asia Minor against his other foes to Eumenes.³ This led to a crisis which had a singular result. The writer Eumenes accomplished his task with brilliant success, and the general Perdicas achieved nothing, and was finally murdered by his own people.⁴

Eumenes was attacked from the west by Antipater and Craterus, from the east by Neoptolemus, the satrap of Armenia. Eumenes first defeated the latter, who then fled to the other

two. They divided their forces, Antipater going to Cilicia and Craterus advancing with Neoptolemus to meet Eumenes. The idea was that Craterus would be able to dispose of the Cardian, who was hated and despised by the Macedonians, without Antipater. And beyond a doubt the Macedonian troops of Eumenes, if they had known that the general favourite Craterus was opposing them, would have simply left their commander in the lurch. For this reason Eumenes concealed from them whom they were going to fight against. In the decisive battle the cavalry of Eumenes was victorious; the Macedonian phalanx of his opponents was not broken, but both Neoptolemus and Craterus were killed, and thus Eumenes won the day. The phalanx, which felt insecure without leaders, went over to Perdikkas, who was represented by Eumenes, and swore obedience to him. But their object in taking this oath was only to extricate themselves from a difficulty; as soon as the danger was past they left their camp and marched after Antipater. The Greek saw the fate which awaited him at the hands of the Macedonians if he was not always successful.

The result, however, was quite different in Egypt, where Perdikkas fought his battles himself. Ptolemy defended the line of the Nile with the greatest prudence and valour, while Perdikkas thoughtlessly and obstinately exhausted the strength of his troops in useless attacks, and in the end was murdered by his own officers, among them even Seleucus. The Macedonian army submitted to Ptolemy and would have liked to make him regent of the empire. But he declined the dangerous office, which was undertaken on his recommendation by Peithon of Media and the general Arrhidaeus—two regents instead of one! The regency had become a mere form. Thus the victories of Eumenes had been in vain. Without the protection of a Macedonian the Cardian counted for nothing. He and some other friends of Perdikkas were condemned to death in their absence (321). After some disturbances, promoted mostly by Eurydice, the aged Antipater was appointed regent

in the place of Peithon and Arrhidaeus in Syria, to which country Antipater and Antigonus also proceeded. Although Antipater was the enemy of her enemy, the restless Eurydice, who thus showed that she had more taste than aptitude for high politics, very nearly overthrew him. But he held his own with the aid of Antigonus and was confirmed in his new office by the phalanx.

A fresh division of the dignities and governorships of the empire was now taken in hand in Triparadisus (320 B.C.). The most pregnant in consequences of the decisions arrived at there, although not much noticed at the time, was that Babylon was assigned to Seleucus. Antigonus was made commander-in-chief, Cassander remained chiliarch, Antigones, the commander of the body-guard of the Argyraspidae, received Susiana, Nicanor Cappadocia, Peithon the military command of the eastern provinces in addition to his satrapy of Media. Consequently there was now, besides the governors of the different provinces and the superintendent of the whole empire, a commander-in-chief, a chiliarch, a general in the eastern provinces and a commander of the guard, all of whom, however, except the chiliarch, had provinces of their own. This was an admirable source of disputes, for what rights had the generals as against the satraps, and the chiliarch as against the generals? No one could say, and arms alone could decide. Antipater did not contribute much to swell the confusion. His own inclination and the experiences of Perdiccas prescribed his line of conduct. If Perdiccas had been too active a regent, the aged Antipater was the contrary. He fulfilled in every respect the expectations which had been formed of him when he was appointed regent; he did nothing for Asia and interested himself only in Macedonia and Greece. He knew that the empire had still less chance of enduring without than with Alexander.

One man there was who tried to preserve the empire, and that was Eumenes.⁵ He stood outside the system created by the generals. He was condemned to death, but not yet van-

quished and not so very easy to vanquish. If all the followers of Perdiccas had submitted to him, he would have won the day, for he proved himself the most adroit of Alexander's successors. But no one gave him any serious support, and so he was bound to fall in the end. It was always a matter of great difficulty for him to enlist Macedonian soldiers against Macedonian generals; he was betrayed by them on several occasions and finally succumbed to their treachery. He first of all held his ground in Asia Minor, until Antigonus advanced with an army. The latter bribed Apollonides, one of the cavalry leaders of Eumenes, and in the battle he went over to the side of Antigonus, who thus obtained a complete victory (320). Eumenes tried to escape to Armenia, but was cut off and threw himself into the impregnable rock-fortress of Nora on the borders of Lycaonia and Cappadocia. Antigonus opened negotiations with him, but no understanding was arrived at. Eumenes would have preferred to join Antipater, and with this object sent Hieronymus of Cardia to Europe. In the meanwhile, however, matters became more settled in Asia, Antigonus taking Pisidia and Ptolemy Syria. Apart therefore from the destruction of Eumenes, which was still unaccomplished, there was some semblance of order both in Asia and Europe, when the death of Antipater in 319 gave rise to fresh complications.⁶

Antipater had appointed as his successor not his son, the chiliarch Cassander, but an old comrade-in-arms from the western Macedonian frontier province of Tymphaea, named Polysperchon or Polyperchon. This of course involved the further decline of the so-called central power. Antipater might have achieved something if he had only been willing to do so, for he commanded the respect of all the Macedonians. But Polysperchon had no prestige whatever outside Macedonia and not much in it, and Antipater must have known that this was the case. Cassander of course did not sit down quietly under the slight; he fled to Antigonus, in order to oppose

Polysperchon from the side of Asia. Thus a new apple of discord was thrown among the military commanders and the Macedonians generally. Polysperchon looked around him for support, and found it in several quarters. He began by appealing to the Greeks. They had so long been badly treated by Alexander's successors that they could afford to be grateful for better treatment, even if it only took the form of promises. Polysperchon declared to them in the name of King Philip that they might henceforth enjoy the constitutions which they had possessed in the time of Alexander; the exiles were to be allowed to return, and Samos was to be restored to the Athenians. He thus made a present of something to everybody; whether the different items fitted in to each other, was of course a matter of indifference to him. As Cassander maintained the oligarchic constitutions, this manifesto meant an appeal to the democracy, and we shall shortly see what the effect of it was. The second support which he selected was Olympias, who was living in Epirus. Polysperchon therefore tried to walk in the ways of Perdiccas. Olympias had always been on bad terms with Antipater; consequently she must be well disposed towards the opponent of Cassander. And this turned out to be really the case. But the two supports were not of much use to him in the long run. The Greeks were too shrewd to believe that he was more friendly to them than any other Macedonian. Olympias too was of doubtful assistance, because she had no material force, and because Polysperchon flew in the face of Eurydice if he dragged Olympias out of oblivion. How any one could rule in the name of the consort of Eurydice, the only one of the two kings who could be represented as in his right senses, and at the same time be guided by the wishes of Olympias, was difficult to imagine, and we shall see in fact that the experiment was not a successful one. For the moment, however, the intervention of Olympias produced a change in a quarter to which the material power of Polysperchon did not extend

—in Asia. Olympias helped him to come to an understanding with Eumenes. They gave the brave man the choice of assisting Polysperchon in Europe or defending the rights of kings Philip and Alexander in Asia in the place of Antigonus. At the same time the command of the Argyrasidae and the disposal of the royal treasure, which was still in the mountain-stronghold Cyinda in Cilicia, were entrusted to him. This was a turn of the wheel for the Cardian. By it he secured what he had hoped to accomplish by his embassy to Antipater. Whether he received these communications in Nora is unknown to us. At all events while he was there he received fresh proposals from Antigonus through his friend Hieronymus, from which he learned that many things had changed to his advantage since the death of Antipater. He accepted the proposals with modifications, which enabled him to leave Nora, but then declared that he would defend the rights of the kings in Asia, and he actually received the homage of the Argyrasidae, on whom the alliance of Olympias and Polysperchon must have made a great impression. The next step, however, was to keep a tight hold on fortune, and to secure the very dubious loyalty of the guards for a permanence. This he set about with great cunning. He told the officers that Alexander had appeared to him in a dream and had expressed the wish to continue to command his army. It would therefore be advisable to make a tent and set up a golden throne in it with the insignia of the royal dignity. They would have to go inside this tent every morning, burn incense to Alexander and then adopt decisions under the influence of his spirit. The proposal was accepted and actually carried out for a time. The army began to appreciate the ability of Eumenes more and more, and at the outset obeyed the affable, unselfish and prudent general. He collected a considerable force. Antigonus tried to make his soldiers revolt from him, but he stepped into their midst and declared that his life was in their hands but that he had

no fear of them. This produced an effect; they remained loyal to him for the present (318).

In the meanwhile strange proceedings had been taking place in Europe. Polysperchon's proclamation had produced acute disturbances in Athens. The aristocratic government, with Phocion at its head, relied on the Cassandrian garrison of Munychia commanded by Nicanor; but there were no foreign soldiers in Athens, and so the democratic feeling aroused by Polysperchon could find free vent, especially when his son Alexander drew near to Athens. Phocion got into a still worse predicament by Nicanor occupying the Piraeus as well, which Phocion, as was supposed, ought to have prevented. He was removed from the office of strategus. He now went to Alexander, and the latter sent him to his father, who was at Pharygae, near Thermopylae. An embassy from the democratic party in Athens came there too, and between it and Phocion a dialogue ensued in the presence of King Philip and Polysperchon, which ended in the regent sending Phocion and his friends in fetters to Athens to stand their trial. The people condemned the aged general to death and he drank the poison-cup (318). The execution of this man, who had passed his life in loyal service of the city and was upwards of eighty years of age, is one of the darkest stains on the fair fame of Athens. Besides this, the deed was of no use to its authors, for Cassander did not give up Athens for lost. He came to Attica, and prevented Polysperchon from taking the harbours of Athens. The latter thought he might achieve more success in the Peloponnese, but here his efforts were frustrated by the oligarchic government of Megalopolis, and in addition to this his fleet was defeated off Byzantium by that of Antigonus and Cassander under the command of Nicanor. Polysperchon was glad to be able to hold his own in western Macedonia. The result was that Athens submitted once more to Cassander, who put to death Nicanor, who seemed to him a dangerous individual, and withdrew to Macedonia. He left,

however, the Peripatetic philosopher, Demetrius of Phalerum, as his representative in Athens (317), who governed the city for the space of ten years as an enlightened man of the world, looking after his own material welfare and that of the city as well, and promoting the interests of his master. We shall return to him before long.⁷

The royal house, which had no men who might have waged war on each other, now collapsed entirely in Europe owing to the passionate jealousy of its women, while the last champion of its claims succumbed in Asia, both events happening about the same time. Olympias and Eurydice played much the same parts as Fredegunde and Brunhild, whom they somewhat resembled in character. Eurydice naturally resented Polysperchon's understanding with Olympias; she also considered him an incompetent man, incapable of achieving anything—which was probably true—and she joined Cassander, who had proved his ability in Athens. She thought she held another trump-card in her hand which would win her the game. She made Philip appoint Cassander regent. This was the third way of creating a regent. Perdiccas and Antipater had been appointed by the army, Polysperchon by Antipater and now Cassander by the weak-minded king and his wife. Cassander accepted his promotion readily, but did not assist Eurydice in consequence. Eurydice had evidently disgusted all by her incessant machinations, Cassander himself as much as any one. Formerly she had intrigued against Antipater and then accepted aid from Polysperchon, the enemy of Cassander. If she now had recourse to Cassander she was just as likely to desert him again, and Cassander did not consider himself under any obligation to her. The upshot was that her end soon came. As long as Cassander remained in Macedonia, she was safe, but when he marched once more into Greece, where he restored Thebes and was generally supreme in the east, while the semi-Epirote Polysperchon had his adherents in the west, her fate overtook her. Olympias came to Mace-

donia from Epirus, and Eurydice advanced to meet her with an army. But no loyal Macedonian would fight against the mother of Alexander, although she was an Epirote, in obedience to the commands of a mere woman. The soldiers went over to Olympias. She put Philip and Eurydice to the torture and had Philip shot with arrows. Eurydice was allowed to hang herself. Olympias cherished a special detestation of Cassander and his family, which had always been hostile to her; she even believed that her son, the great king, had been poisoned by Iollas, Cassander's brother. Now, she thought, the moment had arrived to take vengeance on the whole hated race. She put to death Cassander's brother Nicanor and hundreds of Cassander's friends. But when Cassander returned to Macedonia her power was at an end. He besieged her in Pydna. The provisions ran out; the ship on board of which she intended to take flight was removed by Cassander's orders, and she had to surrender (316). A promise had been made to spare her life; but at Cassander's instigation the relatives of his adherents who had been murdered by the aged queen compassed her destruction. They impeached her and the army condemned her to death. But no soldier would kill the mother of Alexander. Her accusers undertook the office, and stoned her to death. Roxana, who had recently become a devoted adherent of Olympias, as well as the young Alexander, were kept in close arrest for a time. Cassander now married Thessalonice, a daughter of Philip, and thereby acquired a claim to the throne of Macedonia himself.

About the same time that the mother of Alexander the Great was killed in Europe, his faithful minister perished in Asia. For a time he had held his ground by undertaking the defence of satraps. Peithon was using his position as strategus of the East to turn out the satraps, and Eumenes took this opportunity to intervene on their behalf. It was a strange reversal of positions, the representative of the central executive

protecting the authority of the satraps, but there was sound logic in it. The object was to prevent the empire from being broken up, and it was not the satraps but the generals who wished to partition it. Eumenes collected a considerable army, in which Peucestas, the friend of Alexander, held the most important position. Antigonos marched against it in concert with Seleucus. Severe engagements took place; the scene of action shifted from Susiana to Persis. Eumenes was generally victorious; but on one occasion when the troops of Antigonos plundered his camp, and the Argyraspidae lost the whole of their valuable baggage, the latter intimated that they were ready to surrender their general if their property was returned to them. This was done, and Peucestas also went over to the enemy. Eumenes was murdered by order of Antigonos (316). Thus the aristocratic Macedonians were at last rid of the low-born writer from Cardia, who had put them to shame by his superior ability, and they could continue their favourite occupation of mutual destruction with exclusively Macedonian resources. First of all the traitors disappeared from the scene, as was right and proper, Peucestas without leaving a trace behind him, and the Argyraspidae by the disbandment of the corps—Praetorians, Janissaries and Mamelukes were also put out of the way as soon as they became too powerful. Then came the turn of the allies. Antigonos would tolerate no rivals. Peithon was accused of plotting treason, condemned and executed. Seleucus fled, in order to escape the same fate.⁸

With the death of Eumenes the last attempt to keep Alexander's empire together for the benefit of his natural heirs came to nought. The state of things prevailing in the family of the great king made it besides a hopeless undertaking. That the little Alexander would soon be murdered was a matter of course, and an empty throne with a sceptre on it could not fill the place of a live king. But it had not yet been proved that what would have been beyond the reach of

Eumenes the Greek, even if he had aimed at it, viz. to be sole successor of Alexander in his own name, could not be accomplished by a Macedonian. Antigonus thought that he could attain this object. He took the first steps on this path when he removed Peucestas, Peithon and Seleucus. By this time the ambition which animated the satrap of Phrygia, now commander-in-chief in Asia, must have been clear to all the other generals, and it was natural that they should protect themselves against it by all the means in their power. The further aspiring enterprises of Antigonus, his death and the concluding history of the surviving Diadochi will occupy us in the next chapter.

NOTES

AUTHORITIES for chaps. i.-v., i.e. for 323 to about 280 B.C. The only connected narrative of the history of this period, as well as of the others treated by me in this volume, is that of JUSTINUS, who in bk. 13 goes from 323-321, in bk. 14 down to 316, in bk. 15 to 301, in bk. 16 to 285, in bk. 17 to 280; bks. 18-22 deal with the West. Narratives are found in the *prologi* of the corresponding books of Trogus. The object of Justinus was to narrate thrilling events in grand language; the correctness of his extracts was of no importance to him. Droysen is often moved to anger by him. A pleasant feature in him is that he relates legends of kings (Lysimachus, Seleucus) as well as of cities (Cyrene). Trogus (for whom cf. of older treatises that by Heeren, printed in Frotscher's Justinus, Bd. 1) has, as von Gutschmid, Rhein. Mus. 37, 1882, conjectures, made special use of Timagenes, a contemporary of Augustus, for whom cf. now Wachsmuth in the Rh. Mus. 46, 1891. Timagenes wrote about the kings in general, no doubt arranging them ethnographically; besides him Trogus used Ephorus, Theopompus, Timaeus, Phylarchus, Polybius and Posidonius; the plan of a universal history may be his own. He had an eye for what was important in general history, and took due notice of barbarous peoples. See Schanz, Gesch. der röm. Litt., Munich, 1892, §§ 328-330, whose remark directed against Wachsmuth, that Trogus must have simply worked up a Greek original which contained the idea of a universal history because he is a mere compiler as a zoologist, is not to the point, for this reason that a man may perfectly well be an independent historian and at the same time a mere copyist in

natural history. Universal geniuses are rare.—DIODORUS goes down to 318 in bk. 18, to 311 in bk. 19, to 301 in bk. 20. Only fragments remain of the rest; bk. 21 went down to 283. His authorities are those of Plutarch, especially Hieronymus and Duris. See also below, chaps. ix. and xv.—Of PLUTARCH the biographies of Eumenes, Demetrius and Pyrrius belong to this period, besides a good deal in the Moralia. For the former cf. among others A. Schubert, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Lebensb. des Eum.*, Dem. und P., Leipzig, 1878, *Jahrb. f. class. Phil. Suppl.* X. As a "practical writer and man of refined feeling" (v. Wilamowitz, *Antig. v. Karystos*, 210) Plutarch did not copy his authorities word for word (see above). Of CORNELIUS NEPOS the Eumenes belongs to this period; cf. the edition by Nipperdey-Lupus. Arrian and Memnon have come down to us in extracts, in Photius. ARRIAN wrote ten books τῶν μετ' Ἀλέξανδρον; Phot. cod. 92, printed in Didot's Arrian. The work went down to the return of Antipater to Europe (320). Reitzenstein has published a fragment of it, from a palimpsest in the Vatican, in the *Berl. Phil. Abhandl.* III.; cf. Koehler, *Sitzungsber. Berl. Ak.* 1890, p. 557, and 1891, p. 267.—MEMNON of Heraclea, who probably lived at the beginning of the second century A.D., wrote a history of Heraclea. Phot. cod. 226 has an extract from bks. 9-16, 363-46 B.C., valuable among other things for the history of Lysimachus and the Galli; Müller, *Fr. H. Gr.* 3, 525-585.—In Phot. cod. 82 we have a fragment of the τῶν μετ' Ἀλέξανδρον of DEXIPPUS (third century A.D.); Müller, 3, 667 seq.; cf. *Dr.* 2, 1, 46. Dexippus depends entirely on Arrian.

The above-mentioned writers drew from the following sources which were contemporary with the events. HIERONYMUS of Cardia, according to Diod. 18, 42 ὁ τὰς τῶν Διαδόχων ἱστορίας γεγραφώς and according to Dion. Hal. 1, 16, composer of a *πραγματεία περὶ τῶν ἐπιγόνων*; cf. Susemihl, *Gesch. der griech. Litt.* 1, 560 to 563 and 570; Müller, 2, 450 seq. Hieronymus was a countryman of Eumenes; he was in his service, and after his death in that of Antigonus, Poliorectes and Gonatas. His work certainly went down to 272. His impartiality, which is questioned by Paus. 1, 9, 8, is now generally recognized.—DURIS of Samos, said to be a descendant of Alcibiades, born about 340, tyrant of Samos for a time, wrote among other things *ἱστορίαι* in twenty-three books, which extended from 370 down to 280 at least. Cf. Susemihl, 1, 585-592, to whose references must be added the treatises of Schubert, über die Quellen Plutarchs (see above) and über Agathokles (see below, chap. vii.), Müller, 2, 466 seq.—Somewhat less connected with events was AGATHARCHIDES of Cnidus, a good geographer, who also treated the Diadochi in historical works:

Sus. 1, 685-692, Müll. 3, 190-197.—For Athens the Ἀθῆναις of the *μάρτυς* Philochorus, put to death by Gonatas, was of importance, Sus. 1, 594, 599, as also the *ψηφισμάτων συναγωγή* of Craterus, a half-brother of Gonatas, Sus. 1, 599-602; of other special histories that of the Byzantine DEMETRIUS (about the Galatae) and that of NYMPHIS of Heraclea about this city and the Diadochi; see for both Sus. 1, 620.—For all questions relating to the study of authorities cf. C. Wachsmuth, *Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte*, Leipz. 1895, who gives, for instance, a searching criticism of Diodorus.

The accounts of distinguished literary figures of the Greek nation compiled by Diogenes Laertius are of importance; for his work cf. v. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, Berl. 1881. The whole history of the literature of this time is treated with great thoroughness by Susemihl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, 2 Bde. Leipz. 1891, 1892.

Of the INSCRIPTIONS, some of which have been published in the well-known collections and others in periodicals, a selection is given in Hicks' *Manual* and Dittenberger's *Sylloge*. Since then we have had the results of excavations, in Pergamum for instance (*Inscripfen von P.*, published by M. Fränkel, I. Berl. 1890, with an excellent commentary), and of journeys of exploration, such as have been undertaken especially in Asia Minor; cf. chap. v. note 9. Of these Sterrett, *An Epigraphical Journey in Asia Minor*, Boston, 1888, and The Wolfe Expedition to Asia Minor, Boston, 1888, produced a rich harvest. Paton and Hicks' book, *Inscriptions of Cos*, Oxford, 1891, is a valuable attempt at direct combination of epigraphy and history.

I shall frequently revert to the subject of COINS in this volume. Of numismatic works may be here mentioned: the recently published catalogues of the great collections of the British Museum, of the Berlin Cabinet, and the admirable 1st vol. of the Paris Cabinet; E. Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, Paris, 1890; the works of L. Müller on the coins of Alexander and of Lysimachus (Copenhagen, 1858); the writings of Imhoof and Six, of Th. Reinach and Babelon, the papers of other scholars in various periodicals and Head's *Historia Numorum*, Oxford, 1887.

The journeys undertaken by scholars, to which we have just referred in speaking of the inscriptions, have furnished valuable contributions to the knowledge of the period with which we are dealing. An instructive commentary on the discoveries made from 1883-1890 in the department of Greek antiquities is given by Sal. Reinach, *Chroniques d'Orient*, Paris, 1891.

Of recent narratives of the period under consideration the most

important is DROYSEN's admirable *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, Bd. 2, *Diadochi*, Bd. 3, *Epigoni*, Gotha, 1878. Droysen only goes as far as 220, but he intended to go into the first century B.C., cf. e.g. vol. 3, 1, 419, note 1. I shall refer to his excellent method in the notes to chap. ix.; I may remark here that the plan which he adopted of writing the history of the sovereigns has not enabled him to accomplish a real history of the Greek world such as I am attempting, a work for the composition of which he of all men was peculiarly fitted. In conformity with his plan he has lingered lovingly on the aims of insignificant or contemptible individuals, if they happened to influence politics, and has hardly referred to important intellectual movements, the bearing of which he thoroughly appreciated (cf. 3, 1, 335, and chap. x. of this volume, note 4), as for instance that which gave rise to the Stoa. This preference for reigning potentates and their servants is due to the fact that, as we shall see farther on (chap. ii. note 8), he has not taken a just view of the people of one of the most important republics, the Athenian people. We found the same lack of justice (vol. iii. of this work) in many historians as regards the Athenians of the fourth century, and thus the unfavourable view of the republican contemporaries of the *Diadochi* and *Epigoni*, which has been dominant since Droysen's time, is all the more easily accounted for. Starting from this point of view, Droysen still considered the monarchs, even in the period subsequent to Alexander, as the most important element in history, and devoted the whole of his attention to the unravelling of their intrigues, and all his skill to the narration of these matters. The importance of Alexander misled him as to that of his successors. This being the case, the loftier intellectual currents, which he perfectly appreciated, were bound to take a second place in his narrative. Perhaps a correct perception that the continuation of his work on the same lines, *i.e.* as a history of the reigning monarchs, would have become more and more unsatisfactory owing to the increasing moral worthlessness and political insignificance of his heroes, may have led him to break off where he did, in spite of his marked preference for the history of politics. See a remarkable passage of his quoted below in note 4 to chap. x. A historian who follows Droysen in making the history of Greece after Alexander identical with the history of the sovereigns can hardly go beyond the year 220. From that time onwards the history of politics and warfare on Greek soil has another hero—Rome. Mommsen is the continuation of Droysen. On the other hand, those who agree with me in holding that even after the year 323 the real subject of the history of Greece is the Greek people, *i.e.* the civilized Greeks from Massalia to the

distant East, will admit that my attempt to trace the history of this race, the political organization of which is the same in all countries, up to its absorption in the Roman Empire, is justifiable, and will pass an indulgent verdict if the attempt, which is made for the first time, turns out to be very defective. The history of civilization, which is passed over by Droysen, is given in the interesting work by MAHAFFY, *Greek Life and Thought*, London, 1887, which extends from 323-146 B.C. Cf. his *Alexander's Empire*, London, 1887; and *The Empire of the Ptolemies*, London, 1895, an admirable book.—DURUY, *Histoire des Grecs*, vol. 3.—SPIEGEL, *Eran. Alterthumskunde*, III, Leipz. 1878, and Bened. NIESE, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten*, I, Gotha, 1893, pp. 190-416.—For Clinton's and Hertzberg's works see below, chap. ix.—SCHWARZ is clever, *Die Demokratie*, Bd. I, Leipz. 1882; PÖHLMANN in I. Müller's *Handbook*, vol. 3, brief and full of matter.—For all the contents of this volume the articles in the new edition of Pauly's R. E. by Wissowa should be consulted, such as Antigonos, Antiochus, Antipater, Appianus, Aratus, Areus, Aristion, Arrianus, etc.

Of recent maps the most important are those of KIEPERT, especially his *Spezialkarte vom westlichen Kleinasien*, Berl. 1891, containing 15 maps, as well as his maps for works of travel, e.g. for those of Sterrett, *Epigraph. Journey* (map of Cappadocia), Wolfe Expedition (Pamphylia, Pisidia, Lycaonia).—An important work is Imhoof-Blumer's *Porträtköpfe auf ant. Münzen hellen. und hellenisirter Völker*, Leipz. 1885.

1. The young Alexander was also called Aigos, in consequence of an error of Petavius; cf. Droysen, 2, 1, 13.—Great designs of Alexander in war, religion and civilization communicated to the army by Perdicas from his *ὑπομνήματα*, and not approved by it, Diod. 18, 4.—Aristotle tried to influence Alexander's political measures shortly before the death of the great king, as Nissen, *Die Staatsschriften des Aristoteles* (Rhein. Mus. 1892, pp. 161-206), is at pains to show by the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία*, which was published at the beginning of 323. Aristotle is supposed to have wished Alexander to make the Greek *polis* the basis of a great free state.—DISTRIBUTION of the OFFICES and PROVINCES: Droysen, 2, 1, 13 seq. and 23 seq., Aem. Reiche, *De rebus post Al. mortem Babyl. gestis* I. Regim. 1887, and especially Szanto, *Die Ueberlieferung der Satrapienvertheil. nach Al. Tode*, Arch.-epigr. Mitth. aus Oesterreich, 15, 1. In spite of the six accounts which we have of this matter, by Diodorus, Justinus, Curtius, Arrian, Dexippus and Orosius, there is much that requires explanation, e.g. the title of 'regent of the empire' given to Perdicas.

Droysen (2, 1, 23) conjectures that he was appointed *ἐπιμελητῆς αὐτοκράτωρ*, the title given to his successor Antipater in Diod. 18, 39. Diodorus (18, 2) calls him *ἐπιμ. τῆς βασιλείας* while Dexippus attributes the *κηδεμονία* and *προστασία τῆς βασιλείας* to Craterus. By way of explanation of this expression I may point out that in Polyb. 5, 63 Agathocles and Sosibius, who rule Egypt for the minor Ptolemy IV., are styled *οἱ τότε προσετώτες τῆς βασιλείας*. In Diod. 18, 3 *ἡ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονία* is ascribed to Perdiccas, a very vague expression. The upshot of all this seems to be that not only the title but also the functions of Perdiccas were left quite undefined. And that was in keeping with the circumstances. Even the real kings proved their power by deeds as much as they could and were allowed to do, and their representatives acted in the same way. But in this case there were two special reasons for the vagueness. In the first place it was difficult to define the rights of the competing authorities, as it was a creation of an entirely new system, which was to come into force at once. And in the second place none of the parties concerned was anxious to have everything clearly settled, either as regards rights or titles. It was a truce, which each intended to break as soon as possible to the detriment of the others. For this reason the most important points were left in obscurity, and disputes might arise as to who was the real commander of the Macedonian army, the *ἐπιμελητῆς* or the others as well. As the Macedonian army was the real depositary of sovereignty, every commander, *epimeletes*, *strategus* or *satrap* was only *de facto* or *de jure* master to the extent that he had the army on his side. The state of things resembled that prevailing among the Germani during the migration of peoples.

The position of Antigonus was extremely important because he ruled the province in which the two routes into the interior of Asia diverged (see below, chap. iv.), and thus controlled the communications between Asia and Macedonia. Philip Arrhidaeus was to have married the daughter of Pixodarus of Caria, then Alexander wanted to marry her; eventually she married a Persian, Dr. 1, 1, 96.

For the distribution of offices, etc., see Niese, 1, 195-199. For the foundation of colonies and building of temples contemplated by Alexander but now abandoned, *ibid.* 198.

2. Revolt of the Greeks in Bactria, Droysen, 2, 1, 42; Niese, 1, 199, 200.

3. THE LAMIAN WAR, Dr. 2, 1, 49 seq.; Krafft, in Pauly's R. E. 4, 742-747; Schaefer, *Der lamische Krieg*, Giessen, 1886. See also Hermann's *Staatsalt.* § 134 of the edition by Thumser; and Schaefer, *Dem.* 3, 351-397.—The dignified decree of the Athenians,

the significance of which Droysen also recognizes, Diod. 18, 10. Cf. too C. I. Att. II, 184.—Leosthenes was an Athenian, Diod. 18, 9. Formerly he was held to be identical with the orator and general Leosthenes, who fled to Macedonia in 361 (Sch. Dem. 1, 133), but this view is now abandoned, and the identity of the two men is also somewhat improbable for this reason that the general of the year 361 must have been too old for the part played by the commander in the Lamian War; cf. Sch. D. 3, 355. True, Phocion was also an old man, born about 400 B.C., and yet he might have been the successor of Leosthenes. So it is possible after all that the general of the year 361 may have been Leosthenes.—The Epitaphios of Hyperides in honour of Leosthenes and his comrades, Sch. D. 3, 375 seq.—Death of DEMOSTHENES, Sch. D. 3, 394. He died on the 16th of Pyanepsion, Ol. 114, 3 (12th October, 322). During his long political career Demosthenes, by the stubbornness with which he opposed Philip, did much to obtain for Athens and the Greeks who followed her lead the respect of contemporaries and of posterity, and in this way he even then deserved well of his country, although he also injured it by many isolated disreputable transactions. His last opposition to Macedonia, however, is in every respect worthy of praise. For the war against Antipater, who was really aiming at what Demosthenes unjustly ascribed to Philip, the enslavement of Athens, was just, meritorious and even not without hope of success, and with his efforts in connection with this war Demosthenes brought his career to a worthy termination. The individual actions of great agitators like O'Connell, Gladstone and Demosthenes are not always free from blame, and when this is the case we have a right to censure them—a right of which the contemporaries of all three have largely availed themselves; but a man who, like Demosthenes, closes his career by risking his life in a way consistent with all his antecedents, must be commended for having sacrificed himself to a lofty ideal.

4. Final achievements and adventures of Perdikkas, Dr. 2, 1, 89-139. Capture of Laranda and Isaura, Diod. 18, 22; for their position see Kiepert's map for Sterrett's Wolfe Expedition, Boston, 1888. See also Niese, 1, 212-223. That Ptolemy submitted to the decision of the army is told us by Arr. Succ. Al. 28. Interment of Alexander, Niese, 1, 217. The remains were brought to Memphis instead of the oasis of Ammon, and afterwards to Alexandria.—Arrangements in TRIPARADISUS, Diod. 18, 39. Cf. the treatise of Szanto cited in note 1, according to whom all the Asiatic provinces now recovered their character of satrapies.

5. EUMENES, Niese, 1, 225-230. The position of Nora (according to Strabo afterwards Neroassos) is not yet agreed upon. According

to Hamilton, and Sterrett, *Epigraphical Journey*, Boston, 1888, p. 232, it was the higher peak of Zengibar Kalessi, south-west of the Argæus mountain, near Nazianz. Ramsay thinks it must be farther west, As. Min. 308, relying on the statements of Str. 12, 537.—Antigonus subdues Alcetas in Pisidia, Niese, 1, 231. Eumenes escapes from Nora, Niese, 1, 238.

6. The end of ANTIPATER, Dr. 2, 1, 177, Niese, 1, 234. Demades executed by order of Cassander, Niese, 1, 233. Antipater's disposition of the succession, Diod. 18, 48: ἀπέδειξεν ἐπιμελητὴν τῶν βασιλέων Πολυσπέρχοντα καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτοκράτορα. An ἐπιμ. τῶν βασιλέων is evidently less than an ἐπιμ. τῆς βασιλείας (see above, note 1); Polysperchon was appointed guardian of the two incompetent kings. What this guardian might do with his office was his own affair. It was natural that nobody who had not an interest in the matter should pay any heed to him.—The end of PHOCION, Dr. 2, 1, 214 seq. following Plut. Phoc. 32 seq.; Diod. 18, 64-67; Nepos, Polyæn. 3, 12; Ael. V. H. 3, 47. Cf. also Hermann-Thumser, *Staatsalt.* § 134, and Niese, 1, 243.—Phocion was a model of a conscientious statesman, and a keen critic of all extravagance; he was not a leader of men.

7. I discuss the government of Demetrius in chap. ii. In point of form he was elected to his office by the Athenian people, C. I. A. 2, 584 = Hicks, 139, but according to Cassander's idea καταστήσθαι δ' ἐπιμελητὴν τῆς πόλεως ἓνα ἄνδρα Ἀθηναῖον, ὃν ἂν δόξῃ Κασάνδρῳ, Diod. 18, 74. Koehler conjectures ἐπιστάτης or προστάτης. Brachyllas, who was placed over Sparta by Doson, is called ἐπιστ. by Polyb. 20, 5. Diodorus (18, 74; 20, 45) calls Demetrius ἐπιμελητής.

8. Concluding events of the life of EUMENES, Dr. 2, 1, 253-324; Niese, 1, 258-270. For the geography see Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumsk.* 3, 12-20. With regard to the district of Gabiene mentioned only in Strabo, 16, 745, Spiegel merely states that Rawlinson places it in the neighbourhood of Mâl-Amir in Susiana. Gadamarga, or whatever it was called (Diod. 19, 32, 37), was near Ispahan according to Spiegel, 3, 19. The last engagement took place according to Spiegel close to the desert, whither Eumenes had proceeded to meet Antigonus.

Alexander had founded an empire, but it is worthy of remark that the notion which we form of an empire, viz. that definite boundaries are essential to it, consequently that its importance is a territorial one, was unknown to the Greeks. This also explains why

they had no special word for empire. They say ἀρχή, βασιλεία, but both really mean the rule of an individual or of a city. They generally, however, avoid the expression, even in later times in Byzantium, where they might have become accustomed to a precise term, if it had been in existence. We find for instance τὰ Ῥωμαϊκά and τὰ Περσικά, ἡ πολιτεία Ῥωμαίων and ἡ Περσική, τὰ Ῥωμαϊκὰ μέρη (formed on the Latin *partes*) etc. In the same way there is no regular expression for the parts of an empire, for provinces. Diodorus (18) still says σατραπείαι, Dion Cass. (51, 12) ἔθνη; χώραι also occurs, finally θέματα. All this shows, as I endeavour to prove on more than one occasion in this volume, that the idea that a large territory could be under a single government was quite foreign to the Greeks, and that the individual political bodies, cities or tribes, πόλεις or ἔθνη was the principal thing in their eyes. Administrative centralization was a modern invention.

CHAPTER II

THE DIADOCHI DOWN TO THE DEATH OF SELEUCUS (316-230)

HIS old comrades very soon rose against the ambitious and arrogant Antigonus. It was natural that Seleucus, whom he had driven into exile and who had betaken himself to Ptolemy, should stir up the disaffection. Ptolemy, Lysimachus of Thrace and Cassander intimated to Antigonus that it was not reasonable that all the advantages accruing from the victory over Eumenes should be reaped by him alone, that they too ought to get something. Antigonus simply replied that he intended to wage war against Ptolemy, who had harboured Seleucus. His object was to isolate his antagonists by means of a fleet, and then to conquer Syria and if possible Egypt with his main force himself. He announced his plans at a great gathering of the army, the occasion for which was given by the arrival of the son of Polysperchon, Alexander, who preferred a complaint against Cassander. Antigonus invited the army to declare that Cassander was to deliver up King Alexander, and in default to be regarded as an enemy of the empire; the Greeks were all to have their independence.¹ The army adopted these proposals as formal resolutions, and Antigonus began the war both in the north and in the south. He conquered Phoenicia himself, Tyre alone holding out for any length of time. In Asia Minor he was represented by his nephew, Ptolemy, and in this quarter his fleet held its own against the Egyptian fleet commanded by Seleucus.² In

Greece Polysperchon fought with success, until his son left him and went over to Cassander (315). Ptolemy had moreover, in order not to be behind Antigonus, declared for the independence of the Greeks; the one cared just as much about them as the other. Of the events of the year 314 we can only mention that Antigonus took Tyre after a fifteen months' siege; for the rest the contest was continued both in Asia Minor and in Greece with varying success. The course of events was the same in 313, the only noteworthy incident being that a large fleet sent to sea by Antigonus actually conquered a part of the island of Euboea, while Ptolemy of Egypt held his ground in Cyrene, his possession of which was being contested, and once more subdued Cyprus. In 312 the nephew of Antigonus took Chalcis and part of central Greece. But the ruler of Egypt advanced with a considerable army to Gaza, and there inflicted a complete defeat on Demetrius, the son of Antigonus. This altered the position of affairs. Ptolemy took Phoenicia and gave Seleucus 800 foot-soldiers and 200 cavalry, with which the latter hurried to Babylon. His small force swelled in numbers on the way, and he made himself master of the city. He then defeated Nicanor, the satrap of Media, and this secured his conquest for the moment. It was probably later that he dated the acts of his government from the capture of Babylon (1st October, 312); this was the era of the Seleucids.³ Ptolemy did not enjoy the possession of Phoenicia very long; Demetrius defeated his troops near Myus in Syria, and Antigonus and his son now re-occupied the country. As Antigonus did not venture to attack Egypt, and yet wished to make a special *coup*, his son was ordered to march into the country of the Nabataeans, who lived in Arabia Petraea. But nothing more came of it than the apparent subjugation of the people. Antigonus, however, drove Seleucus out of Babylon (311). We now hear all at once of a peace, concluded in 311 between Cassander, Ptolemy and Lysimachus on the one

side and Antigonus on the other, and prescribing that Cassander should be strategus in Europe until Roxana's son Alexander came of age, that Lysimachus should rule Thrace, Ptolemy Egypt and the adjoining parts of Libya and Arabia, and Antigonus the whole of Asia; the Greeks were to obtain their independence. Two points are uncertain here—how this peace came about, and whether we have a complete record of its terms. What became of Seleucus? Was he really not included in the peace? Did Ptolemy leave him in the lurch? It is by no means impossible.⁴

If the causes and the special conditions of the peace are enveloped in obscurity, it is just as doubtful when and under what pretexts it was broken. We find the war going on again in the year 310, and are told that Ptolemy of Egypt conquered districts in Cilicia from Antigonus, and at the same time summoned the cities under Cassander and Lysimachus to assist him. Soon after the peace of 312 Cassander had put to death the young king Alexander and his mother Roxana. The murder of the king, whose life and qualities no one refers to because no one paid any heed to them, made but little impression. There was, however, a less legitimate scion of Alexander still in existence, the young Heracles, son of Barsine, who lived in Pergamum. Polysperchon now dragged him out of his obscurity, declared him lawful heir to the empire and collected an army, ostensibly for him, to which the Aetolians sent a considerable contingent. But the promotion of Heracles was his ruin, for shortly afterwards Polysperchon used him as a means of obtaining concessions from Cassander, who promised Polysperchon the supremacy over the Peloponnesus and even a share in the government of the whole empire if he would make away with Heracles. He did so (309), and Cassander seems really to have partly kept his promise, at all events we are not told that he had Polysperchon murdered as well. It is true that we do not know what was the end of Polysperchon. This so-called

regent of the empire disappears from history without leaving a trace behind him. A couple of years more, and the empire itself vanishes from the scene.

In the year 309 Ptolemy made further progress. He established himself firmly in the south-west of Asia Minor, where he took Xanthus, Caunus and Phaselis. From Myndus he sailed by way of Andros, which he 'set free,' to Greece, where Cratesipolis ceded Corinth and Sicyon to him, in 308. At first his intention was to liberate some more Greek cities, but before long he thought it better to come to terms with Cassander. It was agreed that each should keep what he had got.⁵ On the other hand, another plan, which held out a prospect of some advantage, fell through. Alexander's sister Cleopatra, who was living in Sardis, had a mind to marry Ptolemy; after an attempt which had not been attended with success (see above, p. 18), she once more wished to have a ruler for a husband, and Ptolemy thought the connection an advantageous one. Cleopatra wanted to leave Sardis for this purpose, but Antigonus prevented her departure, and soon afterwards some women put an end to her life. Antigonus of course inflicted due punishment on them, and the murdered woman received a handsome funeral by his orders. But a great success in Africa made up to Ptolemy for his disappointed hope of an alliance with the sister of Alexander. He recovered Cyrene. His governor of this province, Ophellas, had revolted in 312, but had afterwards been put to death by Agathocles, and now Ptolemy's stepson, Magas, had retaken possession of Cyrene for Egypt.⁶ (See below, chaps. v. and vii.) The position therefore at this time, about 308, was as follows: Ptolemy was powerful by his possession of Cyrene, Cyprus, part of Lycia and Caria, Cos, Andros, Corinth and Sicyon; Cassander was master of Macedonia, met with no resistance in Epirus, and still held Euboea, Thebes, Athens, Megara, and Megalopolis;⁷ Lysimachus had consolidated his power on

the Hellespont by founding Lysimachia, east of Cardia. Against these three Antigonos was isolated. He was even threatened in the rear, for Seleucus was once more supreme in Babylon. Antigonos was forced to do something striking, something that would create a sensation. He conceived the happy idea of attempting a *coup-de-main* on Athens, the intellectual capital of Greece.⁸ Here, as we are aware, Demetrius of Phalerum was in power as Cassander's lieutenant; he increased the prosperity of the city during the ten years of his administration, but lowered the morality of the people by his own bad example, while at the same time he played the part of a genuine tyrant in pretending to check luxury by means of officials and spies. His rule was tolerated, and many Athenians were even well pleased with it; but those who still thought of the past were ashamed of the position into which the city had fallen. It was a disgrace to have to obey the orders of a man who had never done anything in war, and who was not even allowed to follow his own judgment, but was obliged to carry out the orders of Cassander.⁹ If they could only regain their freedom, they would have every reason to thank the gods. And if this entailed giving support to the policy of foreign potentates, at all events the latter were farther off and less oppressive than the king of Macedonia, and they would be able to vote their resolutions in accordance with the old forms. The result was that when Demetrius, the son of Antigonos, a brave, handsome and able man, and a man of the world into the bargain, like his namesake of Phalerum, appeared off the promontory of Sunium with a large fleet, and troops and money on board, in the year 307, and owing to a mistake on the part of the sentinels, who thought that the ships were Egyptian, was able to enter the Piraeus with twenty fine vessels, he was received with open arms by the people.¹⁰ After some brief encounters, Demetrius of Phalerum applied to him for protection from the people and went to Thebes. Antigonos' son took Megara and the fortress

of Munychia, which was garrisoned by the Macedonians, and in September 307 made a triumphal entry into the city of Athens. He promised to give the citizens grain and timber for ship-building, and to make them a present of the island of Imbros. Prosecutions were set on foot against Cassander's adherents, but only the absent were condemned; those who had remained, among them the poet Menander, were acquitted. But if the people observed moderation in revenge, they transgressed the bounds of it in the homage paid to their deliverer and his father. Two new Phylae, Antigonis and Demetrias, were created, a day of the month and a festival were named after Demetrius, and both Antigonus and Demetrius received the titles of gods and kings. The emancipated Athenians behaved almost as servilely to the general Demetrius as the enslaved Athenians had done to Demetrius of Phalerum, and the prince lived just as self-indulgent a life in the most intellectual city of Greece as the philosopher. The liberation of Athens had the effects anticipated by Antigonus. It placed the power of Cassander in such an unfavourable light that the Epirotes plucked up courage to murder their king Alcetas, a tool of Cassander, and to proclaim the nephew of the murdered monarch, the young Pyrrhus, son of Aeacides, as king. Demetrius would have caused many more revolutions in Greece if he had not been recalled by Antigonus. The latter wanted him to oppose Ptolemy, who was collecting a large force in Cyprus. Demetrius called on the Rhodians to join in an alliance against Egypt, but they declared that they wished to remain neutral, and Demetrius made up his mind to chastise them when he had an opportunity. He besieged Salamis, which was defended by Menelaus, the brother of Ptolemy. At this point Ptolemy himself approached with a large fleet. Demetrius completely defeated him; he captured forty ships of war, sank more than eighty, took over 8000 soldiers on 100 transports prisoners, and made enormous booty, among which the flute-player Lamia attracted his

especial favour. Menelaus surrendered in Salamis, the whole of Cyprus submitted to the conqueror. Antigonus happened to be staying at the mouth of the Orontes, when the Milesian Aristodemus, who had been despatched by Demetrius, landed and greeted him with the words: "Hail, king Antigonus." The crowd re-echoed the cry. Antigonus sent his thanks to 'king' Demetrius. He hoped to have revived the monarchy of Alexander in this way, but his rivals could not put up with this. Ptolemy, Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander forthwith also styled themselves kings. The assumption of the same title by a petty tyrant, Dionysius of Heraclea, only proved that the empire of Alexander had completely broken up.¹¹

Antigonus had accomplished a great deal, but the most important achievement remained—the conquest of Egypt. He attempted it with a numerous fleet and large army. But the enterprise failed. Antigonus advanced with his land force to the Pelusiac arm of the Nile, the left bank of which was occupied by Ptolemy; his plan was to delay the passage until Demetrius had landed farther to the west and could take the Egyptians in the rear. But a storm prevented Demetrius from landing, and he returned to the army. Thereupon Antigonus thought it best to abandon the whole campaign. He evidently was afraid of sharing the fate of Perdiccas, but to withdraw without making a serious attack, after such imposing preparations, was not particularly glorious (306).

He now wished at all events to obtain satisfaction elsewhere. The Rhodians had not joined him in an alliance against Egypt. They had shown him every possible civility in other respects, but they declined to fight against Ptolemy, because their prosperity and their power rested on their trade with Alexandria.¹² Antigonus determined to punish them for this, and he counted on their not obtaining many allies and on his being able to subdue them without difficulty

in consequence. The first calculation was tolerably correct, but the second was mistaken. Demetrius sailed with a powerful fleet, 200 ships of war, 170 transports and 1000 pirate vessels and merchantmen, to the harbour of Loryma opposite Rhodes, and from there repeated his request to the Rhodians to conclude an alliance with him against Egypt. They consented after a time, but on Demetrius demanding 100 leading citizens as hostages and besides this a passage into the harbour of Rhodes for his ships of war, they recognized that his sole object was to reduce them to subjection, and they determined to fight to the bitter end. Demetrius now proceeded to besiege the city, a siege which is famous in history owing to the skill of the attack and the vigour and stubbornness of the defence (305-304). The position of the Rhodians was all the more unfavourable, because their war-fleet was weak in proportion and Demetrius had command of the sea. But they were such good seamen that they managed to get about everywhere with single ships. In this way they informed Cassander, Lysimachus and Ptolemy of the danger which threatened them, and appealed for aid. They received assurances of sympathy from all sides, but very little real help. They even abandoned the suburbs of the city, for, strange to say, they had only 7000 combatants, 6000 citizens and 1000 metoeci, besides the slaves whom they had armed. Such a small force could of course defend only a short section of the walls effectively. But the women backed up the men with devoted courage, and even assisted them in the fighting on the walls. Demetrius first attacked from the sea; his object was to obtain possession of the harbour, in order to penetrate thence into the city. He captured the outer harbour, but not the inner one, and eventually he was driven even out of the former. He then proceeded to attack from the side of the land, and employed all the resources of the besieging art of those times. The most extraordinary of his engines was a *helepolis*, a wooden tower shod with iron, 75 feet

broad each way and 150 feet high, on eight gigantic wheels, movable in every direction by 3400 men. It had nine stories full of all kinds of artillery. Besides the *helepolis*, four machines with roofs were erected for mining operations, and two enormous battering-rams 190 feet long, each of which was served by 1000 men, were held ready for an assault on the walls. The machines were set in motion, towers and fragments of the walls collapsed, but behind them rose a fresh wall, which the Rhodians had erected with all haste. They even constructed a third one behind this, in case the second one should be carried. They inflicted much damage on the enemy's fleet in small naval expeditions. Their allies the kings went so far as to send them grain, and Ptolemy actually despatched 1500 soldiers. Demetrius was after all very near taking the city by assault. A division of his men forced their way through a large breach into the theatre, and took up a position there. If the citizens, in the first panic at this success of the enemy, had hurried from the walls to the theatre, the walls might have been stormed and the city would have been lost. But the Rhodians maintained admirable discipline on this occasion; only so many of them rushed to the theatre as was absolutely necessary. In this way they tired out the attacking party, who could not take the city from this point, and were obliged eventually to retire with heavy loss. Rhodes was once more safe. In spite of this it must have fallen, like every strong place which is attacked by a superior force and not relieved from outside, had not Antigonus ordered the abandonment of the siege while preserving the form of a surrender by the besiegers. The Aetolians and the Athenians demanded the presence of Demetrius because they were being pressed by Cassander. The Rhodians were of course glad to escape with a few concessions. They declared themselves allies of Antigonus, except against Ptolemy, and subject to the proviso that they were not to be compelled to receive a garrison from the king; they agreed to give 100 hostages, among whom,

however, there were to be no city dignitaries. This peace (304) was quite in keeping with the prudent and unpretending character of the Rhodians; it meant concession on points of form combined with retention of essentials. For Antigonus it was a defeat. To the potentates who had rendered some assistance to the city Rhodes wisely showed herself as grateful as if they, and not the citizens, had saved it. The Rhodians inquired of Zeus Ammon whether they should pay King Ptolemy the respect due to a god, and received a reply in the affirmative. They dedicated a sacred precinct to him, chanted paeans to him and gave him the surname of Soter. Their neutrality was henceforth secured.¹³

Demetrius sailed to Greece, where Cassander had already conquered Euboea and Boeotia, but was now (in the autumn of 304) obliged to give up his conquests. The young conqueror retired to Athens for the winter, to enjoy life there. In the year 303 he took the Peloponnesus, including Acrocorinthus, strengthened the position of Sicyon, which for some time afterwards was called Demetrias, and assumed the title of general of the Greeks at the Synedrion in Corinth. He obtained possession of Corcyra, which had been misgoverned by the Spartan Cleonymus, and of Leucas. He spent the winter of 303/2 in his usual fashion in Athens, the inhabitants of which degraded themselves by the homage which they paid to him and to his favourites. His next design was to attack Macedonia itself. But at this point he was confronted by a new alliance between Cassander, Lysimachus, Ptolemy and Seleucus.¹⁴

Seleucus had ceded the territories about the Indus to King Tchandragupta, who ruled from the Ganges up to the Indus, and had received 500 war-elephants in return. With his eastern frontier thus secured and besides provided with what might prove to be formidable material of war, he was able to take part in the struggle against his old enemy Antigonus. The campaign was opened by Lysimachus, who crossed the

Hellespont from Lysimachia and, after an unsuccessful attack on Abydos, turned south-west into the interior, where he captured Synnada, a stronghold of Antigonos filled with treasure, while his general Prepelaus marched along the west coast and seized the important city of Ephesus. Eventually only the citadel of Sardes held out for Antigonos in this district. The latter hurried from Syria to Asia Minor and tried to drive Lysimachus into a battle in the open, in which he was sure of defeating him. But his crafty antagonist evaded him; his object was to gain time until Seleucus could appear on the scene. In the meanwhile Lysimachus captured the important city of Heraclea, the regent of which, Amastris, widow of King Dionysius, married him. Ptolemy had also taken the field and conquered a part of Syria, when he received or is said to have received news that Seleucus and Lysimachus had already been defeated, and he returned to Egypt, but not without leaving garrisons in Syria. Demetrius had marched to Thessaly in the year 302, where Cassander advanced to meet him. A battle was apparently on the point of being fought between them, when Demetrius was recalled by his father, and he obeyed, after having concluded a treaty with Cassander. The provisions of this treaty are unknown to us, except that the independence of the Greeks was once more proclaimed. The operations of Demetrius were attended with success at the outset. He sailed to Asia, conquered Ephesus and some of the Hellespontine cities, and took up his winter quarters in the rear of Lysimachus. Seleucus had meanwhile made his appearance in Cappadocia, where he also went into winter quarters. Cassander looked after his immediate interests by replacing Pyrrhus in Epirus by another Molossian prince, Neoptolemus (nephew, and through Cleopatra also grandson, of Olympias), but he also sent reinforcements to Asia. In the year 301 the great struggle was decided in a pitched battle at Ipsus in Phrygia, consequently in the province which Antigonos had

ruled for some three-and-thirty years. The allies succeeded by means of the elephants in separating Demetrius, who had command of the cavalry, from the bulk of the army under Antigonus, and in utterly defeating the latter. Antigonus himself was killed; Demetrius fled with 5000 foot and 4000 horse to Ephesus.¹⁵

The empire of Antigonus was destroyed, but Demetrius might find a new one. He still had his fleet, which controlled the seas, he was master of Cyprus, Sidon, Tyre, some islands of the Aegean, and places in Greece, such as the important city of Corinth, and evidently southern Thessaly into the bargain. If in addition to this he were to hold his own in Athens, he would be even a powerful potentate, for in the eyes of the Greeks at least the name of Athens was worth thousands of combatants. But the Athenians were not inclined to be used as one of the material factors of Demetrius' power. They intimated to him that they wished to remain neutral in the contest between the kings; the policy of the Rhodians commended itself to them as well. Demetrius considered their conduct as gross ingratitude; for him as for Alexander Athens was the centre of the world. He did not reflect that the Greeks still regarded freedom from kingly domination as a *sine qua non* of political life.

The conquerors, i.e. Lysimachus and Seleucus, divided their conquests among themselves. Seleucus received the lion's share, Asia as far as Phrygia, Cilicia only being reserved for Pleistarchus, the brother of Cassander. The latter had to be satisfied with the consolidation of his rule in Europe. Seleucus was to have Syria, and not Ptolemy, who had done nothing against Antigonus, an arrangement which of course gave rise to fresh complications. In northern Asia Minor the rulers of Bithynia (Zipoites), of Cappadocia (Ariarathes), of Paphlagonia and Pontus (Mithridates) became more independent than before. In these countries therefore there is already a return to the old Persian system; besides, the

rulers of Cappadocia and Pontus claimed to be descendants of high-born Persians.

Seleucus' share of the spoil had been so out of proportion to that of the two others, that they soon combined against him. A marriage was the outward token of this understanding. Lysimachus married Arsinoe, the daughter of Ptolemy. This induced Seleucus to come to terms with Demetrius, the master of the sea and of the islands; he married his daughter Stratonice, whereupon Demetrius landed in Cilicia, and took away 1200 talents from Cyinda, the balance of the royal treasure which had been often drawn upon without being quite exhausted.¹⁶ But the good understanding between Demetrius and Seleucus did not last very long; the latter requested his new father-in-law to cede either Cilicia or Tyre and Sidon to him, which Demetrius of course was unwilling to do. Demetrius even formed a connection with Ptolemy by betrothing himself to his daughter Ptolemais. For the moment, however, the conflict broke out only in Greece, viz. in Athens, after the death of Cassander in 297, who was succeeded first by his sickly son Philip and then by the latter's brother Antipater. There were two popular leaders in Athens, the much-belauded Demochares, nephew of Demosthenes, who plumed himself on his genuine republican sentiments, but yet thought fit to invoke the aid of Macedonia, and the much-abused Lachares, who, when Demetrius gained a footing in Attica and occupied Eleusis and Rhamnus, made himself master of the city and was decried as a tyrant, partly no doubt because he enforced strict discipline among the besieged. Athens was starved into submission, and the conqueror was glad to be able to transfer the blame from his beloved Athenians to the tyrant, in order to have an excuse for granting the city favourable terms. He communicated the latter to them himself in an address; the people gave him an ovation, and made him a present of Munychia and the Piraeus, which he had

already. In this way due form was at all events observed (294).¹⁷

Demetrius had thus once more become master of Athens, and he prepared to conquer the rest of Greece from this centre. In the Peloponnese he met with energetic resistance from Sparta; the Spartans even invaded Arcadia. Demetrius repulsed them, but then suddenly retraced his steps and marched into Macedonia. In this quarter there was a large stake for him to win, which seemed to him all the more necessary because he had just lost so much, viz. his possessions in Asia. Lysimachus and Seleucus had taken the cities of Asia Minor, and Ptolemy Cyprus; Demetrius' wife Phila alone held out in Salamis. The affairs of Macedonia now gave him an opportunity of making good these losses in Europe. King Antipater had quarrelled with his brother Alexander, because the latter was more in favour with their mother Thessalonice, Philip's daughter, than he was, and he had ended by murdering his mother. Alexander applied to Demetrius for aid, but as Demetrius was not able to help him at once, he fled to Epirus, where Pyrrhus had just returned with reinforcements from Egypt. At first Pyrrhus had acted as co-regent with Neoptolemus, but afterwards when he saw that his cousin intended to murder him, he had anticipated him and put him to death, and was now sole king of Epirus. Pyrrhus brought Alexander back to Macedonia. Antipater first of all went to his father-in-law Lysimachus, but then came to terms with his brother. Demetrius now appeared in Macedonia, most unseasonably for Alexander. True, the latter had invited him, but now he did not want him and of course wished to be rid of him. He decided to have recourse to the *ultima ratio* of the sovereigns of those days and put him out of the way, but Demetrius heard of it and anticipated him. Demetrius then ingratiated himself with the Macedonian aristocrats. A reference to all the mischief which the house of Antipater had done to that of Philip and Alexander

produced an effect. Demetrius' brilliant personal gifts contributed their share, and the Macedonians accepted him as king in the year 294 B.C.

But he was not the stamp of man to enjoy his possessions in peace and quietness; some fresh enterprise was always necessary to him. The first country to which he devoted his energies was Greece. Thebes, where Lachares was living, was hostile to him; he took the city and made Hieronymus of Cardia governor of Boeotia. In Athens a plan was formed to overpower the Macedonian garrison of the Piraeus; it was betrayed and Demetrius now placed the garrison in the city itself, on the Museum. The imprisonment of Lysimachus by the Getae greatly facilitated his operations; the Getae released their prisoner, but from a military point of view the Thracian king was for the time of no importance. Boeotia on the other hand, which revolted again, gave him trouble; it was subdued, and treated with clemency, on the intercession of Demetrius' son, Antigonus Gonatas. Sparta and Aetolia were now the only countries in Greece not dependent on Demetrius, and as the Aetolians controlled the routes to Delphi, Demetrius made this a pretext for celebrating the Pythia of the year 290 in Athens. His fame spread far and wide; Agathocles of Syracuse and his daughter Lanassa, the consort of Pyrrhus, entered into relations with him (see below, chap. vii.); he himself sent some pirates of Antium, whom he had captured, back to the Romans, whose importance he recognized.¹⁸ Perpetual war was a necessity to him; but he had no talent for government. He was severe and imperious in his treatment of the Macedonians; when Pyrrhus thereupon made a raid on Macedonia Demetrius soon put him to flight. An act of his which showed correct geographical insight was the founding of Demetrias at the foot of Pelion; from there he could always penetrate into Euboea and Greece and use the harbours of Phthiotis for maritime expeditions. His last idea was that an

alliance with Pyrrhus might be of advantage to him. Of the two equally restless and ambitious sovereigns the Molossian might rule the West and the Macedonian the East. A treaty was actually concluded, and Demetrius then made vast preparations for a great expedition to Asia.¹⁹ This of course was a menace to the old allies, who were otherwise so seldom on good terms with each other, Lysimachus, Seleucus and Ptolemy; the combination which had to be formed against Antigonus thirteen years before recurred to their mind. Besides the kings, however, the independent states of Byzantium, Cyzicus and Rhodes were hostile to Demetrius. It seemed that if he carried the day free traffic on the seas would be at an end (288). His opponents hit upon a crafty device for injuring him without unduly exerting themselves; they stirred up Pyrrhus against him, and the king of Epirus broke away from him. Demetrius had just marched against the Thracians and had sent his son Antigonus Gonatas to Greece. At this point the news was brought to him that Pyrrhus had invaded Macedonia and had already taken the city of Beroea, while about the same time an Egyptian fleet appeared in Greek waters. He at once marched against Pyrrhus. But no battle was required to decide the issue. The Macedonians went over to Pyrrhus; they were thoroughly sick of the adventurous hero. Demetrius had to fly; he went to Antigonus in Greece. Of course his position was not yet quite desperate, but many thought it was so, and his consort Phila, whom he had so often neglected, felt the misfortunes of her husband so keenly that she committed suicide by taking poison. Pyrrhus had become king of Macedonia, but he was not permitted to rule it alone. He had to give up part of the kingdom to Lysimachus, who, in order to make a clean sweep of all other claims, put to death the last remaining descendant of Antipater, his son-in-law Antipater. The Athenians managed to turn to account this change in the position of affairs with prudence and boldness. Under the

leadership of Olympiodorus, a friend of Theophrastus, they stormed the Museum and captured it. True, Demetrius appeared on the scene himself and harassed Athens,—he still had power enough for this—but in a short time he gave up the siege, according to Plutarch on the intercession of the philosopher Crates. In reality the approach of Pyrrhus probably had something to do with it.²⁰ Eventually Pyrrhus and Demetrius came to an understanding, but on what terms is unknown to us. Probably the monarch of Epirus recognized Demetrius as ruler of Greece. But the restless king would not remain there, he now carried out his old plan of an expedition to Asia, in order if possible to wrest it from Lysimachus. In Miletus, for the sake of another pleasant change, he married Ptolemais, the niece of Phila, Ptolemy's daughter, to whom he had already been betrothed. He then marched into the interior of Asia Minor (287).²¹ This was strange, for the sea was now more his element than before, Macedonia being lost to him; but his intention is said to have been to throw himself into Armenia. He did not, however, reach that country, but found his way, we do not know how, to Cilicia. This brought him into conflict with Seleucus, and at last he had no alternative but to surrender to him. But Demetrius could not reconcile himself to a life of inaction; he began fighting again, and even penetrated into the Cyrrhestis, the district of Aleppo. At one moment a battle seemed to be impending between the two kings, when Seleucus went in person to the enemy's troops and persuaded them in a speech to come over to his side. Demetrius was now in the same plight with Seleucus as with Pyrrhus two years previously; he had completely lost his personal charm. Soon afterwards he had to surrender a second time (286), and he was taken as a prisoner to Apamea on the Orontes, where he passed his life in hunting and drinking. He died in 284. Seleucus was reproached with having killed him by inches by keeping him in confinement; he had become, it was said, powerless

for mischief. This is true enough; Demetrius had ruined himself in body and mind. Pyrrhus, however, who had driven him out of Macedonia, did not enjoy his possession long. Lysimachus put him to flight and conquered Macedonia and the greater part of Thessaly into the bargain (287).

There were now, about the year 285, only three powerful monarchs left on the scene: Lysimachus, Seleucus and Ptolemy, all three advanced in years; Ptolemy 82, Lysimachus 76, and Seleucus 68 years old. But Ptolemy retired from active political life in 285 and made over the empire to his younger son Ptolemy, afterwards called Philadelphus, who was about 24 years of age, passing over his elder son Ptolemy Ceraunus. This prince, who was about 30, went to Lysimachus, whose son Agathocles was married to Lysandra, the full sister of Ceraunus, whereas Lysimachus himself had, as we know, wedded another daughter of Ptolemy, Arsinoe. Ceraunus brought ruin to the house of Lysimachus. In concert with Arsinoe he slandered Agathocles to his father, and Lysimachus threw his son into prison and then put him to death. This did the king great harm. It was then that Philetaerus of Tius, who was guarding 9000 talents of treasure belonging to Lysimachus in the citadel of Pergamum, revolted from him, ostensibly to join Seleucus, but in reality to make himself independent with the money—another Harpalus, but much cleverer than the original one. Ceraunus himself fell into disfavour with Lysimachus and also went to Seleucus, at whose court the other son of Lysimachus, Alexander, put in an appearance. Lysimachus was now completely isolated through his own fault, and although he sent his daughter Arsinoe to be married to Ptolemy Philadelphus, it was too late for this to help him. Seleucus made war on him, and in the plain of Coron, in Hellespontine Phrygia, Lysimachus was defeated and lost his life (281).²²

Thrace and Macedonia were now at the disposal of Seleucus; it appears that he intended to spend the remaining years of

his life as ruler of Macedonia, his native country, the memory of which he had revived in so many names of newly-founded cities in Asia. He set out for Europe, but was murdered near Lysimachia by Ceraunus, and the murderer was recognized as king by the army, which was taken unawares (281/80). Ceraunus actually took possession of Thrace and Macedonia; in Asia Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, found more adherents. Philetaerus sent the corpse of Seleucus, which he had bought of Ceraunus, to Antiochus. Antigonus was not able to make Greece a base of operations for opposing Ceraunus. Pyrrhus might have done so, but this monarch was starting just then on an expedition to Italy, in response to an appeal from the Tarentines, and provided with ships, money and troops by three potentates, Ceraunus, Antiochus and Antigonus. All of them were glad to be rid of him.²³ To make his rule quite secure, Ceraunus induced his sister Arsinoe, in concert with whom he had already put Agathocles out of the way, to marry him. But he took this step only in order to get her sons, who might have laid claim to Thrace, into his power. He succeeded in this and had them put to death in her presence (280).

We break off here, on the eve of a catastrophe of another kind, for the purpose of considering the character of the period with which we are engaged from a special point of view.

NOTES

1. Proclamation of the freedom of the Greeks by Polysperchon, Diod. 18, 56 (Dr. 2, 1, 188, 211); by Antigonus, Diod. 19, 61 (Dr. 2, 2, 11); by Ptolemy, Diod. 19, 62 (Dr. 2, 2, 15); by the united action of Cassander, Ptolemy, Lysimachus and Antigonus in the year 311 B.C., Diod. 105. The decrees apply to τοὺς Ἑλλήνας πάντας (19, 61), i.e. all Greek cities in Asia as well as Europe. Ἑλλήνες are the republican Greeks as opposed to βασιλεῖς, wherever they may live, cf. Polyb. 5, 90. The view represented by Gaebler, Erythrai 19, which interprets the words

as meaning only Greece proper, is in my judgment unfounded, and Niese agrees with me, 1, 277, n. 4. By those decisions all Hellenes are recognized as *ἐλεύθεροι, ἀφροῦρητοι, αὐτόνομοι* (19, 61), and this held good in principle up to the time of the Roman Empire. Of course practice was not much in accord with theory. But the theory also presented difficulties. What was the outward and visible sign of a Hellenic community? In Europe no doubt was possible, nor in Asia in the case of old admittedly Greek cities, such as Abydos, Ephesus, etc. But what about cities like Caunus, Selge, Soli and the like? When they claimed to be Hellenic themselves, so as to have a title to freedom, the kings said that they were barbarous cities and must therefore be subject to them, and in the end the stronger prevailed. What was the position again of those which were founded by kings and bore royal names as a token of it? In the opinion of the kings this evidently excluded them from the category of the legally free Hellenic cities (the cult of the founder was enough to insure dependence on the royal house, hence changes of names), while their inhabitants just as naturally laid claim to the same freedom as that of the old Hellenic cities. And as a matter of fact the passion for autonomy inherent in the Hellenes could not be suppressed even in these cities, and their endeavours were eventually so successful that at the close of the whole period with which we are dealing one half of the Syrian empire broke up into city republics (see chaps. v. and xx. and elsewhere). Besides, an autonomy of this kind with recognition of a monarch's suzerainty is so little of a contradiction in the East, that even now Bulgaria, according to the Berlin Treaty of 1878, is an 'autonomous' tributary principality under the suzerainty of the Porte. At the end of the second century B.C. Antiochia, Laodicea, etc. stood in much the same position towards the kings of Syria. It may therefore be said that while the old Greek cities are legally *αὐτόνομοι* and *ἀφροῦρητοι*, those founded by the kings strive to be both and attain the former more completely than the latter. These considerations are also of value for estimating the legitimacy of the monarchies according to Greek ideas, a point which is of great importance for the history of the years 323-30. For the Hellenes the kings as such have no lawful existence at all. Within the *polis* the king has no place whatever, and outside only that which is conferred on him by special treaties. The idea of territorial sovereignty is, as we have seen above, not a Greek one. See also the correct remark of Pöhlmann, *Grundzüge*, p. 456.

2. There is a good deal about Ptolemy I. in Paus. 1, 6. For Ptolemy, the nephew of Antigonus, who goes over to Cassander and then to Ptolemy of Egypt and is put to death by the latter, see

the inscription C. I. A. 2, 266 = Hicks 141, with his remarks. For the events of the years 315-312, cf. Niese, 273-292.

3. Era of the Seleucids 1st of October, 312 (Ol. 117, 1) Dr. 2, 2, 51; Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, p. iv. The founding of the Seleucid power was in consequence indirectly recognized as due to Egyptian aid. This era first came into use with the Phoenicians.

4. Seleucus is not mentioned at all in the peace concluded in 311; Diod. 19, 105. Seleucus does not occur again in Diodorus till 20, 53 (307 B.C.) where he has acquired *προσφάτως τὰς ἀνω σατραπείας* into the bargain. But this must refer to the year 312 and to what Diodorus has said in 19, 100. The war interrupted in Diod. 19, 105 is going on again in the year 310 in 20, 19.

5. Treaty between Ptolemy and Cassander, Diod. 20, 37.

6. Cyrene subdued by Magas in 308, Suid. *Δημήτριος*; Magas consequently reigned from 308-258.

7. The Macedonians supported Acarnania against Aetolia, Thebes against the rest of Boeotia, Megalopolis against the rest of Arcadia, Dr. 2, 2, 103, 104.

8. The intellectual and moral condition of the Greeks about the year 307 B.C. is described by Droysen (2, 2, 102 seq.) as follows: "The masses impoverished, without morality, indifferent to the gods and to their mother-country, the rising generation perverted by the fashionable philosophers." This is not true, neither the first nor the second part of it. The incorrectness of the first cannot be demonstrated here. Assertions of so general a character are always difficult to refute. The whole course of my narrative will show that Droysen's view is a mistaken one. The second part ("the rising generation" etc.) is a definite statement and admits of discussion. It must be assumed that Droysen refers to the period before the founding of the Stoa, for as soon as the latter came into existence there can be no question of perversion as the characteristic of education. But it is not applicable before this. What reason is there for supposing that the Academics, Peripatetics, Cynics and Megarians were pernicious fashionable philosophers? One would be inclined to think that there must be some weighty reason for the opinion, otherwise Droysen would not have made such assertions. But the following will show clearly that these remarks are nothing but the expression of personal feeling. For his further observations are still more strange. On p. 103 he calls the Greece of Asia and the Islands, "which had sunk into communal autonomy," happy compared with the corrupt free Greece. But it is not true that the Greeks of Asia and the Islands had sunk into communal autonomy. Legally they were just as free as Athens, and practically almost as much so, and some of them played as

exalted a political part as Athens, and their worth did not suffer thereby. We need only recall Abydos (Droysen, 2, 2, 201 and 211) and Rhodes. If they were happier than Athens, the reason was not that their citizens confined themselves to communal politics, for they did not do so. Droysen, however, becomes quite unintelligible, from an objective point of view, when he says that things were better in the West, that Sicily was happy at this time under Agathocles, and that "the wealthy Tarentum by its wise and well-ordered régime gives the feeling of a support to the smaller cities as well." In reality the luxurious Tarentum could not even stand alone, much less assist others; on the contrary, it had to hire one Epirote or Spartan after another, and it would be difficult to discover a trace of Sicily's happiness under Agathocles; cf. chap. vii. These statements, the groundlessness of which I believe I have proved, I have ventured to characterize as expressions of personal feeling, for the following reasons only: firstly, because they come from a scholar of the first rank, and secondly, because by so doing I can make it all the clearer that the soil from which they have sprung, viz. the supposed corruption of ancient Greece, which is really still striving after freedom, also exists only in the imagination. See also notes to chap. vi.

9. Demetrius of Phalerum, for whom cf. the writings quoted in Hermann-Thumser, *Staatsalt.* § 135, as well as Sus. 1, 135-143, is placed on a high pedestal by Schwarcz, *Die Demokratie*, Leipz. 1882, and by v. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 184. According to the latter Demetrius introduced security and order, peace and prosperity, pointed out clear-sightedly the way to become reconciled to the existence of a purely communal independence, "was the first to assign the education of boys to the state," and made "the *ephebia* a state educational institution." The last assertion can no longer be maintained, in the face of Arist. *Ἀθ. πολ.* 42; the *ephebia* was that as early as 323. According to v. Wilamowitz, Demetrius also placed the freedom of teaching in the philosophical schools on a firm footing. This is not the case. An official of a foreign king could not put anything on a firm footing in Athens. Demetrius' decrees were even less firmly established than his statues. He no doubt protected the freedom of teaching, but it was founded and maintained by the right feeling of the Athenian people. Just as little did he introduce peace and prosperity. They did not depend on the communal officer Demetrius, but on his master and the latter's fellow-monarchs. That security and order prevailed under him in Athens may be the case—so far as he did not interfere with them himself. The reorganization of the dramatic competitions is also attributed to him (Koehler,

Athen. Mittheil. 3, 235; Müller, Bühnenalterth. § 22). In point of fact Demetrius did as first archon preside over the Dionysia in 309/8, and some time afterwards we meet with the *agonothesia*. It is therefore possible that this change originates with him. The difference, however, between the two institutions is this, that the *choregia* is a *liturgia*, and the *agonothesia* an office. The innovation was due to the fact that a sufficient number of people could not be found to contribute money to the festivals. But as the festivals had to be held in any event, the Demos itself undertook the *choregia* and appointed an *agonothetes*, who was a responsible official, to carry out the required arrangements. The measure resembles that which Eubulus is wrongly reproached with (vol. iii. p. 222); it is making the state pay festival-money, and that under very aggravating circumstances, for only the well-to-do citizens had the right to vote under Demetrius. Consequently if this class was also relieved of the honourable duty of paying for the festivals, and the public treasury was saddled with the expenditure, it was equivalent to a marked favouritism of the rich, and we can understand that in their delight the latter went a step farther and decreed 360 statues to their benefactor; the public treasury could pay for this too. It is true that an attempt has been made to represent the matter in a somewhat different way, which sets Demetrius and the wealthy classes in a better light. It is supposed that the *agonothetes*, and not the state, had to defray all the expense, and in support of this the *psophisma* of the Athenians for Philippides is appealed to (C. I. A. 2, 314 = Ditt. 143), who is honoured in this decree for having spent a great deal *ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων* as *agonothetes*. According to this view no charge came on the public exchequer. But it is a mistaken one, cf. Ditt. l.l. and Hermann-Thumser, § 121. In the first place it is not proved, and in the second place it is intrinsically an absolute impossibility, a fact which has not yet been pointed out. The honours paid to Philippides do not prove it, for he is honoured for what he spent of his own money, without being obliged to do it; the responsibility attaching to him presupposes the administration of public funds, to which he added money of his own. And then *choregia* of the Demos is equivalent to an obligation of the Demos to pay. But the view is also a practical impossibility, because a state which is supposed to be unable to find a dozen or half-a-dozen persons willing to bear the expense of the choruses, must be still less able to find one man every year who is prepared to pay the whole sum formerly contributed by a dozen or half-a-dozen. The introduction of the *agonothesia* therefore is making the state pay festival-money, and if Demetrius introduced it, he knew perfectly well who

benefited by it, and the wealthy citizens knew it too. Demetrius, however, did try to pose as a serious statesman. He encouraged statistics, *Ath. 6, 672*, *Beloch, Bevölkerung*, pp. 4 and 57; he appointed *νομοφύλακες* and *γυναικονόμοι*, and in *Sync. 273* he is even called *τρίτος νομοθέτης Ἀθηναίων*. He wanted to be considered a little Solon. In particular he thought proper to confine the expenditure on tombs within certain limits (*Cic. de legg. 2, 66*), by which he did harm to art; cf. *Berl. Phil. Woch. 1892, p. 448*. *Huic procurationi certum magistratum praefererat*, says Cicero—consequently another official, a very characteristic trait of Demetrius. Not less characteristic of his mental horizon is that, according to *Cic. de off. 2, 60*, he *Periclem vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in praeclara illa propylaea conjecerit*. And at the same time he accepts the erection to himself of 360 statues! Spending money on this was of course quite another matter. He evidently had no idea of the fact, which after all was clear to most of the Greeks, that the greatness of Athens consisted of two things—love of freedom and love of the beautiful. It is pointed out that under his rule the Athenians paid less attention to foreigners than usual, but the reason simply is that Demetrius monopolized and absorbed all the flattery for himself. As a man of learning he evidently possessed ability, and if it is true that he originated the foundation of the Alexandrian Museum, then he did a great work; but in other respects he was more than a dubious character. He was fond of three things—learning and debauchery for himself, and strict discipline for the poor. He was a cultivated man of the world, who played the saviour of society, a type of which we have had so many examples in modern times.—A brilliant contrast to this immoral servant of a foreign monarch is presented by *Lycurgus*, an enthusiastic devotee of all that is beautiful and noble and yet a highly practical republican statesman, who has left abiding traces of his generous activity in Athens. Cf. for him *Dürnbach, L'orateur Lycurgue*, Paris, 1890, and *E. Curtius, Die Stadtgeschichte von Athen*, Berl. 1891, pp. 213 seq. 225 seq.

10. Demetrius Poliorcetes comes to the Piraeus with twenty ships (*Polyaen. 4, 7, 6*) like Alcibiades. He protects Demetrius, *v. Wil. 194*.—Honours paid by the Athenians to Antigonus and Demetrius, *Wachsmuth, Stadt Athen, 1, 612, 613*.—A brief account of the Phylae in *Hermann-Thumser, § 135*.

11. Demetrius sends 1200 suits of armour to Athens, *Dr. 2, 2, 135*. The same writer conjectures (141) that the rulers of Paphlagonia, Pontus and Atropatene also took the title of kings at this time. See also the remarks on these countries. The kingdom of

Antigonus and Demetrius distinguishable on coins, Head, H. N. 201, 202. The tetradrachm with the standing or sitting Poseidon on the reverse is remarkable. A copy of the Nike of Samothrace, now in the Louvre, is found on the gold and silver coins of Demetrius Poliorcetes, Head, H. N. 202, fig. 143. See below, chap. xxi.—For the attack on Egypt, Niese, I, 322-324.

12. The siege of Rhodes, Diod. 20, 81-87 (305); 91-100 (304); Dr. 2, 2, 153-174; Niese, I, 333, note 1; Torr, Rhodes in Ancient Times, Camb. 1855, pp. 54-58. Plan of Rhodes, Kiepert, Hellas, Plate VIII. Map of the island, Kiepert, Westl. Kleinasien, XIV.; see also below, chap. xxii. note 1.

13. The honours paid by the Rhodians to Ptolemy are also instructive as to the value and meaning of such tributes in general, and enable us to form a correct appreciation of the conduct of the Athenians in similar cases. And this is important, because the latter are generally severely reproached from a moral point of view with the homage which they rendered to foreigners. The Rhodians, however, were as far removed from degeneration as it is possible for men to be; this is proved by the defence they made in 305 and 304. It was consequently an act of international courtesy, which testifies to the corruption of the Greek religion, but not to want of love of freedom, when a foreign potentate was treated as a god; and the same thing may be said of the Athenians when they made gods of Demetrius and Antigonus. The erection of hundreds of statues in honour of a fellow-citizen was much worse. It must not be overlooked that the same principle is observed in our own day also, viz. that courtesy to a foreigner must be exaggerated. Foreigners receive orders for services which are taken no notice of in the case of natives of the country. Since the time of Lysander the raising of a foreigner to the rank of a god was an international civility. Tit. Quinctius Flaminius also had temples built to him in Greece (Momms. Staatsr. 2, 717). See also the next note and chap. iii, chap. vi. note 1, and chap. xiii. note 3.—That more is conceded to foreigners than natives in Greece even in our own day, is shown by a remark of Mahaffy's in Problems in Greek History, p. 80: "Even in the present day Greeks have often told me that they would not for a moment endure a Greek as king, because they all feel equal, and could not tolerate that any one among them should receive such honour and profit." The same applies to the appointment of foreigners as arbitrators in their internal affairs, so popular among the Greeks in antiquity, of which later on. Cf. Aem. Beurlier, De divinis honoribus quos accep. Alex. et succ. ejus, Paris, 1890.

14. Demetrius τοὺς Σικωνίους εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μετακίνας

τιμῶν ἰσοθέων ἔτυχε παρὰ τοῖς ἐδ' παθοῦσιν, Diod. 20, 102. The Sicyonians honour Attalus in the same way, Polyb. 18 (17) 16. Von Wilamowitz rightly remarks (Ant. v. Kar. 190) that the end of the four years' war in the document of Laches for Demochares preserved by ps.-Plut. βίοι τῶν δέκα ῥητ. ought to be placed before 300, which was accepted by Clinton but contested by Droysen. See Ladek, Ueber die Echtheit zweier Urk. in ps.-Plut. βίοι, etc., Wiener Studien, 1891, who puts the war in 306-302; Hermann-Thumser, § 135; and Niese, 1, 333, note 1. See, however, Stschakarew, in the Phil. Woch. 1891, 148.

15. For Synnada-Tschifut (Cassaba) see notes to chap. xiii. Ipsus was near the more modern Julia, now Tchai, Kiepert, Westl. Kleinasien, IX, or Sakli, according to Ramsay (A. M. 434), in the district where the roads leading from the interior of Asia to Asia Minor meet, the old northern king's road and the southern caravan road. Antigonos evidently wanted to prevent a concentration of forces, which might come by both these routes, but he did not succeed in doing so.—For the importance of this plain, see Radet, Lydie, p. 37. Seleucus must have come from the north-east and have joined Lysimachus to the north of Antigonos' position.—For the arrangements made after the victory by Cassander, Lysimachus and Seleucus, especially as regards Syria, see Polyb. 5, 67. If Seleucus got the lion's share, we must not forget that he had contributed a great deal to the result; that instead of attacking Syria, he made the long march from Babylon through Cappadocia and Phrygia, in order to fight on the ground chosen by Lysimachus and Antigonos, was undoubtedly a very considerable piece of generalship.

16. Cilicia and perhaps Lycia and Caria conquered by Demetrius, see v. Wil. 198.—Other events of this period explained by the inscription, Hicks, 151, and C. I. A. 2, 197, and Hicks, 153.—Kyinda is Anazarba (-os) according to Suidas and Malalus, according to Strabo 14, 672 a fortress above Anchiale near Tarsus; cf. Dr. 2, 1, 194, and the article Anazarba in Pauly, 1, 1, 169. In this valley of Cilicia there are many isolated summits suitable for the construction of strongholds.

17. For Demochares and Lachares, see chap. iii.—Peace between Athens and Demetrius in the spring of 294, v. Wil. 237.

18. Pirates from Antium sent back to the Romans, Str. 5, 232; Niese, 1, 371.

19. Demetrius' preparations in Southern Thessaly and the expedition which is to start from there recall Minyan traditions, v. Wil. 203.

20. Mediation of Crates, v. Wil. 207, 208. It seems that the Piræus still remained in the hands of Demetrius. Andoleon of

Paeonia and Spartocus of Bosphorus had supported Athens, Hicks, 157, v. Wil. 206. See for these events Hermann-Thumser, § 135, where all the references are given.

21. The march of Demetrius into the interior of Asia Minor raises many questions not yet considered by modern writers. Even Droysen has only repeated Plutarch's story in an effective way, without explaining some striking statements of his. When Plutarch for instance says (Dem. 47): *ἀπῆγεν ὀπίσω τοὺς λοιποὺς*, and this backward move brings him to Tarsus, the question arises: where was Demetrius before this, perhaps already in the plains of Cilicia? Droysen has not gone into this point in his sketch of the campaign. But one main question is: where did Demetrius actually want to go? Did he really want to make for Armenia? And why did he not get there? According to Dr. 2, 2, 305, he was driven out of his route against his will, and that is also pretty much the view of Plutarch, who says expressly that his soldiers did not want to march to Armenia. It might be conjectured, however, that Demetrius intended from the beginning to go to Cilicia. There his fleet could bring him assistance from Greece, and he could perhaps recover the country from his son-in-law. If he had this intention, he was of course bound to conceal it, to avoid exciting suspicion, and to act as if he were being taken to Cilicia against his will. On the other hand, it is not impossible that he really had intended to go to Armenia and Media. The enterprise was not so foolhardy as it otherwise must have appeared, for a reason which has hitherto not been taken into consideration. Demetrius had saved the life of Mithridates, who became king of Pontus with the surname of Ktistes, and was no doubt already very powerful in those regions. The road to Armenia and Media led by Comana, the capital of Pontus. If Demetrius wanted to try his luck in Armenia and Media, it could only be done with the assistance of Mithridates, and Demetrius must in carrying out such a plan have counted with or without reason on the support of his old friend. It may be that Demetrius was forced to retrace his steps owing to the aversion of his soldiers to enter on such a far-seeming undertaking; but it is also possible that he heard on the way, perhaps even not till he got to Cappadocia, that Mithridates could not or would not help him, and that he therefore went to Cilicia. It is quite uncertain how far he got; Plutarch says nothing definite about the whole march from the Lycus (which Lycus is meant?). I have referred to all this as a proof that even after Droysen this or that particular point in the history of the Diadochi can be discussed in detail. But this would be the work of a specialist. Seleucus' *ἱπποτροφεῖον* was in Apamea. That is

why Demetrius was at home there; he could ride there as much as he liked; this point too has not yet been noticed.—Uncertainty of the chronology, Dr. 2, 2, 310.

22. Battle *περὶ Κόρου πεδίου*, Porph. Eust. Sch. 1, 233. The site does not seem to have been yet ascertained. As according to App. Syr. 64, this war was *περὶ Φρυγίαν τὴν ἐφ' Ἑλλησπόντῳ*, it must have been somewhere there. Philetaerus, Str. 13, 623; for Pergamum, see chaps. v., xiii. and xxi.

23. Antigonos was allied with the Aetolians. Areus of Sparta marched against them suddenly in 280, but had to retreat. What political complications were at the bottom of this, we do not know; Pöhlmann acutely conjectures that Egypt incited the Spartans; see chap. xii. note 7.

CHAPTER III

THE LEADING FIGURES OF THE AGE

THE period from 323-280 is one of great confusion, in which the sorely-tried and expiring empire splits up into separate states, the most important of which are Greek in character. Greek culture now takes the lead in many of the countries conquered by Alexander. But the spread of Hellenic civilization is not the main characteristic of the forty years, the history of which we have narrated as briefly as possible; it is rather the predominance of the individual, which is seldom of such great importance in ancient history as in this epoch. Everything in this period always turns exclusively on the desires, the will, the advantage, of individuals; the wishes and the advantage of the nations are sometimes taken into consideration incidentally, but as a rule are entirely disregarded. The heroes of the age are rulers; the people plays a very insignificant part; only in Greece proper and in Asia Minor does it try to assert itself, and rarely with success, on one occasion it is true in really brilliant fashion (Rhodes). The people had by no means degenerated, as many writers suppose.¹

The individuals who came to the front may be designated in a certain sense as 'self-made' men. They attained to the position which they occupied, not by their birth, but by their own abilities. But we must not consider this rise to undreamt-of elevations in a wrong light. The Diadochi have been compared with the marshals of Napoleon I. There is an

element of truth in this, but the essential distinctions must not be lost sight of. Napoleon was a *parvenu*; among his ablest marshals were sons of an innkeeper, of a servant and of a stable-man. Alexander was a legitimate monarch, and most of his generals belonged to the nobility of the country. But what they became after the death of their leader they owed to themselves, and they had all the more difficulty in maintaining their position, because they were never united. It was a regular struggle for existence, in which only a strong type of character holds its own. One prominent quality they all of course had—personal courage. Two famous kings, Antigonos and Lysimachos, fell in battle, both of them at an advanced age, which proves how vigorous the men of those days were. But one highly characteristic trait of them is that religion had no influence on their mode of life. This was owing to the Greek religion itself, which on the one hand reposed on ceremonies, and in the second place was an affair of State. As it consisted of external actions, it had no direct influence on the morality of the individual; as it was an affair of State, the monarchs could make use of it for their own advantage without materially changing its character. It was not until 300 years after the events related by us that the need of a better religion made itself felt, owing to the evil consequences of the existing one. Even at that early stage the Greeks had themselves destroyed the moral value of their religion by ranking living individuals among the gods.

Religion therefore, as it existed then, did not contribute to the improvement of manners. It only intensified the selfishness of the rulers, who resorted to signs and dreams to establish their descent from the gods or to better attain their ends. Practices of this kind served their purpose, for the people still retained belief. Thus Seleucus tried to prove his divine origin, and Eumenes, less egoistically, his divine mission. When the generals and kings who succeeded Alexander acted in a humane and proper manner, they did so from personal

motives or philosophical conviction; and we must not be less grateful to them, for the times were so favourable to the success of desperate undertakings, that some strength of character was required not to consider the advantage of the moment as the sole standard of action.

The influential personages are almost all Macedonians by descent; consequently the element of violence predominates. But they have Greek culture, which was not lacking even to the comrades-in-arms of King Philip. Hence the appearance of certain forms which they invariably observe in their outward conduct. Some of these forms arise at this very time and are due to Greek education, as, for instance, great politeness in intercourse between sovereigns, such as reappeared later in the West. This is compatible with barbarousness below the surface, in which respect many potentates of this time are not much better than the Merovingian Franks. The age of the Italian Renaissance, however, presents greater points of similarity; there too we find a veneer of culture over the most unfeeling egoism.

One indication of the enhanced importance of the individual is the prominence of women, who play a considerable part precisely in the period now under our consideration. This too recalls the Renaissance.

In the following remarks we give a sketch of the leading figures among the Diadochi, the immediate successors of Alexander, adding a few of the Epigoni, who succeeded the Diadochi, as well as some representatives of the republics and some remarkable women.²

We pass over Perdikkas,³ whose independent action was of too brief duration and who, by nature a modest and capable man, proved unequal to the task of governing the whole empire, as well as the generally esteemed and prematurely deceased Craterus, and begin with ANTIPATER.⁴ He was the oldest of the Diadochi. He was eighty years of age when he died, in the year 319, consequently sixty-three years old

when Alexander started for Asia, nearly forty when Philip ascended the throne, and fifteen years older than Philip. He was a Macedonian of the old type, who would have nothing to do either with Greek refinement or with a policy of general conquest, a man who evidently cared a great deal for Macedonia but not the slightest for Asia. Antipater was opposed to exaggeration of every kind, and this prosaic temperament of his brought him into constant conflict with the eccentric Olympias when he had to rule in Europe during Alexander's campaign in Asia. He was cruel in his punishment of the enemies of his state, as was shown by the treatment of the Athenian patriots after the Lamian War. Self-seeking, on his own account or for his family, he was not, or he would not have appointed the aged Polysperchon to succeed him as regent instead of his son Cassander.

The next in point of age was ANTIGONUS,⁵ son of a certain Philip, and born in 385. He too was consequently older than Philip, of the same age as Demosthenes. He began his great career comparatively late, for he was appointed governor of Phrygia by Alexander, a province of great importance owing to its position on the west of the central desert of Asia Minor, and as starting-point of the two routes to the East (see chap. iv.), and he remained in this important but by no means brilliant post up to the death of the king, without taking any considerable part in his campaigns. Not till after the death of Alexander, when he was sixty-two years of age, did he come into the front rank. He was of lofty stature, but one-eyed, and therefore called Monophthalmos and also Cyclops. Antigonus was a circumspect methodical man who amassed money. It was said that he had a yearly income of 11,000 talents and treasure amounting to 35,000. He was witty, and many good sayings of his are recorded. He was also affable, but would not stand any jokes about his one eye; the sophist Theocritus of Chios paid for one with his life. Antigonus seems to have been greater as an organizer than as a general. He got

the better of Eumenes more by stratagem than by fighting; against Egypt he did nothing at all, and we may assume that he was only conquered by Lysimachus and Seleucus because he neglected to attack them with energy separately. His relations with his son Demetrius, in whom he had absolute confidence, were very striking. His mental calm, even when there was no reason for it, and his trust in his son were shown at the battle of Ipsus. The enemy were pressing round him on all sides. "They are aiming at you, King," said his attendants. "Who else would it be?" he replied; "my son will come and save me." In this assurance he fought and fell. He left a good name in Phrygia. A peasant was digging in his field after his death and on being asked: "What are you doing there?" replied: "I am trying to find Antigonus."

Next to him in age comes PTOLEMY, son of Arsinoe and Lagos, a man of low rank.⁶ Yet it was said that his real father was King Philip, which is not probable owing to the dates. He was born in 367, was very brave, energetic, reliable, and devoted to Alexander. It was he who took Bessus prisoner. He showed his great shrewdness by correctly appreciating the importance of Egypt and taking possession of this province immediately after the king's death and never aspiring to the sovereignty of the whole empire. As ruler of Egypt also he proved his courage and judgment in the defence of the country against Perdiccas and subsequently against Antigonus and Demetrius. He was so well educated that he was able to come forward as a writer himself; his history of Alexander the Great was generally appreciated. He displayed great self-denial in abdicating in favour of Philadelphus. He died two years afterwards, in 283 B.C., at the age of eighty-three. His dynasty lasted the longest of all the dynasties of Alexander's successors, nearly 300 years, which is due exclusively to its founder, who knew how to select the form of government best suited to the peculiar condition of the country.

LYSIMACHUS, a son of Agathocles, a native of Thessaly, was born in 361.⁷ He had been one of the body-guard (adjutants-general) of the king, and was a brave man and skilful general. He showed his good generalship by contriving to avoid a decisive encounter in the war with Antigonus, who was superior to him in numbers, and by not delivering battle till Seleucus had arrived. He had acquired a fine kingdom, which included Thrace and part of Asia Minor, and had scraped together a good deal of money, for which he was laughed at as Gazophylax. He, like Antigonus and Seleucus, recognized the importance of the policy of founding cities; he founded Lysimachia on the Hellespont, and rebuilt Smyrna. The money-grubbing Lysimachus had the satisfaction of seeing his types of coins imitated for a long time by the Greek cities in Anterior Asia. With advancing years, however, he gave proof of a narrow-mindedness, and in fact baseness, of disposition, which no doubt had been formerly kept more under control, and by these faults he contributed most to his own ruin. He sent Pyrrhus a letter composed by himself but purporting to be written by Ptolemy, to mislead him; he offered Seleucus 2000 talents if he would kill Demetrius—so little did he know the character of his old comrade. He gave credence to Ceraunus' calumnies and put his able son Agathocles to death; he murdered his son-in-law Antipater to obtain possession of Macedonia, and at last committed so many discreditable actions that all his adherents deserted him and after his death, which he met bravely in the battlefield, the only creature that took any notice of his corpse was his dog.

SELEUCUS was born about 353, and was the son of Laodice and the general Antiochus, or, as flatterers maintained, of Apollo.⁸ Seleucus had great physical strength; he is said to have once thrown down a wild bull in presence of Alexander. He became chiliarch through the influence of Perdiccas, but nevertheless took part in the latter's assassination. He was prudent and persevering, and was considered the best of Alexander's generals.

He was an admirable administrator. He founded many cities, but also encouraged agriculture and horse-breeding, paid special attention to trade and patronized art. His good nature is proved by the story of the illness of Antiochus, to which we shall refer shortly, the humanity and nobility of his disposition by his wish after the victory over Lysimachus to be allowed to end his days in his dearly-loved Macedonian home. That he was not more on his guard against Ceraunus shows that his mind was on a far higher level than that of this despicable individual.

The only Greek whom we have to mention here is EUMENES. He was a native of Cardia and born about 361. He had had an influential yet not a brilliant position under Alexander (vol. iii. p. 379), but was not regarded as an able soldier at that time. This quality did not reveal itself until after the death of the king. He then proved himself a good soldier, a prudent general and a skilful diplomatist. He knew how to turn to account and influence the feelings of the soldiers; this is shown by his erection of Alexander's tent. Antigonus was only able to vanquish him by treachery. By making the defence of the unity of the empire and of the royal house his aim he courted ruin. If he had listened to the proposals of others, who wished to get him on their side, he would in all probability have escaped with his life. Eumenes was morally on a level with the best Macedonians, with a Seleucus, a Ptolemy, an Antigonus, and both as general and statesman at all events on a par with the two last, and even superior to Antigonus. In that turbulent age he was in every way a credit to the Greek nation. His misfortune as opposed to the other generals consisted in the fact that his nation was no support to him, whereas they enlisted adherents in all quarters by simply appealing to their Macedonian descent. The last great purely Greek general in Asia proved by his adherence to a cause which was already half lost and by his sacrifice of himself to it, that idealism and loyalty had not departed from the

Greeks, less at all events than from the Macedonians. In view of the prevailing prejudice against the Greek character it is of importance to draw attention to this.

The transition from the Diadochi to the Epigoni is formed by CASSANDER, the son of Antipater.⁹ He was born about 354, and was consequently of the same age as Seleucus. Of a hard and obstinate disposition, he had been badly treated by Alexander when he came to Asia and behaved in an unseemly way at the close of the latter's reign, and he therefore during his whole life cherished a feeling of violent resentment against the king, a feeling which he vented all the more readily on the latter's family because Olympias and Antipater had always been on bad terms with one another and Olympias persecuted Cassander's family in a frantic way. This was why he put Olympias to death, as well as young Alexander and the latter's mother Roxana, and incited Polysperchon to murder the remaining son of Alexander, Heracles. He died of consumption in 297. Of his sons the eldest inherited his weakly frame; in the case of the others, Antipater's cool calculation, which had become extreme severity in Cassander, developed into low cruelty. The eldest son Philip died after a reign of only four months; of the other two Antipater killed his own mother and was murdered by order of his father-in-law Lysimachus; finally Alexander wanted to assassinate Demetrius and was cut down by the latter's orders. This was the end of the house of Antipater, a house the disappearance of which was no loss to Macedonia.

Just as Cassander is an intensified but deteriorated Antipater, so is DEMETRIUS an intensified Antigonus, but with this difference, that he inherited hardly any of Antigonus' egoism and many of his good qualities.¹⁰ He was a handsome man, grand in his plans, chivalrous in his conduct to his enemies (Ptolemy), self-sacrificing and thoughtful in that to his friends (Mithridates), very dissolute, but in his good days only when there was no serious business on hand. He had a

decided taste for the theatrical, both in his personal demeanour and in his military preparations. In a siege the main point for him was a display of power on a grand scale ; he was capable of consoling himself for the failure of the siege of Rhodes by the thought that such a siege had never taken place before. This was why he presented the Rhodians with the Helepolis, the mere name of which was a triumph for the besieged. He was rightly called Poliorcetes. He was as little of a good general in reality as his father. With advancing years his faults increased ; his unstableness developed into incapacity to rule a country quietly. When he was king of Macedonia, he wanted to enjoy the splendour of the exalted position without discharging the prosaic duties of a ruler : he threw the petitions into the water. But he was so good-natured that afterwards the reproaches of an old woman made him do his best to govern for a time. In many respects he was an imitator of Alexander, in his love of Athens, for instance, which he visited again and again, not, it is true, for the sole purpose of intellectual enjoyment. From the booty at Salamis he sent suits of armour to Athens, as Alexander had done from the Granicus. It might be said that he was really more of an Alcibiades than an Alexander. At all events his landing at the Piraeus and his private life more recalled the former. True, he was not such an able politician as Alcibiades, but far more high-minded and good-natured. He did not make merry over the world like Alcibiades ; on the contrary, he let it get the better of him, and this was his ruin. It is not impossible that the conduct of the Athenians towards him seemed to him a sad piece of ingratitude. He was a model son and father, and that was no small thing in that self-seeking age. Born in 337, he died in 284, at the age of fifty-three only. For some period of time he was master of the sea and ruler of pirates ; when he had to submit, he led the life of a robber-chief in the country. In him the individuality so marked in those days reached its culminating

point, and he wrought his own destruction precisely by not being such a deliberate egoist as all his rivals. The times eventually became so serious that aimless genius could not lead to anything. He is the knight-errant of the age, a fit subject for an epic in the style of Ariosto, which the Greeks have never had. He might be described as a grown-up child.

The son of Ptolemy I., who succeeded his father, we shall refer to presently. He is a man who, like Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, who will also not be discussed till later on, was not so much adapted for fighting as for the peaceful government of an inherited country; he is an Epigonus in another and perhaps more correct sense. Among the Epigoni, however, in a literal sense, *i.e.* the sons of the Diadochi, who continued their fathers' work with less originality and vigour, may be classed PTOLEMY CERAUNUS.¹¹ His father deprived him of the succession with a true appreciation of his character. Ceraunus does not appear in history until he leaves Egypt. At that time he must have been at least thirty years old. What kind of man he was is revealed by his actions. He escapes to Lysimachus, whose wife is his own sister Arsinoe, forms a connection with her in order to kill the king's son, and kills him, then he flies to Seleucus and assassinates him, makes himself master of Thrace and Macedonia, marries the above-mentioned Arsinoe, and puts to death her children in her presence, because they are the lawful heirs of Thrace. That he was slain in the incursion of the Galli in the year 279 shows that this invasion was after all good for something. What crimes must this miscreant not have already committed in Egypt to make his father, who must have recognized in him at all events one hereditary quality, that of cool reflection, decide to comply with the entreaties of the mother of Philadelphus and disinherit Ceraunus!

Of Polysperchon we know too little to give a sketch of his character; Pyrrhus must be dealt with later on.

Of republican statesmen we can only enumerate Athenians.¹² Demosthenes and Phocion do not belong to this category; only the close of their careers extends into this epoch. The same remark applies to Hyperides. Demades no doubt does not come to the front until after the battle of Chaeronea; but he too soon vanishes from the scene after an inglorious life. DEMOCHARES, a nephew of Demosthenes, is not altogether unassailable; his fame has been preserved by his son Laches in an eulogistic motion which is still extant. In it is pointed out that he served only the republic, but at the same time, naïvely enough, that he contrived to obtain money for Athens from Macedonian kings. Polybius defends him against abuse by Timaeus; but this does not prove, as is generally assumed, that Polybius knew anything positive to his credit.

The censure bestowed on LACHARES, who made himself tyrant of Athens during the war of the Athenians against Demetrius, is, it would seem, not altogether deserved. True, he is said to have stolen the State treasure. On the other hand, his maintenance of strict discipline in the besieged city, and contenting himself with moderate rations during the scarcity, is only a credit to him.

DEMETRIUS of PHALERUM was no statesman at all; he was a scholar and a man of the world, who as governor of Athens for a time proved his talents in the department of administration.

Among the women¹³ those of the royal house deserve the first place. At their head is the demoniacal figure of OLYMPIAS. What must have been the experiences of this queen from her youth up! After neglect by her husband came the unparalleled career of her son, but even this brought no real pleasure to Olympias; she wanted to rule in Macedonia, and Antipater would not allow it. Then with Alexander's premature death all the joy of her life was gone. She withdrew to her native Epirus, which she left once more to perpetrate horrors in Macedonia and to meet with an

equally horrible death. She is a woman before whom all criticism is speechless.

Just as energetic as Olympias were CYNANE and EURYDICE, of whom enough has been said in chap. i. Cynane was a virago; on one occasion in a war with Illyria she had slain the queen of that country, who was also taking part in the engagement, with her own hand. It was difficult for Alcetas, the brother of Perdiccas, to find Macedonians to kill the daughter of Philip. Of a similar character was her daughter Eurydice, who used her connection with the imbecile king to gain political influence.

THESSALONICE, daughter of Philip by a native of Pherae, became the wife of Cassander, who wished to secure more respect from the Macedonians by this alliance. He named the city formerly called Therma, the modern Salonica, after her. She went through all the stormy scenes of the turbulent party fights, to be murdered at last, about 295 B.C., by her own son Antipater, who resented her preference of his brother Alexander.

At an earlier date, in the year 308, another daughter of Philip, CLEOPATRA, daughter of Olympias, had perished. She cannot have inherited much of her mother's savage nature, for on becoming widow of her uncle Alexander of Epirus and being unable to gratify her wish to marry Leonnatus or Perdiccas, on account of their premature death, and unwilling to take Cassander or Lysimachus, who courted her hand, she lived a quiet life in Sardes. Then she conceived the ill-inspired idea of marrying Ptolemy, and Antigonus put her to death in the manner above described.

Nothing more need be said of Roxana than has already been stated.

A human interest is awakened by PHILA, the daughter of Antipater, who married first Craterus and then Demetrius Poliorcetes. She forgave her brilliant husband his numerous infidelities and put an end to her own life when she thought

there was no hope of his retrieving his position. This was in 288. Demetrius' splendid nuptials in Miletus in the following year with Phila's niece, Ptolemais, daughter of Ptolemy and Eurydice, a few months before he set out on his last adventurous campaign in Asia Minor, are characteristic of the age and the man. Phila's son by Demetrius was the prudent and capable Antigonus Gonatas; her son by Craterus appears to have been the historian Craterus.

ARSINOË, the daughter of Ptolemy I., must have been an intriguing clever woman; as wife of Lysimachus she put to death her step-son Agathocles in concert with her step-brother Ceraunus, and committed the folly of marrying Ceraunus, which the latter repaid by murdering her children. Up to that time she had only shown her taste for intrigue; her prudence she displayed in the later years of her life. She went to Egypt, where she became the wife of her full brother, Ptolemy II., whom, as it appears, she completely controlled. She belongs mainly to the following period.

CRATESIPOLIS, the wife of Alexander, son of Polysperchon, was a regular virago; when her husband was murdered in 314, and the city of Sicyon which was subject to him revolted, she defeated the Sicyonians in person at the head of her soldiers and had thirty of them crucified. She then governed Sicyon until she handed it over to Ptolemy of Egypt. After that she lived in Patrae. At a meeting which she once had with Demetrius, the latter was very nearly being taken prisoner.

AMASTRIS was a respectable Persian lady, a niece of King Darius, who married Craterus at the great marriage festival of the soldiers. Subsequently Craterus made her over to Dionysius of Heraclea, who gained such prestige by this alliance, that, although he only ruled over a small territory, he was able to take the title of king instead of tyrant. After the death of Dionysius the elderly Amastris married Lysimachus, who is supposed to have thought very highly of her. This of course did not prevent him from sending her away

in order to contract a seemingly more advantageous alliance—with Arsinoë—and she returned to Heraclea, where her two sons, Clearchus and Oxathres, murdered her. For this they were killed by Lysimachus. As in her quality of a Persian lady of rank she had not been bred to independence—Roxana, who had grown up in her father's mountain stronghold in the wilds of Bactria, had a much better idea of helping herself, and showed it by murdering another wife of Alexander—we can understand that she submitted cheerfully to her double dismissal.

If we try to deduce from the foregoing some general considerations for an estimate of that age, one main point is that it presents glaring contrasts in close proximity, a great deal of shadow, but yet a certain amount of light. The shadows are painfully prominent. In particular no regard whatever was paid to human life, i.e. the life of others, where personal advantage was in question. If the best specimens behaved in this way, what is to be said of the bad ones? That Antigonus put to death the captive Eumenes after some hesitation, may be excused as a political necessity; the murder of Cleopatra in Sardes was not so urgently required. Ptolemy forced Prince Nicocles of Paphos and Ptolemy, the nephew of Antigonus, to put an end to their own lives, because he suspected both of wishing to revolt from him; Seleucus himself took part in the murder of Perdiccas. Apollodorus of Cassandria presented an example of a cruel tyranny. The conduct of the Argyraspidae, who betrayed Eumenes in order not to lose their personal comforts, may serve as an instance of treachery. The worst feature, however, is that the relations between parents and children are often so sad. Lysimachus puts to death his son Agathocles, Clearchus and Oxathres of Heraclea murder their mother Amastris, King Antipater of Macedonia his mother Thessalonice. A brilliant contrast to this is presented by the relations which prevailed in the family of

Antigonus. Perfect accord existed between Antigonus and Demetrius; the father trusted implicitly to his son. In the battle near Ipsus, even a few moments before his death, he fully believed that Demetrius would hew him out of the enemy. Demetrius was always ready to begin and break off undertakings at his father's orders without consulting his own interest or even using his own judgment. Mutual trust also prevailed in the relations between Seleucus and his son Antiochus. There is the well-known story, which it is true sounds rather mythical, how Antiochus fell very ill, and how when the physician Erasistratus discovered or asserted that his malady was caused solely by a suppressed passion for his young stepmother Stratonice, daughter of Demetrius and Phila, and informed Seleucus of it, the latter made her over to his son, at the same time ceding to him the government of the eastern province of the empire.¹⁴ In the subsequent career of the dynasties of Macedonia, Syria and Egypt such examples of united family life become rarer and rarer, and the reverse more frequent. Absolutism produces its evil effects here too, and in the end all these dynasties, as well as those of Bithynia, Cappadocia and Pontus, richly deserved their fate by their unbounded selfishness and immorality. The sovereigns of Pergamum, who were more Greek in origin, were the only rulers who behaved more satisfactorily.

A pleasant trait in the history of the age is the courtesy with which the better specimens among the rulers treated their opponents. The example had been set by Philip in his conduct towards Athens, and still more by Alexander; of their successors, Ptolemy and Demetrius continued it worthily, the latter following in his father's footsteps. After the battle at Gaza, in 312, Ptolemy sent back his captured friends, servants and baggage to Demetrius, with congratulations on the valour displayed by the young general. After his victory at Myus, in the same year, Demetrius returned Ptolemy's courtesy in a similar way, by sending back the general Killes, whom he

had taken prisoner, to the ruler of Egypt. At the siege of Rhodes too both sides showed the greatest consideration, the Rhodians by not pulling down the statues of Antigonus and Demetrius, which were in their city, and Demetrius by making the Rhodians a present of the Helepolis with his compliments. Demetrius' consideration for the painter Protogenes, who was living in a suburb of Rhodes, on whose account he is said to have refrained from burning down this suburb, a proceeding which would have been advantageous for the besiegers, is another instance of this.

As regards marriages, the example of Philip is followed: the rulers contract as many alliances as they like. The sole difference is this, that while Philip consulted only his own inclination, with Alexander's successors political considerations come into play. At one time the advantage is a connection with the royal house, at another with the families of the other Diadochi. The marriages are the outward sign of the terms of friendship between the princes. Hence they last only just as long as those terms, and princesses change their husbands and their residences very rapidly, being lucky if they are only sent away and not put to death. With Demetrius Poliorcetes it is more a case of polygamy. Of course there is often enmity between half-brothers and sisters. Marriages of brothers and sisters are a peculiarity of ancient Egypt.

In the army,¹⁵ whether it served in Europe or in Asia, the Macedonians had a preponderance. Yet the mercenaries gradually become more and more important. In this respect the position reverts to what it was before Alexander's campaigns. And at the same time piracy is rife. Mercenaries and pirates are often the same persons, who ply the one trade or the other according to circumstances.

It is remarkable that the last outward token of the unity of the empire is the storage in certain fortresses of treasure which is considered the property of the empire, and cannot

be meddled with as a matter of course by the generals when they have become kings. One of these fortresses was Cyinda in Cilicia, the treasure in which is mentioned as late as the year 302, and again in 300, when Demetrius appropriates the balance remaining, 1200 talents. The hoarding of treasure becomes a general practice. Pergamum was a treasure-house of the miserly Lysimachus; in later times we shall hear of seventy-five treasure-houses of Mithridates in Pontus.

NOTES

1. In general cf. Droysen's character-sketches, as well as chaps. 3 and 4 of Mahaffy's *Life and Thought*.

2. DIADOCHI AND EPIGONI, already used as characteristic designations by Hieronymus of Cardia, see above, p. 31; see also Diod. 1, 3, and Usener, *Epigramm von Knidos*, p. 36. Epigoni was originally the regular name for the sons of the Seven against Thebes. The period of the Diadochi may be said to go down to 280; bringing down the Epigoni to 320 is an extension of the idea by Droysen. Diod. 1, 3 does not use the term *ἐπίγονοι* for the middle of the third century B.C.—Other *ἐπίγονοι*, see below, chap. xv. note 3.—The Diadochi and their successors were at great pains to secure the position which they had attained by force in other ways. At first the doctrine was propagated that the *βασιλεία* was not really a thing which must have been inherited: it belonged to the ablest (Koehler, *Sitzungsber. Berl. Ak.* 1891, Feb. 26). That was a justification of the usurpations of an Antigonius, a Cassander, etc. But as the ability of the individual was a very doubtful matter, other titles were soon discovered, which were especially suitable for the ever-increasing number of incapable kings; hereditary right was dragged out again, and even a kind of divine right manufactured. The nine kings were either descendants of Philip, the father of Alexander (Ptolemies), or of the Macedonian royal house in general (Antigonids, Polyb. 5, 10; Ptolemies, Satyrus, Fr. 21, Müller, 3, 165), or even of gods (Seleucids). There was also a combination of two qualifications: ability and divine right, indirectly attempted by Euhemerus, see chap. vi. If Zeus himself had been simply a fortunate monarch, why should a Cassander, if he only had good luck, not be a legitimate king?—The ability of Alexander's generals is praised by Polyb. 8, 12, where, however, the expression *ζῶες* in the recognition

of Alexander is not well chosen, even on Polybius' own showing, as in other passages he rightly places the leader's influence higher (7, 14).—The difference between Napoleon's marshals and the Diadochi is also pointed out by Mahaffy, *Life*, etc., p. 67.

3. PERDICCAS, honourable remark of his in Plutarch, *Al. virt.* 2, 11.

4. ANTIPATER is called 'edel' by von Wilamowitz (*Ant. v. Kar.* 185). He was a shrewd man, the Ptolemy of Macedonia, and indulged in no illusions as to the importance of the monarchy (he was opposed to Alexander's claim to divinity) or his own powers. Hence he really does make a comparatively favourable impression.

5. ANTIGONUS. His extraction, *Dr.* 1, 27, and 1, 1, 87; cf. *Ael. V. H.* 12, 13.

6. PTOLEMY. Detailed account by Cless in Pauly's *R. E.* 6, 1, 179-191. His surname of Soter, *Paus.* 1, 8, 6 (gratitude of the Rhodians); *Arr.* 6, 11, 8 (incorrect on account of the rescue of Alexander); first honoured in Egypt as Soter in 261/60 by command of his son; *Cat. Br. Mus. Ptol.* p. xxxv. Cf. Koehler, *Sitzungsber. Berl. Ak.* 1891, Feb. P. Gardner (*New Chapters*, p. 452) says: "It would be difficult to find a juster ruler than the first Ptolemy." I am not aware that anything special is known of his justice.

7. LYSIMACHUS, Cless in Pauly, 4, 1303 seq.; *locus classicus*, *Paus.* 1, 9, 10. A brave member of Alexander's staff, he was afterwards placed in charge of Thrace, and had to contend against barbarians for seven years, especially against the Odrisian Seuthes III.; it is not till 315 that he intervenes vigorously in the party-fights as opponent of Antigonus. According to *Diod.* 19, 77 in the year 312 he prevents the Byzantines from joining Antigonus. For his cleverness after the battle at Ipsus, Cless, 1306-1309.—Lysimachia, now Hexamili, took the place of the neighbouring Cardia. Lysimachia was about 600 feet above the sea, equi-distant from both seas, whereas Cardia had access only to the Thracian Sea and not to the Hellespont. Asia had now become of greater importance.—Lysimachus called γαλοφύλαξ in *Plut. Dem.* 25. Besides the treasure of 9000 talents in Pergamum, which Philetaerus embezzled, a treasure of Lysimachus in Sardes is mentioned (*Polyaen.* 4, 9, 4) and one in Tirizis in Thrace (*Str.* 7, 319).—Antigonia in Bithynia called Nicaea by Lysimachus after his wife. Other cities founded by him, see Kuhn, *Entstehung der Städte der Alten*, Leipzig, 1878, pp. 335-362.—Lysimachus banishes the philosophers, *Ath.* 13, 610.—Pöhlmann has rightly pointed out in *I. Müller's Handbuch*, 3, 444, that coins of Lysimachus do not prove that the cities which issued them were dependent on him;

they only prove the popularity of the type.—For Lysimachus see also Niese, 1, 396-399.

8. SELEUCUS, Cless in Pauly, 6, 1, 923-936; Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, pp. iii-xxxix. So far as I am aware no connection between the anchor which is supposed to point to Apollo (Just. 15, 4) and this god is demonstrable. The anchor appears for the first time on the coins minted in Babylon by Seleucus as successor of the satrap Mazaeus. Cf. the passage in App. Syr. 56, not quoted by Babelon, according to which Seleucus' mother finds a ring with an anchor, which Seleucus loses by the Euphrates, a sign that he was destined to rule on that river. This seems to me to point to the connection of the anchor with Babylon.—Legends, Just. 15, 4. Some of them are similar to those of Lysimachus. Seleucus overcomes a bull (App. Syr. 56), Lysimachus a lion (Just. 15, 3); the bandage tied by chance round the head is a sign of future royal dignity in both. The emblem of Seleucus on coins is the face of a horned horse; the portraits recognized as those of Seleucus by Babelon have the horns and the bandage. Seleucus bestows gifts on Athens, like Alexander; Curtius, *Stadtgesch.* 242.

9. CASSANDER. Von Wilamowitz credits him with "cool, intelligent deliberation." According to Arr. 7, 27, and Plut. Al. 74, he was more a passionate man, controlling his temper with difficulty, and breaking out on occasion all the more fiercely afterwards. Nor was it a 'misfortune' that his rule was not consolidated. Von Wilamowitz thinks that the Celts would not have committed such ravages under his government. But there is no reason to suppose that he would have accomplished more against them than Ceraunus did, and from a general point of view it may be said that the death of this prince was not more of a misfortune for anybody than that of most of the other sovereigns of the age.


10. DEMETRIUS. Fine sympathetic sketch of this interesting man by von Wil. 187. Cf. Hermann-Thumser, *Staatsalt.* § 135. It is much to be regretted that in the hurry of events Demetrius did not receive a better education, but even without it he is both as a man and a statesman far above Alcibiades, who resembles him in many respects. He was invariably chivalrous and loyal to the cause he had once championed, whereas in Alcibiades it is precisely the want of good faith in politics which conveys such a melancholy impression. But Demetrius too gradually lost his moral balance; cf. the story in Plut. Dem. 43, where his son Antigonus appears more humane than he does. It is also remarkable that the older man at the close of his career engages in the adventurous campaign in Asia Minor, while his son keeps the provinces in Greece together so unobtrusively that, if he had not

made Greece a base for the conquest of Macedonia afterwards, one would hardly be aware that he still possessed an empire in those regions. From the point of view of Greek history Demetrius deserves decided recognition for his great affection for Athens.

11. **PTOLEMY CERAUNUS.** The way in which Droysen contrives to shed a lurid light on the figures of this age is seen by his translating at full length into German (2, 2, 339) Justinus' inflated description of the murder of Arsinoë's children (24, 2, 3). Details of this kind are mere rhetoric in Justinus.

12. Republican statesmen, Hermann-Thumser, § 135. Very good account in v. Wil. 189 seq. The vindication of Demochares by Polyb. 6, 12, 13, has nothing to do with his work as a statesman.

13. The WOMEN of the royal family :—



AMASTRIS is described by Droysen (2, 2, 207) as 'venerable' just at the time when she marries Lysimachus. In spite of this, according to him, she "won the king's heart" then. Of course it was the wealthy Heraclea which won the shrewd king's heart. It is characteristic, however, that the kings of those days should now be not only of lofty character, but actually so full of feeling as to be quite on a par with the characters in Racine's classic tragedies.

14. Seleucus and Antiochus, Sus. 1, 799 ; Percy Gardner, New Chapters, p. 454.

15. THE MACEDONIAN ARMY, the people in arms, had a great importance under Alexander. It maintained and supported its king, but it also influenced him. It compelled him to turn homeward, to recognize the Macedonians as *συγγενεῖς* and to send back the veterans. Even after the death of the great king the position remained the same for a considerable time; the army was a support to, but also occasionally the master of, the sovereigns. It insisted on Arrhidaeus ascending the throne, it acquitted Ptolemy against the wish of Perdiccas, it approved the murder of Perdiccas, and could only be won over with great cunning by Eumenes, from

whom it revolted as soon as possible. The arrogant demeanour of the Argyraspidae, however, convinced the sovereigns that it would be better for them not to rely exclusively on Macedonian soldiers, and as even in the mother-country the soldier served first one and then another of the pretenders—and there was no reason why it should not be so, as they were all usurpers with an equally good title—the Diadochi came to the conclusion that mercenaries had their good side for people in their position. Popular king : popular army ; usurpers : mercenaries ; that was the proper equation. The assembly of the army therefore actually loses its political importance in Macedonia, and even the Antigonids depend a good deal on mercenaries for their foreign undertakings.—The mercenaries were of all possible races. Among the Greeks the first place was taken by the Cretans and the Aetolians, who also supplied most of the leaders of the mercenaries. Cf. for the Cretans, Polyb. 8, 18. Aetolians we often meet with, especially in Egypt. Then there were barbarians, such as Thracians, Polyb. 5, 65, and Celts from Thrace and Asia. Cf. L. Chevalier, *Die griechischen Söldnerheere*, Pest and Prague, 1860. For the position of the mercenaries in regard to their employers, see the interesting inscription in Fränkel No. 13. Cf. also Polyb. 31, 3.—The same races, especially the Greeks, and among them chiefly the Cretans and Aetolians, also practised piracy. They became *λῃσταί*, or as was said euphemistically, *πειραταί*, people who make attempts to earn something on the high seas. For the connection of the mercenary system with piracy see Strabo 10, 477 *à propos* of Crete. Unemployed mercenaries, when they had enough money to buy a ship, became pirates and on occasion mercenaries again. Well-paid generals of kings were arch-pirates, such as Aminias, who was in the service of Antigonus against Pyrrhus, Dr. 3, 1, 212 ; for his action against Cassandria see Dr. 3, 1, 199. That Macedonia must have fostered piracy, see chap. v. The connection of Poliorcetes with pirates is clear ; in 305 τὰ τῶν πειρατῶν πορεῖα were employed by him against Rhodes. Pirates in the service of Ptolemy II. against Antiochus I., Paus. 1, 7. Demetrius of Pharos, the friend of Philip V. of Macedonia, commits acts of piracy, Polyb. 4, 16, 19. The arch-pirate Nicander fights under Polyxenidas, the admiral of Antiochus III., against the Rhodians, Liv. 37, 11. Cf. Stein, *Ueber Piraterie im Alterthum*, I. Coethen, 1891, and Comparetti, *Commentary on the laws of Gortyna*, col. 225 of the 3rd vol. of the *Monumenti Antichi dei Accad. dei Lincei*. Certain states and individuals practise piracy as a business. Of the Aetolians we read in Polyb. 4, 6 κατὰ θάλατταν παραχρῆμα πειρατὰς ἐξέπεμψαν. Here the resemblance

is unmistakeable to the privateers of modern days, who are private persons committing piracy on their own account with the sanction of the state which employs them. Privateering by Philip vol. iii. p. 227. Of sovereigns who sanction piracy, I may mention also Agathocles, who concert with Iapygians and Peucetians for this purpose, Diod. 21, 4; Nabis of Sparta: *ἐκoinώνει τοῖς Κρησὶ τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν ληστειῶν*, Polyb. 13, 8; also Philip V. according to Polyb. 18, 54, through his general Dicaearchus, who had the impudence to erect altars to *Ἀσέβεια* and *Παρανομία*, while his master very appropriately declared that he feared only the gods! See chap. xvi. note 4.—The southern coast of Asia Minor, which subsequently became so notorious as a haunt of pirates, is not prominent in this respect in the beginning of the third century; the power of Egypt prevented the pirates from thriving at that time. See also chap. xvii. for the consequences of the peace which the Romans concluded with Antiochus, and chap. xix. note 10.—The evil effects of the mercenary system on the morality of the free cities have been exaggerated in modern days. The captains of mercenaries no doubt swaggered in the royal courts, and the mercenaries themselves in the royal cities, but not so much in the free cities. In Athens especially, where intellect was more valued, they could hardly come to the front; more so in Rhodes, where people liked a brilliant exterior. The Aetolians and Cretans brought home a good deal of booty.

In forming an estimate of this period we must not lose sight of the intrinsic essential difference between Alexander and the Diadochi, or be led by a proper appreciation of the greatness of the former into ascribing extraordinary merits to the latter and believing that they conferred any benefits on ancient Greece. Alexander was a genius who opened a new era for the Greeks, and a good specimen of a man into the bargain; the Diadochi were egoists, who aped a genius, even in externals. They only deserve recognition in so far as they promoted culture, and this must be placed to the credit of the Seleucids especially for their encouragement of Greek city life, which always retained a character of freedom and conducing to culture; the Ptolemies merit recognition in a lesser degree for their promotion of science. The Antigonids did little in this respect. In the preceding volume (pp. 374, 375) I have advanced the proposition that in the history of the Greeks, this eminently republican people, Alexander is entitled to take his

place alongside the tyrants, but as the best of them, because with lofty enthusiasm he freed the Greeks from the rule of the barbarians and brought Greek civilization into honour over a vast area. This latter point must also determine the verdict on his successors. In so far as they promoted Greek culture in Asia and Egypt, they are to be commended, but the idea that they were a source of benefit to the Greeks of the old country is in my judgment out of the question.

CHAPTER IV

THE CELTIC INVASION—THE CHARACTER OF ASIA MINOR AND ITS CONSEQUENT HISTORY

ON this selfish society, whose sole object was pleasure and power, a heavy punishment seemed about to descend through the incursion of a barbarous people which was even more unscrupulous than the arrogant Macedonians, and which attacked both Macedonians and Greeks with equal ferocity. But the result was not such as might have been anticipated. The storm blew over and the Graeco-Macedonian world was able to continue its development in its own fashion. This people, which had threatened more than done actual harm, consisted of Gallic tribes.¹

The Gauls or Celts, who were racial kinsmen of the Greeks and more so of the Latins, had migrated some centuries earlier from the east to the west, and had occupied Gaul and Britain. But even by the middle of the fifth century B.C. isolated bands of them had retraced their steps eastwards from their western homes, and had then turned in a southerly direction. In this way some of them had crossed the Alps into the valley of the Po, while others had travelled north of the Alps to the central reaches of the Danube. About 390 B.C. the former had made the celebrated attempt to conquer central Italy and even Rome itself; it was not till a hundred years later that the latter succeeded in pouring farther south and east and in becoming a source of danger to more highly civilized peoples.

That they made this move at this very time was evidently partly due to the fact that their numbers were swelled by a contingent from Italy, where the Gallic tribe of the Senones had been destroyed in 283 and a combined Etrusco-Gallic army had been defeated by the Romans at the Vadimonis Lacus. Many of the conquered emigrated and marched eastwards to their kinsmen, who now naturally found the country too small for them.

Both in Italy and in the Balkan peninsula the Gauls had remained what they had been in Gaul, a restless warlike people, preferring cattle-breeding to agriculture, fond of splendour and booty, of reckless courage in battle, and quickly squandering their gains. Their tactics had nothing of the cautiousness of the Greeks and Macedonians; they tried to overwhelm their enemy by an impetuous charge. A chivalrous element has been noted in them, and this is true if by chivalry is meant bravery combined with a love of display. But they lacked the finer feelings which after all belong to the nature of chivalry. These are met with in many Macedonians and Epirotes, in Demetrius and Pyrrhus for instance. Compared with both of these men the Gauls were a very poor sort of knights.

The movement in the Balkan peninsula appears to have begun as early as 300 B.C., about which time Celts took up their abode on the river Margus, the Morava, which falls into the Danube, and on the Orbelus range east of the Strymon. In the latter region they were already quite close to the Aegean Sea. But in the year 280 they went farther. They saw that the Graeco-Macedonian world was wasting its strength in internal dissensions, and they concluded that it had become feeble enough to be destroyed by their fresh vigour. They advanced in a southerly and easterly direction.

The history of the invasion of Macedonia and Greece by the Celts, and of their further advance and settlement in Asia Minor, has been most inadequately recorded. We have no

connected narrative of it in antiquity, and, strange to say, no remarkable man whose biography might have contained something about the Celts distinguished himself against them. When they came to Macedonia and Greece, Pyrrhus was occupied in Italy, and when they made their appearance in Asia Minor, Demetrius, for whom a fight with them would have been as suitable an occupation as the crusade against the infidels was to Richard Cœur-de-Lion, had been dead for some years, and there was no one to take his place. The other sovereigns who opposed them were no great heroes. Antigonus Gonatas took advantage of a lucky accident to annihilate a number of them; we do not know what Antiochus Soter accomplished against them, and if the Attalids had not taken up the war with the Galli and had not been great lovers of art and literature, we should not know much more of them than that a bit of Asia Minor subsequently belonged to them. The really respectable achievements of the Greek republics against them have been preserved more in legends than in sober accounts. The result is that the history of the incursions of the Gauls into Greece is very imperfectly known, whereas their settlement in Asia Minor, and on the very spot where it took place, is undoubtedly a most important event in the history of the world, the significance of which has hitherto not been properly appreciated. The following is all that has come down to us. :

In 279 the Celts moved from their homes in Thrace in three divisions and in different directions, under Cerethrius against the Thracians and the Triballi, under Brennus and Acichorius into Paconia, under Bolgius against the Macedonians and Illyrians. This last section conquered Ceraunus, who fell alive into the hands of the Celts, who killed him and carried his head about on a pole. The death of so feared and, although bad, so brave a man produced great confusion in Macedonia. There was no generally recognized leader left. Meleager, Ceraunus' brother, Antipater, a nephew of Cassander, and a general called Sosthenes governed the country in turn, which was exposed

to the ravages of the Celts. In 278 they undertook another great campaign in two divisions. Leonorius and Lutarius marched eastwards, but the main body under Brennus and Acichorius turned to the south. The hordes swept over Thessaly, but at Thermopylae the Greeks offered some resistance. Here, according to tradition, the heroic deeds of the Persian wars were repeated, and, as in the time of Xerxes, the enemy took the Greeks in the rear by a march over the mountains, and the latter were rescued by an Athenian fleet. Besides the Athenians, the Boeotians, the Phocians, the Locrians, and a few Macedonians, the Aetolians had made a stand at Thermopylae in considerable force. They, however, had been obliged to return home before the decisive struggle in the pass owing to an incursion of the Celts into Aetolia, in the course of which the city of Callium was destroyed in a horrible way. Here they took such a bloody revenge on the barbarians that only half of the force which had invaded Aetolia escaped. Brennus with his followers marched from Thermopylae to Delphi; but here they were terrified by landslips and earthquakes and some of them slain, and finally, as the legend says, they killed each other in the night in a fit of madness. The survivors retired northwards. Brennus, who was wounded and did not desire to live any longer, poisoned himself in a draught of wine. This was the Greek story. In reality the robbers probably returned to Thrace with some booty.

If all this has an epic ring about it, the further progress of the expeditions of the Galli is exactly like the history of the Greeks after the Trojan war; we have only fragmentary accounts of them. According to these accounts a band of Celts founded a kingdom in the Balkans with a capital called Tylis. Others came into conflict with Antigonos Gonatas in the Thracian Chersonese not far from Lysimachia, and were entirely defeated there (277), which brought Gonatas into so much favour with the Macedonians that in default of other

suitable leaders he was recognized by them as their king, at first not for long.² The Celts, who were still nomadically inclined, were now crowded together on the Propontis and Bosphorus, mostly under Leonorius and Lutarius. After having thoroughly sacked the territory of Byzantium, they determined to cross over into Asia, where there were still better opportunities of plunder. They succeeded in this partly by their own endeavours but mainly through Nicomedes king of Bithynia, who brought them over in 277 as valuable allies in his contest with his brothers, having previously concluded a treaty with them, which Memmon has preserved for us. This treaty provided for perpetual friendship with Nicomedes and his successors, without the consent of whom they could not serve any one else; they were, however, to assist the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, Heracleotes, Tiansians, and Cieranians (inhabitants of Cios) if need be. The treaty was concluded by seventeen chiefs. It is a fact that it was kept; the kingdom of Bithynia continued to exist, as also did the independence of the above-named cities. If the Byzantines were oppressed by the Gauls later on, this was due to European Galli. Those who had gone to Asia were allowed to pillage the land which belonged to other people to their hearts' content, and for many decades they took the fullest advantage of this permission. Of course they must, as they had brought their families with them (otherwise they would not have founded a nation), have had land given them even at that stage, which no doubt subsequently formed part of Galatia. Starting from there, they made great raids during their early career in Asia, the three tribes into which they were divided selecting different districts, the Trocmi the Hellespont, the Tolistoboi Ionia, and the Tectosages the interior. Besides this they took service where they could get it, and fought as more or less independent allies of potentates, such as Antiochus Hierax, against their enemies.³ By degrees, and chiefly in consequence of defeats they sustained at the hands of the kings of Per-

gamum, they were restricted to the region in which they had their settled abode, a region which in the first place had been assigned to them, or rather the occupation of which had been proposed to them, by Nicomedes, and of which the other potentates of Asia Minor, notably the Seleucids and the kings of Cappadocia and Pontus, afterwards left them in possession. This was the country about the Upper Sangarius and the central Halys, at a high elevation, poorly wooded, in the south mostly steppes and salt desert, more pasture than arable land. Here the Tolistoboi settled in the west around Pessinus, the Tectosages in the centre about Ancyra and the Trocmi in the east round Tavium.⁴ They were commonly called Galatae, and later among the Romans often known as Gallo-Greeks. Their political institutions will be described later on (chap. xiii.).

The nature of their successes is quite accounted for by the character of the people. If they were able to pour southwards through Macedonia and Thessaly, this was due to the fact that in these countries the number of cities was comparatively small. After they had defeated and slain Ceraunus they were more feared than any one else, and no longer opposed in the open field; they themselves, on the other hand, never attacked cities, because their only defensive weapons were wooden shields. They therefore settled on all the flat country like a swarm of locusts. But as soon as they reached Greece with its many cities and its mountain ranges, their power was at an end, especially after they had experienced difficulty in advancing through the Pass of Thermopylae. They did not even attack Heraclea on Mt. Oeta. The only city which they took at all was Callium, quite a small place. They maltreated its inhabitants in a terrible manner; this was simply because they found nothing to eat in the mountains, and like hungry wolves fell in blind rage on everything that came within their reach. Eventually there was nothing left for them but to retrace their steps to the north.

The history of the Celts in the Balkan peninsula and in Asia Minor, of which we shall have to say a few words more, has three periods. At first they try to make great conquests as a people. That fails, and they obtain only a part of Asia Minor. This period is a short one; it only goes down to about 275. Then, while retaining their practice of making systematic raids from their own country, they seize every opportunity of enriching themselves by taking foreign service in large or small bodies. We find them in Europe, Asia and Africa, with Pyrrhus as well as his opponent Demetrius, with the sovereigns of Macedonia and of Asia Minor, with the Ptolemies. The natural consequence of this was that their numbers gradually diminished. They often mutinied, and were then slain in thousands by their employers. Thus we find them in the third period of their history, in the second and first centuries B.C., reduced to more or less turbulent inhabitants of their Phrygian and Cappadocian highlands, and as such of no great general significance. But the mere fact of their living in that region gives them an importance of a special kind. To understand this point, which has hitherto not received the attention it deserves, it is necessary to form a clear idea of the structure of Asia Minor in general, the knowledge of which is besides of great service for the whole of our further narrative.⁵

Asia Minor is a high table-land, with mountain ranges on the fringe and deserts in the centre, and may therefore be compared with Iran, only that it is surrounded on three sides by the sea, and that its finest and most fertile tracts are near the coast. West of the Euphrates it begins with a mountainous country, from which rivers flow into three seas: into the Black Sea (Acampsis, Iris, Halys), into the Mediterranean (Pyramus, Sarus), and by means of the Euphrates into the Indian Ocean. From this mountain region the Anti-Taurus runs in a N.E.-S.W. direction, between the two streams which form the Sarus. West of the Anti-Taurus comes the Taurus, which also at first trends in a south-

westerly direction, then curves to the west and forms the lofty southern edge of the plateau of Asia Minor. The northern edge is formed by a chain which has no general name, and is besides much lower than the Taurus, as is shown by the way it is pierced by the streams which take their rise on the plateau in the interior. This plateau, which has a general slope towards the north and the west (for which reason the rivers which do not run northwards flow westwards into the Aegean), is naturally divided into many parts, which may be summed up into four larger ones, one of considerable extent in the west, and three of lesser size in the east. The latter are: firstly, the high plateau of Cappadocia around the extinct volcano of Argæus, with an area of about 150 geographical square miles, and an average height of 3800 feet above the level of the sea; secondly, to the north-east of it, the plain of the Halys—afterwards divided between the kingdoms of Cappadocia and Pontus—of the same size as the last, and about 3500 feet above the level of the sea; thirdly, to the north-west, the high plateau of Galatia to the right of the Halys, the country of the Trocmi, also about 3500 feet above the sea-level. The western part of Galatia, to the left of the Halys, a more mountainous country, adjoins the fourth plateau, which must now be described. This has an area of about 700 square miles, and runs south-east and north-west from the foot of the Cilician Taurus almost to the borders of Bithynia on the one side, and on the other to the confines of the mountains of Galatia, the home of the Tolistoboi and the Tectosages on the upper courses of the river Sangarius. This plateau is often described as the Lycaonian table-land, or the plateau of Conia (Iconium). In the west it has a chain of heights which divides it, firstly towards the south, from the high valleys of Pisidia and Isauria with their deep lakes, and then farther north from the watersheds of the Maeander and the Hermus, consequently from the districts which had long been connected with Greece. To the east

is the large salt lake of Tatta. This plateau, which has an average height of 3300 feet above the level of the sea, is arid and treeless—a desert for want of water in summer, and covered with cattle in the winter. An old caravan road winds in a N.W.-S.E. direction at the foot of the above-mentioned chain connecting Lydia with Cilicia. It is not a road through inhabited country, and can be conveniently traversed in winter only, because there is no drinking water in summer; but the route, though of course not much of a beaten track, is not an unpleasant one because it presents no natural obstacles, which are but too common in mountainous districts. For this very reason, however, it is not a road to be used by the lonely traveller. The country in fact, is a kind of desert, and divides the districts between which it lies completely one from the other. Only well-protected caravans of travellers can cross it; only a powerful kingdom can really control it; for conquering armies it is always more or less of an obstacle, as they cannot get sufficient provisions there. The Persian Empire was powerful, but it did not effect its communications with Phrygia and Lydia by this route, but by a more northerly one, which led pretty directly from the source of the Maeander to Pessinus and Ancyra in the region of the Sangarius, and from there to Pteria on the plateau of Galatia (Boghaz-Koi), and thence in an easterly direction to Comana in Pontus, where it divided, one arm going to Armenia, the other to the Euphrates. This route led northwards round the central steppe of Asia Minor, always traversing inhabited districts.

It was a great piece of this very country that came into the possession of the Galatae. The old centres of culture of Pessinus with its worship of the mother of the gods, of Ancyra, of Pteria, with the old rock sculptures, fell into their hands. For the greater part of the third century the Galatae lived in a state of warfare with the more civilized of their neighbours. There is no ground for supposing that there

was peaceful communication through their territory between the Greeks in Ionia and the Greeks and Macedonians in Cilicia and Syria. The settlement of the Galatae in Asia, therefore, promoted the division of Asia Minor from a political point of view. In consequence the Greeks and Macedonians developed the southern route, and the cities on it show by their names—Nysa, Antioch, Laodicea, Apamea (hitherto in the territory of the Maeander), Julia, Philomelium, Laodicea Catacecaumene—their later origin, whereas the places on the northern road bear old names. But it took some time for the southern route to be lined with settlements of any importance; all through the third century only large bodies of armed men could travel on it with safety.

The question arises—Was this division of Asia Minor prejudicial to civilization in general? We believe not. Unity under the Seleucid dynasty would, in spite of the preference of these sovereigns for city communities, in the long run have redounded to the advantage of absolute monarchy; the difficulties in which these kings were generally involved promoted city freedom. Owing to the cessation of the connection between the states which surrounded the centre of Asia Minor, each one of them was better able to develop in its own fashion, and even in Cappadocia and Pontus Greek nationality eventually made peaceful progress. The Galatae were in specially close connection with the kings of Bithynia. The latter were of barbarian extraction, but hellenized themselves, and lived on friendly terms with the neighbouring Greek cities, as is shown by their treaty with the Galatians. And here we see the second great benefit which the success of the Galatae conferred on civilization: it liberated the most important maritime route known to antiquity. In the hands of a Ptolemy Ceraunus, and in general in those of the Macedonian kings, this route was in danger of becoming the means of enslaving the neighbouring and distant Greek independent states. The formation of a great empire embracing Thrace

and the opposite regions of Asia Minor being prevented, Byzantium, Heraclea, Cyzicus and Abydos could remain independent, and consequently the traffic with the shores of the Black Sea could be free as well. By settling the Galatians in the back country, and including the trading cities in the treaty with the Gauls, the kings of Bithynia may claim the no doubt involuntary merit of having protected freedom in those regions. The same effect was produced by the consolidation of Egyptian power on the coast line of the country rendered possible by the invasion of Asia Minor by the Gauls, which we shall consider more minutely later on. For in these districts the Ptolemies were more protectors and supervisors than owners, and their connection with Rhodes made this protection particularly advantageous to city freedom, especially in commercial matters.

The barbarous Gauls were, so to speak, boxed up in Asia like a foreign organic or inorganic substance which has penetrated into a living body and is tightly imprisoned in it, and so prevented from doing permanent harm. If the prison is ever opened, then, of course, the enemy breaks out again. In the end, however, Asia Minor assimilated the Gauls.

The invasion of the Gauls showed besides that Alexander's empire had ceased to exist, much as the incursions of the Normans, Slavs and Hungarians into Charlemagne's empire proved that the latter had really fallen, although to all appearances it was still upright. And in considering this it is remarkable that the onslaught of the Gauls failed not in Alexander the Great's native land but in Greece, in a dependent country which had politically fallen into the second rank. Of course this was specially due, as we saw, to the inability of the barbarians to attack towns, but it just shows the importance of communities based on cities. And their importance is also demonstrated by the siege of Rhodes by Demetrius. Demetrius disposed of every resource available in those days for taking a city, and in spite of that he did not

take it, mainly because the citizens of Rhodes did their duty in a pre-eminent degree. Even after Alexander's time the element of civic freedom remained an indestructible factor in the welfare of the people of antiquity. And it remained at the same time an important component part of the state system, the history of which will occupy us in the next centuries. For this was the result of Alexander's campaigns : a number of states more or less Greek in character, and in close intellectual connection with one another. A survey of the most important of them, as they appear about 275 B.C., is a necessary preliminary for understanding the events which we shall have to relate ; this survey we propose to give in the next chapter.⁶

NOTES

1. The Celts in Greece and Asia Minor. Authorities : Paus. 1, 4, 10, 19-23 ; the Celts in Greece ; cf. v. Wilam. Ant. v. Kar. 223 ; according to Schmidt (see below) Pausanias' narrative is derived partly from Attic sources, perhaps through the medium of Timaeus, which also applies to Diodorus and Justinus. Diod. 22, 4, 9 ; Just. 24, 4-8 ; 25, 1, 2 ; prol. 24. Justinus deals with the Celts in Europe and Asia ; Livy, 38, 16, with the Celts in Asia. Memnon, 19 (Müller, 3, 535), relates a different version of the distribution of the country among the three tribes. — Modern writers : Baumstark's article Galli in Pauly's Enc. vol. 3, esp. pp. 602-606, where the older works of Wernsdorff, Thierry and others are quoted. W. A. Schmidt, De font. vet. auctor. in enarrandis exped. a Gallis—factis, Berol. 1834 (also in his Abh. z. alten Gesch. Berl. 1888) with Susemihl, 1, 569. Ritter, Erdkunde, 18, 597-610. Droysen, 2, 2, 340-358 ; 3, 1, 85, 86. Droysen treats the Celts only as an intermezzo in the history of the quarrels of the sovereigns, and consequently cannot do justice to their importance. The real significance of the Celtic invasion of Asia is, however, much greater than that of the so famous and much more dramatic irruption of their kinsmen into Italy. Chevalier, die Einfälle der Gallier in Griechenland, Prague, 1878, and his Gallier in Kleinasien, Prague, 1883. Wachsmuth, Die Niederlage der Kelten vor Delphi, Hist. Zeitschr. Bd. 10. — Cf. the papers written in consequence of the discovery and explanation of the monuments of Ancyra and Pergamum, of which those relating to

Pergamum are quoted in chap. xxi. As regards Galatia cf. especially Perrot, Guillaume et Delbet, *Explor. archéol. de la Galatie*, Paris, 1863 seq. 2 vols. fol., as well as Humann and Puchstein, *Reisen in Kleinasien und Nordsyrien*, Berlin, 1890. See also below chap. xiii. note 4, and chap. xxi. note 4, on the coins of Ephesus. In the case of Ephesus the relation to the temple pointed out by Curtius and the analogy of Smyrna is to be noticed.

2. Victory of Gonatas at Lysimachia in 277, Just. 25, 2; Diog. La. 2, 141. On this account he issued coins with the head of Pan, Imhoof, *Monn. gr.* 128, n. 1; Usener, *Epigramm von Knidos*, 37.

3. Celts as mercenaries with Ptolemy in the war against Cyrene, Dr. 2, 2, 270; with Pyrrhus and his opponent Demetrius, Dr. 3, 1, 203; with Pyrrhus and his opponent Gonatas and again with the latter, see below chap. ix.; with Apollodorus of Cassandria, Dr. 3, 1, 199; in Egypt about 200 B.C., Polyb. 5, 65; later with potentates of Asia Minor, Reinach, *Mithridat.* 38, 264. Byzantium obliged to pay tribute to the European Gauls, see below, chap. xiii.

4. As regards the site of Tavium, Kiepert and Ramsay seem to be right and Hirschfeld wrong; cf. Reinach, *Chron. d'Or.* 4², 98. The Tolistoboi were called Tolistoagii at Pergamum; see Fränkel, *Inscr.* p. 24.

5. Asia Minor. Configuration of the country, Ritter, *Erdkunde*, 18, 3 seq., 32 seq., 61 seq. (the central plateaus and the difficulty of travelling in them). Ritter's two volumes are an excellent repository of what was known about Asia Minor up to 1858, except the western slopes. Part of the latter has now been well described by Radet, *La Lydie et le monde grec au temps des Mermnades*, Paris, 1893. For the old geography of Asia Minor see Kiepert, *Lehrbuch*, § 89 seq., Lolling in I. Müller, Bd. 3 (good literary references), and Ramsay, *The Historical Geography of Asia Minor*, London, 1890. This work is not a historical geography of Asia Minor, but an excellent collection of numerous detailed investigations connected with that geography, which scholars cannot afford to be without, but for the use of which the assistance of a number of good maps, especially that of Kiepert, is indispensable, as those supplied by Ramsay himself are no aid to the real study of the text owing to the absence of contour lines and modern names. It is more easy to praise the work as it deserves than to study it. Cf. the copious account by G. Hirschfeld in the *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1891. Owing to this very difficulty of using the book it would appear to have hitherto escaped notice that Ramsay,

who has devoted so much attention to the Persian royal route, has completely misunderstood (p. 42) the οἶποι of Cilicia in Herod. 5, 52, and has been thereby led into an incorrect drawing of the ὁδὸς βασιλῆην,—a great inferiority to Kiepert. See also below, chap. v. note 9. Cf. A Handbook for Asia Minor, Transcaucasia, Persia, etc., ed. by Maj.-Gen. Sir Charles Wilson, London, Murray, 1895, in which Hogarth and Ramsay have also co-operated. The excellent maps and the two indexes make an admirable supplement to Ramsay's Asia Minor, which can now be conveniently studied with the aid of this Handbook. I have, therefore, not thought it necessary to quote the Handbook for each ancient city. The first index makes this superfluous, as it contains all the old names. Sir Charles Wilson's Handbook is at the present moment one of the best practical aids to the study of the ancient geography of Asia Minor.

6. I have taken a different view of the incursions of the Celts and the achievements of the sovereigns against them than is usually held. On the latter point Droysen says (3, 1, 199): "If the whole of Greece was not to be ravaged by the wild hordes as Asia Minor was for many years to come, then a powerful Macedonia would have to protect the Hellenic world like a rampart, and Antigonos, the conqueror of Lysimachia, was the man to keep the barbarians off. It is true that the records of antiquity show no trace of this signal achievement of Antigonos; they only relate how he put an end to the despotism of Apollodoros in Cassandria." Droysen therefore himself admits that there is no record of Antigonos having kept the barbarians out of Greece; but he considers his performances and his successes at Lysimachia and Cassandria so important that he credits him with the merit of protecting Greece, although the ancients say nothing about it. But as a matter of fact, Antigonos did but little in the first instance, and nothing in the second. At Lysimachia the Gauls are taken unawares and *nihil tale metuentes trucidantur*, Just. 25, 2; cf. Diog. La. 2, 140 and Droysen, 3, 1, 193. Cunning and good luck are enough to accomplish this; a conqueror of this order is no military hero. This surprise does not count among the brilliant exploits recorded by history. But Cassandria was not taken by him at all, but through a stratagem of the robber-chief Aminias, his secret confederate: Polyæn. 4, 6, 18. This would not have been enough to make the Gauls abstain from attacking Macedonia and Greece again. That they did not come to Greece a second time was due, apart from the resistance they encountered at Thermopylae, to the fact that they did not get enough to eat in a country covered with cities, as well as to the fact that the with-

drawal of many of them to Asia and elsewhere weakened them. Consequently the merit of keeping the Gauls out of Greece belongs to circumstances and to the valour of the Greeks, not to the Macedonian kings. It is the old groundless assumption that the republicans of that age were degenerate and wanting in energy, but the kings capable, which has led a historian to deny the recorded deserts of the Greeks and to maintain that an unrecorded performance of the kings is an actual fact. The best proof that Macedonia contributed nothing to the protection of civilization against the Gauls is furnished in Polyb. 9, 35 by the Acarnanian Lyciscus, who states that the protection of Greece by Macedonia appears from the fact that when the Gauls had lost their fear of the Macedonians owing to the death of Ceraunus they made their way into Greece. He therefore is not aware of any positive achievement of Ceraunus' successors; otherwise he would have mentioned it. His argument consequently amounts to this: protection is afforded to peaceable folk from robbers by the soldier who is slain at the first encounter with them, while the peaceable folk then put their own shoulder to the wheel and kill some of the robbers and put the rest to flight. In this sense the ancient as well as the modern admirers of the Macedonians are right. That the Macedonian kings did more in war generally than the Athenians, for instance, which cannot be disputed, is owing to several causes; the natural bias of the Macedonian people, the connection with men like Aminias, who placed bodies of mercenaries at their disposal, and an unscrupulous application of the principle that war must support itself. A self-governing state could not be so unscrupulous, even if it wished; such conduct would have been too little in keeping with the principle of freedom.—The Gauls by the way were not at all such uncivilized barbarians as might be supposed. They had communication with Massalia as late as about the beginning of the second century B.C.; *Inscript von Lampsakos, Athen. Mittheil.* 1881, Beil. to p. 96, quoted by v. Duhn, *Benutzung der Alpenpässe*, not. 38, N. Heidelb. Jahrb. ii.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF THE GREEK WORLD ABOUT THE YEAR 275

AFTER Alexander's generals had disappeared from the scene the old order of things set in again in many respects. Europe and Asia became politically separated; Egypt grew even more independent of Asia than under the Persian empire, the place of which had apparently been taken by the Seleucids. But everything had really changed. Greeks were ruling in Egypt and the basis of the Seleucid empire was the Graeco-Macedonian nationality, in which the Greek element had a preponderating importance. The result was that external separation covered greater internal unity than before. In our survey of the component parts of this loosely-compacted group of states, we will begin with Europe.

Macedonia, the mother-country of the conquerors of Asia, still possessed great strength in spite of the extraordinary drain of men, and the Celtic invasion had left no permanent traces. A vigorous stock must after all have been left in the old country, and besides this we know that Alexander's soldiers longed to return to Macedonia, and even insisted on returning there in the heyday of his career. As a rule the Macedonians remained on the old footing with their sovereigns. Of monarchical tendencies, they had often had to choose between pretenders, and for that reason opposed their rulers of the moment frequently enough. This continued to be the

case, and all the more because Alexander's family had ceased to exist. They obeyed Pyrrhus as long as he governed ably, and submitted to Antigonus the more readily because his ability was still more unquestionable. Besides, Antigonus seems to have set up for being a kinsman of the Temenidae. The state of Macedonia remained much what it had been. Country life predominated, as in the old days. Few new cities were founded; there was no inducement in Macedonia to encourage the spread of the Greek element in this fashion. Pella remained the capital, by no means one of the striking cities of the age. The influence of Macedonia extended to Thrace, Epirus, Thessaly and Greece proper. If the king of Macedonia wanted to be safe from invasion from the east, the north and the west and influence Greece, he was bound to carefully husband the resources of his country, especially as he was not, like the eastern monarchs, a sovereign of rich territory. His main strength lay in the vigour of the people. Universal military service remained in force, and the famous phalanx continued to be what it was, a formidable engine of war. In addition Antigonus had mercenaries in his service, who, however, were in all probability mainly paid by allowing them to carry on private piracy.¹

Thrace might have developed into a fairly civilized state if Lysimachus' kingdom had continued to exist. But now it became the home of more or less barbarous peoples, Thracians, Getae, Celts, against whom the independent Greek states of the coast had some difficulty in protecting themselves. At the head of these was Byzantium, which had made such a brave defence against Philip, and where luxury, not prosperity, had increased, and love of freedom not grown less. The existence of cities was such a necessity for a civilized king in a country of this stamp that Lysimachus had won his best title to fame by founding them. His kingdom had included a portion of Asia Minor. That constituted its strength; a purely European Thrace, being open to the north

and exposed in that quarter to all the attacks of barbarous tribes, could never attain to permanent prosperity, especially if it did not possess Byzantium. The kingdom of Thrace, therefore, ceased to exist after Lysimachus' death. The country was intrinsically so little fitted for independence that soon even Egypt, and in the end actually the remote Aetolia, obtained influence and territory there. And that was a gain for culture in general, for now the important water-way between the Aegean and the Black Sea was lined only by republics and small states which could not interfere with commerce.²

North of Macedonia dwelt the Dardani, an Illyrian tribe, and west of it the Illyrians, who gave the Macedonians a good deal of trouble.³

Farther south on the Adriatic comes Epirus, the numerous tribes of which, fourteen according to Theopompus, were at that time united, in the districts of Chaonia and Thesprotia in the west and south and in Molottis in the north-east, under the rule of the Molossian king Pyrrhus, whose achievements will be discussed subsequently. He had made a brilliant capital of Ambracia, which had been ceded to him by Alexander, son of Cassander. The Epirotes were very uncomfortable neighbours of the Macedonians.⁴

Thessaly was independent in its internal affairs, probably in the form of the tetrarchy created by Philip. Macedonian influence predominated; the Macedonians possessed the fortress Demetrias built by Demetrius. But there was also an anti-Macedonian party.⁵

In central Greece there were two leading powers: Athens and Aetolia. Athens had been free since 286; in that year the Athenians under the leadership of Olympiodorus had stormed the Museum which was garrisoned by the Macedonians, and in 279 had made a vigorous stand against the Galli with country people and a fleet. They were on very friendly terms with the Aetolians, with whom they had found

themselves in agreement more than forty years before, when Athens and Aetolia refused to surrender Samos and Oeniadae respectively in spite of Alexander's orders (vol. iii. p. 365).⁶ The Aetolians, whom we shall deal with in detail in chap. xii., were masters of central Greece, which lay to the east of them, up to the Malian Gulf and the borders of Boeotia. They controlled the pass of Thermopylae and the Amphictyonic League, to which they had rendered a great service by opposing the Celts. Next to them Athens was the most influential in the Council of the League. Both powers also took an interest in the civilizing side of the League by founding a new festival to commemorate the deliverance from the Gauls, the Soteria, which was adopted throughout Greece and solemnized mostly by dramatic performances. This was why the Amphictyonic college took the artists of Dionysus under its special protection at that time. By the transfer of ascendancy in the Council of the Amphictyons from Macedonia to Aetolia the former had lost a material and moral means of exerting pressure on Greece. If it wanted to invade central Greece it could no longer pass the defile of Thermopylae; it was obliged to go there through Euboea, where Chalcis and Carystus belonged to it. And on the other hand it had no religious means of getting resolutions passed in the name of the Greeks; it had ceased to have any internal connection with the independent Greeks, whom it held by brute force. The Aetolians therefore deserved well of Greece by their reorganization of the Amphictyonic League. The old enmity between Aetolians and Acarnanians no doubt made the latter, as the former wanted to be free, only too ready to side with the Macedonians. In 314 B.C. they had on the advice of Cassander concentrated themselves in several large cities, of which Stratus was the most important. It was Cassander too who in 316 B.C. had enlisted the sympathies of part of Boeotia for the Macedonian cause by restoring the freedom of the city of Thebes; it is true that on Thebes thus becoming

Macedonian, the other Boeotians became all the more anti-Macedonian. Thebes had offered a refuge to Lachares and fought bravely against Demetrius Poliorcetes.⁷

In the Peloponnese Macedonia had at least as much influence as in central Greece, if not more. It made its power felt by garrisoning Acrocorinthus. On its side were Corinth, Sicyon, Argos, Messenia, Elis, as well as part of Arcadia, including Megalopolis; Achaia, on the other hand, began to assert its independence about 280. Macedonian influence in the various cities was brought to bear mostly through tyrants. Sparta, who did not always meddle with *la haute politique*, preserved a perfectly independent position. In 295 B.C. she fought against Demetrius, subsequently against Antigonus Gonatas, even for the tyrant Apollodorus of Cassandria. She displayed marked activity against Antigonus under Cleonymus, whom we shall discuss in chap. ix. We shall also see in that chapter how, on one occasion at least, under Areus, the opponent of Cleonymus, Sparta joined Antigonus Gonatas. Laconia is also of importance because its southern extremities, especially the promontory of Taenarum, were, with the permission of the authorities, the rendezvous of a collection of rabble of all kinds, recruited for service when wanted, to which we have already referred on more than one occasion. The same part is played by the island of Crete, whose republics are quite independent. These countries are on friendly terms with Egypt and Cyrene, just like Aetolia, whose taste for mercenary service and piracy is well known.⁸

We can therefore define the limits of Macedonian influence in Greece by two lines drawn obliquely from north to south. The Macedonian sphere includes, proceeding from north-east to south-west, Euboea, Boeotia, Corinth, Sicyon, Argos, southern Arcadia, Messenia. To the west of it Aetolia with Delphi and Thermopylae remain independent; but Acarnania again is on the side of Macedonia. To the east of it, however, Athens and Sparta are not subject to Macedonian

rule. At these points Egypt now endeavours to gain a footing.

In the Cyclades, where Macedonian and Egyptian influence, the latter predominating, contend for the mastery, a peaceful *coinon* of the islanders is formed (see chap. xxiii.).

The general result is that the situation of the Greeks appears a by no means desperate one. With more unity they would have shaken off the Macedonians, whose position was not very brilliant just at that time.

Turning now to Asia,⁹ here too we shall begin with the most powerful state, the state which lays claim to rule over the Asiatic portion of Alexander's inheritance, although there is not the slightest warrant either in law or in fact for such a claim. In any event this state during a long period of time interfered in the affairs of every city and country, from the Hellespont to India, under Antiochus the Great, even in those of European Greece, until the successors of Seleucus were made to feel that they were not in a position to back claims of this kind properly. In the period of which we are speaking here (about 275) the empire of the Seleucids, the Syrian empire as it is called, because Syria was its intellectual centre, had ceased to possess the importance which it enjoyed under Seleucus I. Seleucus Nicator had been the organizer of the empire; we must now once more refer to his career.

He had very soon given up playing the sovereign in the border countries of India. He saw that by abandoning claims which after all were not sustainable he could gain a valuable ally in those regions. As far back as 317 Porus had been murdered there by Eudemus, who was subsequently put to death by Antigonus. Thereupon the Indian prince Tschandragupta, called Sandrocottus by the Greeks, had made himself king in the countries about the Indus, and extended his empire from the peninsula of Gujerat to the mouth of the Ganges. Seleucus at first waged war with him, then came to terms with him, and expressly renounced his claim to the

Indus country, in return for which the Indian rajah, as we saw in chap. ii, supplied him with the elephants which won the day at Ipsus. The friendly relations between Seleucus and Tschandragupta were kept up for a time through the Greek Megasthenes, who went as Seleucus' envoy to Palibothra (Pataliputra) in India and wrote a work about this country, some fragments of which have been preserved. Seleucus did not give up the border countries of Bactria and the Paropamisadae territory. Alexander had with great discernment settled a large number of Greeks in these marches during his long stay there, and they remained a permanent centre of Greek civilization. But they and their rulers, as is natural in the case of border regions, enjoyed a somewhat more independent position than other provinces of the empire. After the battle of Ipsus Seleucus transferred his permanent abode from Babylon to Antioch on the Orontes in Syria, a city which had been founded by him. He evidently considered it expedient to live near the Mediterranean. Otherwise, if the ancient city of Babylon, in which Macedonians could form only a dwindling fraction of the inhabitants, did not suit him, he might have taken up his residence in Seleucia on the Tigris, also a city of his foundation. His making Antioch on the Orontes and not, for instance, Seleucia on the sea his capital may appear a half measure from a geographical point of view, especially as Antioch did not permanently remain a place of great importance, but Seleucus probably considered that a position on the sea would make his capital unsafe, and in fact Seleucia was in the hands of the Ptolemies for a time. He therefore selected a point not too far inland, in a fertile district. I shall refer later on (chap. xx.) to Antioch, which I would describe here only as a symbol of the Syrian empire in general. Near the sea and yet not a maritime city, close to the desert and yet not a necessary starting-point for caravans, it resembles the empire of which it was the capital, and which also was not a regular military nor a regular naval power; both were artificial

creations. It was a city of Greeks, and the essence of the empire also consists in its being an attempt to found in the East a state based on Greek views. In considering the position of Antioch we must also take into account that Phoenicia and Coelesyria belonged mostly to Egypt, and that Antioch therefore was almost always more or less a frontier city. In spite of this Seleucus must have come to the conclusion that the position of Antioch presented the fewest drawbacks for a capital of the badly protected empire.

That in removing his permanent residence to the west the king had no intention of foregoing his sovereignty over the interior of Asia was shown by the organization of the empire, in which the central government could intervene more than had been possible under Alexander. He divided it into 72 satrapies. Although we cannot say for certain what was the area of the empire thus parcelled out, yet so much is known of the number of the provinces in Alexander's times as to justify the assertion that Seleucus split up each old province into about six new ones, the object of which could only be to curtail the power of the governors and to deprive the old provinces of the internal cohesion which facilitated revolts. It was a measure resembling the division of France into Departments. The arrangement of the central government can be inferred from the existence of the order of 'friends' of the king, which we must assume also in the case of Macedonia and Egypt and the monarchies in general. These 'friends' formed the council of state; the various branches of the administration had special chiefs. That Seleucus tried to promote the hellenizing of Asia in the spirit of Alexander appears from the many cities which he founded, the number being stated at 75 by an ancient writer. Appian says that he founded 16 Antiochias after his father, 5 Laodiceas after his mother, 9 Seleucias after himself, 3 Apameas and 1 Stratonicea after his wives. Other cities founded by him he named after Greek or Macedonian places, or after exploits of his own, or after Alexander.

Ammianus mentions that in the country between the Nile and the Euphrates he converted villages into cities which still bore the names which he had given them at the time side by side with their old Syrian names. The district, however, which he most favoured and influenced by these settlements was Upper Syria, south-east of Cilicia and south of Commagene, the region which was called Seleucis and which in fact first obtained importance through him. Here there were four great cities: Antioch, Seleucia, Apamea, and Laodicea, regular representatives of his family. Strabo calls this district Tetrapolis. In the second century B.C., from Alexander Balas up to Antiochus VII., these four cities minted coins with the inscription *adelphôn demôn*, the allied communities. If we attempt to give an idea of the other foundations of Seleucus, there is the city of Oropus, in the country between the Orontes and the Euphrates, which is described as founded by Nicator; Seleucus himself was a native of the Macedonian Oropus. On the Euphrates, at the point where the road to the east touched the river, he laid out the city of Zeugma, and opposite, on the left bank, Apamea, and close by another Seleucia. The old city of Bambyce-Hierapolis, south of Zeugma, had also been settled by Seleucus, as had Amphipolis on the Euphrates. Whereabouts Nicatoris was in these parts is unknown. In the Cyrrhestice, called after the Macedonian city Cyrrhus, and situated between the Amanus range and the Euphrates, was the city of Beroea (the modern Aleppo), founded by Nicator. Between the Euphrates and the Tigris he founded in the old Urha the city of Edessa, which became famous in the Middle Ages. His Seleucia on the Tigris, to which we shall refer later on (chap. xx.), was very large and brilliant. In Media he converted Rhagae into Europus; in Parthia he founded Calliope and Hecatompylus the capital of the country. In the districts west of Syria, Seleucia on the river Calycadnus and Apamea Damea on the Taurus range were foundations of Nicator. Most of the cities founded by Seleucus of which we hear lie between the Mediterranean

and Media; from the mouth of the Orontes up to Babylon he wanted to be on firm ground.

What was the position of the cities in the Syrian empire? They were all independent internally, this is part of the conception of the Greek *polis*; the example of the neighbouring Phœnician cities, which we must not forget were types of self-government even before the time of the Greeks, also pointed in this direction, and the subsequent history of the East proves it. Many of them also had the right of coinage. Whether and how far they acted as corporate bodies towards the outside world cannot now be decided. That they had great moral importance is shown by many incidents, among others the fact that on one occasion the pretender Achæus, in the time of Antiochus III., applied to them; whether, however, they were so far independent as to form separate contingents in the Syrian army is not known. At all events the districts thickly populated with Greeks played a certain part in it, as appears, for instance, from the circumstance that separate divisions were formed of the *Cyrrhestæ*. Of course, however, there were a number of tracts in which the inhabitants did not govern themselves in city fashion, but, as was customary in Asia, lived as tributary country-people under the patriarchal rule of chiefs of tribes. Many of these countries were in high repute for special civilization, of an Oriental kind. The Greek element makes its home in the cities, and the progress of Greek life is revealed in this very fact that eventually Syria proper breaks up almost entirely into city communities.

The great wealth which sovereigns and citizens amassed in the Syrian empire came from commerce. In this respect also the empire of the Seleucids took the place of that of Babylon and of Persia. The Seleucids contrived to keep open the old trade-routes through Asia, and they even endeavoured to discover new ones. In Seleucia on the Tigris Seleucus Nicator managed to create a brilliant centre of trade between the Mediterranean and India (see chap. xx.). But he also had in

view the possibility of making the northern commercial route between the Caspian and the Black Sea subserve his interests, and with this object he sent Patrocles to those parts, a statesman and scholar who navigated the Caspian farther in a northerly direction than others had done before him, and left behind him a book on the subject. This mission proves besides that Seleucus still felt himself master on the southern shores of the Caspian. He had no power whatever on the southern coast of the Black Sea.¹⁰

Western Asia Minor, on the other hand, the Seleucids regarded not only as their property, but they actually tried to assert their title to it. True, here again an exception must at once be made in the kingdom of Bithynia, which they never seem to have formally claimed, and which, therefore, has a special interest for us, as it was essentially Greek in character. It embraced the district of Olympus and the upper waters of the Rhyndacus in an easterly direction as far as the river Parthenius, which flows into the Black Sea between Tius and Amastris. The heart of the kingdom is the country about the upper courses of the river Sangarius. It includes the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus with Chalcedon and a number of other ancient and recent Greek cities, to which we shall have to refer later on. The kings of Bithynia were not model individuals. Some of them were even of a very low stamp. But on the whole they did less harm than a good many famous potentates, as for instance Philip, the last king of Macedonia but one, because they had sense enough not to wish to be more than they were and could be, and consequently were not led into committing useless crimes out of ambition, and because they allowed the Greek cities within their territory a large measure of independence. They were not able or disposed to interfere with the highly important trade between the Aegean and the Black Sea; they kept on good terms with the republic of Heraclea. We shall return to Bithynia in chap. xiii., where we shall also deal with

Pergamum, to which Cyzicus stood in much the same relation as Heraclea did to Bithynia, that of an independent friendly city. Apollonis, wife of Attalus I. and mother of Eumenes II. and Attalus II., was a native of Cyzicus.¹¹

In attempting to determine the position which the more important ancient cities of Asia Minor, to which we now come, held as regards their independence, it is necessary to begin with an observation of a general kind. We must not be guided by modern views in forming an opinion on these matters. We have in these days a body of international law based on universally recognized state-treaties and imparting a settled character to the various states. Any state which is not recognized by the others in the form which it actually has, feels uncomfortable; its material relations even suffer now and again. There was nothing of this in antiquity. The *de facto* position formed the basis of international law. As a general rule a special recognition was not required. But this *de facto* position had the same foundation in every one of the various states, so far as they were Greek in character. The Greeks formed city communities, and every city community was not only autonomous in itself, but was also invariably considered so by the others. What they did with their autonomy was their affair. Influence exerted by foreigners, which was not of rare occurrence, in no way altered the legal conception of the self-governing *polis*. Even while it was being influenced it was held to be self-governing. It concluded treaties in its own name, even when a foreign garrison was in its midst. And the constitution itself was never entirely suspended by these influences. Foreigners only brought to bear a certain amount of pressure. The autonomy of the single state was besides still further assured by the absence of permanent embassies. The outside world was not always informed as to every change in the constitution of a single state, and never knew exactly to what extent a state, independent in theory, was being influenced just at the

moment. Every community which knew how to assert itself was respected. Formal difficulties connected with the destruction of a state's independence, which give a great deal of trouble in these days—as in the case of Cracow for instance—did not exist then; on the other hand, the material difficulties were very considerable, for the right of each community to autonomy was perpetual, as was the wish of its citizens to be self-governing or to once more become so.

These considerations will explain why it is not possible to say exactly which cities of Asia Minor were free at that time and which not. From a legal point of view all the old cities of the Greeks were independent; practical independence was not always the lot of all the ancient indisputably Hellenic cities. How far indeed a city founded in point of form by a king and named by him after himself, or after a member of his family, was to be regarded as a genuine Greek city, and consequently having the traditional claim to autonomy, we cannot say. It depended on circumstances.

The leading cities were: in the north Lampsacus, famous for its beautiful coins, and Abydos, which was important for its position on the narrowest part of the Hellespont, and had behaved bravely against Lysimachus in 302, and with still greater energy against Philip of Macedonia in 201. These cities, with Byzantium, secured the free passage to the Black Sea. Next to them comes Smyrna, which, since its destruction by Alyattes, had existed only as a group of villages, but had been restored as a city by Antigonus; Lysimachus had embellished it. By the middle of the third century B.C. it was once more an important city, as is shown by an inscription that has come down to us, from which it appears, quite in accordance with what has been remarked above, that the cities, even when they allowed the influence of kings in their affairs, did not describe themselves as subjects but as their friends, *i.e.* allies. Of course weaker friends of this kind were treated with less consideration by the kings. We see an instance of

this in the rescripts of Antigonos to the Teans about the union of Lebedos with Teos, and the removal of the Lebedeans to the latter city. The most important Ionic city was Ephesus, which, however, was never free from foreign interference; it was at first under Seleucid and then under Egyptian protection. For further details see the note. Of the islands Chios is much more independent than Samos, which was subject to Egypt. The flourishing island of Cos was politically in much the same position as Samos, swayed by the Ptolemies. I do not deal with Rhodes here; it was absolutely independent, and will often occupy our attention (see especially chap. xxii.). The power of Rhodes and of Egypt left the cities of Caria, Lydia and Pamphylia little opportunity of asserting themselves in the outside world, which their inhabitants only cared for in so far as there was money to be made by it; they were, especially the Carians and Pamphylians, traders, mercenaries and pirates.¹²

The Seleucids, to emphasize this important point once more in conclusion, were the regular continuators of the work of Alexander the Great on the following lines: control of Asia based on preference given to the Graeco-Macedonian nationality. The policy was a fine one, but difficult of execution for men who lacked Alexander's genius. For these sovereigns wanted to be absolute rulers at the same time, and Greeks were neither inclined to nor adapted for slavish obedience like Asiatics. This was a source of constant difficulties to the Seleucids, and the result was that they destroyed their own power by the mistakes they committed, while city life flourished more and more, so that in the end the Syrian empire broke up into city communities.

We leave the discussion of the Greeks in the far north (Crimea) for a more suitable occasion (chap. xxv.) and turn to Egypt.

Here an entirely different state of things prevailed from that in the Syrian empire and in Asia generally. In Egypt the

task was far easier. After government had once been established by a man who was as brave as he was prudent, and organized in harmony with the circumstances of the country, the machine almost worked of itself. Three things made this possible: the position of the country, its nature, and the character of its inhabitants. All three are well-nigh unique in their way, and so was the government of Egypt compared with that of the other states which had sprung from Alexander's empire.

The position of Egypt has this peculiarity that, being surrounded by seas and deserts, it is difficult of approach by land, and consequently, as the coast is not long, generally easy to defend, and besides is on an important trade route. The character of the country is formed by a never-failing fertility due to a special force of nature and by an unexampled simplicity in the position of the dwelling-places of its inhabitants. Finally, the character of the people consists of a marked docility, combined with no small amount of perseverance and great skill. Clever rulers, therefore, can enrich themselves and the country and at the same time defend it against a not too powerful enemy. With an intelligent government Egypt can prosper, and provide a brilliant dynasty with an abundance of superfluities.

The principle on which the first Ptolemy established the government of Egypt, and which his successors, so far as they had any idea of governing and did not live merely for pleasure, continued it, was opposed to that of Alexander and the Seleucids, but corresponded to Egyptian custom and to the character of the country and its population. It consisted in the first place of changing nothing which did not require alteration in the interest of the ruler's security. The civil constitution and the religion were not touched. To prevent the inhabitants from revolting, in case they had a mind to do so, the Ptolemies kept an army of mercenaries, composed of Macedonians, Greeks, Celts and others, also intended for

service abroad, in which, of course, the Macedonians at first formed the dependable nucleus, and afterwards professional soldiers, like the Cretans, obtained the best positions, while in course of time the rabble, which flocked together from all countries and was ready for anything, predominated. Eventually the mercenaries were used only for keeping the people in check, as in later times foreign wars no longer occurred.

The administration of the country was entrusted to an epistrategus in each of the three great provinces, and to a strategus in each of the various districts. The three epistrategi were seldom natives. A royal fleet sailed on the Nile. As the whole of the inhabited land was confined to the Nile—it is nowhere more than ten miles broad—and all the cities of Egypt were accessible from the Nile, the country resembled a place which has only one broad main street, and in which therefore the police can be handled with great ease. But the kings also took care, at all events in the beginning, that their subjects should have no inclination to revolt by governing better than the Persians, and by carefully making allowance for national peculiarities and prejudices. This last was also done by the later worthless Ptolemies. The taxes of course remained the same as under Persian rule. The people paid assessments on land as before; the priests especially were in a better position than under Persia, and they showed their gratitude for it. The king had domains, landed estates, mines and factories. Among the products of the country corn came first, and was shipped to Greece, Sicily and Italy; under the Ptolemies Egypt took the place of the northern coast of the Black Sea as a grain-producing country. The manufacture of linen stuffs and glass was of importance.

Much of the Indian and Arabian merchandise intended for Europe passed through Egypt. Of these consignments some went by the Nechos canal from the Red Sea to the Nile, which was restored by the first Ptolemies, if not by the Persians;

others were landed at Myos Hormos, Leucos Limen (the modern Kosêr), or at Berenice on the western shore of the Red Sea, and found their way from there over the mountains to the city of Coptos on the Nile (near the modern Kene), and thence down the Nile. They were transhipped at Alexandria, which was in direct communication with the leading seaports of the Mediterranean. How much of the profit flowed direct into the king's treasury we cannot say; at all events they had the lion's share of the corn trade, as they could obtain as much corn as they liked. They founded hardly any Greek cities in the country, apart from Ptolemais near Abydos, which, according to Strabo, had a Greek constitution, Arsinoe in the Fayûm, and Berenice on the Red Sea. Of course Greeks lived in other parts of the country as well. The capital of the Ptolemies was Alexandria, to which we shall refer subsequently (chap. xiv.). As it was not on the sacred stream of the Nile, its foreign character was no offence to the Egyptians. It gave the dynasty safe communication with foreign countries. The Egyptians had no political rights. The Ptolemies never tried to hellenize their country as the Seleucids did Asia. And this was extremely prudent, for the other policy would only have landed them in embarrassment. A man with Hellenic training was by nature not inclined to slavish obedience like the Egyptian, and if Hellenic culture did happen to bring philosophers into the country who endeavoured to explain the idea of a tyrant to the Egyptians, which was not an impossibility in the third century B.C., the dynasty derived no advantage from it. Greek culture in Egypt was simply an affair of utility and pleasure for those who were born to it. Of utility, for the first Ptolemies were perfectly well aware that knowledge is power; of pleasure, for the Greeks looked on foreign cultures, such as the Egyptian, with curious but in no way envious eyes; only the colossal aspect of Egyptian art excited their amazement; Egyptian science could, of course, be

learned indirectly. In a word, Egypt was for the Ptolemies a great landed estate, from which as much profit as possible is extracted, and the submissive inhabitants of which are well treated because the more ready they are to work the greater the return from the property. The Ptolemies looked at their rule over Egypt from the standpoint of individual right. They took up much the same position with regard to their country as the Dutch have long done with their Eastern possessions. Alexandria was a Graeco-Macedonian colony on foreign soil. We shall examine the peculiarities of Alexandrian culture later on, and shall see how in Alexandria, which at first was only the home of a Greek court-civilization, there gradually arose a sort of connecting link between Western and Oriental culture. The character of Egypt as a large private estate also accounts for the position of the Greeks in Alexandria, who had no rights but only privileges, as, for instance, to be beaten not with a whip but with a stick. The importance of the Jews in Egypt will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

The Ptolemies used their position as owners of the lucrative Egyptian estate to obtain other possessions abroad, which supplied them with that which Egypt could not furnish them, but which was necessary for securing their rule and cutting a figure in the world. A position of this kind, that of a participant in politics on a large scale, was occupied by Egypt only under the Ptolemies, if we exclude several epochs of her earlier history, in which, however, she acted more by means of campaigns of conquest; the corresponding attempt made in our own century by Mohammed Ali and Ibrahim Pasha failed, as we are aware. The Ptolemies needed three things for the part they had to play in the group of states of the successors of Alexander: money, soldiers and arms. Money was provided by the exploitation of Egypt, of its soil and its trade; mercenaries came wherever money was offered them, consequently to Egypt as well as other places; but ships and

arms were necessary, and crews for the former. These were not to be found in adequate quantities in Egypt; the foreign possessions, especially Phoenicia and Cyprus, supplied them. From that quarter too the Ptolemies could more conveniently watch the affairs of Greece than from Alexandria. To these possessions, to which category Cyrene also belonged, the Ptolemies, as it would appear, with a correct estimate of the situation, allowed some internal independence, much as Venice did with its *terra firma*.¹⁸

In the first place, Cyrenaica was closely connected with Egypt. The cities of this country, which was well watered and fruitful in antiquity, were formerly under the Battiadae dynasty, and had then become powerful as independent states. They had entered into friendly relations with Alexander the Great, and had presented him with 300 chargers and five teams of horses as the best products of their country. After the death of the great king disturbances broke out in Cyrenaica, in which Thibron interfered, the Spartan who had murdered Harpalus in Crete and taken possession of his mercenaries and of the treasure that still remained to him. Some exiled Cyrenaeans applied to Thibron; he sailed to Cyrenaica, forced the population to submit to him, and allowed his followers to plunder the seaport Apollonia. The Cyrenaeans were indignant at this, and waged war against him with the help of an officer who had been degraded by Thibron, a Cretan named Mnesicles, a man of the same stamp as Thibron. The latter procured 2500 men from Taenarum (where, although the mercenaries collected there had just been taken off by Leosthenes to the Lamian war, thousands of such men had already flocked together again), and continued the war with success. Cyrene was hard pressed. Thereupon many of the inhabitants appealed to Ptolemy of Egypt, and he sent (about 322) Ophellas, a Macedonian of Pella, with troops to Cyrenaica. Ophellas defeated Thibron, who was captured in Tauchira and crucified in Apollonia. But in spite of this the majority of

the Cyrenaeans would not admit Ophellas into the city. Ptolemy was obliged to come in person and subdue them. Thus Cyrenaica came into the possession of Egypt about the year 321. In 313 the Cyrenaeans rose, being no doubt instigated by Antigonos, but they were reduced to submission. In 312, however, Ophellas himself revolted from Ptolemy, and, wishing to improve his position still further, agreed to a proposal of Agathocles to help him in the war against Carthage, and was murdered by the latter at a distance from Cyrene. Ptolemy was now once more master of Cyrene, which he governed through his stepson Magas. This man remained ruler of Cyrene, first as governor and then as king, having made himself independent after the death of the first Ptolemy. Hence about 275 Ptolemy II. does not control Cyrene, but the position soon changed, and for most of the time Cyrene was in the possession of the Ptolemies either as a sort of secundo-geniture, or in some other form involving the maintenance of a certain internal independence of the various republics.¹⁴

Still more important for Egypt and permanently dependent on her was Cyprus. Under Alexander the Great this island had remained independent like Cyrene; it had assisted the king against Tyre. In the contest between Antigonos and his rivals it had been at one time on the side of Antigonos, at another on that of Ptolemy (315); after that the Egyptian monarch had gained the upper hand. But in 313 the Cypriotes revolted from Ptolemy, just like the Cyrenaeans. Yet Ptolemy subdued them once more, and made Nicocreon of Salamis his governor there. In 306, however, Demetrius appeared, defeated Ptolemy in the famous battle of Salamis, and held the island even after the battle of Ipsus up to 294 B.C. Then Ptolemy took possession of it again. He placed it under a governor (strategus), who also had to collect the tribute and send it to Alexandria, and consequently was a sort of viceroy. Subsequently Cyprus was also occasionally

a secundo-geniture of the dynasty. The island was of the greatest value to Egypt, as it supplied the wood required for shipbuilding and copper, which last was, it is true, to be found in Egypt, but could be more conveniently brought from Cyprus than from Sinai, for instance.¹⁵

Finally Egypt for a long time possessed Phoenicia and Coelesyria, under which last designation Palestine was included. That a strong Egypt naturally aspires to be master of these countries is shown by the history of ancient as well as modern Egypt. In the third and fourth centuries B.C. they were long a bone of contention between Egypt and Syria. What their position was about the year 275 is indeed not quite clear. In 320 they had been taken by Ptolemy, in 318 by Eumenes for a brief space, then in 315 by Antigonos, in 312 by Ptolemy again after the battle of Gaza, although he had to give them up in consequence of his defeat at Myus. On the fall of Antigonos a portion of them came into the hands of Ptolemy; on that of Demetrius probably much of the rest shared the same fate, although we have no definite accounts of particular parts. Thus in 275 a large section of southern Syria belonged to Egypt, only we cannot give the frontier with any accuracy. From 266 onwards we have Ptolemaic silver coins, tetradrachms, which were mentioned in the Phoenician cities of Sidon, Tyre, Ptolemais, Joppa and Gaza. The Ptolemies, of course, were obliged to allow the Phoenicians many liberties. To the Jews they showed themselves well disposed as a rule; there were many of them living in Alexandria.¹⁶

If Theocritus' 17th Idyll was written about or before 260, as is now supposed, then Ptolemy's empire at that time was undoubtedly a large one: Phoenicia, Arabia, Syria, Libya, Aethiopia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, Lycia, Caria, the Cyclades. Of course there is a good deal of exaggeration in this. In the case of Cilicia it is certainly not true of the level tracts with Tarsus; in that of Pamphylia it may be generally accurate, of Lycia and Caria only a fraction, i.e. a few points on the

coast; the interior of Caria was more Seleucid. That Ptolemy was master of the Cyclades is unquestionably incorrect. Of course for a flattering poet it was very appropriate to describe every country in which there was a castle with an Egyptian garrison, or in which the Egyptian flag was the most feared, as subject to the king of Egypt. Egypt, as has been rightly remarked, had together with Rhodes in many districts stepped into the shoes of Athens, which could make its power felt only on the coast-line.¹⁷

NOTES

1. Macedonia. Other new cities laid out by Cassander: Casandria, which took the place of Olynthus; Uranopolis, on the promontory of Athos, founded by Alexarchus, brother of Cassander; Thessalonice, to replace Therme. Cf. Dr. 2, 1, 250, and for Thessalonice the exhaustive paper by Tafel, *De Thessalonica*, Berol. 1839. Subsequently the Macedonian kings left off founding cities.—For Antigonus Gonatas, Dr. 3, 1, 87 seq.; v. Wilamowitz, *Ant. v. Kar.* 211 seq. 260 (period of his reign).—Universal military service: a pueris eruditi artibus militaribus, Liv. 42, 52; Dr. 3, 1, 90.—The disbanding of the army at harvest-time (Polyb. 4, 66) also proves the national army.

2. Thrace. See notes to chap. iii. for Lysimachus.—For Byzantium, cf. especially Frick's excellent article in *Pauly*, 1, 2, 2601 seq.

3. The Dardani. Cf. Dr. 3, 1, 88; Kiepert, *Lehrb.* § 299. The Dardani had at that time a king Monunius, of whom coins with Dyrrachian types are in existence, Head, *H. N.* 267.

4. Epirus. Dr. 3, 1, 99 seq., Ambracia ceded to Pyrrhus; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 6. Papers by Merleker on the country, its dynasty and inhabitants, Königsberg, 1841, 1844, 1852.

5. Thessaly. Dr. 3, 1, 92; *Hertz.* 1, 108.

6. Athens. Dr. 3, 1, 95, where the unfavourable view of the state of Athens at that time is conspicuous. After the fall of the Museum a Macedonian garrison may have been quartered for a time in the Piræus, Dr. 2, 2, 302; 3, 2, 226; Wachsmuth, 1, 619, 620. As Athens itself was independent, the assumption seems inevitable that it issued coins, which Head (*H. N.* 316) disputes, on the theory that it was deprived of the right of coinage from 322 to about 220. It is clear that Athens was not bound to

coin even when it was quite independent, for all independent cities did not have mints of their own. But Athens, whose coins were so widely circulated and so much in favour, is pretty sure to have coined if not prevented from doing so. A break in the coinage of Athens lasting from 322 to 220 is therefore hardly credible.

7. The Aetolians. Dr. 3, 1, 97-99, and below, notes to chap. xii.—Acarnania, synoecismus, Diod. 19, 67; Busolt, Gr. Staatsalterth.² § 75.—Boeotia, Dr. 3, 1, 93-95; in later times, Polyb. 20, 4-6; Busolt, l. l. § 263.

8. Sparta. Dr. 3, 1, 200. Cleonymus worked in the interest of Egypt as opponent of the Antigonids. On his return from Italy he conquered Corcyra, but was driven out of it by Demetrius about 303 B.C., Dr. 2, 2, 190. Afterwards he was in Thebes with Lachares, who was also an enemy of Demetrius. He then intrigued in Sparta against Antigonus, and subsequently against him in concert with Pyrrhus, the *protégé* of Egypt. Kleonymus' antagonist was Areus, for whose equivocal conduct see notes to chap. ix.—For Crete, Str. 10, 477.

9. Geography of Asia Minor. See notes to chap. iv. Since the older works, which Lolling has summarized in I. Müller, 3, 249, of late a great development in the exploration of Asia Minor has to be noted, which is also given in outline by Lolling (l. l. 249 seq.), and followed up in detail by S. Reinach in his *Chroniques d'Orient* in the *Revue archéologique*, reprinted in one volume, Paris, 1891. In this field, however, every year marks a fresh advance. In recent years the following scholars especially have earned distinction by travels of research in Asia Minor: G. Hirschfeld, Benndorf, Niemann, Lanckoronski, Petersen, Paton (Caria, Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia), Humann, Puchstein (Galatia, Commagene), Ramsay and Hogarth (esp. Phrygia), Sterrett (central and southern Asia Minor), Bent, Heberdey, Wilhelm (Cilicia); also Fabricius, Winnefeldt, Judeich, Clarke, Koldewey, Schuchhardt, Hiller von Gärtringen, Paris, E. Gardner, Radet, Dürrbach, Fougères, etc., not counting the explorers of the Troad and of Pergamum. Southern Asia Minor has been taken in hand specially by Austria. The best maps are those of Kiepert, his own publications and those executed for books of travel by other authors. Cf. also Feigl, *Archäol. Forschungsreisen in Kleinasien*, in the *Oesterreich. Monatsch. für den Orient*, Jahrg. 18, Nos. 6, 7.

10. The Empire of the Seleucids. Of modern writers cf. esp. Cless, in Pauly's *R. E.* 6, 1, 930 seq. It is called the Syrian empire, although southern Syria, Coele Syria (at first the valley between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon and then all southern Syria), did not belong to the Seleucids for the greater part of the time,

but to the Ptolemies. The Seleucids and India, Str. 15, 724; Dr. 3, 1, 178; Lefmann, *Gesch. Indiens*, 755.—Megasthenes, Dr. 3, 1, 178; Susem. 1, 547-552.—Seventy-two provinces, App. Syr. 62; the division of the Parthian empire probably borrowed from that of the Syrian, see below, chap. xix.—Court of the sovereigns of the Macedonian empire αὐλή, Polyb. 18, 55. Around the sovereigns the φίλοι, Polyb. 5, 22; Liv. 30, 42; among them some called πρῶτοι φίλοι; even in the earliest days of Egypt there were 'friends' and 'favourite friends' of this kind, Erman, *Aegypten*, 1, 110. Cf. Spitta, *De amicorum in regno Macedon. condic.*, Berlin, 1875. In later times the Roman emperors too had their *amici* of the same description. Also συγγενεῖς, Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 231. A grand vizier, such as the Surenas was afterwards in Parthia (Spiegel, *Eran. Alt.* 3, 104), was up to this time unknown in these kingdoms. Yet it would appear now from inscriptions and passages from authors that in the Seleucid empire and in Pergamum the prime minister was called ὁ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων (Fränkel, *Inscr.* 1, 110). Cf. below, chap. xxvii. note 1. The word τεταγμένος should be added. Similarly, the war minister of Mithridates is τετ. ἐπὶ τῶν δυνάμεων. σύντροφοι of the king in Macedonia, Syria, Pergamum, Pontus (Fränkel, *Inscr. von Pergamon*, note to No. 179).—Governors σατράπαι; some are called ἑπαρχοί (*praefecti*); sometimes στρατηγοί serve as governors, Polyb. 5, 46; Dr. 3, 1, 65. In isolated cases viceroys of large sections of the empire are met with, as, for instance, Antiochus I. in the East actually as king, and Achaeus in Asia Minor.—The succession to the kingly office, whether the son or the brother, was determined by circumstances.—For the cities founded by Seleucus I. App. Syr. 57; Amm. Marc. 14, 85; they were 75 in number according to Pausanias. Damascus near Malalas, Müller, *Fr.* 4, 470; cf. Dr. 3, 2, 254.—The Σελευκίς, Str. 16, 750, τετράπολις, *ib.* 749.—Zeugma, Apamea and another Seleucia, Dr. 3, 2, 306. Oropus, Steph. Byz. Beroea, Dr. 3, 2, 288, the modern Aleppo, still a flourishing city on the direct route to Persia and India, Baed. Palaest. 405. Dionysius, tyrant of Beroea and Heraclea, Str. 16, 751, at the time of the dissolution of the empire, about 100 B.C. Hierapolis (now Manbedsch, Baed. Pal. 405) and Nicatoris, Dr. 289, 290. Amphipolis, Dr. 309. Edessa, Dr. 311; Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, p. ciii.—To Seleucia on the Tigris, the 'king's city' according to the Babylonian document, *Zeitschrift für Assyriol.* vii. 232, I refer in the notes to chap. xx. Opposition to the Magi at the founding of Seleucis, App. Syr. 56.—Europus, etc., Dr. 319-321.—Seleucis on the Calycadnus, Apamea, Damea, Dr. 284, 285, 247, and below, chaps. xiii. and xx. How independent the cities were is shown by

the fact that Demetrius I. (162-150) lived in a stronghold outside Antioch; he was not at his ease in the city; there was nothing of this sort in Egypt.—In Polyb. 5, 50 the Cyrrhestae, to the number of 6000, are referred to as an important factor of the *δύναμις* of the king. As regards the composition of the Syrian army, the description given of it by Polyb. 5, 79 before the battle of Raphia, 217 B.C., is instructive. We find a phalanx of 20,000 men, evidently Macedonians, with 10,000 men from the whole *βασιλεία*, armed in Macedonian fashion, 2500 Cretans and in addition a crowd of barbarians, but altogether not equalling in numbers the above-mentioned troops. In the Cyrrhestice were the cities Beroea, Cyrrhus, Hierapolis Bambyce. Besides this district three other Syrian ones had Graeco-Macedonian names: Chalcidice, south of Aleppo, the city of Chalcis, the modern Kinnesrîn, Baed. Pal. 410, Chalcidene, Chalcis on the Lebanon, now Andschar, Baed. Pal. 305, on the road from Damascus to Beyroot, and the Seleucis referred to above. Then many Greeks lived in four other tracts of country: (1) Commagene, capital Samosata on the Euphrates, cf. chap. xxvii.; (2) Coelesyria (see above and elsewhere); (3) Trachonitis, the mountain-range of Haurân east of Lake Gennesareth, which up to this day abounds in stone houses of the time of the Empire; (4) Decapolis, cf. Plin. 5, 74, and especially Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 2, 83 seq., the region east of the Jordan, to which belonged Gerasa, Baed. 181, Gadara, Baed. 198, and Philadelphia (Rabbat Ammon), Baed. 187, and below, chap. ix. note 2 and chap. xx. note 17. That Nos. 2-4 were under the Ptolemies for a long time was of no consequence, for outside Egypt the Ptolemies were not opponents of Greek city freedom. Of the neighbouring Mesopotamia Osroene and Mygdonia are also counted Hellenic provinces, and the city of Seleucia on the Tigris.—That the Greeks in the Syrian cities continued to thrive is shown by Cic. ad Fam. 12, 13, where Cassius writes that Dolabella "Graecorum militum numero speciem exercitus effecit" out of Tarsus and Dolabella. This points to an organized city militia. See also chap. xxix. note 8 and Gardner, *New Chapters*, p. 436.—For the cities of Asia Minor and Syria described as *ἱεραὶ καὶ ἀσυλοὶ* see below, chap. xx.—Babelon (pp. cxi., cxii., cxliv.) is no doubt right in assuming that the inhabitants of Antioch on the Orontes and the other Antiochs had privileges; see below, chap. xviii.—The principle generally enforced when the Germani broke into the Roman empire, that foreign inhabitants of a country have henceforth to live under their own laws, held good in Alexander's empire and in that of his successors, and is in accordance with the practice of antiquity in general.—Achaëus applies for help to the cities, Polyb. 5, 57. For the spread of Greek

civilization in Syria see the remarks of Nöldeke and Mitteis in Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht*, Leipz. 191, p. 26 seq. Mitteis proves that Greek law was the basis of the Syrian law preserved in the code of Hierapolis (see above).—The natives paid a poll-tax, Mitteis, p. 27.—Trade routes, Dr. 3, 1, 73; Gardner, *New Chapters*, 437.—For Patrocles, Susemihl, 1, 657-659.—Culture in the Syrian empire, Dr. 3, 1, 75 and below, chap. xx.—COINAGE. Percy Gardner, *Cat. Br. Mus. Kings of Syria*, 1878; Head, *H. N.* 637 seq., and especially Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, Paris, 1890, who uses and amplifies earlier research in his introduction. See also his *Mélanges numismatiques*, Paris, 1893, pp. 124-129. Babelon comes to the interesting conclusion that "les statères aux types de Baaltars et du lion qui ont de lettres grecques, des monogrammes ou des symboles, représentent dans leur ensemble le monnayage d'argent des généraux d'Alexandre en Asie, comme chefs d'armées et comme satrapes, avant que quelques uns d'entre eux prissent le titre de roi en 306." The letters ANT therefore on these coins, for which cf. Imhoof, *Monn. gr.*, pp. 377, 378, might denote Antigonos and Δ his son Demetrius. The coinage of Seleucus, as well as that of the other Diadochi, follows that of Alexander. The so-called coins of Alexander (vol. iii. p. 395) continued to be minted, only adjuncts denoted the sovereigns who issued them. Cf. L. Müller, *Numismatique d'Alex. le Grand*, Copenh. 1855. Thus those with a torch are ascribed to Cassander, the eagle denotes Ptolemy, the half-lion Lysimachus, the horse Seleucus; the emblems of Antipater, Eumenes and Antigonos have not been discovered. After the Diadochi became kings, especially after 301, a change sets in, instead of the sitting Zeus there appears on the Alexander-coins a standing Pallas, to which the various sovereigns add their emblems. Then Antiochus I. introduces the type of Apollo into Syria. As regards the coinage of the Seleucid empire, a striking peculiarity of it is the great variety of the types compared with those of the other kingdoms, especially the Ptolemaean. This is due to the entirely different character of the two empires. Coins are essentially a Greek product. But in the empire of the Ptolemies, apart from the adjoining countries, hardly anything but the dynasty with its immediate surroundings was Greek. In the Syrian empire, on the other hand, we see a number of Greek communities, and the kings themselves do their best to diffuse Greek culture. Hence the thoroughly Greek variety of the types even of the royal coins, which is not found to this extent in any other kingdom of the Diadochi.—Seleucus, who obtained Babylon in 321, at first continued the coinage which had been started there by Mazaeus, and in doing so

adopted the symbol of the anchor (see above, chap. iii. note 8), which was retained as a family emblem. It was not till 306 that Seleucus issued coins with his own name. The horned types also are peculiar to him: horns on his own head, on his helmet, on a horse, on an elephant—and this too is preserved by his successors. For these types cf. Babelon, xviii-xxv. The horn denotes strength, among the gods it belongs to Dionysus; a horned horse recalls Bucephalus, after whom the city of Bucephala in Seleucus' empire was named. With elephants Seleucus won his victory at Ipsus and Antiochus I. defeated the Gauls. Seleucus was called Ἐλεφαντάρχης, Plut. Dem. 25. In Antioch there was a τετράπυλον τῶν ἐλεφάντων supposed to have been erected by Diocletian, Bab. xxviii. For the other types met with on coins of Seleucus see Babelon. As regards the cult of Apollo it is to be noted that Daphne was dedicated as early as 300 B.C., that Seleucus and Stratonice sent gifts to Delos, but that the Apollo sitting on the omphalos was first introduced into the coinage by Antiochus I. Subsequently Antiochus IV., Epiphanes, once more gave the preference to the worship of Zeus. For the mints of Seleucus see Babelon, xxxv-xxxix.—Seleucus was the youngest of Alexander's successors, younger than Alexander himself; he was the only one who really showed an appreciation of Alexander's civilizing policy; I should be inclined to call him a true disciple of Alexander.—Unlike Droysen, who does not admit any founding of cities by Seleucus Nicator in Anterior Asia, Radet (De colon. 50) attributes to him Laodicea Catacecaumene and Thyatira, with the neighbouring localities. There are no definite data for Laodicea; as regards Thyatira the passage in St. Byz. is undoubtedly inaccurate; consequently there remains only a slender probability. See below, chap. xiii. note 7.

11. Bithynia. Era according to Reinach, Mithr. 283: according to Mommsen 297 B.C. and Ramsay, As. Min., 283/82 B.C. History of Bithynia, Clinton, F. H. 2, 420 seq.

Heraclea. Authorities: Memnon, see above, notes to chap. i.; Just. 16, 3-5; Polsberw, De rebus Heracleae, 1833; Kämmerl, Heracleotica, 1869; Schneiderwirth, Heraklea, Heiligenst. 1882-84; v. Wilamowitz, Ant. v. Kar. p. 155.—Chalcedon and Astacus recognized as independent by Ptolemy, nephew of Ptolemy I., Dr. 2, 2, 15.—Cius with Byzantium and Heraclea among the testamentary executors of Nicomedes I., consequently independent; see below, chap. ix.

Cyzicus. Marquardt, Cyzicus, Berlin, 1836; Head, H. N. 454.—Apollonia, for which cf. Fränkel zu den Inschr. von Perg. Nos. 160, 169 and Koepp, Beil. z. Allg. Zeit, 1892, April 1, perhaps

represented on a coin, reproduced in Coins of the Anc. VI. a pl. 48. 6.—Subsequent relations between Cyzicus and the Attalids, Fränkel, No. 248.—For Pergamum, see below, chap. x. note 2, chap. xiii. and esp. chap. xxi.

12. Position of the Cities in Asia, see above, chap. ii. note 1.—Much pains is taken in the present day to ascertain the status of the various cities in that age, whether autonomous or not, e.g. Gaebler, Erythrae, 17, 20, 22, and other writers. But no definite result is obtained. We have to deal always with a *de facto* and not a *de jure* situation, and words are often taken for things. Thus, for instance, Gaebler says (pp. 17, 18) that after Antipater's death the satraps began to "reduce the independent cities to submission and hold them down by garrisons." But a "liberator" of the Greeks arises in Antigonus; he "restored the cities their freedom but left garrisons behind for their protection." Assuming the last point to be correct (I find no trace of it in Diod. 18, 52 quoted by Gaebler), the "liberator" after all is no better than the oppressor; a garrison is a garrison, independence with a garrison comes to exactly the same thing as oppression with a garrison; the rights of the cities remained unchanged. The kings oppressed the cities as much as they could; fine words did not cost anything. Radet, *De coloniis*, etc. Paris, 1892, p. 82 seq.: Internal independence the rule, but supervision exercised by generals and commanders, who demand taxes. Loyalty of the inhabitants promoted by religion: (1) the founders worshipped—according to the name—Antiochus, Laodice—even Themison; (2) cults of Alexander and of the kings, the living and the dead; also ἀρχιερείς; the τύχη of Seleucus also worshipped (Radet, 87). The latter refers (p. 17) to the difference in the city of Magnesia of the Hellenic οἰκηταί and the κάτοικοι, soldiers, some of whom lived in the villages. In these matters too great variety observable.—The position of the rulers of Pergamum is interesting; they originally formed a free Greek community, cf. Fränkel, *Inscr.* No. 5, on their sovereigns, for which see Swoboda in the *Rhein. Mus.* 1891. It appears from the Pergamum inscriptions that its kings respected the self-government of the demos, but brought influence to bear on its decisions in various ways, by the appointment of strategi and by ἐπιστολαί; cf. Fränkel, No. 18.—For LAMPSACUS Head, H. N. 457.—ABYDOS fights bravely against Lysimachus, Dr. 2, 2, 201, 211; against Philip V., see below, chap. xvi.—SMYRNA, cf. Kuhn, *Entsteh. der Städte der Alten*, Leipz. 1878, pp. 335-362, and for the other cities founded by Lysimachus. Relations between Smyrna and Magnesia, C. I. Gr. 3137 = Hicks 176 = Ditt. 171.—TEOS and LEBEDOS, *Inscr.* Lebas-Waddington, *Asie min.* 86 = Hicks 149 = Ditt. 126; we can

see that a *synoecismus* was not very easy to carry out.—ERYTHRAE, see Gaebler's book quoted above.—For the Ionic cities in general see Head, Cat. Br. Mus. Ionia, pp. xlv. xlviii.—EPHESUS. Cf. besides chaps. xiii. and xvii., and esp. Head, On the Chronological Sequence of the Coins of Ephesus, London, 1880, who in the history mainly follows Droysen. The facts are not all clear, yet the history of the city is extremely interesting for the very reason that it was not quite independent. After 302 Ephesus at first is alternately under Lysimachus and Demetrius, but finally under Lysimachus again, who names it after his wife Arsinoe and entrusts the government of it to his son Agathocles. Head says (Ionia, p. xlv.): "Ephesus under the temporary name of Arsinoe also struck Attic octobols and bronze coins. It appears also to have struck bronze coins under the name of Eurydicea, out of compliment to Eurydice, a daughter of Lysimachus" (reprod. pl. 10, 7). After the death of Lysimachus Ephesus becomes independent, but is a good deal influenced, by Seleucus, by Antiochus I., then by Egypt as well, see Phylarchus in Ath. 13, 593. Head and Babelon do not agree as to the history of the next following period. While Head cannot find in it any trace of Seleucid influence on Ephesus and thinks that Ephesus was permanently influenced by Egypt as early as 258, Babelon (lxxiii.) points out that, according to Euseb. 1, 251, Antiochus II. died in Ephesus (246); consequently permanent Egyptian influence probably did not begin until after the year 246, evidently in consequence of the disputes between Seleucus and Antiochus Hierax. Hence Babelon sees no reason why Seleucid coins with a bee, the symbol of Ephesus, should not be ascribed to Hierax. When Ephesus was subject to Ptolemaic influence it coined again on the Rhodian standard, Head, Ionia, xlvii. A golden octadrachm of Berenice II., wife of Ptolemy Euergetes (Cat. Ptol. pl. 13, 2), was struck in Ephesus. The relations of Ephesus with Rhodes were of old standing (vol. iii. of this work, p. 48); hence as soon as it had shaken off the Seleucid yoke and was devoted to the Ptolemies it could once more assimilate its coinage to that of Rhodes, which was on friendly terms with Egypt. At that time Ephesus became one of the most important harbours of the East. The fact that Ephesus, although not quite independent, yet minted coins, shows the elasticity of the conception of independence. See also below, chap. xiii. note 2, and chap. xxi. note 4 on the coins of Ephesus. In the case of Ephesus also the relation to the temple pointed out by Curtius and the analogy of Smyrna is to be noted.—SAMOS. Decision of Lysimachus in the dispute between Samos and Priene, C. I. Gr. 2156 = Hicks 152.—Cos. Cf. Paton and Hicks, The Inscriptions of Cos, Oxf. 1891, with

a detailed history of Cos ; and Larfeld in the Berl. Phil. Woch. 1892, Nos. 22, 23. According to the letter of Antigonus quoted above (Ditt. 126) the laws of Cos were to be provisionally binding on the united Teans and Lebedaeans. Ptolemy Philadelphus was born in Cos.—For RHODES see below, chap. xxii. ; for the Crimea, chap. xxv.

13. Egypt. Excellent summary of authorities and passages in Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östl. Prov. des röm. Kaiserreichs*, Leipz. 1891, pp. 35-39, with a list of the discoveries and papyri. I confine myself to a few points. S. Sharpe, *Gesch. Aegyptens*, translated by Jolowicz, with notes by Gutschmid, Leipz. 1862 ; Lepsius, *Königsbuch der alten Aegypter*, Berl. 1858 ; the same author's *Ergebnisse der ägyptischen Denkm. f. die Ptolemäergesch.*, Berl. Akad. 1852 ; Cless in Pauly's *R. E.* 6, 1, 179 seq., esp. 229-235 ; Clinton, *Fasti Hellen.* 2, 383-409 ; Hubert's *Obs. chronol. in Ptolem. histor.*, Lugd. Bat. 1857 ; papers by Lumbroso : *Économie polit. de l'Égypte sous les Lagides*, Turin, 1870 ; *Ricerche Alessandrine*, 1871 ; *L'Egitto al tempo dei Greci e dei Romani*, Rome, 1882 ; Baedeker's *Aegypten*, 2 Bände. In *Die Aegyptologie*, Leipz. 1891, Brugsch says (p. 489) that the historical authorities for the Ptolemaic age are walls of temples, steles, native inscriptions of the Serapeum, native and Greek papyri, etc., "an almost inexhaustible store of material which is awaiting detailed treatment." And the number of these records is constantly on the increase, especially at the present moment owing to the papyri brought to England by Flinders Petrie, examined mostly by Sayce and Mahaffy. Thus parts of mummy-cases in Tell Gurob in the Fayûm (Baed. 2, 13 ; Flinders Petrie, *Ten Years Digging in Egypt*, Lond. 1892, pp. 128-138) contain the wills of soldiers who had become land-owners by royal gift, as well as other business papers ; edition, *The Flinders Petrie Papyri*, with Transcriptions, Comm. etc. by Mahaffy, Dublin, R. Irish Acad., 1891. In the London Orientalist Congress of 1892 Mahaffy read a paper entitled *On the Gain to Egyptology by the Petrie Papyri*. One of Mahaffy's last discoveries is that of the letter of a soldier about the war in Syria ; see below, chap. x. note 1.—The army of mercenaries, Polyb. 5, 62-65 ; 8, 18 ; 34, 14.—The finances have been treated by Droysen, *Zum Finanzwesen der Ptol.*, Berl. Akad. 1882.—Traveling judges, Cless, 6, 1, 232 and P. Gardner, *New Chapters*, pp. 226, 428, also Mitteis, 48 seq. ; competition of Egyptian and Hellenic law institutes ; formation of a kind of *jus gentium* in Egypt, Mitteis, 57.—Ptolemy I. treated by Mahaffy, *Emp. of the Ptol.*, pp. 19-111. Max. L. Strack, *Die Dynastie der Ptolemäer*, Berlin, 1897, which deals with the chronology and genealogy of

the Lagidae in a most minute way. — The surnames of the Ptolemies discussed by von Gutschmid, *Kleine Schriften*, IV. p. 107 seq.—Ideal picture of the Monarchy of the Lagidae by Mommsen, *R. G.* 5, 559. He compares it with that of Frederick the Great; the system “required” a king “engaged in the daily work of administration”; the rulers “had good reason for adopting the epithet of ‘Benefactor.’” As a matter of fact, however, with the exception of Ptolemy I., none of these sovereigns performed the “required” daily work. If his activity had been of the Frederick order Ptolemy II. would not have suffered so much from *ennui* as he did—at all events he had mind enough to find his life really a dreary one. Ptolemy III., Euergetes I., whose grand surname does not prove, more than that of a Philopator or Philometor, anything but the impudence of the bearer of it and the submissiveness of his courtiers, was in the end according to Polyb. 5, 42 notorious for his *βαθυμία* and in general an ordinary Oriental despot; see Cless, 6, 1, 208. Of the other Ptolemies the less said the better in connection with the discharge of royal duties. Among the baddest of the bad, however, was Euergetes II., ‘fat paunch,’ who will be briefly noticed in chap. xix. Polybius (34, 14) also refers to the *οὐδέμεια* of these monarchs. The Attalids had more right to take the title of ‘Benefactor’; Fränkel, *Inscr. v. Perg.* 1, p. 21. The “administration directed towards the well-being of all subjects alike” is not a “peculiarity of the Lagidae régime,” which lasted for 300 years, but at the most of Ptolemy I., who reigned about 23 years as king, and even in his case it is a question whether he cared for the general well-being of all his subjects at all. As a rule the idea of an administration which has to look to the welfare of the governed, is more of a modern than an ancient one; in the Greece and Rome of antiquity there was not much “administration.” But the Egyptian government, which is specially in question here, was conducted under the Ptolemies on the lines of the Pharaohs. One of the best judges of Egypt, Erman, says (*Aegypten und äg. Leben im Alterthum*, 1, 84) that there, as everywhere in the East, “the machine of government works only for the ruler.” The question therefore arises, whether Ptolemy I. had the will and the power to alter this. Did he wish to make the Egyptians happy in a way that they did not understand? At Alexander’s death, when he took over the satrapy of Egypt, he was 44 years of age; he had always been bent on doing his duty as a soldier and had never bestowed a thought on making his fellow-creatures happy; his immediate and pressing preoccupation now was to hold his own in the country. He did so, and in his 61st year made himself king. Is it likely that he turned over a new leaf at that age? He maintained his

position because he governed as the old Pharaohs had done, because he kept order and did not interfere with the priests. And Ptolemy I. was the best of the Ptolemies; all the others governed still less on Frederick's principle, but simply on that of enjoying life. Generally speaking the state-craft of the Ptolemies was that of the last four Bourbons of Naples; they relied on the native priesthood and on foreign mercenaries, allowed both these classes great privileges and did what they liked themselves. In opposition to my view of the Ptolemies Mahaffy in his 'Empire, etc.' draws attention to what they achieved in administration as well as to their patronage of art and science. Cf. esp. the conclusion, p. 486.—The position which the Ptolemies wished to take up with regard to the natives is shown by several documents: a decree in honour of the satrap Ptolemy I., Brugsch, *Zeitschrift für ägypt. Sprache*, IX. (1871); Wachsmuth, *Rhein. Mus.*, N. F. Bd. 26; Baed. 1, 318 (Diadochi stele in the Museum at Cairo), an inscription which glorifies the rulers as protectors of the Egyptian religion; a stele of Ptolemy II. and Arsinoë, see below, chap. ix. note 2; the so-called Tanis stone, also called the decree of Canopus, of Ptolemy III., in the same Museum, Baed. 1, 334; finally the famous Rosetta stone of Ptolemy V., Baed. 1, 376. All the three first Ptolemies are said to have brought back the Egyptian holy relics which had been carried off to Asia; see as to this below, chap. ix. note 2, and chap. x. note 1.—The Graeco-Macedonian rule was made more tolerable for the Egyptians by the idea that Alexander was a son of Nectanebus II.—Mahaffy (Petrie Pap. 16) assumes that Ptolemy II. adopted an attitude more friendly to Greek than to native culture.—Cf. also the brief and pointed remarks of E. Meyer, *Geschichte des alten Aeg.*, Berl. 1887, pp. 397 seq.—TRADE with the Red Sea: Coptos, Str. 17, 815, Baed. 2, 112; Berenice, Str. 17, 815; Baed. 2, 88; Kosêr, Baed. 2, 87. P. Gardner, *New Chapters*, 437: "Harpalos discovered or rediscovered the course of the monsoons, and at the proper seasons Arabian fleets went to and fro between the Malabar coast and the harbours sedulously constructed by the Ptolemies on the Red Sea."—Ptolemais, Str. 17, 813; Baed. 2, 57. Arsinoë, Str. 17, 809; Baed. 2, 8; see however Mahaffy, *Empire of the Ptol.* p. 81. The early Ptolemies paid great attention to trade.—COINAGE. Catal. of Greek Coins, Ptolemies, by R. Stuart Poole, Lond. 1883.—For inland trade Egypt uses only gold and copper; the silver coins were intended for trade with foreign countries. These latter were at first struck in Phoenicia, and when it was lost, in Cyprus. From and after 305 Ptolemy coined in his own name, before that date Alexander-coins. Types: head of Ptolemy, rev. eagle on thunderbolt. The first coins of Ptolemy II. are the same as those of his father,

who of course was still living. See also Gardner, *New Chapters*, p. 226.—No city coinage in Egypt under the Ptolemies, so thoroughly un-Greek was the Ptolemaic despotism. The Romans were the first to introduce a variety of coinage there, coins of the city of Alexandria and of the *νομοί*. The only known coin of Naucratis, found by Petrie, is attributed by Head (H. N. 718) to the period between 323 and 305. As soon as the Ptolemies ruled in their own name, this came to an end. Naucratis was of course in a special position; it was a very old Greek foreign colony with a constitution of its own, *τιμοῦχοι* (Gardner, *New Chapters*, 224), as in Massalia; Phocaea, as we know, had helped to found Naucratis. There is an early precedent for the surnames of some of the Diadochi and Epigoni in Syracuse, where Gelon was proclaimed *εὐεργέτης* and *σωτήρ* by the people in the year 480 (Diod. 11, 26), always supposing that the tradition is correct.—The difference in the mode of whipping (Momms. 5, 561 following Philon in Flacc. 10) might be represented by a Ptolemaic court-scholar as a recognition of the traditional peculiarities of the two races and consequently as a genuinely conservative practice, for the Pharaohs used the lash and the Spartans the stick. A punishment not absolutely objected to by a Themistocles might very well be put up with by a casual Greek in Alexandria at the hands of an official of the divine monarch.

14. Cyrenaica. Cyrenaica and Alexander, Diod. 17, 49. Cyrenaica Egyptian, Dr. 2, 1, 105.—Revolts against Ptolemy, is subdued; Ophellas installed as governor, Dr. 2, 2, 35; Ophellas revolts, Dr. 2, 2, 91.—Magas discussed in detail, Dr. 2, 2, 94; cf. Koepp, *Die syrischen Kriege der ersten Ptol.*, Rhein. Mus. 39 (1884).—Coins: Müller, *Numism. de l'anc. Afr.* 1; Head, H. N. 725 seq. esp. 732; Cat. Br. Mus. Ptol.; Babelon, *Mél. numism.* 1, 33-43.

15. Cyprus. Dr. 2, 2, 9, 15, 35, 258.—With regard to the absence of Cyprus in Theocritus' 17th Idyll cf. Koepp, l. l. 2.—Products of Cyprus which were useful for Egypt, Dr. 3, 1, 56.—Coins, Head, H. N. 627; Cat. Br. Mus. Ptol. xix., xxiii., xxxiii.; symbol, a shield. Gardner (*New Chapters*, p. 165) refers to the "number of Ptolemaic inscriptions discovered in the island," and to the "enormous quantities of silver coin issued by the Egyptian kings at Cyprian mints."

16. Phoenicia and Coele Syria. Dr. 2, 1, 167; 2, 2, 9, 47, 54. Koepp rightly assumes in consequence of Pol. 5, 67 that Ptolemy was in possession of these countries at an early date.—Coins: Head, 650, 665 seq.; Cat. Br. Mus. Ptol. xxiv., xxxiv., xxxviii.—For Aradus and Ascalon on Seleucid coins, see below, chap. ix. note 4; for Phoenicia, chap. xvi. note 2.

17. Egypt and Thrace. Droysen (3, 1, 268) assumes that with Arsinoë Ptolemy II. acquired claims to Lysimachia, Ephesus and other cities of Lysimachus. Ptolemy III. was no doubt the first to gain a footing there; v. Wilamowitz too (Ant. v. Kar. 220) does not mention Thrace among the possessions of the Ptolemies about 270. About 230 proof of it is given by the appointment of the Spartan Hippomedon to the post of Egyptian commander in Thrace, Telles in Stob. flor. 2, 72 L.—According to Polyb. 5, 34, Egypt in the year 222 has Lysimachia, Aenus and Maronea.—The Cyclades, v. Wil. 220; Busolt, Griech. Staatsalterth. 2nd ed. p. 63; games called *Πτολεμαία* there. T. Delamarre, Les Deux premiers Ptolémées et la confédération des Cyclades, Paris, 1896.

We see then that after the period of the greatest confusion (323-278) a *nexus* of states arises which includes both kingdoms and republics. Some of the latter are powerful (Rhodes), others contrive to protect their freedom by means of mutual association (leagues) or by an accommodating attitude towards the kings (Ephesus). Of the kingdoms those which have Macedonian dynasties mostly attract attention. Among these Egypt is despotically governed at home and has a liberal policy abroad; the rulers of Syria are liberal at home, owing to the preponderance of the cities, and quarrelsome abroad; Macedonia is a patriarchally governed state bent on conquest. As regards the dynasties of these three states it may be said that they continue, under altered circumstances, the traditions of the countries in which they have installed themselves. The Antigonids behave like the old Macedonian kings, the Ptolemies imitate the Pharaohs, the Seleucids take up the same attitude as the Achaemenidae. That is the influence of the *milieu*, as people say nowadays, of the soil, the surroundings. But the extraction of the dynasty also asserts itself; the sovereigns are Macedonians with a Greek education. So we see the Antigonids using their culture, which is higher than that of most of Alexander's ancestors, to carry out their ambitious plans more skilfully. The Seleucids, following the example of the Achaemenidae, allow the component parts of their empire great independence, and as the Greek element, which the Seleucids highly value, happens to be among them, the empire eventually falls to pieces for this very reason. Finally, the Ptolemies are inclined to continue the traditional patriarchal régime of the country, which they rightly consider advantageous, but as they are not in touch with the religion of the people and only make use of their power to deal with foreign

affairs as enlightened Greeks and for the rest lead a life of self-indulgence, their system acquires an internal inconsistency, the consequence of which is that in the end they have not even enough energy and intelligence for the conduct of diplomacy and become addicted solely to pleasure, to the ruin of their country and themselves.—I cannot allow, as was remarked at the end of chap. iii., that the monarchical system, the varied aspects of which I have described in this chapter, possessed any intrinsic value for the Greeks of that age, and I now add some further observations to those made in that place. The Greek *polis* required kings only for the purpose of keeping the peace among the communities. For this the rule of Alexander or of a successor resembling him, who would have controlled the whole, would have been of use. An empire of that kind would have become a sort of Roman empire. Seleucus, if he had been in possession of the whole, would have been able to work on these lines. But he never obtained the whole. The successors of Alexander, the Diadochi as well as those who came after them, apart from the faults of character peculiar to them, did harm by constantly warring upon one another, which from their own point of view they were bound to do. In their case the monarchical principle, which is salutary in the form of a hereditary kingship, revealed little but its darker sides. They ruled by right of conquest, and that comes to an end with power. Hence it was natural that they should ruin themselves, the Seleucids, however, being entitled to the merit of having fostered the growth of cities and states in the countries under their control. The Roman empire then stepped into the shoes of Alexander's successors. Rome accomplished what Alexander was not able to carry out, and over a wider area.

CHAPTER VI

THE CULTURE OF THE GREEKS—ATHENS

WE now come to more pleasing aspects of history, for we have to discuss the culture of the Greeks during the same period.

The victories of Alexander brought about great changes precisely in those external circumstances of the Greeks which influenced their whole culture. On the one hand, the sphere of Greek culture was extended in a marked degree, on the other hand, free institutions no longer predominated as much as before in the Greek world, for a very great number of Greeks were henceforth under the influence of the kings. This entailed important consequences for religion in the first place. A more intimate acquaintance with Asia and Egypt had the effect of making the cults of these countries more popular among the Greeks, and besides this, the kings, especially in the East, ranked with the gods even in the eyes of the Greeks.¹ Now this last practice, which has already been referred to in chap. iii., was not wholly absurd according to Greek notions. For religion was, up to a certain point, an affair of the independent community, and the individuals so honoured by it were foreigners and never fellow-citizens. For the isolated *polis* as such the abstract antithesis of man—god with which we are familiar did not exist; any one who was not a citizen of a particular city might at a pinch become a deity of it. This abstract possibility was applied in a con-

crete fashion in those days. Of course a religion which made a god of Poliorcetes was contemptible. Even if the god Dionysus was not in himself of a much more exalted character than the god Demetrius, yet it was possible to form a more ideal conception of him, for the very reason that any qualities could be ascribed to an imaginary being. This was not possible with a Demetrius. Hence the Greek religion, by reason of the conclusions which it drew itself, was proved to be defective in a more emphatic way than before. And this came about not only through facts in the manner above described; it was also effected in a literary way by a man who set up for a historian or geographer, the Messenian Euhemerus, a friend of king Cassander.² He had made a journey to Asia for the king, in the course of which he claimed to have discovered marvellous islands in the Indian Ocean, which he described in his work entitled *The Sacred Document*. In the largest of them, Panchaea, the exploits of men who had been subsequently worshipped as gods, the deeds of Zeus and of the other denizens of Olympus, were recorded in sacred letters. This assertion, that the Greek gods had been only human conquerors, afterwards excited the interest of the Christian Fathers of the Church, who saw in it the desired admission on the part of the heathen that their religion was untrue, and in the present day this method of interpreting myths is called *Euhemerism*. Of course the doctrine of Euhemerus was of no use to the people, for its inventor did not give them anything better in exchange for what he took from them, their naïve belief; it was of service only to Cassander and his fellows, who could now become or actually be gods with just as much right as Zeus. If endeavours of this kind were made to force and persuade the Greek people to accept men of the stamp of the Diadochi as gods, the Greeks would be sure, even more than in the fifth or fourth century, to look for religious consolation among less civilized peoples, and the Thracian, Phrygian and Egyptian

cults, which had long had a hold on the Hellenes, now spread more widely. Among the Greeks of Asia Minor and Syria especially there arose a regular mixture of religions.

The transformation of Greek culture is of course not a lifting of it to a higher level. But the countries in which it mostly took place did not take the lead as regards culture in general. In Alexandria, the most brilliant city of the Diadochi, the city which transplanted the cults of Isis and Serapis into every Greek country, many Greek poets gathered together, but they were natives of the old Greek republics and in many ways bore the stamp of the old Greek culture. More than that, the real centres of civilization were still these independent states, above all Athens, which at this time set the fashion in the intellectual life of the Greeks to an almost greater extent than formerly. For it was precisely about the year 300 B.C. that Athens struck out lines in philosophy and poetry which, if they are not so lofty as the previous achievements of the famous city, yet sway the world down to our own day. The philosophy of Athens is the genuinely Greek answer to the above-described attempts to introduce Oriental deities or this or that Macedonian into the Greek Olympus, as well as generally to all attempts to make the advantage of the moment or the temporary requirements of the subject the great aim of life. We will begin with this philosophy.

Athens remained the home of the existing schools and new ones were added to them. It had been of no use for Demochares' party to carry the utterly un-Athenian measure of state control of philosophical instruction by means of a certain Sophocles; the law was soon repealed as unconstitutional. Theophrastus, who had left Athens in consequence, shortly returned thither, and the progress of philosophical development was now unimpeded.³

Of the older schools in Athens the Megarian, which rediscovered the Eleatic 'existence' in the Socratic conception of the good, found an able representative in Stilpon of Megara,

who lived about 380-300 and in accordance with the Cynics laid the greatest stress on the practice of virtue. Among other things he influenced the mental education of Zeno.

The Academy, *i.e.* the School of Plato, existed at first on the great name of its founder, without achieving anything of importance itself. It paid little attention to the Ideas which the master had presented as the fountain-head, but devoted itself to the less fruitful theory of numbers instead. Plato was succeeded by his nephew Speusippus, up to about 335; he was followed by Xenocrates, who was about the same age and whom the Athenians, although he was a foreigner, also employed on diplomatic missions. Then we find succeeding each other as heads of the School the Athenian Polemon (314-270) and Crates. The astronomer and physician Eudoxus of Cnidus and the fertile writer Heraclides from Heraclea on the Pontus also belonged to the Academy. The later Academy departed still more from the spirit of Plato, as it allied itself with the Sceptic School, which had been founded by Pyrrhon of Elis. The Sceptics emphasized the uncertainty of all assertions; hence their rule was to abstain as much as possible from every affirmation. This suspension of judgment, called *ἐποχή*, produces tranquillity of mind, which in the life of that age, kept in a constant state of excitement by the fearful conflicts of the reigning sovereigns, was a special *desideratum*. The founder of the Sceptic, the so-called middle Academy, which held probability alone to be attainable, was Arcesilaus.⁴

The Peripatetic School became at an early stage, in harmony with the character of Aristotle, a resort for the investigation of the existent in general. Aristotle's first successor was Theophrastus of Eresus (up to 287), whose strength lay in the field of the natural sciences. About the same time of the Peripatetics Eudemus studied ethics, Aristoxenus of Tarentum the theory of music, Dicaearchus of Messana the science of politics. Theophrastus bequeathed his landed

property to the School, and thus it was placed on a permanent footing. From 287 to 269 its head was Straton of Lampsacus, who favoured materialistic views, and with his adoption of heat and cold as the primary forces almost reverted to the Ionic philosophy. Through Demetrius of Phalerum the practical side of the Peripatetic philosophy became predominant in Alexandria.⁵

Almost all these philosophical schools had deviated widely from the spirit of Socrates. The idea of Socrates had been to teach men to bethink them of their duties and to act after mature consideration ; the Academics and Peripatetics engaged in learned investigations, the former in more abstract fashion, the latter by developing the various branches of knowledge. To the bulk of mankind, who had no desire for erudition, this was of little use, and that was especially regrettable in an age when religion was becoming more and more unsettled. What was wanted was that philosophy should once more pay heed to real life, and by meeting this want the two schools we are about to mention acquired great and lasting distinction. They stand much in the same relation to the older schools as the Franciscans and Dominicans do to the Benedictines and their numerous offshoots. The latter did all manner of good, only they did not attend to the immediate needs of the people. For that reason the mendicant orders, who went among the people, rightly attained great popularity. So it was in Greece about the year 300 B.C. The Socratics were everything but what their name implied. At this point the Stoics and the Epicureans stepped in and once more brought philosophy down from the skies to mother-earth and tried to give the people what religion was no longer able to bestow.

The Stoic School was founded by Zeno of Citium in Cyprus, who lived from about 340 to 265.⁶ He had a private fortune and came to Athens as a merchant, being strongly attracted by its intellectual life. There he studied philosophy with ardour, firstly that which presented the most marked contrast to a

luxurious life, the Cynic. The principles commended themselves to him, but it was not scientific enough in his eyes. Mental gymnastics he learnt of the Megarians and the Academics. He then set up as a teacher of a new philosophy, which was at once practical and scientific. This he did in the Stoa Poikile, which was in the heart of the city. That was a point of importance. The Academy and the Lyceum were outside the gates; a special resolve was therefore needed to go there; every Athenian passed by the Stoa Poikile almost daily. In precisely the same manner the Franciscans and the Dominicans did not, like the Benedictines, Cistercians, etc., found their monasteries in country districts and solitudes, but on principle in the cities, to the inhabitants of which they wished to be of service. Zeno's successor, Cleanthes of Assos, was not his equal in point of knowledge, yet we have a noble hymn to Zeus from this energetic inquirer, who raised himself amid privations from a humble rank in life to a position of great eminence. The third chief of the Stoics again, Chrysippus of Soli in Cilicia, was a man of greater attainments. Thus we see that of the three first heads of the Stoa two were certainly natives of semi-Greek countries, but the School was born and grew up in Athens and is due precisely to a reaction on the part of thoughtful easterns against Oriental pomp and Oriental extravagance.

The Stoic doctrine stamps itself as an essentially practical one by laying the most stress on a proper mode of life; but the proper mode of life must, as Socrates also required, proceed from a proper conviction. The Stoa draws for general imitation the ideal picture of a sage who is also the virtuous man. The sage must be dispassionate (*apathia*) and obey the laws which materially and spiritually control the universe; he must act according to nature and reason. If he lives in this way, then he fulfils his duty. The conception of duty (*cathecon*) was developed specially by the Stoa. But it is not permissible to believe that duty consists in the performance of

external actions. In the discharge of duty the main point is the intention. That was lofty and commendable in itself ; it was a reminder to the Greeks to make good the deficiencies of their own religion, which was taken up with ceremonial. But this feature in the Stoic doctrine nevertheless led to abuses. As intention only was the main point, Stoics have been able to commit unseemly and even immoral actions without feeling out of touch with their doctrine ; they have not unfrequently behaved like Cynics. Of great importance, however, was the fact that in the eyes of the Stoa the individual is no longer the political being conceived by Aristotle. The *polis* has no attraction for the Stoic. He rises above the city to the notion of a more comprehensive fellowship of mankind. By this means not only is the Greek state broken through, but—a point which is not sufficiently noticed—the Greek religion too is dispensed with, for this was based on the *polis*. Socrates had already made a modest beginning with cosmopolitanism, the Stoa founded it in theory. In so doing the Stoics abolished the state for the moment, because at that time there was no state which corresponded to Greek ideas but the *polis*. But after a time they came to the conclusion that a state of another kind could be imagined, which would at all events approximate more closely to the ideal state and not be confined to a city ; and as in those days a state of that description could only be a monarchical one, Stoics entered the service of monarchs as statesmen, always with the intention of influencing their actions for the good of the people. The natural philosophy of the Stoa was of less significance ; it was pantheistic in character and attached importance to the utility of the various aspects of nature. It is interesting that the Stoa uses, besides direct evidence, the agreement of mankind as a means of proving otherwise undemonstrable propositions ; in it they saw a manifestation of the reason which obtains in the world.

The Stoic philosophy is a practical one, but in spite of this

it is not of service for everybody. It remains a doctrine for choicer spirits, for it reposes on the conception of the wise man. But can even the majority of mankind, let alone all, become sages? If not, what is to be done for those who have no prospect of attaining thereto? To this question the Stoa returns no answer; it was not reserved for any system of philosophy to answer it, but for a religion which was higher than that of the Greeks.

The problem of practical philosophy was approached from another side by the Athenian Epicurus, who was born in Samos in the year 341.⁷ He taught first in Mytilene and Lampsacus, and then in Athens, where his pupils assembled in a garden inside the city. He died in 270. His best friend Metrodorus had predeceased him, and thus he was succeeded as head of the School by Hermarchus. Like Theophrastus, Epicurus provided for the continuance of his School by endowing it with his gardens; he bequeathed to it land, premises and capital. The philosophy of Epicurus may in a certain sense be regarded as a resumption of the doctrines of Aristippus. It has a still more direct practical object than the Stoa; for its aim is happiness itself, which is also defined as pleasure. Every kind of pleasure, however, must not be sought after. For there are many which bring sorrow in their train and therefore result in their opposite; these are to be avoided. Hence man must use discrimination in his pursuit of pleasure. Here we see how Epicureanism tries to supplement the Stoa. The Stoa demands in the first place and unconditionally that man should be wise; then he can be happy; Epicurus wants man to have a clear idea of what will give him pleasure without entailing distress. Happiness therefore is the main object of the philosophy. As wisdom consequently serves only as a means to happiness, it becomes easier, for the discernment of what can prevent subsequent pain is more easy to acquire than insight into the laws of the universe in general. Happiness of a sort according to Epicurus' views can be attained by every coolly calculating

egoist ; a happiness of that kind is intelligible also to those who cannot grasp the wisdom of the Stoa. Epicureanism therefore suits the bulk of mankind, but it readily leads them into wrong paths. For putting pleasure in the foreground opens the door to all sorts of caprice. The man who is able so to regulate pleasure that no pain proceeds from it for himself, can always believe that he is acting rightly according to the teaching of Epicurus, even if he is doing harm to other people. From the practical aim of life Epicurus deduces the necessity of the study of nature. For happiness consists in absence of pain and consequently in calmness of mind (*ataraxia*). But this calmness is disturbed by nothing so much as by religion, which according to Epicurus exists only for the purpose of frightening and troubling mankind. It must therefore be got rid of and this is done by natural philosophy. Hence Epicurus looks about for a theory of nature which is capable of achieving this object, and finds it in the atomic doctrine of Democritus, which he adopts with a few modifications. Everything is brought about by the collision of the atoms, and Epicurus holds that there is no need of gods to explain this. That, however, is an illusion. For why the atoms should come in contact, after they have set themselves in motion at the same moment and were not in contact before, and why they should be set in motion at all, is undiscoverable without the aid of other hypotheses. The atomic doctrine of the ancients sets free from religion only those who jump at any pretext for dispensing with it. In the doctrine of the forms of human association Epicurus goes a step farther than the Stoa. The latter had already thrust the city on one side and set up as an ideal a citizenship of the world, which might be approximately attained by a proper grouping of larger states. Epicurus declares friendship to be the sole tie worthy of man. This is equivalent to putting forward private life, association guided only by unfettered choice, as the ideal, a great step backwards in every respect, theoretically as well as practically.

For it is clear that if not states, at all events some ties or other involving compulsion are necessary, if mankind is not to go to ruin. If the Epicureans were unwilling to co-operate in any such system, then their idea was simply to lead a comfortable life at the expense of other people.

If Epicureanism met the tendency of the age by laying stress on the good fortune of those who, heedless of the strife and bloody conflicts of the sovereigns in the wilds of Asia, indulged in the peaceful enjoyments of private life and in the pleasures of friendship, the Stoa satisfied the nobler aspirations of the times, those which aimed at the improvement of public life. The conception of duty would not allow the Stoics to be insensible to the efforts made to organize states on a right basis. Zeno himself was in good repute with Antigonus Gonatas, as was the Stoic Persaeus, whom Zeno sent in his own place to the king of Macedonia, and who had previously been there as tutor of Halcyoneus, a son of Gonatas. Persaeus even became Macedonian governor in Corinth. The Stoic Sphaerus from Borysthenes was adviser of Cleomenes, the reformer of Sparta. The Academy too was not a stranger to political aspirations. We shall refer to the Megalopolitans Ecdemus and Demophantus, pupils of Arcesilaus, in chap. x. If they liberated their city from the *tyrannis*, the Peripatetic Prytanis in the same city served Antigonus Doson as a politician.

A characteristic feature in the labours of the philosophers of this age, with the exception, it is true, of the Epicureans, who undertook no unnecessary work, was their devotion to erudition. The universal Peripatetics paid special attention to the history of literature; to the Stoics belongs the merit of having laid the foundations of grammar.

All these schools had issued from Athens, had their headquarters in Athens, and attracted to Athens a number of foreigners who wished to obtain clear ideas on the serious duties of life. Thus Athens was more than ever the intel-

lectual centre of the Greek world. But it was also the centre of Greek refinement and wit, owing to an Athenian creation of great importance, the New Comedy.⁸

*Defence of
the New
Comedy*

The New Comedy is one of the most striking phenomena of Greek literature, having become the standard for the entire further development of comedy among the ancients and the moderns. It presents a marked contrast to the Old Comedy, as known to us through Aristophanes. For the latter is fantastic and without fixed rule as regards subject-matter, whereas the New Comedy depicts real life and lays down rules which it observes itself and which all comedies have followed since. In part it may be said to have grown externally—for a more inward source of the New Comedy will be discussed below—out of the Middle Comedy, which retained the extravagant and farcical element of the Old Comedy, but differed from it in its avoidance of political aims. It is a matter for regret that the new Attic comedy, which was so prized in antiquity, has come down to us only in fragments, which moreover convey little information on the most important points, the development of the pieces and the treatment of the characters. These we glean mostly from the Roman comedies of Terence and Plautus, who wrote adaptations of the plays of the new Greek comedy. But as these Roman dramatists added a great deal of their own, it is not possible to arrive at an entirely just verdict on the value of the new Attic comedy through them. In spite of this we find in most books which allude to this subject in the present day a decided condemnation of the New Comedy, an opinion which is closely connected with mistaken views on the moral condition of the Athens of that day. The strange part of it is that the unfavourable verdict on the comedy is supported by that pronounced on the morals of the age, while on the other hand the morals are declared to be bad because they are so portrayed in the Comedy. It is asserted, for instance, that the Athenians were much more corrupt in the fourth

and third centuries than in the second half of the fifth, the age of Aristophanes, and the New Comedy is consequently depreciated as the expression of this greater corruption. There is no actual proof, however, of the greater deterioration of the Athenian people in the fourth and third centuries, while the contrary, *i.e.* a higher or at all events equally high moral standard may be inferred from many things. True, the following are quoted as startling facts which justify the verdict: the condemnation of Phocion and the servile attitude of the Athenians towards the two Demetrius's. But it is forgotten that the treatment of Phocion was no worse than, for instance, the condemnation of the generals who fought off the Arginusae, that the 360 statues were voted to Demetrius of Phalerum by a packed oligarchy, which in no way represented Athens, and no notice is taken of the fact that the most conspicuous honours in that age, those paid to Antigonus and Demetrius Poliorcetes, not only (as we saw above, in chap. ii. note 13) had nothing unusual about them, but were quite in keeping with the most strenuous public spirit. We shall show below, in note 3 to this chapter, that it was precisely in the third century B.C. that the Athenians gave the most striking proof of energy and ability in war and of strong love of freedom. There remains only the argument drawn from the contents of the New Comedy as proof of the moral decay of Athens, but this is just as little to the point. In the first place we may remark that the counterpart of what is adduced from the comedy is to be found in the whole comic drama of later times which proceeded from it: young women of easy virtue, shrewish wives, impudent parasites, hectoring soldiers, and the like. The inference would be that all subsequent ages were just as bad as the Athens of that epoch. It is clear moreover from the fragments of the New Comedy that characters of that kind were considered just as reprehensible in the Athens of that day as they have been elsewhere in other ages, and the occurrence of these

types therefore does not prove that they were the ideals of the Athenians of those times. According to this theory the morally much worse English comedies of the latter half of the seventeenth century, on which we have a fine essay from Macaulay, would prove that the English people was utterly corrupt, and yet this was the people which drove James II. from the throne when he trampled on the laws of the country. On the contrary, what we still have of the new Athenian comedy warrants the assertion, firstly, that it ranks high as a work of art, and secondly, that the Athenians of the third century were not worse than their predecessors, and this precisely in private life. Whereas in the fifth century Aristophanes paints only the disreputable and contemptible side of the private life of his fellow-citizens, the New Comedy portrays a generally speaking decent family life, although of course the excrescences, *i.e.* the absurdities and vices, had to be emphasized, for the very purposes of the comedy. We see that there were respectable households, and that they were regarded as patterns. Nor must we forget that the new departure of philosophy about the year 300 B.C. proves the solid effort of the Athenians of that age and of the Greeks in general. A society in which a Cleanthes was held in honour was not a corrupt one.

If we want to have a clear idea of the justification, nay the necessity for the New Comedy, we must take the following considerations into account. The Old Comedy was an extravagant burlesque for a male society of much wit and very little restraint. In the fifth century cultivated Athenian society was confined entirely to men. Aspasia wished to change this, but did not succeed in doing so. The comedy existed only for men, who were interested mainly in politics and literature, and who considered women only in their contemptible aspects or not at all. A respectable woman was *ipso facto* debarred from listening to and looking at the plays of Aristophanes, for what was there in them to amuse her?

The caricature of politics, which could entertain only those who frequented the market-place, or the caricature of private life, which was equally unknown to her. A comedy which could only be tedious or unpleasant for respectable women may be an interesting product of a particular era of culture, but can never claim to be of value for all ages alike. And yet comedy as well as tragedy ought to have a general human interest. Here precisely was the gap in Greek literature. Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides could be enjoyed by all, women as well as men, Aristophanes by men alone, and without a commentary only by men of the fifth century. To have generally humanized the comic drama, to have converted it from a sort of carnival literature for the countrymen and contemporaries of Cleon into a source of recreation for all, that is the great merit of the new Athenian comedy. It represents in a worthy fashion the advantageous change in the life of Athens as compared with the close of the fifth century. At the end of the fourth century there arose a mixed society of men and women, in which no doubt women of easy morals still played a more important part than the others; this was the society for which the New Comedy was written.

The subject-matter of the Old, Middle and New Comedy has been very well described by G. Guizot, who says that the Old Comedy represents public life, the Middle Comedy life in public and the New Comedy private life. Private life therefore is the subject of the New Comedy, and its first and greatest representatives portrayed it in a fashion which holds good for all time. Love became and always remained the chief topic. The method of presentment in the New Comedy is the satisfactory unravelling of the plot on the one hand, and the delineation of character on the other. If the plot is still of a somewhat simple kind—most frequently it turns on the rediscovery of a relative who is supposed to have been lost—on the other hand the delineation of character in the

new Attic comedy is on a level with the best examples of later times. This comedy created most of the types which have been current ever since, for the very reason that they correspond to the permanent realities of life. The various kinds of fathers and mothers, the enamoured son, the different slaves, the courtesan, the swaggering soldier, the parasite, the philosopher, all these appear in the New Comedy as they do in all comic plays down to our own century. Equally typical in the New Comedy is the description of generally human failings and foibles, such as anger, superstition, grumbling, avarice. The excellence of the psychological observation of these dramatists is proved by the apophthegms which constitute almost all that remains of their pieces.

In conclusion, another remark of some importance remains to be made. The New Comedy is only externally the continuation of the Old and Middle Comedy, of which it took the place at festivals; internally, in its real nature, it is rather a continuation of the tragic drama of Euripides, and it was precisely because people became aware of this that the traditional aversion to Euripides was transferred to Menander. We saw that Euripides approximates to the drama of ordinary life. But his *dramatis personae* are still heroic; they live and move in a distant past. The New Comedy treats the plot in the same way as Euripides, but places the characters not in Mycenae or in the ancient Argos, but in contemporary Athens or Rhodes. This after all was more straightforward and more entertaining. In many respects the New Comedy is an appendage of Epicureanism; at all events, the ideal of life is more an Epicurean than a Stoic one.

Its founder appears to have been Philemon, who came at an early period of his life from Soli or Syracuse to Athens and set up as a dramatic poet from Ol. 112 (330 B.C.) onwards.⁹ It was not till two Olympiads later that Menander started on his career. Philemon was generally victorious in the competitions, it is supposed because he ridiculed well-

known characters more in the old fashion. He spent some time out of Athens, with Magas of Cyrene among others. He died at the age of 100, about Ol. 129, 3 (262 B.C.), occupied with his art up to the last. Of his pieces the "Merchant" and the "Treasure" are known to us from adaptations of Plautus (the latter as *Trinummus*).

Menander, however, gradually became a still greater favourite than Philemon; he was an Athenian, born in Ol. 109, 3 (341 B.C.), consequently in the same year as Epicurus, with whom he was on terms of friendship from the time when they lived together as young men. Of the philosophers he was mostly influenced by Theophrastus; Epicureanism was more an intellectual element which played around his dramas and his life. Demetrius of Phalerum too, whose friend he was, might from his mode of life be called a disciple of Epicurus. Menander was an elegant man, who knew how to enjoy life. Ptolemy I. invited him to Alexandria, but he was unwilling to leave Athens. He died in Ol. 122, 3 (290 B.C.), at the comparatively early age of 51. Menander excelled in drawing character and was a subtle delineator of the manners of the times; his audience felt that he made them reflect on the important problems of life, and cultivated people especially preferred his pieces. Even advocates could get hints from him for their profession. Of his plays several are known through adaptations by Terence: the *Andria*, the *Brothers*, the *Self-tormentor*, the *Eunuch*. Through his comedy of *Thais* this name became a type for the ordinary courtesan, and is so used in Dante; the good name of his own mistress *Glycera*, on the other hand, he celebrated in another piece.

Of the other dramatists of the New Comedy we know too little to be able to discuss them here.

While philosophy shows how the independent Greeks continued their endeavours to solve the highest problems of existence, the Comedy shows how they, and among them

especially the Athenians, contrived by means of generally accepted maxims of practical worldly wisdom to extract a cheerful and yet instructive element from daily life. Philosophy represents progress, the Comedy a comfortable conservatism, and both gave the ideas which lay at the root of them the most complete expression imaginable. With these achievements Athens maintained the position among her contemporaries which she had long occupied. In the sixth century she took the lead in the pursuit of wisdom through Solon and in elegance through the two competitors for the hand of Agariste in Sicyon. That Athens reigned in intellect as well as elegance in the fifth century need not be demonstrated. At the close of the fourth and at the opening of the third century she does the same with Stilpon, Theophrastus, Zeno, Epicurus, Philemon and Menander. Through them she influenced the whole of contemporary Greece and the world in general for many years to come. Compared with this the achievements of the royal capitals are but meagre, when it is not a question of erudition and pure science. What are Callimachus and Apollonius to the world in comparison with Epicurus and Menander? Science no doubt was, as we shall see, well fostered in Egypt. What Aristotle had begun in Athens was continued by the divided labours of his pupils in Alexandria. If therefore the capital of Egypt surpassed Athens at that time in the study of science, yet it was not the leader of Greece in literature and art, but in the former was excelled by Athens and in the latter by Rhodes.

In art too, therefore, it is once more a republic which stands first. But that art did not flourish in Athens but mostly in an Asiatic city, is due to the fact that it requires not only genius, like philosophy and poetry, but also considerable material resources, and at that time Athens was not so rich in these as Rhodes. It was not till later that a reaction set in in this respect. Rhodian art had a preference for the grand; when the taste for simplicity revived, Athens once

more came into repute as the city of art. This we shall revert to later on, in chapters xxii. and xxiii.¹⁰

NOTES

1. Susemihl's *Gesch. der griech. Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit*, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1891, 1892, quoted above (p. 32), gives an exhaustive account of everything in the life and the works of the various writers, even the most unimportant, that can interest the scholar.—Deification of men; see above, chap. ii. note 13. As we saw, the honour was paid only to foreigners. Even the worship of the emperors in the Roman Empire is accounted for in the same way, a point not generally noticed. The living emperors were not gods to the Roman citizens, but only to the independent communities, first of all of Asia and then of the other countries. These communities could, without committing an impiety according to Greek ideas, worship as a god any individual who was not their fellow-citizen. This does not prove the servility of the Greeks, but the defectiveness of their conception of God and of religion.—Change in the Greek religion, P. Gardner, *New Chapters*, pp. 441 seq.; Cybele and Mithras, 443, 444; religion of the Indo-Greeks, 444; deities of the thiasoi in Greece itself, 446.—The Attalids were somewhat more modest in their claims to divine honours than the Ptolemies and the Seleucids; only the dead sovereign was described as *θεός*; the living one was *σύνναος τῷ θεῷ*.

2. Euhemerus. See Holm, *Gesch. Sic. im Alterthum*, 2, 272-276 and 481. Brunnhofer, *Vom Aral bis zur Ganga*, Leipzig, 1892, pp. 70-93. According to him Panchaia = Bengal (phonetically as well), the capital Panara = Benares; Cretans, Kuretes = Kuru, etc.

3. Philosophy. Cf. the well-known handbooks, esp. Windelband and, for the philosophers themselves and their literary achievements, Susemihl, 1, 10-106.—Lysimachus banishes philosophers, *Athen.* 13, 610.

4. The Academy and Sceptis. Ecdemus and Demophantus, *Dr.* 3, 1, 337; Prytanis, *Dr.* 3, 2, 155. Pyrrhon, P. Gardner, *New Chapters*, 448.

5. The Peripatetics. v. Wilamowitz, *Antig. von Karystos*, 197; *Dr.* 3, 1, 337; 3, 2, 155.

6. The Stoa. *Sus.* 1, 52. The philosophers and Gonatas, *Sus.* 11.; *Dr.* 3, 1, 89, 197, 230, 414, 416; v. Wilam., *Ant. v. Kar.* 217.—The Stoa does not at once take part in public life, *Sus.* 1, 60.—The Stoa subsequently the ideal philosophy of the Roman empire, *Wind.* 297, while Epicureanism is its real philosophy, *ibid.* 304.—

Zeno and Chrysippus are Orientals ; sharper contrasts in the East ; hence a deeper view possible. Headquarters of the Stoa the much-abused Cilicia.—The direct evidence : *καταπληκτικὴ φαντασία*.

7. The Epicureans. Epicurus had lived in Lampsacus ; Metrodorus and several later Epicureans (Polyaenus, Colotes, Leonteus, Timocrates) were also natives of the city of Priapus ; here at all events there is no contrast, such as exists between the Stoa and Sardanapalus, who is said to have ruled in Cilicia (vol. iii. of this work, p. 327), but rather a resemblance. The existence of the state, for which they would not give themselves any trouble, permitted them to lead a somewhat aristocratic club-life with cheerful, now and again even philosophizing, ladies (Leontion the most famous). Viewed from a certain standpoint, the Stoa corresponds to Christianity, Epicureanism to Islam. The internal connection between the Stoic doctrine and Christianity is well known ; again, the Mahomedan Kéf, *i.e.* a tranquil inactive half-dreamy state, is a thoroughly Epicurean ideal. It must not be forgotten, however, that there is an external connection between Epicureanism and the beginnings of Christianity in the stress laid on friendship, to which importance has been attached of late ; see Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek History*, Lond. 1892, p. 206.—Probability : *τὸ πιθανόν*.

8. The New Comedy and the moral condition of Athens. I begin by quoting the most remarkable utterances of modern writers. Droysen says (2, 2, 102) : "Domesticity, modesty and shame were almost non-existent or only talked about in the Athens of those days ; the whole life of the city had become an affair of phrases and jokes, of ostentation and laborious idleness ; Athens paid a tribute of praise and wit to the powerful, and accepted presents and largess from them in return ; the more oligarchical it was, the greater its servility." . . . "Religion had disappeared, and with the indifferentism produced by enlightenment superstition, magic, necromancy and astrology had come all the more into vogue." By way of proof of these statements Droysen says simply : "For the picture of Athens in this epoch the fragments of the Comedy, especially of Menander, supply the characteristic traits." Mommsen expresses himself still more forcibly (R. G. 1, 901 seq.), and so does Christ, § 202 ; I do not quote their remarks, because they do not bring forward any fresh points of view but only harp on the same string as Droysen. Preller is more lenient in his excellent article *Menander* in *Pauly* 4, 1777, yet he says that the description of the women in the New Comedy "points to great irregularity in ordinary married life." In examining these statements we must see if the Comedy warrants them, for no other proof is adduced. But it does not. 1. It is not true that the New Comedy of Athens paints

a state of moral deterioration. Abuse of women (Preller) was traditional with the Greeks. If there was such good ground for it as to oblige us to accept all that is said as gospel truth, then we should have to apply the same criterion to the pictures drawn by Simonides and Aristophanes, and the result would be that the women of Athens about the year 300 would be far superior to those of the year 400, for instance. A comparison of the women of Menander with those of Aristophanes would prove this very point, viz. that the morality of Athens had improved in the course of the fourth century. But then it is said, in order to depreciate the comedy of Menander, that Aristophanes after all wrote for "a great nation," the inference from which would be that in view of this greatness in other respects it would be no harm if the morality of this nation were not on a very high level; at all events the nation was great. Unfortunately, however, the contemporaries of Aristophanes did not, as is notorious, give him the impression of being great, nor do they make any such impression on the moderns; see vol. iii. of this work, p. 195. Aristophanes may have been a greater poet than Menander, but this does not make his contemporaries better than those of the latter. Droysen's remarks about the decline of religion do not prove his point. Superstition, etc., is always found among all peoples and in all ages. The general observations on the absence of modesty and shame have the same value as the similar censure of Athens discussed in chap. ii. note 8, and the praise accorded to Italy and Sicily.—2. The analogy of the English comedy after 1660 referred to in the text (p. 152), as to which cf. the Essay by Macaulay, Leigh Hunt, *The Dramatic Works of Wycherley*, etc. 1840, printed in the collections of his Essays, is conclusive. A far worse New Athenian Comedy than that of Menander would not prove that the people were as bad as the Comedy paints them. The Comedy therefore does not show, as Droysen supposes, that the Athenians of Menander's time were devoid of restraint and modesty.—But there are two positive proofs of the contrary, *i.e.* of the proposition that the Athenians of this age were men of solid worth, at least as much so as in Aristophanes' time. The first is what they accomplished in war after the death of Alexander. Achievements need not be victories, not to lose heart in adversity is also a sign of greatness. These achievements were: (1) The Lamian War (chap. i.) (2) Athens' resistance to Poliorcetes (chap. ii.) (3) The rising under Olympiodorus (chap. ii.) (4) The participation in the war against the Celts (chap. iv.) (5) The Chremonidean War (chap. ix.) Is not this indefatigable recourse to arms for the protection of freedom, in the teeth of continual failure, great and magnanimous? The

second proof is the tremendous moral uprising revealed by the philosophical movement about the year 300, especially by the creation of the Stoa, and which also belongs to Athens, who was not merely an indifferent spectator of it. In this respect the life of Cleanthes is significant, cf. Diog. Laert. 7, 5. Cleanthes came to Athens as a poor youth and hired himself out to a gardener for night-work, to be able to attend Zeno's lectures by day. And Cleanthes was not the only one who exhibited the thirst for knowledge and the self-denial which many pupils of Socrates had displayed a hundred years previously. Mommsen (1, 694) calls this "spoiling the day over the midnight oil." The more who did it the better! In one point only is Droysen perfectly right, when he says that the more oligarchic the Athenians the greater their servility. Mommsen, by the way, has made up for his epigram on the Athenians of the year 300 by the following remark on Greek life under the empire in the 5th vol. of his History of Rome: "Even setting it is the same sun," from Anth. 12, 178: *δυνόμενος γὰρ ὁμῶς ἡλῖός ἐστιν ἔτι*. That is true, but in the year 300 the sun was not near its setting, and it shone for a long time afterwards. The result which we arrive at then is that the Athenian people was just as sound about the year 300 as about the year 400 B.C.—It is interesting to see how learned scholars have arrived at their incorrect views on the Athenians of the third century, views which required rectification, because opinions of these very scholars are generally held to be *a priori* well founded. Three factors combine to produce them: unmistakeable faults committed by the Athenians of that age, an unwarranted preference of the moderns for the kings side by side with an equally unwarranted aversion to republicans, and finally the incorrect estimate of the Athenians of the fourth century. As regards the second point, I think I have sufficiently emphasized the proper view (see conclusion of the note to the Introduction), and I will only point out here that the tendency of the present day is to reserve all condemnation for the republicans, even in cases where a more lenient view ought to prevail. When in the year 200 two Acarnanians had crept into the Eleusinian mysteries, they were punished with death by the Athenians (Liv. 31, 14), and Mommsen (R. G. 1, 710) characterizes this treatment as the outcome of a "foolish and cruel vanity." It is of course possible that this verdict of Mommsen's is not absolutely unjust, although the piling up of three such vigorous epithets is somewhat strong for a proceeding which was not contrary to law. But in that case the historians should pass an equally severe judgment on the actions of the kings as well. They would then have plenty to say about folly, vanity and cruelty, but they do nothing of the kind. It

may be objected that this is not done because it seems superfluous to weary the reader by the repetition of such expressions, as they are self-evident and as in general there is no need to draw special attention to the folly, vanity and cruelty of those sovereigns. But this is not the real reason. The kings are measured by a different standard from the republicans. I only point out here that a mediocrity (Gonatas) is made into a great man, and that impudent speeches of Philip V. are pronounced to be "subtle" (see below, chap. xvi. note 4). By the application of this double standard to the characters and actions (an involuntary tribute, by the way, to the independent states, from which a higher level of morality is expected) the reader's judgment of the works in question is confused. Those who are not conversant with the authorities come to the conclusion that the kings in those days were invariably able and virtuous, and the peoples corrupt, and yet they both had the same human faults, and the difference between them was that the peoples pursued less selfish aims with less unworthy means.—The wrong estimate formed of Demosthenes and his contemporaries, to which I have referred in vol. iii., has had a good deal to do with the confusion of the judgment passed on the third century. Any one who believes that Demosthenes was a high-minded man with clear perceptions and a love of truth, but that his fellow-citizens were wanting in energy and ready to take bribes, will no doubt also believe that the people had probably not improved fifty years later. Those, however, who agree with me in thinking that the Athenians of the Demosthenic era were animated by lofty sentiments and that they did not hit on the right path for the sole reason that the leader whom they looked up to did not grasp the truth, or if he did grasp it, would not give utterance to it and in spite of all his speeches on military matters understood nothing of war, will hold it not improbable that the Athenians were the same in 280 as in 330, full of noble aspirations, but not always stable in purpose and occasionally transgressing bounds in their predilections and aversions. Starting from this view, it may be said that they acted wrongly when they put Phocion to death, that it was contemptible of the wealthy class to flatter Demetrius of Phalerum, and that it is intelligible but by no means creditable when the reinstated democracy paid more honour to their liberator Poliorcetes than republicans should have done. The final verdict, however, will be that from 323 up to about 300 Athens passed through a series of crises which are comprehensible after all that had happened, crises in which moderation was exceeded first in one direction and then in another, but that after their termination the city once more showed itself worthy of its great past, and that,

taking all things together, it deserves to be judged more leniently for what was done in the heat of excitement than the kings, who were nothing but vulgar usurpers and who acted as such. Polybius also has contributed to set the Greek element in a bad light, *eg.* 18, 34; cf. v. Scala, *Studien des Polybios*, 208.—For the New Comedy see Christ, §§ 199-205; Susem. 1, 248-269; G. Guizot, *Ménandre, Étude histor. et littér. sur la comédie et la soc. grecques*, Paris, 1855.—High praise of Menander by Plutarch, *Σύγκρισις Ἀριστοφάνους καὶ Μενάνδρου, ἐπιτομή*.—Studies of character encouraged by the work of the writers of speeches, vol. iii. of this history, p. 172. Inversely the comic writers were studied by the orators, Preller in Pauly, 4, 1779. Character-studies of the second school of sophistry in the time of Aeschines, Blass, *Griech. Bereds. von Alexander, etc.*, 58, following Philostr. *vit. Soph.* 1, 5.—Difference between the Old, Middle and New Comedy, Guizot, *Mén.* pp. 148-150.—The parasite was created by Epicarmus, the swaggering soldier by Aristophanes, if not earlier.—The characters and plots of the Roman comic drama borrowed from the Greek New Comedy are very well described by O. Ribbeck, *Geschichte der römischen Dichtung*, vol. 1, Stuttgart, 1887; the description would be the best detailed justification of Menander and Philemon, if these writers required one.—Reconstruction of the *phasma* in Guizot, *Mén.* 178.—Christ (189) has rightly called the *Clouds* of Aristophanes an “extravagant burlesque.” This holds good also of the other pieces of Aristophanes. Clever burlesques may be first-rate of their kind, but this kind is not the best. The portrayal of generally human faults and foibles, *i.e.* the new Attic comedy, is on a higher level. Schanz, *Röm. Litteraturgesch.* 37, quotes Lessing’s verdict on the *Captivi* of Plautus: “the finest piece that ever appeared on the boards.” What would Lessing have said of the Greek originals! Goethe too (*Gespräche mit Eckermann*, 1825) had such a high opinion of Menander that he calls him his favourite next to Sophocles; Lübke, *Menander*, p. 5. A. W. von Schlegel in his *Vorles. über dram. Kunst und Litteratur*, vol. 1, is quite just to the Greek ‘Lustspiel,’ as he calls the New Comedy.

9. Philemon. Cf. Ladewig in Pauly, vol. 5. Concise account in *Sus.* 1, 259.—Menander came from the Demos Kephisia; cf. Preller in Pauly, vol. 4; Guizot, *ll.*; Denis, *La comédie grecque*, vol. 2, Paris, 1886; brief account in *Sus.* 1, 253; H. Lübke, *Menander*, Berl. Lessinggymn. 1892.—Other comic writers: Diphilus of Sinope, *Sus.* 1, 260.—Philippides from the Demos Paiania, a poet, a wealthy man and a politician, in good repute at Lysimachus’ court, a benefactor of Athens, cf. *Sus.* 1, 262, who quotes the *psephismas* referring to him, and Hicks, 160.—Posidippus of

Cassandria, Sus. 1, 264. Seated statues of him and Menander in the Vatican.—Apollodorus of Carystus, Sus. 1, 263.

10. This age compared with ours: P. Gardner, *New Chapters*, 449. Luxury and murder, 451, 452.—Changes in the manners of the Greeks at that time discussed by P. Gardner, 451 seq. (position of women, *hetaerae*, taste for beauty in nature, realism in art; types of barbarians).

CHAPTER VII

AGATHOCLES

WHAT was the aspect of affairs in western Greece about this time? The position in the main was similar to that in the East, except that the shadows are far deeper than in ancient Greece. The character of the Diadochi period, with its unscrupulous violence of self-seeking monarchs, asserts itself here too, in an intensified degree even, and there is no republican community, like Athens and Rhodes in the East, to champion the cause of civilization and intellectual progress against these excesses. Magna Graecia and Sicily are of course the countries which arrest our attention, and especially the latter, which was always politically the more important of the two. Here the part of the Diadochi and Epigoni is played by Agathocles, and this Sicilian tyrant actually stretches his hand eastwards beyond Italy and westwards beyond Sicily, to Epirus and Carthage, so that he ranks among the most influential figures of antiquity. The little that we have to say besides of the West in this period is connected with the narrative of his exploits. After him Pyrrhus, a man of a very different stamp, will occupy our attention. The career of Agathocles can be traced from 317-289, although at the last only in a fragmentary way; it therefore runs parallel with the events related in the two first chapters of this volume. With Pyrrhus we come down to the year 274.

Agathocles, the son of Carcinus of Rhegium, was born at

Thermae in Sicily (the modern Termini), where his father was living in exile.¹ Carcinus went to Syracuse, and there the young man won the favour of the influential Damas. Through him he became chiliarch in the army which was fighting against Acragas, and by his marriage with the widow of his benefactor after the latter's death he himself acquired wealth and consequence. But a quiet city life gave him no satisfaction. He was an ambitious pushing soldier. When serving as chiliarch with the troops which the Syracusans sent to help the Crotoniates against the Brettians, he quarrelled with his commander-in-chief, Sosistratus, and brought charges against him before the people of Syracuse, and being unable to obtain a hearing, left the city and wandered about with mercenaries in Italy and Sicily, at one time taking service with other powers, at another attempting *coups* on his own account. He did not succeed in taking Croton; the Tarentines dismissed him, because he incurred their suspicion. He therefore returned to Syracuse when Sosistratus with his following had been overthrown, but soon exchanged the Syracusan service for that of the enemies of the city. His fixed intention, however, was to get a firm footing in Syracuse, and he attained his object eventually through the interposition of the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, who was commanding in Sicily and who evidently thought he would be able to make use of him for his own aims. Agathocles was recalled to Syracuse and became commander-in-chief there. He used this position to effect a *coup d'état*. He put 4000 Syracusans to the sword, and thus became *de facto* master of the city. Then by posing as the champion of the lower orders against the arrogance of the oligarchs, who had hitherto been all-powerful, he succeeded, in 317 B.C., in obtaining the recognition of his rule from the bulk of the citizens. He maintained his power over Syracuse up to the end of his life, a cruel tyrant to the well-to-do and educated classes and an indulgent protector of the mob. The extension of his empire soon became an object of his ambition.

First of all he attempted to take Messana, but the Carthaginians prevented this, and a coalition was even formed against him, the Syracusan refugees obtaining the support of the cities of Acragas, Gela and Messana. The allies engaged the Spartan Acrotatus, son of king Cleomenes, as general. On his voyage to Sicily Acrotatus landed at Tarentum, which promised him help and actually sent it, although it had intervened as peace-maker in the disputes between the Samnites and the Romans in the year 320 and consequently had its hands full in Italy. Acrotatus, however, effected nothing (314 B.C.). He wanted to found an empire for himself in Sicily, and he put to death Sosistratus, the leader of the Syracusan exiles. This brought about a complete reaction of feeling. He was driven out of the city and the resistance to Agathocles was abandoned. The eastern cities of the island submitted to the hegemony of Syracuse. But this peace was of short duration. It had been concluded through the mediation of Hamilcar, but the Carthaginian senate would not ratify it. The senate held that the interests of Carthage were not sufficiently safeguarded and declared against Agathocles. The result of this was that his Sicilian opponents also plucked up courage and recommenced the war. Agathocles was successful in it at first. He conquered Messana; Acragas he was unable to take, because it was protected by the Carthaginians. He, however, defeated the force collected by the Syracusan oligarchs under Dinocrates at Galaria, in 312 B.C. But he then sustained a heavy blow. He fought a great battle with the Carthaginians at Mount Ecnomus on the southern Himera and was defeated, just like Dionysius had been at Gela. Like Dionysius he hurried to Syracuse, but instead of personally undertaking the defence of the city against the Carthaginians, who were advancing to besiege it, he left it to its fate and carried the war into the enemy's country.

It was an adventure worthy of the age of the Diadochi, yet withal an exploit in the grand style, a truly historic enterprise.

Agathocles prefaced it by putting to death a number of well-to-do Syracusans and confiscating their property. He then left his brother Antander as governor in Syracuse and embarked with 600 ships, of course without divulging his destination. He gave the slip to the Carthaginian fleet, which was blockading the port of Syracuse, and landed in Africa south of the promontory of Hermaeum (Cap Bon) to the east of Carthage. On the pretext of fulfilling a vow made to Demeter and Persephone in case of a successful landing, he burnt the fleet, which was now only an impediment to him, and marched through a well-cultivated country, in which he made rich booty, in the direction of Carthage. The city was not prepared for such an attack, and, what was worse, the inhabitants were torn by party conflicts. No doubt Agathocles had known this. Nevertheless they did their utmost. A large force was raised, and Hanno and Bomilcar were appointed leaders of it. They were the heads of two hostile families, and the Carthaginian senate had selected them as generals to hold each other mutually in check. But the expedient did not have the desired effect. Hanno was slain in the battle, and Bomilcar, instead of fighting, withdrew. Thus for the moment Agathocles was master of the open country. The Carthaginians tried to appease the wrath of their gods by human sacrifices and sent for assistance from Hamilcar who was commanding in Sicily. In spite of this Agathocles made further progress. He took Hadrumetum and even met with support among the natives. A Libyan chief, named Elymas, joined him. But the understanding did not last long; Elymas revolted from him and was put to death.

Meanwhile in Sicily fortune was wavering in the balance. In 309 a disastrous storm at Epipolae threw Hamilcar into the power of the Syracusans, who sent his head to Agathocles that he might show it to the Carthaginians. But the enemies of Agathocles also began to stir themselves in Sicily. The Acragantines collected an army under Xenodiceus, which had

some successes in the interior of the island. The fortunes of Agathocles in Africa were just as varying. A mutiny occasioned by a dispute between his son Archagathus and one of the subordinate commanders seemed likely to deliver the army into the hands of the Carthaginians, but Agathocles by his resolute demeanour once more brought the troops over to his side and defeated the Carthaginians.

In the year 308 the war in Africa at first shifted more towards the interior. Then the crafty adventurer opened negotiations with the ruler of Cyrene, the Macedonian Ophellas.² He offered him a share of the booty, and Ophellas started to join Agathocles at Tunes with a large number of soldiers, who flocked to his standard from far and wide, some of them even with their families. Hardly had he arrived there when he was murdered by Agathocles, who took the soldiers he had brought with him into his own army. About the same time, however, the adventurer lost a powerful support. Bomilcar tried to surprise Carthage, as Agathocles had done with Syracuse, but was defeated in the middle of the half-conquered city and then executed. The citizens of Carthage had not lost their old courage and tenacity. With the fall of Bomilcar the Sicilian adventurer's main resource, the disunion of the Carthaginians, had disappeared, and he had no longer any prospect of conquering the city. At first, it is true, he still felt so powerful that after the conquest of Utica (307) he went to Sicily with a handful of troops to improve his precarious position there, leaving the greater part of his army under his son Archagathus in Africa. But the latter only sustained defeats and was therefore obliged to ask his father to return. Agathocles vanquished the Carthaginian fleet and the Acragantine army, put to death a number of peaceful inhabitants of Syracuse to make up for his inability to defeat the Syracusan *émigrés* under Dinocrates, and then embarked once more for Africa (306 B.C.). Here he set up as king, in imitation of the Diadochi (see above, p. 45), for whom he felt himself a match

in ability and power. But as king he achieved less in Africa than he had done as general and tyrant. He fought a battle with the Carthaginians in which he was worsted, and the events which followed it completely ruined his cause. In the night after the battle 5000 Libyans, who were serving under Agathocles, left his standard and marched into the Carthaginian camp. But the camp happened to be in flames just at that moment, and when the Libyans reached the scene of the conflagration the bewildered Carthaginian soldiers mistook them for assailants and fled panic-stricken to Carthage. The Libyans then returned forthwith to Agathocles' camp, but were taken for enemies there too, and a confused scuffle ensued until the morning, when the mistake was discovered and calm restored. But the Libyans now deserted Agathocles, and with this all his chances of success vanished. He gave up the game and determined to return to Sicily alone, leaving behind him his son Archagathus, whom he no longer trusted. The latter heard of it and made known his discovery, whereupon the infuriated soldiers took Agathocles prisoner. But the clever tyrant managed to persuade them to release him from arrest; he made use of his freedom to escape from the camp, and at once sailed for Sicily. The soldiers now murdered his two sons who had remained in Africa and surrendered on favourable terms to the Carthaginians. This was the end of Agathocles' African campaign, a most remarkable enterprise, which showed that the city which displayed such power in other countries maintained its rule in Africa by compulsion only; for otherwise the Sicilian tyrant would not have been able to remain there for four years. But it also proved that Carthage possessed a source of power in her citizens which could not be destroyed all at once by energetic attacks of a foreign adventurer, however able, nor by treachery on the part of the natives. The overthrow of Carthage could not be compassed by a self-seeking leader of mercenaries; that was

reserved for a powerful state founded on moral principles—for Rome.

In Sicily Agathocles began the new stage in his career with far-fetched atrocities, which were intended to inspire terror and which did achieve their object. On the pretence that his life was being conspired against, he put to the torture and executed the inhabitants of the city of Segesta, his ally, while the families of the Syracusans who had accompanied him to Africa were murdered by his brother Antander. He then opened negotiations with Dinocrates, and when they came to nothing he made peace with the Carthaginians, who retained only the territory west of the river Halycus in Sicily. Beaten in Africa, he must nevertheless have gradually driven back the Carthaginians in Sicily, otherwise a peace on these terms would be unaccountable after the long siege of Syracuse. In 305, however, he also made terms with Dinocrates. The two evidently came to an understanding with each other at the expense of the city communities.

Agathocles now, as he could not have the whole of Sicily, turned his forces against the East and Italy, just like Dionysius. In the year 304 he plundered Lipara; then he directed his attention to Corcyra. The island had been conquered in 303 by the Spartan Cleonymus, the younger brother of Acrotatus, who had been some time in the service of the Tarentines, always in want of foreign aid, and who made raids from it. Demetrius took it from him, but Cassander tried to wrest it from Demetrius. Thereupon Agathocles appeared on the scene in the character of a protector, defeated the Macedonians and plundered Corcyra on his own account. The *protégé* of Ptolemy of Egypt, Pyrrhus king of the Molossians, to whom Agathocles also gave his daughter Lanassa in marriage, became ruler of the island. With the fleet, on board of which the tyrant of Syracuse was conducting her to her husband, he took Croton on the way and plundered it. On another occasion he took Hipponium. He was so powerful at sea that

he was called lord of the islands. He also established a piracy business on a grand scale in concert with the Iapygians and Peucetii, which was profitable for both parties. Subsequently Pyrrhus ceased to please him as son-in-law, and Agathocles put himself in communication with Demetrius, who of course was as ready for this alliance as for any other. Demetrius sent Oxythemis, one of his confidants, as envoy to Agathocles, and married Lanassa.

Eventually, at the age of 72, Agathocles once more thought of war with Carthage. But he was poisoned by his grandson Archagathus, to whom he had preferred his son Agathocles. Oxythemis is said to have had him placed alive on the funeral pyre (289 B.C.).

How characteristic it is of the wretched political condition of Syracuse that the envoy of a sovereign who was not secure in his own country (two years afterwards Demetrius lost Macedonia and Phila took her own life in despair) should have been able to behave in this way to a dying tyrant who himself, as is recorded, commended his wife, probably a step-daughter of the king of Egypt, and his youngest children to the care of Ptolemy, the opponent of Demetrius. Evidently there were two parties at the court and in the family of the tyrant, that of Ptolemy (and Pyrrhus) and that of Demetrius. The tyrant deserts Egypt for Demetrius; but on his attempting to desert Demetrius for Egypt, Demetrius' party (including his own grandson) puts him out of the way.

The rhetoric of antiquity, however, has performed the incredible feat of making the aged sinner utter in his last hour moral speeches which move all the bystanders to tears. He is even said to have bestowed freedom on the Syracusans. If he really did so, he was not only a clever tyrant but also a first-rate actor, for in the hour of death, of such a death at all events, people generally give up playing a part. Agathocles was just as bad a man as Ptolemy Ceraunus, and evidently surpassed him in the cunning with which he con-

trived to pursue his own advantage both in war and in peace. He may in a way be compared with Caesar Borgia. The populace liked him, and he had something in common with it. He was fond of amusing it by aping well-known characters. That being so, he was at liberty to plunder, torture and murder thousands of well-to-do citizens without giving offence to the populace.³

Whether he did more good than harm to Greek civilization is an open question. The fact that it was a Greek who was the first to carry the war against Carthage into Africa from Sicily must have made the Greek name famous in the remote west. It may be too that he strengthened the Greek element in Sicily externally to a certain extent. In Italy at any rate he only injured it, just like Dionysius, to whose reign his whole career presents great resemblance. But the characters of the two men are different. Compared with Agathocles, Dionysius is almost a straightforward, at all events an intelligible and even not displeasing individual. For in Dionysius there was a certain harmony between energy, intelligence and morality, between will, intellect and heart; he was not a low creature. Agathocles, on the other hand, was extremely intelligent, extremely energetic, and a very low fellow to boot. He did not even take the trouble to be witty like Dionysius. If he did relax he became vulgar. He left Sicily in the greatest confusion.⁴

NOTES

1. I refer the reader to the modern accounts of Agathocles: Grote, chap. 97; Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum*, 2, 219-227 and 474-485; Meltzer, *Gesch. der Karthager*, I; Schubert, *Gesch. des Agathokles*, Breslau, 1887, who gives a detailed analysis of the authorities; cf. my critique in the *Deutsche Literaturzeitung*, 1888; Niese, I, 430-486.—The view taken by antiquity as well as by the moderns is materially influenced by Timaeus, who is just in this case; see below, chap. xxiii. note 8.—The last part of the history of Agathocles is uncertain, because Diodorus, our principal authority, only goes down to 301.

2. Carthaginian envoys in Athens to counteract Agathocles, whose ally Ophellas applied to Athens, C. I. A. 2, 235 = Hicks, 142, with his commentary.

3. Familiarity with the populace was also a characteristic of Ferdinand of Naples (1759-1825), who, however, was certainly not an Agathocles. The Syracusans of Agathocles' time must have had the same character as the modern Neapolitans. The Sicilians of the present day are much graver. An Agathocles or a Ferdinand would not amuse them. This must be due to the influence of the Arabs.

4. Coinage of Agathocles, Head, H. N. 158-160. Large issues divided into three periods: (1) 317-310, up to the expedition to Africa; (2) 310-306, up to the close of this expedition; (3) 306-289, after he took the title of king. To the first period belong gold and silver coins (tetradrachms of Attic weight, female head, rev. quadriga; Corinthian staters with head of Pallas and Pegasus; drachmae), and copper coins. All these coins have not the name of the tyrant, but ΣΥΠΑΚΟΣΙΩΝ and the triquetra as symbol, evidently pointing to the three-cornered island. This is the first occurrence of this symbol in and for Sicily.—In the second period we have, besides a gold coin, Attic tetradrachms: female head, rev. Nike erecting a *tropaion*, inscription ΑΓΑΘΟΚΛΕΟΥΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ, and silver Pegasus coins without inscription, but of 108 grains instead of 135, consequently pieces not of 10 litrae, but of 8.—The coinage of Agathocles is very carefully considered.—No Sicilian writer was able to remain in his native country under Agathocles, and foreign ones took good care not to come within his jurisdiction. The Sicilian authors of that age were Dicaearchus of Messana, an important geographical and political writer (cf. my *Gesch. Sic. im Alt.* 2, 265-277), and Timaeus of Tauromenium, for whom see below, chap. xxiii. note 8.

CHAPTER VIII

PYRRHUS IN ITALY AND SICILY

AGATHOCLES is followed after a time by a much better man, King Pyrrhus, with whom Epirus also contributes its share to the history of the world.¹ Epirus was an old seat of Greek civilization, as is shown by the cult of the Zeus of Dodona; but in the course of centuries Greek culture had sought other channels and left the old beds dry. The peoples who inhabited Epirus, especially the Molossians, the Chaonians, the Thesprotians, lived after the fashion of the Macedonians under hereditary princes, in a similar state of civilization, like them fond of war, only occupied more with cattle-breeding than with agriculture. The kings of the Molossians, who traced their descent from Pyrrhus, the son of Achilles, gained great prestige through the marriage of Olympias with Philip and the heroic exploits of Alexander the Great. When the brother of Olympias met his death in Italy, he was succeeded by his cousin Aeacides, who was overthrown by Cassander and perished. His young son Pyrrhus was saved by the Illyrian king Glaucias, who placed him on the throne of Epirus when he was twelve years of age. But he was expelled once more and joined Demetrius Poliorcetes, the husband of his sister Deidameia. He fought for Demetrius at Ipsus, then helped him in Greece and, on the conclusion of a treaty between Demetrius and Ptolemy, went as hostage to Egypt for him. Here the handsome, vigorous and courageous youth won the

favour of the king, who gave him his step-daughter in marriage and sent him back to Epirus, where he at first reigned in conjunction with his relative Neoptolemus, and then, after the murder of the latter (see above, p. 52), alone. By an alliance with Cassander's son, Alexander, he obtained Paravaea and Tymphaea in the north, and Ambracia in the south, and made this city into a brilliant capital. Corcyra he got through Agathocles; when Lanassa left him for Demetrius and gave the latter Corcyra Pyrrhus retook it with the aid of a Tarentine fleet. For a short time he was king of Macedonia, but Lysimachus wrested it from him. The valiant monarch, whom Hannibal pronounced to be one of the greatest of generals, now turned his thoughts to Italy. Might he not succeed in doing what his relative Alexander had failed to accomplish in Italy? And all his royal contemporaries encouraged him in his undertaking, thus ridding themselves of a dangerous competitor in the east. A pretext for the expedition was supplied by the affairs of Tarentum.

Tarentum, whose notorious luxury had not made it neglect politics on a great scale and the maintenance of its position in Italy, was once more in need of a foreign leader of mercenaries. Archidamas of Sparta, Alexander of Epirus and the Spartan Cleonymus had helped the Tarentines, but never for long. Now they were more threatened than ever and would be only too glad of the assistance of a man like Pyrrhus. They had become involved in a dispute with Rome, which after subduing the Samnites had advanced to Venusia and Thurii and was approaching Tarentum from two sides. When, in contravention of the treaties which forbade the Romans to sail with ships of war east of the promontory of Lacinium, a small Roman fleet appeared off Tarentum in the year 282, the Tarentines interpreted this as an intolerable outrage; but instead of blocking the harbour and complaining to Rome, they attacked the fleet, destroyed four ships, captured one and put to death or sold the prisoners. Then they marched

to Thurii, drove out the Roman garrison there and the aristocrats and plundered the city. The Tarentines had made a violation of rights, which leads to complaints among civilized peoples, a pretext for a still more flagrant violation of the same kind, and would have to take the consequences, which in view of the power of Rome and Tarentum respectively could not be doubtful. Rome behaved in a very dignified and prudent manner; she only demanded satisfaction for what had taken place off Tarentum as well as at Thurii. The Tarentines refused it, which again was within their rights, but they also insulted the Roman envoy, and thus war had become inevitable. The Romans made a final attempt to secure the predominant influence in Tarentum, which was now necessarily their object, with less trouble and without bloodshed by sending the Consul Q. Aemilius Barbula with an army into Tarentine territory and offering peace once more on the same terms. The aristocratic peace-party in Tarentum had already won the day and carried the election of one of their own side, Agis, as commander-in-chief, when Pyrrhus' minister, the Thessalian Cineas, appeared in Tarentum and announced that Pyrrhus, with whom the democrats of Tarentum had long been negotiating, would shortly send a force to Italy. Agis was removed from his command and Tarentum ranged itself on the side of Pyrrhus.²

His general Milo arrived first with 3000 men, and then, in the spring of 280, Pyrrhus himself with 20,000 hoplites, 3000 cavalry, 2000 archers and twenty elephants. He at once tried to give the Tarentines themselves some military training, but that was only a partial success with this effeminate people, although not only all popular amusements but also all other assemblies were prohibited, and Tarentum consequently was, to use the modern expression, in a state of siege. Pyrrhus had been encouraged to expect great enthusiasm on the part of the Greeks in Italy, but there was no trace of it; he had been promised a rising of the Samnites,

the Lucanians, the Bruttians, but none took place. The Romans despatched the Consul P. Valerius Laevinus to Lucania with a consular army, *i.e.* with two legions, including the allies about 25,000 men. The battle took place at Heraclea on the Siris. The Romans fought in separate companies, *manipuli*, which allowed of more unfettered movement in attack as well as defence; Pyrrhus' army was formed by the compact Macedonian phalanx. Pyrrhus withstood the Roman onslaught seven times without flinching, and then advanced to the attack himself. The Romans gave way, terrified mostly by the elephants; 7000 were left on the field and 2000 made prisoners. But Pyrrhus also had lost 4000 men and the king admitted that the victory had cost him dear. He now found new allies, especially among the Greek cities. The Roman garrison at Locri was cut down; the Rhegians, on the other hand, appealed to Rome for protection, and Rome sent them a Campanian legion. But these Campanians took possession of Rhegium on their own account, put the Roman garrison of Croton to the sword and plundered Caulonia. In the same way the Mamertini had recently made themselves masters of Messana (see next page). Of the aboriginal inhabitants of Italy, many of the Samnites, Lucanians and Bruttians flocked to Pyrrhus' standard, but it is rightly conjectured that they mostly served in guerilla warfare.

Pyrrhus continued his advance, but at the same time despatched Cineas to Rome, to offer peace on condition of the freedom of the Greeks of Italy. Although Cineas in vain tried the arts of corruption on the Roman senators, yet by his undoubtedly genuine admiration of their dignity—he called the Senate an assembly of kings—he contrived to impart such weight to his judicious remarks that the Senate wavered and was only persuaded by the patriotic appeal of the aged Appius Claudius, the famous ex-censor, to decline all negotiations as long as Pyrrhus remained in Italy. Italy for the Romans had now become the watchword of Rome.

Pyrrhus now marched through Campania, where, however, he did not take Capua or Naples, and then along the Latin Way as far as Anagnia. The Romans did not attack him, but Pyrrhus saw that he could not advance farther without running the risk of being cut off, and he returned to Campania. Negotiations for the release of the prisoners, in which all sides, Pyrrhus, the Senate and the envoy Fabricius, behaved with great dignity, did not lead to the peace which the king desired, and in the year 279 a second battle was fought, on this occasion in the east (where Pyrrhus had gone evidently to take the Roman Venusia), near Asculum. The Romans were again beaten, but escaped into their fortified camp. It was therefore a defeat like that of the Spartans at Leuctra. Pyrrhus, however, did not utilize his victory; instead of doing so he turned his attention to a new enterprise, no doubt remotely connected with the war against the Romans: he went to Sicily.

Sicily was longing for a statesman, to put an end to the ceaseless confusion. After the death of Agathocles his murderers and Hicetas, who had been appointed commander-in-chief by the Syracusans, had contended for the mastery. The Carthaginians too had returned, but the Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles had been prevailed on to withdraw and had then conquered Messina, which they henceforth controlled under the name of Mamertini (288 B.C.). They extended their rule right into the interior of Sicily and made raids as far as the south coast, where they even destroyed Camarina and Gela. Syracuse came under the domination of Hicetas (288-279 B.C.), and other cities also submitted to tyrants, the most important of whom was Phintias of Agragas, who built the city of Phintias at the mouth of the southern Himera to replace Gela. After the fall of Hicetas Thoenon and Sosistratus contended for supremacy in Syracuse, and the latter held his own in Ortygia. At this point another Carthaginian fleet sailed into the harbour of Syracuse, and

the city was in the same position as sixty years before, when Timoleon landed. There was now no independent Greece to apply to for aid, but Pyrrhus was in Italy, and both Thoenon and Sosistratus had recourse to him. The object in view was precisely the same as formerly, to vanquish the Carthaginians.

It was remarkable that in responding to this appeal Pyrrhus was really only continuing the war against Rome on a different soil. For in the very year 279 a treaty had been concluded between Rome and Carthage, stipulating that neither party should enter into an alliance with Pyrrhus without the other; the provisions, however, relating to the nature of the mutual assistance to be given were so complicated that no practical result could come of it. Neither wished to really help the other. A feeble attempt of the Romans and Carthaginians to take Rhegium with their combined forces was an utter failure, and while the Carthaginians were watching the Straits, Pyrrhus sailed from Locri direct to Tauromenium, the ruler of which, Tyndarion, gave him a friendly reception, just as Andromachus had done to Timoleon (278 B.C.). From there he marched to Syracuse; the Carthaginian fleet withdrew and Thoenon as well as Sosistratus made over to him the quarters of the city under their control. This first success decided the accession of the other Greek cities in the island to the cause championed by Pyrrhus. The possession of Acragas was of special importance, and this Sosistratus procured for him. From there he commenced his campaign in the Carthaginian part of the island. He conquered the most important points, among others the mountain strongholds of Heircte near Palermo and Eryx, famous for its temple of Aphrodite. But before the maritime fortress of Lilybaeum (the modern Marsala) he was powerless. He saw that it could be taken only by a long and laborious siege and he was not disinclined to accept the offer of the Carthaginians, who were prepared to give up the rest of Sicily on condition of retaining Lilybaeum.

In that case he would be able to return at once to Italy, where in the meanwhile the Consul Fabricius had even conquered Heraclea on the Gulf of Tarentum. But the Sicilian Greeks are said to have insisted on his not entertaining the proposal. He attacked Lilybaeum in accordance with all the rules of art, but was unable to take it. He ought now to have followed the example of Agathocles and shifted the scene of war to Africa. He wished to do so, but to carry out the plan he would have had to make enormous preparations and at the expense of the Sicilians. They, however, were not willing to submit to any sacrifices, and to enforce obedience Pyrrhus was obliged to play the master. This gave rise to discontent; resistance was offered; Sosistratus deserted him, and he put Thoenon to death for refractory behaviour. But acts of this kind were really repugnant to his energetic mind, more bent on daring enterprises than on the systematic execution of political plans. To keep allies together by force and cunning was not in his line; undertakings in which he was not absolute master were distasteful to him. He came to the conclusion that it was a mistake to take so much trouble for the ungrateful Sicilians. His Italian allies had long been clamouring for his return; he left Sicily (276 B.C.). What a field of war, he is said to have exclaimed, we are leaving for the Romans and the Carthaginians!

To get from Syracuse to Tarentum, Pyrrhus had to fight his way through a Carthaginian fleet and then across the territory of Rhegium through bands of Mamertinian and Campano-Rheginian soldiers. Croton and Locri had been conquered by the Romans. Pyrrhus retook Locri and sacked it. At Tarentum he organized his army and advanced with it in a northerly direction. Near Beneventum he met with the consular army commanded by M. Curius, which occupied a strong position. He attacked it and was defeated (275). He then returned to Epirus with the bulk of his forces (274), leaving Milo with a garrison in Tarentum.

We shall pursue the rest of Pyrrhus' career in the next chapter, here we have only to record the fate of Tarentum, which was not decided until after his death (272). The Romans were encamped before the city walls, while a Carthaginian fleet lay outside the harbour. Neither of the two parties among the citizens was able to dispose of the city, as Milo was in possession of the citadel. When he heard of the death of his master he decided to take his troops back to Epirus and concluded a treaty with the Romans, making over the city and the citadel to them. The aristocratic party, which was favourable to Rome, now became master of Tarentum, which was leniently treated by the Romans. In 271 they also conquered Rhegium. The Campanians who had disloyally taken the city were severely punished.

While Agathocles tries to follow in the path of Dionysius and continues the old struggle of the Greeks in Sicily, that with the Carthaginians, Pyrrhus also fights against the Carthaginians, but the main interest of his career lies in his contest with Rome. The best soldier among the successors of Alexander, he engages in a war with the bravest people of the West, and after some success at the outset is after all worsted in the end. This was an omen for the impending conflicts between Macedonia, Greece and Rome.

We conclude this sketch of the history of the West with some observations intended to sum up and develop what has been already said. Agathocles and Pyrrhus are extremely interesting both as individuals and as regards their careers, and the latter quite correspond to what their individual position leads us to expect. They are both representatives of the Diadochi period, but Pyrrhus as a sovereign of ancient lineage, Agathocles as a leader of an army, and both in a capacity not met with in the East—a remarkable point. For in the East there is no reigning sovereign of an old royal line like Pyrrhus, and no vulgar adventurer like Agathocles. All the leading rulers in that part of the world are descendants of

Alexander's generals, consequently of men who, without being sovereigns themselves, have attained their elevation through sovereigns. In the West we find great contrasts: a prince of an ancient royal house and the son of a potter. And—a significant trait for the character of the West—the high-minded king abandons his enterprise because it is repugnant to him to adopt severe measures against a recalcitrant people, while the vulgar adventurer holds his own as a tyrant up to the end of his life. The nature of their activity is also significant. The adventurer Agathocles fights with adventurers against the state which takes adventurers into its service, against Carthage, and is unable to subdue this state because the citizens still constitute the nucleus of Carthaginian power. Pyrrhus, the prince of ancient race, fights with brave loyal Epirotes, with Italian and Sicilian allies and with mercenaries against the Carthaginians in Sicily, and in a brief space of time humbles them more than Dionysius or Agathocles had ever done; he then gives up the game and turns his arms once more against Rome, and here he fails. The moral is that Carthage could not be overcome by an adventurer, and Rome not even by brave troops held together by motives of a moral character.

The inference to be drawn from this as to the issue of the conflict between Carthage and Rome is obvious.³

NOTES

1. Authorities. Pyrrhus himself had composed *ὑπομνήματα*, Müller, Fr. 2, 461; Timaeus had written about Pyrrhus, Müller, 1, 231; there was a work on Pyrrhus by a certain Zeno. Campaigns in Italy and Sicily, Müller, 3, 174. For us Plutarch's biography is of special importance, see above, notes to chap. i. The other authorities are the modern sketches of his career, which are found mostly in histories of Macedonia and Greece, of Rome and Sicily, and need not be quoted here; cf. besides Pauly, 6, 1, 312-320.

2. Tarentum and Rome. The analogous facts quoted by Ihne (Röm. G. 1, 418) prove that the Tarentines were correct in considering the appearance of the Roman fleet as an infringement of

their rights, but they also prove that the proper answer was to block the harbour and complain to Rome. It is possible that the Roman envoys were not insulted exactly in the way recorded, but it is clear that there was great arrogance on the part of the Tarentines. Things of this sort are not invented, only exaggerated. Ihne says that Tarentum was calumniated, like Sybaris. That may be, but in both cases the saying holds good: "on ne prête qu'aux riches." Every anecdote casually related is not true of the man on whom it is fathered, but he would probably have been capable of so acting.

3. Coins of Pyrrhus. We have them from different countries, Epirus, Macedonia, Italy and Sicily. The gold coins and silver pieces of 90 grains (see also Evans, *Horsemen*, 144, note 175, and Head, *Syrac.* 56) are of Syracusan work and so are the finest of his bronze coins. "His tetradrachms and didrachms of Attic weight appear to have been issued at Locri in Bruttium; his Macedonian bronze coins are distinguished by the Macedonian shield on the obverse, while his Epirote money bears the head of Zeus, and is of ruder fabric," Head, *H. N.* 273. Head mentions the following coins as struck by Pyrrhus: 1. Gold. Head of Pallas, rev. Nike advancing, with wreath in the right and *trophaion* in the left hand; minted at Syracuse. 2. Silver. Head of Dodonaean Zeus, rev. seated Dione, tetradrachm (Locri, see above). Head of Achilles, rev. Thetis riding on Hippocamp, didrachm (Locri, see above). Head of Persephone, rev. Pallas advancing with poised spear (90 grains, consequently minted in Syracuse, see above). 3. Bronze. Various types, among them head of veiled Phthia. Perhaps a silver drachm, with only ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ and no name, also belongs to Pyrrhus, Imhoof, *Monn. gr.* 439; Head, *Syr.* p. 56. See also notes to chap. xii.—In Macedonia, where Pyrrhus reigned for a time: (1) in the years 287, 286; (2) in western Macedonia, 284; (3) in the whole of Macedonia (274-272), silver Alexander-coins, *Cl. iv.* Müller, *Numism. d'Alex. le Gr.*, may have been struck by him. Fine coins of Pyrrhus reproduced in Head, *Coins of the Ancients*, pl. 46, 24-29.—Pyrrhus' coinage is very abundant and, in correspondence with his character, not so systematic as that of Agathocles.—For Pyrrhus in Sicily cf. Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager*, vol. II, Berlin, 1896, pp. 226-245.

CHAPTER IX

THE EAST AND GREECE FROM 280-246 B.C.—HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN SYRIA AND EGYPT—DEATH OF PYRRHUS—
ANTIGONUS GONATAS—THE CHREMONIDEAN WAR

IN passing to the narrative of the events which belong to the second division of the first period, the division which extends from the year 280 to 220, we must once more return to the East, *i.e.* to the group of states the composition of which we have described in the fifth chapter, and which embraces the countries between the Adriatic and the borders of India. The above division goes down to the direct intervention of the Romans in the political affairs of this collection of states. The interference of Rome leads to many changes. Down to the commencement of it, however, consequently in the period now under consideration, the powers with whom we have to deal settle their quarrels among themselves, Macedonia, Syria and Egypt taking the lead, and, owing especially to the moderating influence of the smaller states, pretty nearly balancing each other. It is in a way an epoch of equilibrium. The various events of this period, especially those which happened in the East, are only very imperfectly known, and their chronology is in part quite uncertain. True, it must be admitted that, so far as disputes between reigning sovereigns are concerned, history does not lose much by this uncertainty. Whether a Seleucus, an Antiochus or a Ptolemy was victor or vanquished in this or that part of the world,

was a matter of indifference even to contemporaries at a distance. If, instead of the three great kingdoms, a single empire comprehending every state had arisen, that would have been really an event of the first importance. But no such empire was formed. On the other hand, it is unquestionably much to be regretted that we know so little of the history of the Greek independent states in the third century.¹

The first subdivision of this section includes the period from 280-246, the period during which Antigonus Gonatas reigned in Macedonia (about 280-239), Antiochus I. Soter (281-261) and Antiochus II. Theos in Syria (261-246), and Ptolemy II. Philadelphus in Egypt (285-246). We confine ourselves at present to the narrative of political events. The history of civilization in these reigns is left for the chapter which deals with the culture of the whole epoch from 280-220 (chap. xiv.). We take the East first.

Here the figures of the Syrian kings are eclipsed by that of the ruler of Egypt. Antiochus Soter was undoubtedly an able man, who extricated himself with honour from a difficult position, and Antiochus Theos may have been better than his reputation; but neither of them made so much stir in the world as Ptolemy Philadelphus. Of weakly frame but acute and versatile mind, Philadelphus was fully equal to the tasks which the political situation of that day required of an Egyptian monarch. He was more a diplomatist than a soldier, and that was not inappropriate for Egypt in those times. He was an autocrat, like all of the kings; but in banishing Demetrius of Phalerum to Upper Egypt for opposing his accession to the throne, he only promoted the interests of the Museum which Demetrius had founded. In his activity and in his aspirations, good and otherwise, he was materially assisted by his second wife, his sister Arsinoe, and he honoured her in all ways. He even had her head put on coins with his own. This earned him the surname of Philadelphus. Owing to his example the marriage of brother and sister, which occurs in isolated cases

in ancient Egypt, and by which the many external disadvantages of alliances with foreign princesses were avoided, to the detriment of the race, became gradually the custom in the royal family of Egypt, a proof of the narrow intellectual horizon of his successors. It is asserted that Philadelphus married Arsinoe because she had claims to all manner of places in Thrace and Asia Minor through Lysimachus, but her own person and character must have been the main reasons. Philadelphus was such a far-seeing politician that he sent an embassy to Rome in the year 273 and concluded an alliance with the Romans, which was the beginning of the lasting friendship between the two states.²

The king was by no means invariably successful in his various undertakings. This applies, for instance, to his relations with Cyrene, where his step-brother Magas represented him as governor. Magas revolted from Egypt, no doubt at the instigation of his father-in-law Antiochus I, and even occupied Paraetonium, the frontier town of the province of Marmarica. But Philadelphus contrived to stir up the inhabitants of Marmarica, and perhaps the Carthaginians too, against him, and he was obliged to give up his conquest. Still, he retained Cyrene, and Philadelphus was unable to accomplish anything against him, because 4000 of his Celtic mercenaries mutinied; he managed to blockade them on an island in the Nile, where they died of starvation. In betrothing his son Euergetes to Berenice, Magas' daughter and heiress, Philadelphus thought he had finally settled the matter. But this was not so in reality. If on this occasion Syria, as we must assume, had meddled with the affairs of Cyrene, Macedonia did so soon afterwards. On the death of Magas in 258 his widow Apame sent word to Macedonia for the 'handsome' Demetrius, the step-brother of Gonatas, to come and marry her daughter Berenice. Cyrene therefore would have slipped from Ptolemy's hands if Apame had not engaged in an intrigue with the good-looking prince, the consequence

of which was that Demetrius was murdered by the Egyptian party and Berenice married Euergetes. Thus Cyrene remained subject to Egypt after all.

The details of Ptolemy Philadelphus' relations with Syria, Asia Minor and Macedonia, especially with the countries controlled or claimed by the Seleucids, and the official relations with the Seleucids themselves, are far from clear, while as regards those with Macedonia we derive some little information from the not entirely unknown history of Greece. Antiochus I. had been defeated in 280 by the Bithynians, but had then vanquished the Gauls in a great battle—when and where is unknown, we are only told that he took the surname of Soter on that account. He then attacked Egypt, of course with the immediate object of obtaining Coelestria and Phoenicia. But Ptolemy repulsed him with his own troops and some pirates, and then actually sent an Egyptian force into the north of Asia Minor, which, however, was routed by Mithridates, Ariobarzanes and the Galatae. To what extent Antiochus I. derived benefit from this defeat of the Egyptians, we do not know. At any rate towards the close of his reign he was very unsuccessful in the same regions, being defeated by Eumenes, the king of Pergamum, near Sardes. His son, Antiochus II. Theos, could not therefore ascend the throne with favourable prospects of maintaining his position in Asia Minor. That Antiochus I. governed with care is shown by the fact that he built a wall 1500 stades in length to protect the oasis of Margiana on the Margos (Murghâb) from the barbarians in the north.³

We know as little of the hostilities between Ptolemy Philadelphus and Antiochus II. Theos, which are called the second Syrian war, as of those between the same Ptolemy and Antiochus Soter, to which the name of the first Syrian war is given. Of the former too there is only a brief account (in Hieronymus' commentary on Daniel), which historians have tried to make something of by combining it with other

records (see note 4, p. 205). Otherwise all that is known of Antiochus the 'god' is that he was a debauchee and addicted to drink, that he left affairs in the hands of unworthy favourites, that he waged war in Thrace, that he earned his surname by liberating the Milesians from their tyrant Timarchus, and that he was generally popular in the cities of Ionia. These communities evidently had recourse to the assistance of the Syrian monarch in order to be more independent of their neighbours and of the Egyptians. The upshot of the wars in Syria and Asia Minor at this time is inferred from two accounts of the foreign relations of Egypt at various dates, viz. the passage in the 17th Idyll of Theocritus, written in praise of Philadelphus, and the Adule inscription in honour of Ptolemy Euergetes. According to Theocritus, Philadelphus possessed (he "cuts off for himself," says the poet) Phoenicia, Arabia, Syria, Libya, Aethiopia; the Pamphylians, the Cilicians, the Lycians, the Carians and the Cyclades were subject to him. In the enumeration of the Adule inscription the following countries are mentioned as belonging to Euergetes on his accession to the throne: Egypt, Libya, Syria, Phoenicia, Cyprus, Lycia, Caria, the Cyclades. Cyprus therefore is left out in Theocritus, and Cilicia and Pamphylia in the inscription. Why Cyprus is omitted is not quite intelligible, as a poet might perfectly well have referred to this island, which after all only passed out of the hands of Philadelphus for a short period, even if it had another master just at that moment; but the non-mention of Cilicia and Pamphylia, which Theocritus specifies as part of Philadelphus' dominions, among the possessions inherited by Euergetes, must mean that Philadelphus eventually lost them, unless we are to assume that Theocritus made ample use of the poetical license to exaggerate and passed off a couple of Egyptian garrisons on the coast of Cilicia and Pamphylia as the possession of those countries themselves. If we knew the exact date of Theocritus' poem, that would

throw more light on the history of Philadelphus ; for the political result of his reign, however, the general fact suffices that the Idyll belongs to the earlier part of it. Consequently, always assuming that Theocritus only exaggerated a little, a decline in Philadelphus' power in Asia can hardly be contested. And this decline must have been brought about not only by the course of affairs in Asia but also by that in Europe, perhaps even by the latter alone. For the invasion of the Gauls was particularly injurious to the power of Syria and consequently of benefit to Egypt. True, Antiochus I. made a determined attempt to hold Asia Minor. But at the beginning of his reign he was defeated by the Bithynians and at the close of it by the Pergamenians. He evidently on the first occasion wanted to march northwards through the valley of the Rhyndacus and on the second through that of the Caicus, and failed each time. There is no doubt, however, that he defeated the Gauls. But this was not of much use to him, as they retained their independence. His son Antiochus II. even went as far as Thrace with an army. But we know nothing of his having made any permanent conquest there. Egypt therefore was in a good position in Anterior Asia, and if in spite of this it lost ground there, this must, apart from local circumstances which are unknown to us, have been due more to the history of the relations between Egypt and Macedonia. Of these we do hear something, and it makes Egypt appear at a disadvantage. We will therefore take Europe first and return to Syria and Egypt afterwards.⁴

The affairs of Europe, however, are also of far greater interest than those of Asia. In Europe it is not merely as in Asia a question of campaigns undertaken by ambitious monarchs who want to wrest tracts of country from one another ; we have to deal with the aspirations and struggles of free men as well. We observe a welcome revival of the love of liberty, which raises its head at different points in Greece,

but is stifled by the want of unity among the Greeks and by the superior power of the Macedonian king. This king, however, has at first to encounter a great danger.

Antigonus Gonatas was a man of sterling qualities. He was not bred in prosperity or brought up at a luxurious court. Born about 318, he had probably often gone from place to place with his restless father, and his high-minded mother Phila had evidently kept him out of the contagion with which he was threatened by his father's immorality. When the 'taker of cities' was hurled from the summit of his power by the battle of Ipsus, Antigonus had not reached the age of twenty. This event must have impressed still more strongly on his already serious mind that prudence is one of the principal elements of success. The next twenty years he had spent in Greece, half as king, half as private individual, consorting with the most cultivated men of the age. He had studied philosophy and liked the society of Stoics. He then became king of Macedonia and as such tried to do good to his people. He had even somewhat extended his dominions by taking possession of the city of Cassandria after the death of the notorious tyrant Apollodorus. His position appeared to be perfectly secure when the return of Pyrrhus, in 274, gave rise to fresh complications. Pyrrhus complained that Antigonus had sent him no assistance to Italy, and forthwith claimed Macedonia as his own. He had wrested it once from Antigonus' father, why should he not be as successful with the son? A war broke out, in which Antigonus' Macedonian troops did not offer any serious resistance to Pyrrhus. The hero made a greater impression on them than their prudent king. On one occasion some Macedonian soldiers went over to Pyrrhus at a mere wave of his hand. The most loyal adherents of Antigonus were his Gallic mercenaries, and they were cut to pieces. Thus Pyrrhus became once more king of Macedonia. But he had just as little taste for quiet government as Poliorcetes. He not only paid no heed to business,

he actually wounded the susceptibilities of the people by tolerating the excesses of his Gallic mercenaries and allowing Aegae (Edessa) to be sacked and its tombs of the Macedonian kings to be destroyed. Eventually he had not the patience to stay any longer in the country, which was not completely conquered, but left the termination of the war with Antigonos to his son Ptolemy and went to Greece, to win fresh laurels in that part of the world.⁵

The impulse to this campaign was given by Cleonymus, son of King Cleomenes II. of Sparta. He was always a discontented enterprising man. After the death of his father (308) he had hoped to become king, but the Spartans had preferred Areus, the son of his elder brother, the adventure-loving Acrotatus. Since then he had roved about as a leader of mercenaries. He had already been in the service of the Tarentines, and then had fought in Coreyra, out of which he was driven by Demetrius, and in Boeotia—always the same, brave, restless and unscrupulous. Eventually he had returned once more to Sparta, whose adventurous policy (it was even assisting the tyrant Apollodorus of Cassandria) may have inspired him with the hope that he might after all cut a figure in his native country and end by supplanting Areus. But Areus held his own, and after Cleonymus had fought for Sparta against the Macedonians, from whom he actually wrested Troizene, he left the country and went to Pyrrhus, who he knew was ready for any kind of adventure. He proposed to him to conquer Sparta together. Pyrrhus at once started with an imposing army, 25,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty-five elephants, for the Peloponnese (272 B.C.). This expedition was not devoid of general political importance, like his earlier one from Italy to Sicily. In the former case the object had been to defeat the allies of the Romans, the Carthaginians; in the Peloponnese there were still many adherents of Antigonos, who had resided there for a long time before he obtained possession of Macedonia. Corinth

was still his, and Sparta had also joined him unreservedly as soon as Cleonymus had gone. Consequently if Pyrrhus brought the whole of the Peloponnese under his influence with the aid of Cleonymus, his rule over Macedonia also would be more secure than before. The most sensible course no doubt would have been not to leave Macedonia at all, for as soon as he had departed Antigonus occupied it again. But Pyrrhus had no turn for reflections of this kind. The undertaking was very successful at first. Areus happened to be in Crete, where he was assisting the Gortynians in a war. Pyrrhus defeated the Spartans under the walls of Sparta, and would probably have captured the city if he had taken Cleonymus' advice and tried to storm it on the same day. But he put off the attack till the next day, and then it was too late. The old Spartan spirit had revived, even the women took part in the defence, and Pyrrhus was repulsed. He thought he could afford to wait, but time only brought assistance to the Spartans. Areus returned; Antigonus sent the pirate-captain Aminias, who also knew how to fight on land, and eventually came himself to the Peloponnese and took up his abode in Corinth. Argos wavered between Antigonus and Pyrrhus, but most of the Argives were more afraid of Antigonus, because he was the cleverer of the two, and they called in Pyrrhus. The latter abandoned the siege of Sparta and marched northwards. He now had the further misfortune of losing his son Ptolemy, who was killed during the retreat from Laconia. Antigonus and Pyrrhus took up a position in the Argive plain, separated by the city of Argos, which was unwilling to admit either of them. At last the Pyrrhus party let him into the city, but the other side thereupon fetched Antigonus, who occupied the citadels of Argos. Pyrrhus saw that he could not take them and wanted to leave the city. With this object he sent word to his son Helenus, who was outside with troops, to keep the passage through the narrow gateway open for him. But Helenus

misunderstood him and threw more soldiers into the city. The two bodies pressing in and out of it now fell into inextricable confusion, and in the midst of this a tile thrown by an old woman, who was looking down from a roof and saw her son fighting with Pyrrhus, hit the king's head. He fell, and a Macedonian named Zopyrus cut off his head, which was brought by Halcyoneus, Antigonus' son, to his father. The army of the fallen king, which consisted mainly of mercenaries, of course melted away. Helenus was sent by the conqueror to Epirus to his brother Alexander, who was at peace with Antigonus, but engaged in hostilities with the Dardani, who were also threatening Dyrrachium and Apollonia. The latter soon afterwards allied itself with Rome, which gradually came to appear in the light of a protector to the Greeks.

Sparta and Antigonus of course did not remain on good terms after the victory. Sparta could not desire the supremacy of Macedonia in Greece. Besides, Antigonus protected the hideous tyrant Aristotimus, who had risen to power in Elis by the co-operation of the Messenians against the Spartan party. Aristotimus held his own also against the Aetolians, who assisted the oppressed Eleans. But at last the tyrant was overthrown by a conspiracy, and Elis joined the Aetolian league.⁶

With the death of Pyrrhus the last of the generals who resembled Alexander disappears from the scene. Pyrrhus had more of the great Macedonian than any other of the Diadochi and Epigoni. He was remarkably brave, of lofty mind, a very able military leader and organizer, and a dazzling figure. But he lacked one thing, by which Alexander had achieved his extraordinary successes—harmony between will and intelligence. His intellect was not on a par with his energy, and the result was that the latter was too much at the mercy of momentary impulses. He was, like Poliorcetes, specially wanting in consistency, which Alexander

possessed in such a high degree. Alexander knew and said that an undertaking once begun should be carried out, provided there were no unsurmountable difficulties in the way. Pyrrhus on the other hand went from Italy to Sicily, and from Macedonia to Greece, before he had completed his task in the country which he left and before there was any certainty that it could not be completed. His idea was that he could do everything whenever he liked. He put off the assault on Sparta because he thought he was sure to be victorious on the following day as well; he went off to Argos without having disposed of Sparta. He had not even a sufficiency of worldly cunning, which after all was indispensable in those days if you wished to avoid being the plaything of craftier men. He was about 47 when he died.

By his victory over Pyrrhus Antigonus Gonatas became undisputed master of Macedonia.

What we have just related of the affairs of Greece falls short of the expectations which we held out. It belongs after all mainly to the category of events in which a struggle of ambitious men for the mastery is the decisive factor. The element of freedom, to which we drew attention, was shown only in the defence of Sparta against Pyrrhus, and there too simply as a momentary reaction against a sudden attack. What we are now about to narrate reveals a higher flight. Great undertakings are planned in a spirit of liberty. True, here again the policy of the courts is victorious. The constant meagreness of the authorities is much to be regretted in connection with these very events.

The episode in question is a war, of which Athens is the centre and which is called the Chremonidean War by an ancient writer, after Chremonides, the political leader of Athens at that time, a friend of the Stoic Zeno. The only records of this war and of the events connected with it that we have in historians are a brief account by Pausanias in his discussion of the Spartan kings, a few lines in Justinus and

quite incidentally a reference to the death of Philemon in Aelianus; on the other hand, there is an important inscription of the alliance between Athens, Sparta and Ptolemy II. in the year 267 or 266 B.C., which was moved in the Athenian assembly by Chremonides and approved by the people.⁷

This alliance which Athens entered into was a peculiar one. The preamble of the resolution points out that the Athenians, the Spartans and their allies have from time immemorial fought for freedom against its oppressors. This they are prepared to do now, and they are joined by Ptolemy of Egypt, in concert with his sister—Ptolemy, who is an ally of the Spartans and who has the freedom of the Greeks at heart. Besides the Spartans, whose king Areus is specially mentioned by name, the Eleans, the Achaeans, some Arcadian communities, such as Tegea, Mantinea, Orchomenus, Phigalia, Caphyae, and a few Cretan cities are members of the league. It is odd that the Aetolians are left out, as they were in alliance with Athens and specially with Elis. It is also remarkable that the decree contains no reference to the principal enemy of the allied powers, to Macedonia.

It looks as if these powers had decided to wait for Antigonus to declare his hostility to the league by open acts, which he soon did by attacking Athens. Pausanias describes the course of the war which ensued as follows. When Areus, the son of Acrotatus, was king of Sparta, Antigonus led an army and a fleet against Athens. As the Athenians defended themselves, the Egyptian fleet under Patrocles appeared on the scene, and the whole force of the Lacedaemonians took the field. While Antigonus was trying to prevent the allies from making their way into Athens, Patrocles sent messengers to Areus and invited him to attack Antigonus, in which case he himself would fall on the Macedonian rear, adding that he could not begin the attack on the Macedonian army with his Egyptian troops and sailors. The Lacedaemonians were ready to fight, but Areus took them home again as soon

as the provisions ran out, saying that a desperate struggle could not be hazarded on behalf of foreigners. Eventually Antigonos concluded peace with the Athenians, who had resisted as long as possible with the greatest self-sacrifice, on condition of their receiving a Macedonian garrison into the Museum, which Antigonos subsequently withdrew. So far Pausanias. Athens was evidently starved into submission. From the prologue of Trogus we further learn that Areus was slain fighting against Antigonos at Corinth, and that the latter put to death some mutinous Celts at Megara.

To these few recorded facts others have been added in modern times by way of combination. It is clear that, although we are told only of the war for the possession of Athens, there must also have been direct hostilities between Antigonos and Ptolemy at the same time, and this being so it may be that a naval battle off Cos fought by King Antigonos II., which is casually mentioned by Plutarch, belongs to this war and that Antigonos won it, for it can be proved from other sources that Ptolemy was not successful against Antigonos, and this must have been at sea. Further traces of the battle off Cos have been demonstrated with more or less probability. I refer to them as well as to the chronology of these events in the notes.⁸ The war between Macedonia and Egypt was not necessarily at an end with the fall of Athens. But when and on what conditions the two countries came to terms is unknown to us. In any event the power of Egypt in the Aegean Sea was shaken by this war, and the fact mentioned above, that Ptolemy Euergetes owned fewer foreign possessions on his accession to the throne than his father, is more easy of explanation in this way, although it is difficult to see how he could have lost, not the Cyclades, Lycia and Caria, but Cilicia and Pamphylia, in consequence of a defeat by Macedonia.⁹

The importance of the Chremonidean War, which may have lasted altogether from 266-258, is now held to lie mainly

in the fact that it turned the scale in the political rivalry between Macedonia and Egypt; and this view is perfectly justified. For a time the power of Egypt had increased in the north. It was on good terms with the trading republics of Heraclea and Byzantium, and had a devoted friend in Pyrrhus of Epirus. It had then formed an alliance even with Sparta and Athens, ostensibly for the protection of Greek freedom. This must have been very unpleasant for Antigonus; it was his interest that Ptolemy should be humbled, and the king of Egypt did in fact get the worst of it. This result of the Chremonidean War is of real significance. But we must not lose sight of the importance of the rising which was the occasion of the war, and which was specially due to Athens. It is, however, lost sight of if Athens is described simply as the advanced post of the Ptolemaean dependencies. True, Athens sided for Ptolemy and against Antigonus, but it does not follow from this that Athens had become dependent on Egypt. She still retained her own moral and intellectual importance. The pressure exerted by Macedonia being tolerated with reluctance in Greece, why should not the idea of forming a powerful league against Macedonia have originated in Athens? There is therefore no ground for disputing Athens the honour of having led a movement for freedom in Greece, and still less for disputing her the glory of having fought out this struggle bravely, if without success. On the other hand, there is no warrant for the assertion that Antigonus was obliged to wage war because Egypt threatened to stifle him. Egypt protected freedom of trade in the north of the Aegean Sea; its possessions there were of no importance. Macedonia could not be stifled by freedom of trade routes. We must therefore not represent Antigonus as a man who is forced into a struggle for his own existence. He wanted to destroy Egyptian influence in the north of the Aegean and bring Greece under his rule.

Antigonus Gonatas no doubt excites a personal interest because he is a hard-working sovereign and not a mere pleasure-seeker like Ptolemy Philadelphus. But he must not be rated too high on that account. We shall therefore, in adopting the view which is most obvious to the unprejudiced student of these events, not allow ourselves to be diverted by history, which in its exclusive consideration of practical politics takes less account of the power of purely intellectual tendencies, but rather believe that Athens made a laudable attempt, with Greek and Egyptian aid, to tear the meshes of the net which the wily Gonatas had woven around Greece, and to set some bounds to his ambition in the interest of the Greeks. Athens did not succeed, and, as it would appear, mainly through the fault of Areus. In spite of the defectiveness of the records we can see that Athens did her duty. Egypt too seems to have done hers, and if Patrocles said that he could not rescue Athens without assistance, it must be borne in mind that the long walls were evidently in ruins, that Athens therefore was cut off from the sea by the Macedonians, and Patrocles consequently could really do nothing alone. But Areus refused to do anything at all. Was he right? His reasons were absurd. If fighting was equivalent to entering on a desperate struggle, which no doubt must be explained by the fact that the whole Spartan levy had taken the field and that Sparta consequently had no reserve to fall back on, the Spartans knew that when the force was despatched to the scene of action. Why had it taken the field at all if it was not meant to fight? Areus was doubtless of opinion that his old ally against Pyrrhus was still the best friend of the Spartan oligarchy, and that care must be taken not to do him serious harm. Subsequently he was obliged after all to fight against Antigonus, and when he fell in this conflict, probably only the Macedonian king had reason to regret his death.

After a time Antigonus withdrew his garrison from the

Museum, in 256 B.C., but the Macedonians remained in the ports and at Sunium until Aratus removed them about the year 229. We ought now to relate the commencement of the latter's career, as it falls within the chronological range of this chapter, but this would interrupt the internal connection of the subsequent events, and we therefore defer the account of him till the next chapter and return to the East, in order to narrate what happened in that part of the world up to the close of the reigns of Antiochus II. Theos and Ptolemy Philadelphus.

In Bithynia complications arose on the death of Nicomedes. He had been twice married, to Ditzela and Etazeta, and had one son, Ziaelas, by the former, and several by the latter, among these one of the name of Tiboites or Zipoites. By his will he had made the sons of Etazeta his heirs, with a request to Egypt, Macedonia, Byzantium, Heraclea and Cius to see that the provision was carried out. But Ziaelas managed to obtain power with the aid of the Tolistoboian Galatae. Heraclea negotiated a peace, and Zipoites went to Macedonia. This evidently enhanced the influence of Antiochus in Bithynia, for we must assume that Ziaelas relied on the power to which Nicomedes had not been willing to entrust the protection of the heirs whom he had instituted. We do not know for certain when these events happened; Nicomedes perhaps died about 250.¹⁰

If Antiochus Theos was not altogether unsuccessful in Asia Minor, on the other hand things took a very unfavourable turn for him in the East. Seleucus had already left the Indian empire in possession of the Punjab, but now further territory was lost in that quarter. Two new kingdoms were formed at the expense of the Seleucid power, the Bactrian and the Parthian, and a third gained in strength, the Median kingdom of Atropatene. There is not much to be said about the latter; the two former I shall refer to when the connected account of affairs in the East is given (chap. xiii.). I will only

observe here that the Bactrian kingdom did not take up a hostile attitude to Greek culture, whereas the strengthening of the Median kingdom of Atropatene, as well as the founding of the Parthian kingdom, was due to a reaction of the native Asiatic element against the Greek element introduced by Alexander. It is also to be noted that the purely Iranian civilization seems to have found its expression mostly in Atropatene, while the Parthian kingdom, which was founded by barbarians from Turkestan, is not hostile to Greek civilization in itself and is only averse to the rule of the Seleucids. The kingdom of Atropatene was well situated for maintaining the Iranian religion in north-eastern Asia Minor.¹¹

We now come to the close of the reigns of Antiochus Theos and Ptolemy Philadelphus.¹² We recollect that they were at war with each other. Hieronymus says that, to put an end to the strife, Ptolemy gave his daughter Berenice in marriage to Antiochus, and brought her with large treasures to Pelusium. Antiochus already had a wife, Laodice, probably his sister, whom he sent away on account of the new marriage. After a time, however, he changed his mind and recalled Laodice, who thereupon poisoned him and murdered Berenice and her infant son. Laodice's ferocity was such that she even put to death her attendant Danae, who had been the accomplice of all her misdeeds, for the sole reason that Danae had warned and saved her lover Sophron, who was also marked out for destruction. Laodice's son Seleucus II. now ascended the throne (246-226).

About the same time Ptolemy Philadelphus died. He had, it would appear, lived to see the fate of his daughter, and was obliged to leave the avenging of it to his son. We shall refer again to Philadelphus (towards the close of chap. xiii.).

NOTES

1. Authorities for the history of the period from 280-220 B.C. Here too the only connected narrative is in Justinus, whom I have discussed in the notes to chap. i. Bk. 24 contains Ptolemy Ceraunus and the invasion of the Gauls, rhetorically treated; cap. 4 perhaps from Timaeus, Dr. 2, 2, 342 seq. Bk. 22: the Galli in Asia, Antigonus and Pyrrhus. Bk. 26: atrocities of Aristotimus in Elis; slaughter of the Gallic mercenaries by Antigonus, with no mention of the locality; Cyrene. Bk. 27 goes down to 226, and is very confused. Bk. 28 to 220; Epirus in detail, on account of the murders; Aratus is not mentioned at all as being too prosaic an individual. Justinus wrote for what would now be called a circulating library public. The very useful *prologi*, moreover, prove that the arrangement was occasionally not good even in Trogus; v. Wil., Ant. v. K. 226. Justinus as well as the *prologi* contain so much badly-arranged matter and so many dubious passages that an edition with a historical commentary is a great *desideratum*; it would bring out the valuable element in them better than any attempt at a connected historical narrative.—Of Diodorus Bks. 22 (280-265), 23 (264-251), 24 (250-241), 25 (241-219) would chronologically belong to this period; but the fragments that have come down to us refer only to the west; Aratus, Agis and Cleomenes are not mentioned. That is not unimportant for the study of the arrangement of the work, see vol. iii. of this history, pp. 15 and 16, and below, notes to chap. xv. The absence of passages from Diodorus during 280-220 contributes not a little to give the age the character of uncertainty which no epoch of which we have contemporary records exhibits in such a marked degree. One seems to be in the sixth century B.C.—Plutarch gives connected accounts only in his lives of Pyrrhus, Aratus, Agis and Cleomenes. Cf. Schultz, *Quibus ex fontibus fluxerint Agidis, Cleomenis, Arati vitae*, Berol. 1886. But Plutarch pays no heed to chronology.—Of Polybius, for whom see below, chaps. xv. and xxiv., very little comes in question. In the period soon after 280 he mentions only events of the west.—Inscriptions, especially of Pergamum; coins; the papyri collected in Egypt by Flinders Petrie; cuneiform inscriptions from Babylon.

Of the writers no longer extant, who as contemporaries were authorities of the later historians, the most important are Aratus and Phylarchus. For Aratus see Müller, *F. H. G.* 3, 21-23 and Susemihl, 1, 627-630, who quotes the older works, and whose

notes, 534, 547, 547 b, deserve attention. Polybius and Plutarch are almost the only writers who made use of Aratus. He wrote memoirs, as statesmen generally do who have failed in their object and think it incumbent on them to set their actions in the proper light afterwards (Guizot, for instance).—Phylarchus, Müller, 1, lxxvii. seq. and 334 to 358; Sus. 1, 630-633. Phylarchus was probably a native of Naucratis, wrote *Ἰστορίαι* in twenty-eight books of a rhetorical kind and on the side of Cleomenes; cf. Polyæn. 2, 56; Phylarchus was the chief authority of Plutarch and Timagenes, and consequently of Trogus. Many fragments of him have been preserved, because he gave many remarkable details.

There are also some facts in Christian writers, *e.g.* Eusebius' Chronicle; he took his accounts of the kings' exploits partly from Porphyrius, for whom cf. Christ, § 536; Müller, 3, 688-727; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 1, 128. Edition of Eusebius by Schoene.

On the whole there are so few records of the events of this period that Droysen (3, 2, 22) was able to say: "it is a wretched business writing this history." The authorities discovered since then, especially the Pergamum inscriptions, have furnished new material for special researches, which have not led to unanimity of views any more than the earlier works.

Of the latter Droysen's *Geschichte der Epigonen*, 2nd ed. 1877, is the most important. In it Droysen has tried to construct a large edifice with very few bricks—with what slight satisfaction to himself, we have just seen. It was only possible to build it by cementing it with a number of guesses, which Droysen has invariably put forward as such. The narrative of the facts conjectured by him naturally occupies a good deal of space. Thus his account of the Chremonidean War, the recorded facts of which would barely take up a couple of lines, extends from p. 225 to p. 247. It is very instructive to note how, in this as in similar cases, he approaches the same obscure subject from different sides, and thus eventually makes his own theory clear. The book is a collection of admirable monographs, which only a Droysen could have combined into a readable volume.—Schorn, *Geschichte Griechenlands von der Entstehung des ätol. und ach. Bundes bis auf die Zerstörung von Corinth*, Bonn, 1833.—Hertzberg, *Gesch. Griechenlands unter der Herrschaft der Römer*, Bd. 1, Halle, 1866, gives only an outline of our subject.—The affairs of the East are dealt with in the careful articles of Cless in Pauly's *Realenc.*, especially under Seleuci and Ptolemaei, in Fränckel's commentary on the inscriptions of Pergamum, a number of papers by von Gutschmid (collected in part by F. Rühl), by Koepp, Babelon, Gaebler (*Erythrae*, Berlin,

1892) and others. Clinton's *Fasti Hellenici*, The Civil and Literary Chronology of Greece from the 124th OI. to the Death of Augustus, with an account of the various dynasties in the appendices, is also valuable. In our narrative their history does not convey quite the proper impression because we cannot translate all the surnames of the kings and are therefore obliged to leave them in their Greek form. This gives the monarchs an unnaturally solemn appearance. The ancients at once realized the bitter irony of history when they related of the 'father-lover' that he put his mother to death, or recounted the horrors committed by the sovereign whom they called in all seriousness 'benefactor fat-paunch.' The *nuance* of the word Epiphanes, which means at once 'illustrious and visible god,' cannot be rendered by us at all. For Greeks the serious narration of the acts of Ptolemy V., with the constant addition of the title of 'illustrious god,' was a biting satire.

2. Ptolemy II. Philadelphus, cf. Cless, I.1, Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, 199 seq., *Empire*, pp. 112-192, esp. 162. For Arsinoë see the remarkable article by Wilcken in *Pauly-Wissowa*, II, 1282-89, as well as Mahaffy, *Empire*, 159 seq. Arsinoë took the name of Philadelphus before her husband, Mahaffy, *Empire*, 157. Droysen (3, I, 267 seq.) assumes political motives for the marriage with Arsinoë. I believe that similarity of character was the main reason. The ideal of both was power, intrigue, enjoyment of life. They understood each other, helped each other and forgave each other their faults. Date of the marriage 273 according to Wiedemann, *Philologus*, N. F. I, 81 seq. Marriage of brother and sister in Egypt, Erman, *Aegypten*, 221.—Under Ptolemy II. the military colony in the Fayûm was probably founded, about which the Petrie Papyri (see above, chap. v. note 13), edited and explained by Mahaffy, give information. The city around which these soldiers, mostly cavalry, were settled was called Crocodilopolis, and subsequently Arsinoë, and it is probable that queen Arsinoë had given the land, which belonged to her, for the colony, the modern Medinet-el-Fayûm. According to Strabo 17, 809, this district was the only one which had olive-trees and vineyards, i.e. it was the only one in Egypt cultivated in the Greek fashion. Ptolemy I. or II. had settled Greeks and Macedonians in Ptolemais; Mahaffy, *Petrie Pap.* 18; see above, chap. v. note 13. But Ptolemais was a long way up-country, above Siût; a residence in the Fayûm near Alexandria was pleasanter for the aristocratic cavalry, who had so to speak their suburban villas there. These private documents therefore supply valuable historical information. On the other hand official documents, as so often happens, are not entirely above suspicion, as, for instance, the stele discovered by Naville in the city con-

sidered to be Pithom, Philol. Woch. 1890, p. 961. On this Ptolemy II. not only refers to the canals which he constructed and the cities which he built, but also asserts that he brought the gods stolen by the Persians back to Egypt. When was he in Susa or Persis? Is it permissible to explain it by what is quoted from Babylonian sources below, in note 3? See also chap. x. note 1.—The change in the name of the capital of the Ammonites, Rabbat Ammon into Philadelphia, is due to Ptolemy Philadelphus; St. Byz.; Dr. 3, 2, 304; Pauly, 5, 1462; Baed. 187.—Ptolemy Philadelphus favours Byzantium, and the Byzantines erect a temple to him (near Fundukli, coast of Pera), Frick in Pauly, 1, 2, 2609. The 4000 Celts, Callim. Del. 170 seq. with Schol. Cf. Koepf, Die syr. Kriege, etc.; Rhein. Mus. 39, 112.—Additions to the Panhellenion at Naucratis in the time of Ptolemy Philadelphus, Flinders Petrie, Ten Years, etc. p. 43. Personal interest of Ptolemy Philadelphus in the work of the artificers, Jos. Ant. 12, 2, 7, 10.—For the finances of Ptolemy Philadelphus see The Revenue Laws of Ptolemy Philadelphus, ed. from a Greek papyrus, etc. by P. G. Grenfell, and an introduction by Mahaffy, Oxf. 1896, text and plates, and an Alexandrian erotic fragment and other Greek papyri, chiefly Ptolemaic, ed. by Grenfell, Oxf. 1896.—Coinage, Cat. Br. Mus. Ptolemy Philadelphus II. at first coins in the same way as his father. Then come tetradrachms struck in Ptolemais, Joppa, Gaza, Sidon and Tyre; cf. Head, H. N. 714. Types: head of Ptolemy I., rev. eagle on thunderbolt. The bronze coins have the head of Ammon on the face. Under Ptolemy II. begin two series of medallions (splendid coins) in gold and silver, which are continued for a long time: 1. Heads of Ptolemy II. and Arsinoë II., rev. heads of Ptolemy I. and Berenice I., inscr. obv. ΑΔΕΛΦΩΝ, rev. ΘΕΩΝ. Note that ΑΔ can only be referred to the reigning and ΘΕ to the deceased sovereigns, and yet both words together to all of them. 2. Veiled head of Arsinoë II., rev. two cornucopiae or eagle on thunderbolt, ΑΡΣΙΝΟΗΣ ΦΙΛΑΔΕΛΦΟΥ. Embassy sent by Philadelphus to Rome, Liv. Epit. 4; Eutr. 2, 15.

3. For the history of Syria cf. the excellent articles by Wilcken, Antiochus I., II. in Pauly-Wissowa, I.—Antiochus I. Soter. His exploits, Trog. prol. 24. For the war between Antigonos Gonatas and Antiochus see Dr. 3, 1, 190; Memn. 15, 18. Victory over the Galatians (exaggerated, Γαλάρας ἐξελάσας), App. Syr. 65; Luc. Zeux. 8-11. Dr. 3, 1, 186, 258; Mahaffy, Greek Life, 209. Thanks of the inhabitants of new Ilium to Antiochus, C. I. Gr. 3595 = Hicks 165.—Babelon (liv.) assumes that Antiochus I. did not get the title of Soter until after his death, and from the Ionic cities, in view of the services mentioned in the inscription in Foucart, Bull.

corr. hell. 9 (1885), p. 387 ; a festival was founded in his honour. Attalus I. was also probably called Soter, Fränkel, No. 43 to 45. —The so-called first Syro-Egyptian war is only mentioned by Paus. 1, 7. According to Poole, Cat. Br. Mus., Ptol. xxix., it was connected with the war between Ptolemy and Magas. By this war Ptolemy II. is supposed to have obtained Phoenicia, where he had mints from 268 onwards. I assume with Koepp that Phoenicia belonged to Egypt from the beginning of the third century.—We have cuneiform astronomical observations and other records by Babylonian priests in the years 273/2 (Epping and Strassmaier, Zeitschr. f. Assyriol. p. 220 seq.), according to which there is an Egyptian garrison on the other side of the river (Euphrates) ; accounts of journeys of the king and others are also given.—Defeat of Antiochus I. by Eumenes, Str. 13, 624. Building of a wall round Margiane, Str. 11, 516. This wall, which was 1500 stades (about 190 miles) long, recalls the Great Wall of China, and may have given rise to the legend of the wall supposed to have been built by Alexander at the edge of the desert. This district is now a model of cultivation under Russian rule, owing to the reconstruction of the irrigation works ; the light comes to it from the north ! Relations with India, v. Gutschmid, Iran, 28.

4. Antiochus II. Theos. He was the second son of Antiochus I. The eldest, Seleucus, was suspected of conspiring against his father and executed, Pauly-Wissowa, I, 2452 (article by Wilcken). —Second Syro-Egyptian war. Authority: *bella quam plurima*, which according to the commentary of Hieronymus on Daniel, 11, 6, Antiochus II. waged with Ptolemy II. Thrice and others have doubted whether it took place. Droysen (3, 1, 318-323) rightly holds that there was such a war, because this is the only way of accounting for the difference between the possessions of Egypt under Ptolemy II. according to Theocr. 17, 86 seq. (for the date cf. Koepp, l.l.—before 270) and on the accession of Ptolemy III. according to the Adule inscription (C. I. Gr. 5127 = Hicks 173, Mahaffy, Empire, 179, preserved in a copy made by Cosmas Indicopleustes in his Topographia Christiana in the year 545 A.D.)—Donation made by Antiochus II. to Laodice and her sons, and from them again to Babylonian shrines, according to a Babylonian tablet ; Zeitsch. f. Assyriol. VII, 332. The era of Aradus begins 259/8, consequently Antiochus was at that time stronger than Ptolemy in northern Phoenicia ; cf. Bab. lvii. and see below, chap. xix. note 2.—We have unfavourable accounts of the character of Antiochus Theos through Phylarchus in Ath. 10, 438 and through Pythermus in Ath. 7, 289. Rehabilitation attempted by Droysen, 3, 1, 311 seq. ; he even discovers political reasons for the contemptible

conduct of the courtiers Aristus and Themison. Nor is it proved by Memn. 23 (war with Byzantium) that Antiochus II. did great things in Thrace. If, according to Polyæn. 4, 16, he took the city of Cypsela on the Hebrus, we hardly have a right to "expect" from this that not only Lysimachia but even Aenus and Maronea had joined him, and the further inference drawn by Droysen, that the south of Thrace from Byzantium to Macedonia had "at last come into the actual possession of Syria," is more surprising than convincing. In Liv. 33, 40 Antiochus III. grounds his claims to Thrace, not on possession by Antiochus II., but only on the defeat of Lysimachus by Seleucus. It is evident therefore that Antiochus II. never had Thrace.—Timarchus, tyrant of Miletus, overthrown by Antiochus II., who receives the name of Theos for it; App. Syr. 65. According to Trogus, prol. 26, the son of Ptolemy of Egypt, who lost his life in Ephesus, was allied with Timarchus; Ath. 13, 593. Babelon's different explanation (cexxix. n. 2) is evidently wrong. Antiochus II. liked in the Ionian cities according to C. I. Gr. 3137 = Hicks 176 = Ditt. 171; he arbitrated between Samos and Priene, C. I. Gr. 2905; cf. also Jos. Ant. 12, 3 and Droysen, 3, 1, 330.

Coinage. Antiochus I., Bab. xxxix.-lv. Antiochus ruled the eastern section of the monarchy as king for twelve years, 293-281 B.C.; as son of Apame, the daughter of the Sogdianian Spitamenes, whom Seleucus married in 324, he was in his native country there. The coins struck by him during that time have the same types as those of Seleucus.—The main type of the reverse of Antiochus' later coins, which have the hollow-eyed face of the reigning monarch on the obverse, is Apollo sitting on the Omphalos with an arrow in his hand, evidently the Apollo of Antioch. The arrow alludes to the fact that Apollo threw away his arrows on the Orontes, where Daphne was changed into a laurel. This coin of Antiochus I. is moreover an imitation of a coin of Nicoteles I. of Paphos. As, according to Liban. 1, 307 r., Antiochus pillaged the shrines of Cyprus, perhaps the statue in Antioch was taken from that island (Bab.)—Antiochus I. probably struck coins in Europe also, for there are three categories of bronze coins with his name and of European make: 1. coins with Macedonian shield, rev. elephant; 2. Zeus, rev. thunderbolt; 3. Apollo, rev. tripod. Nos. 2 and 3 have as an adjunct the jaw of the Calydonian boar, an Aetolian symbol. The subsequent relations of Antiochus III. with the Aetolians had therefore been prepared a long time back, which is very interesting. It is true that there is no proof for some of the exploits ascribed by Bab. (xlvi.) to Antiochus in Europe. But a body of Antiochus' soldiers undoubtedly fought at

Thermopylae, and the relations with the Aetolians may therefore be accounted for in this way.

Antiochus II., Bab. lv.-lxiv. Antiochus II. sometimes has wings on the temples, an allusion to some deity. The types partly resemble those under Antiochus I., only the seated Apollo generally has a bow instead of the arrow. Arsaces took this type for Parthia. New type under Antiochus II.: Heracles sitting on a rock, a coin struck in Cyme. Heracles of course recalls Macedonia. Themison, the favourite of Antiochus II., appeared with the attributes of Heracles. An Athena resembling the Parthenos of Phidias occurs on a coin of Antiochus II.—Diodotus of Bactria, who adopted the type of Zeus Aigiochos also used by Antiochus II. (Bab. lix.), struck coins with the name of Antiochus Nicator. This Nicator however is Antiochus I. according to Bab. xliii.—It is certain that Antiochus II. coined in Alexandria Troas, but Babelon's conjecture, based on adjuncts, that he did so in other places of Anterior Asia is dubious. For how could places so far apart from each other as Cyzicus and Alabanda, the adjuncts of which would occur on the same coin, have coined together (Bab. lvi.)? As Theos Antiochus II. sometimes has a nimbus on his hair. A coin with MIA (Bab. lvi.) reminds us that Antiochus II. had rendered special service to Miletus.

5. Antigonus Gonatas. Sketch of his character, Dr. 3, 1, 442; 3, 2, 65; v. Wil., Ant. v. Kar. 211 seq.; see below, note 9.

6. Pyrrhus in Macedonia and the Peloponnese, Dr. 3, 1, 202-220. Authorities for these events in Dr. 208, n. 3; they are Plutarch (a great deal from Phylarchus), Pausanias, 1, 13 (what comes from Hieronymus is good); Justinus, bk. 25; Polyaeus.—Apollonia, Dr. 3, 1, 221; Aristotimus, Dr. 3, 1, 223-225. Character of Pyrrhus: impetuous and restless like Poliorcetes, he surpassed him in generalship; next to Alexander he was the greatest general of the Greeks, reminding one of the Emperor Maximilian, who was called "the last knight," who was high-minded like Pyrrhus, was always making grand plans like him and always unfortunate, like the sovereign of Epirus.—Bust of Pyrrhus discovered by T. Six in a Herculaneum marble, Mus. Nap. 6150: Un ritratto del re Pirro, Bull. Inst. arch. 1891.

7. The Chremonidean War. Authorities: Paus. 3, 6; Just. 26, 2 and prol. 26; Hegesandros in Ath. 6, 250 (Müll. 4, 415) has the expression *Χρεμωνίδειος πόλεμος*; Ael. fr. 11 (death of Philemon). Important inscriptions: C. I. A. 2, 332 = Hicks 169 = Ditt. 163; and C. I. A. 2, 334 = Hicks 170 = Ditt. 164, with Dumont, Rev. archéol. 1870, p. 319. This inscription gives a list of the *ἐπιδόσεις* (voluntary contributions) of the Athenian citizens, *εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως*; Euryclides, son of Micion, was *ταμίης τῶν*

στρατιωτικῶν.—Modern writers: Niebuhr, Ueber den Chrem. Krieg, Kl. hist. Schriften, vol. 1; Grauert, Analekten, p. 354 seq.; Droysen, 3, 1, 225-247; Wachsmuth, Stadt Athen, 1, 627 seq.; v. Wil., A. v. K. 219 seq. and 251 seq., and Curtius, who says very aptly: "Athens was once more to become a purely Macedonian provincial city."

8. The naval battle off Cos is mentioned by Plutarch *de se ipso* cit. inv. laud. p. 659 Did. (Plut. Pelop. 2 has Andros instead of Cos), and it no doubt belongs to this war. The comparatively speaking most probable conjectures on this subject are made by v. Wil. 227. According to him the war began about 267 or 266. In 265 Areus is slain at Corinth. The siege of Athens, during which Philemon dies about 263, ends about 261 with the surrender of the city. The war between Macedonia and Egypt is continued at sea; the battle off Cos is fought and peace concluded about 258. There is a difficulty about this construction too. According to Paus. 3, 6 it must be assumed that Athens was hard pressed when Areus refused to come to her aid. This must have been before 265, for Areus was killed in that year. And yet Athens is supposed to have held out till 261! It is also uncertain whether Macedonia obtained Caria at that time; see below, chap. x. notes 12 and 16.—Of the other acute combinations made in connection with this war, the most probable is the supposed reference to the battle off Cos on a coin, Coins of the Ancients, pl. 41, 6; Head, p. 203; tetradrachm, head of Poseidon, rev. Apollo sitting on prow, ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΑΝΤΙΓΟΝΟΥ. It was long a matter of dispute to which Antigonus and to what naval victory the coin was to be ascribed. Imhoof, Monn. gr. p. 128, has interpreted it as alluding to Gonatas and the victory off Cos. Evans, it is true, is inclined to place it in an earlier period of Gonatas (Horsemen, 150). On the other hand, more uncertainty attaches to the connection with Gonatas in the Cnidus inscription, which is very acutely and instructively treated by Usener, Rhein. Mus. N. F. 29, pp. 25-50. It is clear that if Antigonus is called son of Epigonus in it, the presumption that Epigonus is the real name is the most obvious one, firstly, because such a relation between the names of father and son was quite in accordance with usage, and secondly, because, if by Epigonus was meant 'the Epigonus Gonatas,' no one could have any idea of this who did not know that a game of hide-and-seek was intended, and consequently the man would be deprived of the honour paid him.

9. The fr. 11 of Aelianus on the death of Philemon has been connected by Niebuhr with the taking of Athens, on the strength of unwarranted restorations of the text, and Droysen has adopted the conjecture. A correcter view has been taken by Wachsmuth, Stadt Athen, 1, 628, following Bernhardt and others.—The verdict

on Gonatas. The fashion nowadays is to find no fault in him. In the Chremonidean War he is in the right. "Macedonia would have been stifled by the net thrown around her" (the rising power of Egypt), v. Wil. 222. This is not true, for in the north the rising power in question only ensured the safety of the trading republics, Byzantium, Cyzicus, Abydos, etc., and the maintenance of a free route to the Black Sea, and that did not stifle Macedonia, it only prevented her from becoming an Asiatic power. This of course is what Gonatas aimed at, but no one else had any interest in it. In the same way Athens is depreciated too much. She is "the advanced post of the Ptolemaean dependencies" (v. Wil. 222). This seems to me a mistaken view. Athens was an independent ally of Egypt. Egypt never had a garrison in Athens, Macedonia had one now and then. What is wrongly said of Macedonia holds good of Athens: she would have been stifled by the net thrown around her by the enemy, *i.e.* Macedonia, and for this reason, because she was not at that time a conquering state like Macedonia. That Athens did not act as she did about 260 out of submissiveness to Egypt appears from the analogy of the year 200, when she made an energetic stand against Philip. At that time a powerful Egypt did not exist. In the year 200 Athens unquestionably fought only for freedom. Why should she not have resisted Macedonia in the year 260 for the same reason? The republics no doubt needed kings as friends. But it does not follow from this that they were dependent on them. Rhodes too was on good terms with Egypt, but in spite of all its civility to the Ptolemies was not a Ptolemaean dependency. Why should Athens be so? The republics cultivated the friendship of distant monarchs, who could be of great use and do little harm. That is why Athens sided with Demetrius when Cassander was master of Macedonia; but when Demetrius himself ruled in Macedonia, she was against him and on the side of Pyrrhus and Egypt. It is a leading trait of state policy that the weaker has a preference for and an interest in attaching itself to the strong power which is at a distance, and not to that which is close at hand. There are examples of this in our own times too. We may therefore say that the Chremonidean *psephisma* with its emphasis on freedom is no more a piece of hypocrisy than that passed before the Lamian War, Diod. 18, 10.—The foregoing remarks would be correct even if it were true that Gonatas was "a great regent" (Dr. 3, 1, 89). But there is no proof of this. He was energetic and prudent. But he accomplished nothing particular against the barbarians (see above, chap. iv. note 6), and his success against them is supposed to be his special title to fame. When an able sovereign is magnified into a great one, the reason is that

historians have lowered their standard in judging the monarchs of those days. What a high standard is demanded of Philip and Alexander! Philip never put to death one of his opponents, and Alexander repented of his few misdeeds. In spite of this they are generally severely censured, and especially the former. On the other hand, the long string of atrocities committed by sovereigns out of greed of territory between the years 323 and 280 have blunted the sensibilities of historians to such an extent that no particular blame is bestowed on them, and, if a king appears who is laborious, who does not put to death many people (so far as we know only Philochorus according to Suidas *h.v.*, and his nephew Alexander according to Plutarch, Ar. 17), and who patronizes literature, the delight in at last coming across a monarch who is not positively bad is so excessive that he is honoured with the epithet of 'great,' and merits are ascribed to him which he never possessed.—Removal of the Macedonian garrison from the Museum, Paus. 3, 6; Hier. and Eus. Arm. Ol. 131, 2; Eus. 2, 120 Sch.

10. The Bithynian succession, Polyb. 4, 50; Memn. 22; T. Chil. 3, 960; Dr. 3, 1, 311 seq. But why does Droysen assume that by the accession of Ziaelas "Egypt of course alone obtained influence over Bithynia"? Egypt had had to protect the interests of Tiboites, but Tiboites was worsted and Ziaelas ascended the throne. Syria had not been asked to look after the interests of Tiboites. Is not the proper inference that not Egypt but Syria obtained influence over Bithynia? See also Memn. 23. The chronology here too is uncertain. Ziaelas is generally supposed to have reigned from 250 onwards, according to Droysen (350) from 260. Cf. also Reinach, *Trois roy.* 100, and below, chap. xiii. note 1.

11. Atropatene. Pauly, R. E. 4, 1685; v. Gutschmid, Iran 21; Atropatene "deserves notice as the first new native kingdom in the Alexandrian empire, and as the first symptom of an Iranian reaction against Hellenism"; see also the same writer, p. 36.

12. For the death of Antiochus II. and the crimes of Laodice the authorities are as follows: Phylarchus (fr. 23) in Ath. 13, 593; Hieron. in Dan. 11, 5, 6; Plin. 7, 12; Val. Max. 9, 10, etc.; Just. 27, 1; Polyaen. 8, 50. Cf. Droysen (3, 1, 378), who assumes that Philadelphus lived to see the death of his daughter Berenice; Koepp differs, *Die syr. Kriege*, p. 220. Berenice is conducted only as far as Pelusium? What is the reason of that? Did not southern Syria belong to the Lagidae at that time? According to Eusebius Laodice was the daughter of Achaïos; according to Polyaen. 8, 50, who is generally followed since Reinach's *Trois roy.* 205 (not by Mahaffy though, *Empire*, 196), she was a daughter of Antiochus I. and step-sister of Antiochus II.

CHAPTER X

THE EAST AND GREECE FROM 246-220 B.C.—HOSTILITIES
BETWEEN SYRIA AND EGYPT—THE LEAGUES—ARATUS
—AGIS—CLEOMENES—ANTIGONUS DOSON.

IN the history of the second division of the period now under consideration we begin with Egypt, which takes the lead in this quarter of a century also. The reigning sovereign there was Ptolemy III. Euergetes (246-222), the son of Philadelphus and consort of Berenice of Cyrene, who had to take the field immediately after his accession, to avenge the death of his sister on the Syrians. Of this campaign too, the so-called Third Syrian War, only very little is known.¹ The principal authority is the already-mentioned copy of an inscription found at Adule on the Red Sea, of which the passage in question runs as follows: "He marched into Asia with foot-soldiers and horse and with a fleet and with Troglodytic and Ethiopian elephants, which he and his father had first captured in those parts and equipped for war. After having made himself master of all the countries on this side of the Euphrates, as well as of Cilicia, Pamphylia, Ionia, the Hellespont, Thrace, and all the armies there and the Indian elephants, and subdued all the monarchs in those regions, he crossed the Euphrates, and after the subjugation of Mesopotamia, Susiana, Persia, Media and all the remaining districts as far as Bactriana, and after having searched for and carried off into Egypt all the sacred relics which had been taken out of Egypt by

the Persians, together with other treasures from these countries, he sent troops through the canals"—here it breaks off. I quote some other brief references to this campaign in the note. The bringing of the sacred objects back to Egypt is also commemorated by a sacerdotal inscription at Tanis in the Delta. A few details of the beginning of the war, relating to the conquest of Seleucia by the Egyptians and their enthusiastic reception in Antioch on the Orontes, have lately been brought to light by an Egyptian papyrus. It is remarkable, by the way, in the Adule inscription that in Asia Egypt recognizes only sovereigns of the various countries. The claims of the Seleucids to more extensive tracts are simply ignored; the Seleucids themselves are not mentioned at all.

If Euergetes reconquered the empire of Alexander, as he claimed, why did he not keep it? Justinus says that he returned to Egypt on account of a rising in the interior. If the monarch sent bulletins from Bactria, his Egyptian subjects may well have plotted rebellion, like General Malet in Paris when Napoleon was at Moscow. Droysen suggests incidents in Cyrene, where the Greeks Ecdemus and Demophanes were starting a republican movement about that time. The campaign of Euergetes was assuredly a brilliant feat. But what remained of it as a permanent result? The Adule inscription states that he reduced the kings of those countries to subjection. Their submission cannot have amounted to much more than words as soon as he was gone. Practically, Egypt can only have asserted her rule at a few points on the coast-line between Phoenicia and Thrace within reach of the fleet, and even that was not a success.

What Seleucus did in the way of resistance is unknown to us, but Justinus tells us what happened in Asia subsequently. After Ptolemy had withdrawn, he says, Seleucus fitted out a large fleet against the cities which had revolted from him, but lost it in a storm, and the cities then submitted to him again, out of compassion for the shipwrecked monarch, who had barely

escaped with his life. This is a good specimen of the nonsense not unfrequently to be found in rhetorical historians. After this, continues Justinus, Seleucus began a war with Ptolemy on his own account, but was defeated and fled to Antioch (which consequently had already again passed out of the hands of Euergetes!). He now had recourse to his brother Antiochus Hierax and promised him Asia up to the Taurus (Asia Minor) in return for assistance. This shows that Antiochus was independent in Asia Minor. Ptolemy now became frightened, and concluded a ten years' peace with Seleucus. But Hierax did not behave in a brotherly manner; he attacked Seleucus and defeated him with the aid of the Galatae, and, as appears from the prologue of Trogus, at Ancyra. Seleucus had, as the story ran, fallen in the battle; thereupon the Galatae wanted to put to death their suzerain Antiochus as well, to facilitate the conquest of all Asia. But Antiochus pacified them with presents. This narrative of Justinus is supplemented by accounts in the chronicle of Eusebius. According to them the brother of Antiochus' mother, Alexander, who was living in Sardes, assisted him, and Seleucus was unable to take Sardes or Ephesus, which was garrisoned by Ptolemy. In Cappadocia Seleucus fought a great battle with Mithridates, in which 20,000 men fell on his side and he himself "disappeared." This is evidently the above-mentioned battle at Ancyra. Ptolemy took possession of a part of Syria, but could not capture Orthosia, as Seleucus marched against him (Ol. 134, 3, 242 B.C.). Antiochus Hierax was given up to the barbarians by his body-guards or favourites as he was traversing Phrygia Magna to collect taxes; but he escaped to Magnesia and defeated them on the following day with the aid of Ptolemy's troops, and some time afterwards married the daughter of Ziaelas of Bithynia. These fragmentary accounts of Justinus and Eusebius of course only admit of conjectures as to the real facts and their internal connection, and almost every one who writes the history of this time arrives at a

different and not improbable version (see note 2). And yet it would be interesting to know something definite about these matters, for it is clear from the scraps in the two historians that not only was war going on between Egypt and Syria and between the two hostile Seleucid brothers, but also with the Galatae, and the defeat of the latter, it is true by the kings of Pergamum, is closely connected with an important chapter in the history of Greek civilization, the art of Asia Minor in its prime. No doubt fragments of Pergamum inscriptions convey some information about this. But here too everything is obscure, both as regards subject-matter and chronology, and every definite assertion made by scholars in the present day has to be supported by details of a controversial kind. It is obvious that we cannot go into the subject. Even in the note we can only refer to the principal authorities.

To another highly interesting fact, an attempt of the Rhodians to check the growing power of their good friends the Ptolemies, there is only a casual allusion in antiquity. The Rhodians had a naval engagement with the Egyptians off Ephesus. The immediate occasion and the consequences of this war are, however, unknown to us.

We must now return to Seleucus. He bore the grand surname of Callinicus. What entitled him to it? Here the history of the remote East is involved.

Seleucus made a great campaign in an easterly direction, about which, however, again we have only scraps of information, in Strabo when the Sacae, and in Justinus when the Parthians, are mentioned.² Seleucus vanquished King Arsaces of Parthia, and the latter, thinking that Diodotus I. of Bactria was not well-disposed towards him, fled to the Apasiacae, who lived between the Oxus and the Jaxartes. Subsequently, however, Arsaces came to an understanding with Diodotus II., the successor of Diodotus I., and they defeated Seleucus, who was obliged to return to Syria. The day of the victory of

Arsaces over Seleucus was henceforth observed as a national festival by the Parthians. The title to the surname of Callinicus was therefore as well made out as is necessary for an Oriental monarch, and the subsequent foundation of a city called Callinikon in his hereditary territory on the Euphrates by the hero who had been fortunate enough to escape from the Parthians, no doubt made a great impression on the surrounding inhabitants.

The close of Seleucus' reign, however, did not justify his imposing surname quite so much. In the first place his aunt Stratonice gave him trouble. She had been the wife of King Demetrius of Macedonia, and when the latter discarded her for Phthia, the niece of Pyrrhus, she went to Syria and asked her nephew to marry her. As he absolutely refused, she created disturbances, in which she lost her life. This was another success for the king. Then, however, matters became extremely complicated. We will first hear what Justinus has to say about them. Attalus of Pergamum—Justinus with characteristic carelessness calls him Eumenes of Bithynia—attacked Antiochus and the Gauls, and defeated them. The ruler of Pergamum took possession of the greater part of Asia. Now at all events the Seleucid brothers ought to have made it up, but instead of doing so they continued to wage war on each other. Antiochus fled to his father-in-law (?), Ariaramnes of Cappadocia, and when the latter laid wait for him, to Ptolemy. But Ptolemy put him in prison. A woman who loved him set him at liberty; he escaped, and was slain by robbers. About the same time Seleucus, after losing his kingdom, lost his life by a fall from a horse. So far Justinus, who as usual selects the romantic episodes, but has no idea of any connection of events. We are not told to whom Seleucus lost his kingdom. Nor does the prologue of Trogus help to enlighten us. A few details of the same wars are given in the above-mentioned account by Eusebius. According to him Antiochus Hierax was conquered in Lydia in Ol. 137, 4

(229 B.C.), fought in the district of Coloe near Sardes with Attalus, was obliged to fly to Thrace in 228 after a battle in Caria, and then died. In the following year Seleucus also died. These are the most important recorded facts, and they have evidently been distorted by those who recorded them. Of course the acuteness of modern scholars has produced connected narratives even out of these scraps. But a few general outlines are all that is certain, and they are as follows.

The, as it would seem, lawful ruler of the Syrian empire—if there can be any question here of legality and of an empire in the geographical sense of the word—was Seleucus II. Callinicus, also called Pogon, the Bearded. He had an agitated reign, in which good and evil fortune alternated in a surprising manner. Ptolemy Euergetes marched through many of the states which Seleucus claimed as his own, and probably kept many of his conquests, especially in Asia Minor. The ownership of this country was also contested by Pogon's brother, Antiochus Hierax (Falcon), who took the title of king and was supported by most of the independent states of Asia Minor, by Bithynia and Cappadocia, as well as the Galatae. On the other hand, Attalus of Pergamum was an opponent of Antiochus. To the ambitious chieftain, who had no people to back him, the man who called himself king of Asia Minor was more dangerous and unpleasant than the distant Seleucus, who had to be satisfied with a verbal recognition of his suzerainty. We learnt from Eusebius that the country specially subject to Hierax was Phrygia Magna; it was there that he collected tribute. But what remains of Phrygia Magna if Galatia is taken away from it? And if this reduced Phrygia Magna belongs to Antiochus, what is left for Seleucus in Asia Minor? (Not much more than eastern Lydia, for he had not even Sardes, as we saw above, and the cities on the coast were mostly free or under the protection of Ptolemy, and Pergamum was independent. And towards the south too Seleucus' territory did not

extend very far. The western section of the southern coastline of Asia Minor was more Egyptian than Syrian, and Seleucus had hardly anything on the Syrian coast, for even Seleucia Pieria was in the hands of Egypt. Seleucus therefore was really master only of the northern part of inner Syria, of the interior as far as Persepolis and Ecbatana, of the plains of Cilicia and of Laodicea ad Mare for a seaport. Nothing can be said about the character of the two brothers; Droysen's favourable opinion of them can hardly be substantiated by facts. If we are not dazzled by grand titles like Callinicus and bulletins couched in Asiatico-Egyptian style, the residue of fact is that several pretenders fought with varying success for the countries between the Hellespont and the Indus, while the industrious city-populations tried to maintain their independence as best they could, at one time by force of arms, at another by prudent compliance with the wishes of the potentate who happened to be in the neighbourhood with his troops. The aspect of affairs in Anterior Asia at this time must have pretty much resembled that in Germany during the Thirty Years' War.

From 226 to 223 or 222 Seleucus III., Ceraunus or Soter, the elder son of Seleucus II., was monarch of the Syrian empire. He marched across the Taurus range to recover Asia Minor from the rulers of Pergamum, who were continually extending their conquests, and he succeeded, mainly through the ability of his relative Achæus. But he was then murdered by a certain Nicanor and the Gaul Apaturius. He was followed (after an Antiochus, not entered in the official list and mentioned only in an inscription, of whom, however, coins perhaps are extant, and who must have been a son of Seleucus III.) by a younger brother of the latter, Antiochus III., called the Great, who up to that time had resided in Babylon. Achæus, as we shall see in chap. xv., tried to make himself independent of him; but this pretender was not so successful as Antiochus Hierax.³

In the year 222 Ptolemy IV. Philopator came to the throne in Egypt. We shall refer to him in chaps. xiii. and xv.

While the sovereigns are wrangling in their usual fashion in the East, in Greece the movement in favour of liberty pursues its course.⁴ Athens, which had started it, is unable to continue it, as she cannot shake off the rule of Macedonia; the Peloponnese takes the lead, the city of Megalopolis giving the impulse.⁵ We now, as was remarked in chap. ix., hark back beyond the chronological limits of this period to avoid interrupting the internal connection of events. Philosophical reflection had co-operated in the founding of Megalopolis (vol. iii. pp. 107, 116), and subsequently the Megalopolitans were conspicuous for very deliberate action. At the outset adherents of Thebes, and then of Macedonia, they now appear in the character of champions of liberty, and, as it would seem, influenced more by theoretical than practical considerations. Megalopolis was ruled by a tyrant named Aristodemus, who had at first been under Macedonian protection but had then become independent. King Acrotatus of Sparta, the son of Areus, lost his life in fighting against him. Aristodemus had the reputation of being an honest man, but hatred of the *tyrannis* in every form led the Megalopolitans Ecdemus and Demophanes, who had fled their native city and become pupils of the Academic philosopher Arcesilaus in Athens (see above, chap. vi.), to murder him. This deed was soon imitated, and by a man who was destined to exercise the greatest influence on the fortunes of all Greece.

Sicyon also had its *tyrannis*; Abantidas, Paseas and Nicocles had successively oppressed the city. A young Sicyonian, however, was living in Argos, Aratus, the son of the wealthy Clinias who was murdered by Abantidas and had been constitutional archon of Sicyon. At the age of seven Aratus had been brought in safety to Argos (264) and had grown up there in good circumstances; he had learnt all that

the culture of the age had to offer, including gymnastics. His father had been the honoured guest of kings, of Antigonus and of Ptolemy, and throughout his whole life Aratus never lost his inbred aristocratic tastes. He resolved to avenge his father and liberate Sicyon. He would have preferred to accomplish his purpose with the aid of the kings, but Antigonus promised a great deal and did nothing, and Ptolemy was too far off. He therefore decided to make the attempt alone and of course to resort to stratagem. His wealth enabled him to arm thirty of his own slaves and to engage a band of sturdy men through a robber-chief named Xenophilus. He managed to throw the spies in the service of Nicocles at Argos off the scent by simulating a life of debauchery. A practicable point in the walls of Sicyon was discovered and the handful of men actually succeeded in scaling it and in taking the city without a single individual, either on the side of Aratus or of Nicocles, losing his life. Nicocles escaped by a subterranean passage. The people of Sicyon were summoned to the theatre and informed that they were free. The exiles returned and Sicyon joined the Achaean League, at the instigation of Aratus, in 251 B.C. This was the commencement of a new and important stage in the internal history of the Greeks.⁶

The League of the cities of Achaia was of great antiquity but had declined of late years. The Macedonians dissolved it when they obtained preponderant influence in Greece. As soon, however, as the power of Macedonia waned, the League gradually came to life again. About the year 280 B.C. the four westernmost cities of Achaia, Patrae, Dyme, Tritaea and Pharae, shook off the Macedonian yoke, and we may assume that they renewed their old relations on this occasion. In 276 Aegium won its liberty, and subsequently Bura and Ceryneia. Close to Aegium was the shrine of Zeus Amarios. This point was selected as the centre of the new League by the above cities, which were afterwards joined by the

remaining Achaean cities, making ten in all. The Macedonians had not been able to prevent this. But the adhesion of Sicyon made the League of far greater importance. Sicyon was not an Achaean but a semi-Dorian city, of much greater prestige than the above-mentioned ten. A league of which this ancient city became a member acquired importance in the eyes of all Greece. But the extension of the Achaean League was due to Aratus, who in this as generally in his whole career proved himself a clever politician, it is true of the kind which, as Plutarch wittily remarks, is more at home in the dark than in the light. In spite of his training in the palaestra Aratus was not by predilection a soldier; even as a general he preferred stratagem to force. In bringing Sicyon into the Achaean League he no doubt was thinking of his own career; he might become head of the League, and he did in point of fact become so. Since the year 255 a change in the constitution of the League had made it more adapted for vigorous intervention in the affairs of Greece as a whole: instead of two strategi it had been decided to appoint only one to the chief command. This made it easier for an enterprising statesman to enforce his views, and Aratus found a suitable field for his activity. In the first place, however, he devoted his energies to Sicyon. Ptolemy sent him 25 talents, which he spent in ransoming prisoners of war. But the returned exiles demanded very high terms. They wanted to recover their property, and the men actually in possession were unwilling to part with it. Such a state of affairs has always given rise to great difficulties. After the year 403 Athens had, under the leadership of Thrasybulus, by self-sacrificing patriotism honourably extricated herself from a similar position without foreign aid (vol. iii. pp. 24, 25). The spirit of self-sacrifice was not so strong in Sicyon. But a wealthy monarch might be of assistance. Antigonos was out of the question, as the liberation of Sicyon was distasteful to him; there remained only Ptolemy, who besides was the

richer of the two. Aratus therefore paid a visit to his royal friend in Egypt. He had already made himself acceptable to the king by sending him paintings of the famous Sicyonian school, especially some by Pamphilus and Melanthus. Ptolemy gave him 150 talents, which were spent in indemnifying the returned *émigrés*. Of course Aratus promised in return to promote the interests of Egypt in Greece.

After having thus settled the affairs of Sicyon to the general satisfaction, he turned his attention to those of Achaia. He entered the Achaean cavalry, and speedily won such great popularity that he was elected strategus in the year 245, at the early age of 27. As strategus he soon achieved a signal success. True, he failed in his attempt to win Boeotia, for when he arrived there with an army the Boeotians had already been defeated by the Aetolians at Chaeronea and had been obliged to join them. But he succeeded with Corinth. Corinth had belonged for about a century to the Macedonians, who used it as a centre for controlling or influencing Greece. Alexander, son of Craterus, the brother of Gonatas, had been the Macedonian governor of the citadel for a time, but he had not always looked after Macedonian interests, and had eventually allied himself with the Achaeans. He was now dead, having been poisoned by Antigonus, and his widow Nicaea had succeeded him. Gonatas managed to trick her out of Acro-Corinthus by dangling the prospect of a marriage with his son Demetrius before her, and then demanding and obtaining admission as a private individual into the citadel, where he at once assumed command. He appointed the Stoic philosopher Persaeus governor of the place. It was this important position which Aratus contrived to secure, once more by stratagem. Through the agency of a banker in Sicyon, who managed his money matters, he was introduced to a business connection of the latter, a Syrian, named Erginus, who lived in Corinth with three brothers. One of them, Diocles, was a soldier in Antigonus' garrison, the other three

made a practice of robbing the king's treasure, and Erginus was charged with converting the stolen property into current coin. Aratus heard of all this and pointed out to Erginus through his banker that the enterprising family could make more money at one swoop by betraying Acro-Corinthus, which could be easily done by Diocles, than by a series of thefts which were not free from danger, and the brothers did in fact agree with Aratus, for the sum of 60 talents, to show him a point where the wall was only fifteen feet high and could therefore be scaled. Aratus, who had not the money, deposited his plate and his wife's jewels with the banker, as security for the advance, and Plutarch places his readiness to part with his property in order to join in a dangerous undertaking on a level with the contempt for wealth exhibited by Phocion and Epaminondas. The enterprise succeeded; Acro-Corinthus was taken. Persaeus seems to have perished on the occasion. Twenty-five Macedonian ships of war also fell into the hands of Aratus. Corinth was set free and joined the Achaean League; Megara, Troizene and Epidaurus were emancipated and also entered the League. Then Aratus, as Plutarch words it, made Ptolemy the ally of the Achaeans with the chief command by sea and land. The Egyptian king was too far off to be a dangerous confederate of the liberated Greeks.

Aratus made his next attempt at emancipation with Argos. He intended to put its tyrant Aristomachus to death, but one of the conspirators turned traitor and the plot miscarried. Subsequently, on Aristippus taking the place of Aristomachus, who had been murdered by slaves, Aratus renewed his attempt, invading the territory of Argos, but he was obliged to return for want of support from the Argives, and Aristippus now had the hardihood to charge the Achaeans with breach of the peace. The Mantineans, to whom the case was referred, condemned them to pay a fine of thirty minae (about 240 B.C.).

Thus Aratus' attempts to gain Argos came to nothing, and soon his attention was completely absorbed by the affairs of a still more important city.

In Sparta, with which the Achaeans had concluded a defensive alliance, things had happened which testified to a far more vigorous attempt to realize lofty ideals than the efforts of Aratus. The young king Agis, the son of Eudamidas (243-240), resolved to restore the old discipline and with it the old glory and power of Sparta.⁷ The Spartans had deviated a long way from the austerity of manners which still existed in the fourth century under Agesilaus. The contrast between rich and poor had assumed a special sharpness in Sparta. The number of the Spartiates was reduced to 700; only 100 families still possessed estates, and of these some were enormously rich and sunk in luxury. The energy of the privileged class was sufficient to keep the Helots and the Perioeci in check, but abroad Sparta was without influence and well-nigh powerless. Agis' plan was to enlarge the privileged class and also to distribute the wealth possessed by 100 families among as great a number of individuals as possible. He himself, as one of the richest men in Sparta, was ready to set the example of self-sacrifice. A division of property among the poor and outcasts in a genuinely socialistic spirit was consequently the programme. Agis had won over his mother Agesistrata, his uncle Agesilaus, and the influential Lysander, a descendant of the conqueror of Athens, to his 'plan. He contemplated carrying out the revolution as far as possible in due legal form. Lysander became Ephor in the autumn of 243, and brought forward a motion in the Senate that all debts should be remitted and the land redivided. Four thousand Spartiate and 15,000 Perioeci lots were to be formed. Of course several thousand of the Perioeci were to be raised to the rank of Spartiates. Agis himself made over his enormous landed property and his ready money, 600 talents (about £150,000), to the State. The

wonder is how so much money came to Sparta. The explanation lies in the market for mercenaries at Cape Taenarum, which must have put large sums into the pockets of the Spartans, as the contractors and brokers of course had not only to pay high fees for the general permission to carry on their lucrative business there, but also so much per head for each mercenary supplied by them. All that had to be done was to supervise and exploit the market properly, and this the wealthy Spartiates knew how to do. The Senate rejected the motion; the conservatives were not inclined to be summarily expropriated. As King Leonidas appeared to be the main obstacle to the reform he was deposed on a pretext and his dignity transferred to his son-in-law Cleombrotus, who was of the same family, the Agiadae. But now a fresh difficulty arose. The Ephors of the year 242-241 were also hostile to the measure; they even impeached Lysander and his colleague Mandroclinas for unconstitutional proposals. Thereupon the two kings interfered. They maintained that the Ephors had exceeded their powers, removed them and appointed others in their place. They threw open the debtors' prisons. The oligarchs were now intimidated and Leonidas fled to Tegea. The bonds for debts were publicly burnt, but the redistribution of lands did not take place. In the meanwhile a war broke out. The Aetolians were threatening the Peloponnese and especially the Achaean League, and Sparta, which was an ally of the Achaeans, had to render assistance.⁸ The Spartans took the field under Agis and wherever they came in the Peloponnese excited admiration by their admirable bearing, which recalled the old times. Agis wished to fight a battle on the Isthmus, but Aratus, who was in command of the Achaeans, as usual would not run any risk and specially not help Agis to win military glory. He dismissed the Spartans, did not prevent the Aetolians from marching into the Peloponnese, and then managed to surprise and defeat them when they had entered the city of Pellene. If the man

who was on the point of making the rich poor and the poor rich had won a battle for the Achaeans into the bargain, it would have been all up with Aratus and generally with the aristocrats in the Peloponnese, for all the poor among the Achaeans too would have sided with Agis. That was now prevented and Aratus could breathe freely for the moment. The rest was accomplished by the Spartan oligarchs and the folly of Agesilaus, who had undertaken the execution of the reforms, and who either neglected his duty altogether or performed it unsatisfactorily. The bonds had been burnt, but no steps were being taken to distribute the land. Agesilaus had debts which he wished to be rid of, and land which he had no intention of parting with, so said the opponents of Agis. Of course it might be urged against this that less time was required to cancel debts than to distribute land, especially when it had not been settled who was to get it. Anyhow the defective execution of the reforms produced such a reaction in popular feeling that Leonidas was able to return, and Agesilaus fled. The latter's son, Hippomedon, was afterwards Egyptian governor in Thrace. The people soon became so incensed against the reform party that Agis and Cleombrotus had to take refuge in sanctuaries. But this did not avail Agis. Chelidonis, the wife of Cleombrotus, was permitted to save her husband, but Agis was enticed out of his refuge and arrested in the street by the Ephor Amphares, who had pretended to be his friend, and who dragged him to prison. Here he was put to death. Then his mother and grandmother were also lured into the prison on the pretence of seeing Agis and murdered there. Leonidas compelled Agis' widow, Agiatis, to marry his son Cleomenes, she being the wealthiest heiress in Sparta. Thus order was restored in Sparta, and the aristocrats were content (240 B.C.).⁹

Throughout the Peloponnese the aristocratic party breathed again. The prospects of Macedonia also brightened, for oligarchs and monarchs were united by a common interest

against socialism. The Achaeans concluded peace with Antigonus; the king evidently gave up the idea of recovering Acro-Corinthus. He died at the beginning of 239, at a ripe old age.

He was succeeded by his son Demetrius (239-229). He was married, as we saw, to the Syrian Stratonice, but had repudiated her to wed the Epirote Phthia, who he hoped would give him claims to Epirus. The latter country was torn by internal disturbances to a fearful extent. The descendants of Pyrrhus were quarrelling, and one after the other fell a victim to assassination; eventually the last remaining daughter of Pyrrhus, Deidamia, was put to death by the insurgents in the temple of Artemis at Ambracia, and a republican federal state of the Epirotes was founded. Demetrius did not interfere; he probably was inclined to let the storm blow itself out a little, and besides he was in difficulties himself. The Dardani made a sudden attack on Macedonia. The Aetolians also were on the move. They were threatening the Acarnanians, and the latter, as Macedonia was evidently unable to help them at this moment, appealed to the Romans, whom they reminded that their ancestors were the only Greeks who did not take part in the war against Troy. The Roman Senate did call upon the Aetolians to leave the Acarnanians alone, but they paid no heed to the remonstrance. It was probably about this time that the Aetolians also occupied Phigalia in Arcadia, which we find subsequently in their hands. And now Aratus made an alliance with the Aetolians. If they had Phigalia, he would take the neighbouring Heraea. And in other ways he was tireless in his endeavours to extend the power of the Achaean League. He went to work in his own peculiar fashion: stratagem was his favourite weapon. He avoided battles, yet when he could not help fighting his personal demeanour was unexceptionable (although, as was sarcastically remarked, he suffered from palpitation of the heart and diarrhoea in every battle); but he never risked any-

thing and kept his own division back if there was any chance of endangering it by supporting the others. Thus he managed to out-manœuvre and defeat the tyrant Aristippus of Argos, but all the same he did not obtain possession of Argos; the young Aristomachus became tyrant, and the pusillanimous Aratus was ridiculed at his court. In Megalopolis, on the other hand, Achaean policy gained a signal triumph. Here, in spite of recent occurrences, a tyrant had reappeared in the person of Lydiades, a high-minded young man, and he was persuaded to give up the *tyrannis* and bring his city into the Achaean League. The Achaeans were so pleased at this that they elected him strategus, in the year 233. Many of them seem to have felt that the policy of the League ought to be conducted with a little more enthusiasm and a little less reliance on money and stratagems. Lydiades would have been the right man for tactics of this kind. But Aratus, who was appointed strategus every two years, and who was therefore always the presiding genius of the League, contrived to prevent this. His attempts to withdraw Athens from Macedonian influence were less successful at the outset. In the lifetime of Antigonus Gonatas he made an attack on the Piræus. It failed however, and Aratus asserted in his memoirs—consequently even at that early stage—that it was not he but Erginus who had executed it, and that Erginus had called out the name Aratus during his flight to divert his pursuers. The blame of the abortive attempt was conveniently laid on the shoulders of a rogue like Erginus, otherwise the rulers of Athens might eventually have taken it into their heads to follow the example of Aristippus, who had impeached the Achaeans for breach of the peace. When Demetrius came to the throne Aratus' efforts in the north were not attended with greater success. He was defeated at Phylacia by Bitys, Demetrius' general, and a report was spread that he was dead. Diogenes, the king's governor in the Piræus, even summoned the Achaeans to evacuate Corinth

on the strength of this news, and, strange to say, the Athenians put on wreaths because Aratus was dead. In reality no one outside Achaia could bear him. But when Diogenes' message reached Corinth, Aratus was there himself, and he forthwith made a raid into Attica to show that he was in the land of the living. A war between the Achaeans and Sparta, which Lydiades wished to bring on, was prevented by him; the Spartan oligarchs were, as we have seen, his good friends.

On the death of Demetrius, in 229, the position changed. His son Philip, who should have succeeded him, was only seven years old, and the general belief was that the power of Macedonia was broken. But it was saved by a near relation of Philip, Antigonos, the son of Demetrius of Cyrene, who assumed the reins as guardian, *epitropos*, and governed with skill. He is known in history by the name of Doson, the man who is ready to give, probably because he may have often stated that he was prepared to make over power to Philip. At first Macedonian influence outside the kingdom was in a bad plight. Thessaly broke away, the Aetolians were once more predominant in central Greece; in the Peloponnese Aristomachus of Argos laid down the *tyrannis*. Aratus sent him fifty talents, although Lydiades, and not he, was strategus at the time. When Lydiades stated Aristomachus' case to the Achaeans (evidently the reception of Argos into the League) Aratus opposed it and the Achaeans rejected Aristomachus' petition. Afterwards, however, Aratus spoke in his favour, and thereupon Argos and Phlius were taken into the League and Aristomachus elected general. Strange conduct for a statesman! It is clear that in the eyes of Aratus all things were of value only in so far as they were factors in his policy, and politics for him were in a certain sense a business: he purchased power. He carried out a transaction of this kind with or rather for the Athenians, although it did not turn out exactly as he wished. After

the death of Demetrius the general Diogenes intimated his willingness to hand over the places in his custody, the Piraeus, Munychia, Salamis and Sunium, to the Athenians for 150 talents. Aratus provided the money, and Diogenes evacuated the citadels. The Athenians paid honours in the first place to Diogenes, and then to their fellow-citizens Euryclides and Micion, for this service, but took no notice of Aratus, who was evidently looked on as a business man who would be sure to look after his own interests himself, nor did Athens enter the Achaean League. Why was this? Droysen conjectures that Aratus was opposed to it because he did not want to have any "ideas" in the League, in other words because he was afraid that the highly-cultivated Athenians might become too powerful in it and he would lose the control. Although this view is peculiar, it may contain an element of truth. But it is not the whole truth. In the first place the Athenians themselves had no wish to join the League. It would have been a come-down for them, and this unwillingness must have been the main obstacle. But there was probably another obstacle as well. Where did Aratus get all his money from? Evidently from Egypt. It is recorded that Ptolemy made him an annual allowance of six talents, and the king would no doubt have given him more for definite objects if he wanted it. In return Ptolemy of course demanded attention to his interests. But the latter required that Athens should remain independent. Aratus therefore could not even attempt to bring Athens into the Achaean League, even if he had wished it. On the other hand, the sensational withdrawal of the Macedonian garrisons from the territory of Athens led to the immediate entry of Aegina, Hermione and most of the Arcadians into the Achaean League, which became extremely powerful in consequence. The 150 talents had therefore after all been of service to Achaia.¹⁰

In the meanwhile Antigonos was protecting the Mace-

donian frontier; he also extended his sway once more over part of Thessaly, without, however, being able to completely dislodge the Aetolians, who had installed themselves there. Nor could he prevent them from settling in Lysimachia, Cius and Chalcedon.¹¹ For the further consolidation of his dominions he did not attack Athens, which might look to Egypt and even to Rome for protection; he turned his attention to the Peloponnese, where he awaited and at last found a favourable conjuncture.

The opportunity for interference in that quarter was supplied by the resistance offered by Aratus to the new movement in Sparta. This movement proceeded from Cleomenes, the son of the king Leonidas who had crushed the lofty aspirations of Agis in a sanguinary manner.¹² Cleomenes had been forced to marry the widow of Agis, but this very union had kept the recollection of Agis' attempts continually fresh in his mind, and as he was naturally inclined to what was great, he eventually adopted Agis' aims as his own. He resolved to carry out the transformation of Sparta. Besides him there were many young Spartans who were impressed with a feeling that the constitution of the state must be changed; their adviser, perhaps their teacher, was the Stoic philosopher Sphaerus. Cleomenes did not realize his plans immediately after his accession, which took place about the year 235 B.C. They went farther than those of Agis; his scheme did not admit of being announced long beforehand but required mature preparation. His intention was to substitute the power of the kings for that of the Ephors in Sparta, *i.e.* to convert an oligarchy into a despotism, and then to raise Sparta thus invigorated to the position of leader of the Peloponnese, if possible of all Greece. He began by securing Tegea and Mantinea as allies of his city. This placed him in opposition to the Achaeans, who had for some time been accustomed to be masters in Arcadia. A war broke out (227 B.C.), in which Aratus, who was in command

of the Achaeans, at first evaded an engagement. Subsequently, however, a battle was fought, at the foot of Mount Lycaeus in the territory of Megalopolis, and Cleomenes was victorious. Aratus took to flight, but, although he was supposed to be dead, he accomplished the incredible feat of at once collecting a force, of marching with it on Mantinea and making the Mantineans join the Achaeans and give their *metoeci* civil rights into the bargain. Cleomenes now recalled Archidamus, the brother of Agis, from exile; he was to represent the house of the Eurypontidae as king in place of the infant son of Agis, who had just died. It looked as if Cleomenes was in want of a support, but shortly afterwards Archidamus was murdered, no doubt by the oligarchical party. Cleomenes of course might have prevented it, and some writers have gone so far as to assert that he instigated the deed. This is not susceptible of proof, but even the more lenient view, that he purposely refrained from preventing the murder planned by the oligarchs, leaves a stain on his character. In the subsequent course of the war with the Achaeans Cleomenes won another victory, at Leuctra in the territory of Megalopolis. This battle was remarkable for the death of Lydiades, who attacked the Spartans with impetuosity at the head of the cavalry, and was left in the lurch by Aratus, who was in command of the hoplites. The just indignation of the Achaeans at Aratus was so great that they met at Aegium and passed a resolution, which is characteristic of the peculiar situation of the League, that no further sums should be advanced to him for payment of mercenaries, consequently for the continuation of the war, and that if he wished to go on with the war he might pay for it himself. The death of Lydiades came very opportunely for Aratus and only his notorious prudence in battle saved him from the charge of treachery. At first he was inclined to reply to his fellow-countrymen's vote of want of confidence by at once resigning the seals of office. Then, however, he

thought better of it and carried out another of the strokes of which he was a master ; he attacked Orchomenus, killed 300 of the enemy, and took Megistonous, the stepfather of Cleomenes, prisoner. Then and not till then did he retire in favour of Timoxenus, not merely because he had been in the habit of filling the office of strategus every other year only, but also because, as his enemies asserted, the position had become more difficult owing to the revolution which had been carried out in the meanwhile by Cleomenes in Sparta, and he wanted some one else to burn his fingers first.

Cleomenes had carried out his *coup d'état*, after enlisting some leading Spartans in his interest, partly by presents of money. He had at first marched about in the Peloponnese with the Spartan army, and when he had tired out the soldiers in this way, he left them and hastened with a force of mercenaries to Sparta, surprised the Ephors, slew four out of the five, drove eighty Spartiates out of the city and proclaimed the same measures as Agis had done : cancelment of debts and redistribution of estates. And to prevent the reforms being defeated by the old authorities, as had happened under Agis, Cleomenes altered the constitution of Sparta. The Ephorate was abolished. Cleomenes, who wanted to be decently rid of this aristocratic controlling body, made the historical discovery that it had in course of time unduly extended its powers, and concluded that it was his duty to put an end to this abuse. It seems that the Senate also was abolished, and that the double kingship became practically a monarchy. No historical warrant could be found for this. He appointed a new body, the Patronomi. Perioeci were admitted into the ranks of the heavy-armed troops, which had often been done in the palmy days of Sparta, and the army was equipped with sarissae in the Macedonian fashion ; it was an age in which a superstitious respect for the Macedonian phalanx was still felt. Laconia was divided into local districts, departments so to speak. Cleomenes behaved affably to the citizens ; he posed as the

representative of enlightened Greek ideas, in contrast both to the Achaeans and to the king of Macedonia. The Achaeans represented the moneyed aristocracy, Antigonus the kind of monarchy which studies the interest and the pleasure of the sovereign and the privileged classes in the first place, Cleomenes the ruler who labours for the whole people and does not stick even at crimes to ensure their welfare. Of the three men, Aratus, Antigonus and Cleomenes, the last-named was the most original, the most vigorous, the least self-seeking. The Achaeans called him a tyrant, and he was one, but in a higher sense than the old tyrants. His people remained devotedly attached to him, and he to them.

Abroad too, Cleomenes proceeded with the same energy which he had displayed in this revolution of the year 226. He made Mantinea desert the Achaeans. The discontent with Aratus now became still greater among the latter. Many of them too must have thought that their confederation of states would be better led by a man who sympathized with all classes and who fought with bravery than by one whose sole resource was money and stratagem, and who could not even guarantee peace to all, let alone subsistence to the poor. The state-craft of Aratus appeared like a leaky ship which threatens its crew with destruction.

Seeing no other means of protecting his own existence as a wealthy aristocrat and that of his fellow-citizens, who were in a similar plight, against the encroachments of a multitude directed by an able leader, Aratus looked about for foreign aid. Egypt could not give him what he wanted; it supported him with money but not with soldiers. No success could be achieved against the troops of Cleomenes with purchased mercenaries alone, and the Achaeans were not disposed to risk their lives for the cause championed by Aratus. Besides this, Ptolemy did not even provide him with enough money to enlist a large force of mercenaries. He did not care about the rich getting the better of the poor in Greece; the greater the

confusion in that country, so much the better for him. The case was different with Macedonia. Its king could not help seeing that a victory of the populace in Greece was menacing, not only to wealthy citizens, but also to more or less legitimate monarchs, provided they were not divided from Greece by a wide expanse of sea and were not merely despots ruling a foreign population by force, like the Ptolemies. The Achæan aristocracy was therefore obliged to have recourse to Antigonus. The League itself could not be persuaded off-hand to give the lie to its whole history in this way. But Aratus, who was an adept at every artifice, was equal to the occasion here also. He induced the Megalopolitans, who had always been on good terms with Macedonia, to apply to the Achæan League for permission to appeal to Macedonia for aid against Sparta. Leave was given, and in this way relations were established between the Achæans and Macedonia, and it would no longer be such a very unnatural thing if the Achæans also were to ask the king for assistance. Aratus, however, did more than this; he gave the Megalopolitan envoys to Antigonus secret instructions to represent to the king what an advantage it would be to him if he overthrew Cleomenes. Antigonus declared his readiness to help, if the Achæans approved, and Aratus very craftily brought forward a motion in the Achæan Council that the king should be thanked for his offer and that Macedonian aid should be accepted only for the contingency that the League was unable to carry on the struggle alone, which should be attempted in the first instance. The Megalopolitans thus dropped out of the negotiations in a perfectly natural way, and the Achæans took their place. The attempt at unaided action was made, but failed. The Achæans were completely defeated by Cleomenes at Dymæ near Hecatombaeum in the year 224. This defeat had a peculiar result. The idea dawned upon the majority of the Achæans that they had no motive for fighting against Cleomenes, who, as he said, did not want to oppress them but only to become leader of a

united Greece, and they came to the conclusion that a leadership of this kind might very well be accepted. Aratus of course opposed the proposals for negotiation on these lines, but without effect; his opposition was disregarded, and a meeting was fixed between the Achaean authorities and Cleomenes at Lerna, where definitive arrangements were to be made. At this stage Cleomenes fell ill; an internal hemorrhage incapacitated him for serious work, and he was unable to come to Lerna.

The favourable moment was thus lost, and it did not return. Aratus once more acquired influence over his fellow-citizens, and when Cleomenes had recovered his health and the meeting was to take place at Argos, Aratus carried a motion that the king should be requested to come to Argos alone, without armed escort. Cleomenes took offence at this, broke off the negotiations and at once declared war on the Achaeans again. This was a mistake. A more diplomatic man would have surmounted this difficulty and have obtained the leadership of the Achaeans; but then Cleomenes was not so fond of entering by the backdoor as Aratus.

At the outset, however, Cleomenes gained some brilliant successes. He captured Argos, and that was a considerable feat when we bear in mind how from time immemorial the Argives had resisted the Spartans. Aratus held Sicyon, but Pellene and other cities went over to Cleomenes. Corinth, too, received him within its walls. Aratus, who with his usual cunning had slipped out of Corinth at the right moment, owned valuables and houses there. Cleomenes did not confiscate them, and he even offered Aratus a yearly pension of twelve talents if the latter would use his interest to get him appointed general of the Achaeans, but Aratus replied that he could do nothing, that he was not master of the situation. Dissimulation had become his second nature to such an extent that he even lied when there was no need whatever for it. An Achaean garrison had remained in Acro-

Corinthus, mostly mercenaries of Aratus; this was the ruin of Greece.

Aratus now came forward as a dictator, and the Achaeans confirmed him in this position by appointing him strategus autocrator at Aegium. Cleomenes appeared before the walls of Sicyon, where Aratus was, and the latter is said to have hesitated for a considerable time as to what course he should pursue. It was of no use applying to Aetolia or Athens, for their sympathies were on the Spartan side. He decided to call in Antigonus. He left Sicyon, escorted for some distance by a crowd of weeping fellow-countrymen, who were afraid that he would fall into the hands of Cleomenes, and went to Aegium, where he carried a resolution that Antigonus should be appealed to for assistance and Acro-Corinthus surrendered to him. The Achaean League had fallen so low that it offered the king of Macedonia hostages as a guarantee of its loyalty, among them the son of Aratus, who went to the Macedonian court with seemingly brilliant but in reality miserable prospects for the future. As the Aetolians barred the king's advance by Thermopylae, he went to the Isthmus by way of Euboea, with 20,000 foot and 1400 horse; the advantage of holding Chalcis was now seen. Cleomenes still had the territory of Megara, but Aratus' party brought Argos over to their side, and as his rear was threatened in consequence, he abandoned Corinth, made an ineffectual attempt to recover Argos and finally returned to Sparta (223 B.C.). Aristomachus, who had been first tyrant of Argos and then general of the Achaeans, and who had delivered Argos to Cleomenes, was put to the torture and drowned in the sea, a disgrace to Aratus.¹⁸ The Achaeans now passed a resolution in Aegium that Antigonus should be head of the League, and that all relations with foreign potentates should be subject to his approval, thus voluntarily putting the League in the position which Tunis now occupies with respect to France. A larger League was founded under the presidency of Macedonia, of which the Achaeans formed part.

Antigonus did not venture to attack Sparta for the moment. But this state of affairs could not last long. Antigonus and Aratus had a favourable position for this reason, that they in their turn offered a new policy, and one which was welcome to a good many people. Cleomenes was already slightly used-up. If he was the deliverer of the poor, the other two were the saviours of existing society, and besides this they were successful at once, which always influences public opinion. Cleomenes now needed foreign aid, as Aratus had done, and only Egypt could give it him. Aratus had been in Egyptian pay, and had gone over to Macedonia, the constant rival of Egypt; Euergetes therefore acceded to Cleomenes' request for help, evidently pleased to get a firm footing in Greece once more. For although there is no record of the Egyptian monarch's reply, the purport of it may be inferred from the fact that Cratesiclea, Cleomenes' mother, and his son by the deceased Agiatis went to Egypt as hostages. Or did they go thither at once to prefer the request? Ptolemy certainly sent no troops; he may have given subsidies of money, but his main resource was no doubt diplomatic negotiations and threats, which cost nothing. That Egypt brought her power so little to bear in favour of Cleomenes, was evidently due to complications in Asia; that it left him at last completely in the lurch, was perhaps to a certain extent connected with the state of health of Euergetes, who in the second half of his reign no longer displayed his early energy. About that time Seleucus III. Soter had invaded Asia Minor, where Egypt was powerful and on good terms with Pergamum. Subsequently, after the murder of Seleucus in Phrygia in the year 222, his relative Achaeus continued the war, and the brother of Seleucus, Antiochus III., came from Babylon to Syria and assumed the reins of government. Achaeus pressed Attalus hard, blockading him in Pergamum, and the Hellenic cities went over to Syria; Egypt held its own in Ephesus and Samos only. After this Antiochus celebrated his marriage

with Laodice, the daughter of King Mithridates of Pontus. This rise of the Seleucid power must have prevented Euergetes from sending reinforcements to Cleomenes. He ought at all events to have ravaged part of the coast of Macedonia; that would have been of service to the Spartans. Yet the activity of Antigonus seems to have been crippled for a time by the possibility of Ptolemy's intervention, for in the year 222 the war proceeded slowly in the Peloponnese.

Antigonus conquered Tegea and then Mantinea, and here the Achaeans, to whom the capture of the city was not due, behaved with terrible cruelty, massacring the inhabitants and selling them into slavery. Antigonus made a present of the city to the Argives, and the latter, under Aratus' direction, founded a new community there, to which the Achaean general gave the name of Antigonea, in humble submission to the saviour of society.¹⁴ Cleomenes succeeded only in one undertaking, and that not completely. He took Megalopolis; but most of the inhabitants were able to leave the city under the leadership of Philopoemen, who was about to become so famous. Cleomenes offered to let them return on condition that they joined Sparta; but on Philopoemen's advice they refused the offer, and Cleomenes destroyed the city. Antigonus did not interfere. There is something highly honourable about the firmness of the Megalopolitans; in Philopoemen a loftier nature than that of the intriguing Aratus appears on the scene; it is a pleasure to come across a straightforward declaration of policy on the Achaean side for once in a way. Perhaps negotiations took place between Antigonus and Ptolemy at this time; the king of Egypt was to be persuaded to throw over Sparta, which he had supported to a certain extent, altogether. He did so eventually. But why? We can only reply to this question by conjectures. No doubt in this case too the complications in Asia were paramount; Egypt did not like to send its troops so far afield. But if there were negotiations between Macedonia and Egypt, it is

reasonable to assume that Egypt received something for leaving Cleomenes in the lurch. Droysen has advanced the ingenious conjecture that Antigonus may have ceded Caria to Egypt. But unfortunately it is by no means so certain, as historians follow Droysen in assuming, that Macedonia was in possession of Caria. Perhaps it was simply the shattered health of Euergetes, who died soon afterwards, which prevented him and his ministers from intervening actively in the affairs of Greece.¹⁵ Anyhow, Antigonus was able to fight the matter out without the interference of Egypt. He won the Illyrians of Demetrius of Pharos over to his side, and 1600 of them joined him in the Peloponnese, when he struck a decisive blow at Cleomenes in the year 221. He had 18,600 Macedonians, 1050 Epirotes, 2000 Boeotians, 1000 Megalopolitans, 3300 Achaeans. Cleomenes with his utmost exertions could not muster more than 20,000 men against him. When we consider that the Achaean contingent in this contest was with the Megalopolitans only 4300 men as against 18,600 Macedonians, we see how wretched the military organization of Achaia was and cannot but pity Greece for placing herself in the hands of men like Aratus, who wanted to dabble in politics on a grand scale without the necessary energy or the capacity of inspiring their followers with it. The battle was fought at Sellasia. Cleomenes and his force displayed great bravery, but the skilful generalship of Antigonus and Philopoemen decided the day. Only 4000 of the Spartan army are said to have survived. Cleomenes abandoned all further resistance. He remained but a short time in Sparta, standing against a pillar, and refusing food and drink. He hurried to Gytheum, whence a vessel transported him to Alexandria. Antigonus restored the old constitution in Sparta, with the exception of the monarchy; the Boeotian Brachyllas was made Macedonian governor of the state, which was handed over entirely to the oligarchs. While in Sparta Antigonus received the intelligence that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia. He

returned home with all speed. If the news had come a week earlier, the battle of Sellasia would probably not have been fought, and as it was the rapid departure of the king for Macedonia and his death, which took place shortly, at all events prevented the enslaving of Greece from being based on an organization of its whole political constitution. Antigonos defeated the Illyrians and died soon afterwards of a hemorrhage, at the end of 221 or the beginning of 220. Megalopolis was placed in its old position, but Philopoemen went to Crete; he preferred further practice in warfare to participation in the gloomy state of affairs now beginning for the Peloponnese. It was a time when honest men who were not self-opinionated shrank from their own success. Orchomenus remained in the hands of Macedonia.

We shall relate the melancholy death of Cleomenes in Egypt subsequently (chap. xv.), as also the lamentable end of Aratus (in the same chapter), whose discreditable policy brought on himself and his family only death and disgrace at the hands of those for whom he had sacrificed his honour. The Spartan was not only the greater but in the end also the more fortunate man of the two. Both of them lost their life through their so-called friends, through the kings of Macedonia and Egypt; but Cleomenes could not reproach himself with having been false to his principles, and when he saw that he could not continue to live with honour, he sought and found death of his own free will.

NOTES

1. For Ptolemy III. see Mahaffy, *Empire*, 193-242, who points out the difficulty of forming a proper estimate of him, and attempts acute solutions of the problem. On the occasion of Ptolemy's first campaign Berenice dedicates her hair to the gods, whence the constellation Coma Berenices, Mahaffy, *Empire*, 196.—His campaign in Asia. Adule inscription, see above, chap. ix. note 4; Euseb. Chron. 1, 251. Sch. Hieron. in Dan. 11, 5, 6; Just. 27, 1; App. Syr. 65; Polyæn. 8, 50. A Petrie papyrus from which Mahaffy

gives extracts in the *Athenaeum*, 1892, Dec. 10, p. 818. Cf. Petrie Pap. II. xiv. (of 1894); Mahaffy, *Empire*, 198. For this campaign in general see Mahaffy, *Empire*, 197 seq. He points out (p. 201) that if Euergetes went to the East, which could not do him any good in the long run, instead of to Asia Minor, where he could make conquests, this was because Rhodes did not allow him to extend his power in Asia Minor.—Ptolemy III. had Lissa and Telmessus in the year 240: Radet, *De colon.* p. 53 (according to inscriptions). Cf. Droysen, 3, 1, 377-392, esp. 384. The pictures of the victories of Euergetes, which Rosellini and Champollion saw in the temple of Esne in Egypt, and in which prisoners from Armenia, Thrace and Macedonia were represented, have been destroyed, Dr. 3, 1, 384; Baed. 2, 262. According to Eusebius he conquered Syria and Damascus, according to Hieronymus superiores partes trans Euphratem, according to Polyænus μέχρι τῆς Ἰνδικῆς. The Thracians and Macedonians represented at Esne he may have captured somewhere in Asia. Asiatics settled in the Fayûm probably in consequence of this campaign, according to papyri which have been found in the Fayûm: Mahaffy, in the proceedings of the London Orientalist Congress of 1892.—Orthosia north of Tripolis, Baed. Pal. 181.—The Tanis inscription, Wescher, *Rev. archéol.* 1866, p. 49, Hicks 179; Lepsius, *Das Dekret von Kanopus*, Berl. 1866; Baed. 1, 334; Mahaffy, *Empire*, 205 and 226. Cf. chap. v. note 13, and chap. ix. note 2, according to which both Ptolemy I. and Ptolemy II. brought back the stolen gods.—Events in Cyrene, Polyb. 10, 25; Plut. *Philop.* 1; Dr. 3, 1, 403; Mahaffy, *Empire*, 204 (differing from Droysen).—According to Polyæn. 5, 18, Rhodes fought successfully against the Egyptian admiral Chremonides off Ephesus. Chremonides had gone to Egypt after the unfortunate issue of the war named after him, Teles in Stob. *Flor.* 2, 72; we may therefore place this attempt of the Rhodians to guard the freedom of the seas even against Egypt in the reign of Euergetes, whose victories might well inspire the trading republic with anxiety; Mahaffy, *Empire*, 201.—Documents belonging to the time of Euergetes from the tombs of Gurob discussed by Mahaffy, *Empire*, 209.

2. Further history of the two hostile brothers Seleucus and Antiochus. March of Seleucus to the East, Str. 11, 513; Just. 41, 4; Dr. 3, 2, 4 seq.; v. Gutschmid, *Gesch. Irans*, 33. Cf. Koepf, *Die syrischen Kriege der ersten Ptol.*, Rhein. Mus. 39 (1884), pp. 209-230, where the earlier works on the subject are discussed, esp. Droysen and Koehler, *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1882. For Koepf's conclusions see below, chap. xiii. note 6. See also Beloch, *Sel. Kall.* in the *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1888, and Müller, *Porphyrius*, in *Fr. H. G.* 3, 708 seq., whom Clinton also, 312 (314), takes into account.

Fränkel, *Die Inschriften von Pergamon*, Bd. VIII. of the *Alterth. von P.*, Berl. 1890, esp. No. 20 seq. with the commentary of Fränkel, and Gaebler, *Erythrae*, p. 39 seq., who places the battle of Ancyra about the year 235.

3. Death of the brothers. Just. 27, 3; Trogus, prol. 27; Droysen, 3, 2, 19, 20. That Justinus was wrong in making Hierax son-in-law of the king of Cappadocia (Reinach, *Trois Roy.* 14) was noted also by Clinton, 314.—For Antiochus, son of Seleucus III., see Dr. 3, 2, 121, 133.—Droysen (3, 1, 400) indulges in very optimistic views of the characters of the two brothers; in 3, 2, 22, however, he admits that "these youthful figures flit past us like phantoms."

Coinage. Ptolemy III. Euergetes. He begins by continuing the coinage of his father in Cyprus and Phoenicia; subsequently, when the war with Syria lands him in difficulties (Poole, *Cat. Ptol.* p. xliii.), he coins more in Egypt. Coins of his wife Berenice with ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΗΣ, a fine octodrachm struck in Ephesus, *Cat. pl.* xiii. 2; see E. Babelon, *Mél. numism.* Paris, 1893, pp. 1-8.—Ptolemy IV. Philopator (222-204) coined in Cyprus with Dionysus types, which was done afterwards also by Ptolemy VI., VIII. and IX.—Seleucus II. Callinicus and Antiochus Hierax; Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, lxxv.-lxxiii. Seleucus II. was called Πύργων according to Polyb. 2, 71, but his bearded head is rarer on the coins than that without the beard. He has a standing instead of a seated Apollo. Resemblance of some coins of Seleucus III. to Syracusan ones of Hieron II., p. lxvi. The type of Artemis appears first with him. The coins ascribed to Hierax by Babelon are attributed to different Seleucids by other scholars.—Seleucus III. Ceraunus, officially Soter, *Bab.* lxxiii.-lxxvii. Cf. the inscription C. I. G. 4458, where an Antiochus is mentioned, who is evidently his son; see Dr. 3, 2, 121, 133, with whom Babelon agrees.—It has been assumed that Macedonia was involved in the wars going on in Asia at this time, from Trog. prol. 27, where a naval battle off Andros won by Ptolemy over Antigonus is mentioned in a doubtful passage. The relations of Macedonia to the Islands and to Asia are very obscure. See also below, notes 11 and 15, and Mahaffy, *Empire*, 154.

4. Features of the period now about to commence. "The rise of the Achaean League, the attempted reforms of Agis and of the high-minded Cleomenes, the new republican constitution in Cyrene, the democracy in Epirus, Philopoemen's creative energy, lastly the republicanizing of Macedonia and the ideas of the Gracchi movement in Rome—may be noted in advance as the leading points in the development of this memorable century": Droysen, 3, 1, 335. That is a lofty view of history. It is worthy of note

that in this passage the republicanizing of Macedonia, which is generally considered as simply an act of violence on the part of Rome, is actually reckoned among the measures inspired by freedom. What a pity that Droysen was not able to complete the picture! But the colouring of the latter part would certainly have been little in keeping with that of the first (after 323).—Interesting remarks on the "Political Notions of the Day" in Mahaffy, Gr. Lit. chap. xvi.

5. Megalopolis. Plass, Tyrannis, 2, 163; Susem. 1, 628. Beginnings of the Achaean League, see Töpffer in the 3rd ed. of Pauly's Realencyclopädie with the references there quoted.

6. Aratus. References: Hermann, Staatsalterth. § 185, as well as § 49 for Agis and Cleomenes; also Schömann, Prolegom. zur Ausg. des Agis und Kleomenes Plutarch's with the edition by Sintenis, and Klatt, Forschungen z. Gesch. des ach. Bundes, Berl. 1877, and his Chronol. Beiträge, Berl. 1833; Abh. über Ar., Krakauer, Bresl. 1874; Neumeyer, Leipz. 1886; the article Aratos in Pauly-Wissowa.—Character-sketch of Aratus by Polybius, 4, 8, who in spite of his liking for the statesman unmercifully lays bare his weak points: in the field he was *νοθρὸς μὲν ἐν ταῖς ἐπινοαῖς ἀτολμὸς δ' ἐν ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς, ἐν ᾧ οὐ μέντοι τὸ δεινόν*. Plutarch (Ar. 10) calls him a *μισοτύραννος*, but he was so only against small city-despots; the Macedonian monarch, whom in theory he reckoned among the *ἐχθιστά* (Plut. Ar. 43) he served in the end as volunteer adviser. According to Plut. Ar. 10 Aratus was not so much *φίλος ἀκριβής* (bad enough!) as *ἐχθρὸς πρᾶος*, the latter, however, not always; he was cruel to Aristomachus and Mantinea. According to Plut. Ar. 29 people asked *ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς εἰ τὸ πάλλεσθαι τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸ χρῶμα τρέπεσθαι καὶ τὴν κοιλίαν ἐξυγραίνεσθαι παρὰ τὰ φαινόμενα δεινὰ δειλίας ἐστὶν ἢ δυσκρασίας τινὸς περὶ τὸ σῶμα*, and quoted Aratus as a case in point, as this happened to him *περὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας* (in battles). Aratus is the "respectable gentleman," blameless in private life, but in public life capable of sacrificing everything to the prejudices of his party, of narrow horizon and without lofty aims, otherwise he would not have destroyed the work of his own life. It is true that at the outset even he would have preferred to liberate Sicyon with the aid of a king; Plut. Ar. 4.—Aratus, as it appears, owed all his military successes to stratagem and money. He makes his first *coup* in this way: he enlists robbers and slaves and takes Sicyon with them in the night; Plut. Ar. 6-8. He obtains possession of Acro-Corinthus by the same means, bribing the thief Erginus with sixty talents; Plut. Ar. 19 (Cless in Pauly, 6, 1, 208 tries too ingeniously to make out that the four brothers and

the banker Aegias were Jews); he delivers the Athenian fortresses with a sum of 150 talents, Plut. Ar. 34, and gets Argos for fifty talents, Plut. Ar. 35. One must say this for Aratus, that he knew how to turn money to good account. In this he presented a favourable contrast to Perseus and Eumenes, whom Polybius (29, 1) ridicules, and it is mainly this freedom from avarice which has won him the approval of Polybius, who had a high opinion of him as a shrewd and practical man. This he undoubtedly was in an eminent degree. It was one of his strong points to make good a disaster in the open field by stratagem. Cf. Plut. Ar. 34: defeated at Phylacia, he escapes and achieves successes in spite of it, 36; beaten at Mount Lycaeus, he surprises every one by taking Mantinea, 37; he leaves Lydiades in the lurch in battle and the latter is slain (Aratus plays the part of Bomilcar in the war with Agathocles, see above, chap. vii.); he now seems lost in a political sense, but he gains time and is soon more powerful than ever. His achievements in 28-31 are of the same kind, stratagem in lieu of fighting. He manages (Ar. 33) to throw the blame of failure at Athens on Erginus. When by way of exception he tries to attain his end by open fighting, he is unsuccessful because it is out of his line: he accepts battle rashly (Plut. Ar. 47) and is defeated. But now he is in his element; he contrives to lay the blame on the ἀγύμναστοι Ἀχαιοί—as if he were not himself to blame for the neglect of drill—and he is forgiven on this occasion too.—Aratus' reply to Cleomenes, ὡς οὐκ ἔχει τὰ πράγματα μάλλον δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτὸς ἔχεται, Plut. Cleom. 19, is characteristic of the man. He is not indignant at Cleomenes wishing to bribe him; on the contrary, he says he would be glad to oblige him, but is unable to do so. This was untrue, and to tell the truth, viz. that he was not willing, would have been honourable, but his nature would not allow him to act in that way.—Aratus prided himself greatly on bloodless victories, and there he was perfectly right, for by this means he obtained mercenaries more easily, and his opponents submitted more readily. Perhaps he afterwards exaggerated this kind of success in his memoirs. His liberation of Sicyon is characteristic in this respect, Ar. G.: ἀπέθανε οὐδεὶς οὐδ' ἐτρώθη τὸ παράπαν, τῶν ἐλθόντων οὐδὲ τῶν πολεμίων. But not only is no human being slain; even the animals come off with a whole skin. The dogs, which would have betrayed the attacking party by their barking, leave off at the right moment, so that not even they have to be killed, as is generally the case in tales of robbers. Aratus was also so scrupulous as to tell his band that he would abandon the attack on Sicyon ἂν οἱ κύνες ἄγαν ἐνοχλῶσιν αὐτοῖς. Such a

considerate gentleman, who paid well, was gladly served by people of this kind. The state of things in those days reminds one somewhat of that in the fifteenth century in Italy, where in a battle at Anghiari (1440), which lasted for four hours, only one man perished, and that merely because he had the misfortune to fall from his horse and get trampled on (Machiavelli, *Istor.* fior. 5, 33). This was how battles were fought in the beginning of Aratus' career, when the other side might perhaps be won over: there was no loss of life, and if it was not so, at all events it was so represented. Subsequently, when in spite of this the opponents would not always submit, the saving of life was confined to Aratus' party: according to Ar. 29 at the attack on Cleonae with Aristippus of Argos 1500 of the latter's troops were killed, and not one of Aratus' soldiers. One of the favourite tricks of the trade with Aratus was lying bulletins. The main object was to keep the mercenaries under the impression that there was a great deal to gain and nothing to lose only in his service.—It is a fact of some interest that the Achaean League served as material for several political attempts of non-Achaean (Aratus, Lydiades, Cleomenes and Philopoemen) directed towards greater unity of the Greeks, but in the period with which we are dealing only that of Aratus met with success. The too prudent Sicyonian was confronted by the Megalopolitan Lydiades, who represented a bolder policy combined with respect for the private property of the wealthy classes. Aratus managed to get him out of the way when he had already secured a footing in the League. Subsequently, when the policy of Aratus failed once more for want of vigour and enthusiasm, Cleomenes knocked at the door of the League. The property of the rich would now have been in a bad way if Cleomenes had gained his end. But Aratus contrived to profit so adroitly by the situation that Cleomenes never got into the League at all. When the king thereupon resorted once more to force, the Sicyonian betrayed the Peloponnese to the Macedonians.—For the death of Persaeus at the taking of Acro-Corinthus, *Susem.* 1, 70.—Battle at Phylacia, *Plut. Ar.* 34. Can this place be Phylace in Thessaly? *Dr.* 3, 2, 33.—War with Sparta prevented, *Plut. Ar.* 30. Thessaly breaks away from Macedonia, *Just.* 28, 2.—Aratus and Aristomachus, *Plut. Ar.* 35.

7. Agis. Cf. Hermann-Thumser, *Staatsalt.* § 45. The chronology is altogether uncertain, as our main authority, Plutarch, pays little heed to it; the best *data* for the whole of this period are supplied by Klatt's researches. The right to dispose of lots of land extended by a law of the Ephor Epitadeus in the fourth century; see as to this *Plut. Agis* 5 and Pöhlmann, p. 454.—Burning of the bonds, *Plut. Agis*, 13; this reminds us of the renunciation by the French

noblesse in 1789 of their feudal rights, which also represented a considerable money value.

8. Aratus, Agis and the Aetolians, Plut. Ag. 15 ; Ar. 31. Sparta had therefore at that time joined the conservative league as ally of the Achaeans. The Aetolians are in possession of Phigalia in 221, Polyb. 4, 3.—Invasion of Laconia by the Aetolians, Plut. Cleom. 18 ; Polyb. 4, 34 ; cf. Dr. 3, 1, 429, 430. They wanted to bring back the *φυγάδες* and took away 50,000 *ἀνδράποδα* out of Laconia. These were no doubt mercenaries.

9. Pausanias (8, 10, 8 and 27, 14) relates the death of Agis in a battle at Mantinea. This account cannot be accepted and must be due to some confusion.

10. Antigonus *Δώρων*, so called doubtless in connection with statements made by him such as that in Just. 28, 3, 15 : “*deponere imperium et reddere illis munus suum.*”—Liberation of Athens by the surrender of the fortresses to the Athenians, Dr. 3, 2, 56 ; Wachsmuth takes a different view from Droysen as to the motives of Aratus, Die Stadt Athen, 1, 633 (also from 630 onwards).—Koehler, Ein Verschollener, Hermes, 7, 1-6. See also Plut. Ar. 34. Aratus in the regular pay of Ptolemy, Plut. Ar. 41.

11. According to Droysen 3, 2, 18 Antigonus also conquered Caria, the proof being Trog. prol. 28, where no doubt the word Carian occurs, but in a corrupt passage, and Polyb. 20, 5, according to which Antigonus once sailed with a fleet to Asia ; but the wording here is only *ἐπὶ τινὰς πράξεις* ; is it likely that this was a successful campaign of conquest ? See also below, note 15, and above, note 3.

12. Cleomenes. Treatise by Gehlert, De Cleomene, Leipz. 1883. For Sphaerus see Dr. 3, 2, 75 and Susem. 1, 73, 74.—*Κλεομ. τὸν Ἀρχίδαμον ἐπανεῖλετο*, Polyb. 5, 37.—Polybius (5, 37-39) does justice to the character of Cleomenes. He had many of the qualities of a tyrant. Agis and Cleomenes were socialists. But the social question had not the practical importance in antiquity which it has now, as slavery was not meddled with, and besides a number of discontented people found opportunities of making a living as mercenaries or pirates.—The analogy with the Gracchi has been noticed by Plutarch. But the Gracchi were mild in comparison with the two Spartans, and C. Gracchus more unscrupulous than Cleomenes, as, in order to enlist the bankers on his side and make them subservient to his revenge, he flung them the inhabitants of the province of Asia and his own fellow-citizens in Rome as booty. Cleomenes was overthrown only by the enemies of Sparta, C. Gracchus by his own fellow-countrymen.—For the particular facts see also Tüpfers article Achaia in Pauly-Wissowa's Realencyclop. vol. 1.

13. Ill-treatment of Aristomachus, Plut. Ar. 44. Relations with kings left to Macedonia, Plut. Ar. 45.—Larger Greek league under Macedonia, Polyb. 4, 9, 4. Administration of it, Polyb. 4, 26. Meeting in Corinth, then a message is sent to the various *στύμαχοι*, in order that the *δῶγμα διὰ τῶν πολλῶν* may be confirmed. As Sparta is not a member of the league, it must have been formed before the battle of Sellasia. The sudden departure and early death of Doson evidently prevented the scheme taking shape.

14. Cruelty of the Achaeans in Mantinea, Plut. Ar. 45. The excuse put forward by Polyb. 2, 58 is sophistical. The 300 Achaeans who were put to death by the Mantineans had (he says) come at the request of the latter, and therefore the Mantineans deserved their punishment. But it is clear that the Mantineans who killed the 300 were not those who had called them in, but the opposite party. Just as unwarranted is the assertion of Polybius that the fact that the Achaeans did not treat Tegea so harshly as they did Mantinea proves that they were cruel to Mantinea not out of *ὀμότης* but from a sense of justice. Severity or leniency does not prove justice or the reverse, but greater or less resentment. But the Achaeans were more incensed against Mantinea than against Tegea. And the reason is obvious: the Mantineans had once condemned the Achaeans to pay a fine of 30 minae (Plut. Ar. 25), a small money loss, but a great humiliation.

15. Caria ceded by Antigonus to Ptolemy at this time according to Dr. 3, 2, 45; cf. 3, 2, 18 and above, note 11.

CHAPTER XI

ROME AND THE GREEKS DOWN TO 220 B.C.—THE FIRST PUNIC WAR

WE must now return for a moment to the West, the fortunes of which we followed down to the conquest of Tarentum and the incorporation of Italy in the Roman Empire, in order to give a brief account of what happened there down to about 220 B.C. The Romans now crossed over into Sicily. Here a young and able man had made himself a great name soon after the withdrawal of Pyrrhus, Hieron, son of Hierocles, who had been recognized as ruler, firstly by the Syracusan army in the field and then by the citizens of Syracuse (275 B.C.). In these difficult times a vigorous single leadership was a necessity. In the west of Sicily the Carthaginians were supreme, in the north-east the Mamertini of Messana. If Syracuse wanted to command respect, it was bound to humble one of the two powers. No impression could be made on Carthage, so Hieron attempted to vanquish the Mamertini, whose place of abode was also much nearer to Syracuse. He was actually on the point of taking Messana when the Carthaginian general Hannibal threw troops into the city and Hieron had to withdraw. But he had shown such ability that the Syracusans now recognized him as their king (269 B.C.). The Mamertini were saved, but not permanently. They would of course have preferred to remain quite independent, but there was no prospect of this. To submit to Syracuse would have

been a great humiliation and would only have injured them ; the alternative lay between two distant powers, Carthage and Rome. Their racial connection made them draw near to Rome, and in 265 B.C., although a Carthaginian garrison was in the citadel of Messina, an embassy of the Mamertini proceeded to Rome, to commend the city to the protection of the Romans.

The Romans decided in favour of granting the request. The decision might cost them a good deal, for it meant a very grave and serious thing—war with Carthage, with whom they had hitherto lived in peace, and under the most favourable circumstances war beyond the sea. But a regular war with Carthage was inevitable if Messina was left in its hands, for in that case Romans and Carthaginians would confront each other at Rhegium and Messina, and who was to control the Straits? And the struggle with Carthage would become far more difficult if the latter had Messina. Rome therefore acted in her own well-understood interest in taking the Mamertini under her protection. In spite of the vigilance of the Carthaginians the Romans managed to throw troops into Messina and to obtain possession of the citadel. War between Rome and Carthage now ensued. The latter was joined by the two important Greek cities of Sicily, Agragas and Syracuse. But Syracuse did not stick to the war for long. As soon as the Romans made progress and the native cities of the eastern half of the island had gone over to them, Hieron concluded peace with them, in 263 B.C. The terms were not unfavourable for him. He paid 100 or 200 talents, and in addition to Syracuse retained the tract of country stretching from Helorus in the south to Tauromenium in the north and Acrae in the interior. He became an ally of the Romans and gave them loyal support in the subsequent course of the war, and in fact remained their faithful friend up to the close of his long life.

We cannot relate the further history of the Sicilian War,

as it was called by the Romans, to which we give the name of the First Punic War. We confine ourselves to stating that in the year 262 the Romans conquered Acragas, which was garrisoned by the Carthaginians, after a seven months' siege; more than 25,000 people were taken away as slaves. By the peace of 241 the whole of Sicily came into the hands of the Romans, with the exception of the Syracusan kingdom under Hieron, the area of which we have indicated, and the country about Messana. It became the first province, a term which originally denoted only the jurisdiction of an official, and consequently did not have the importance of a territory; the jurisdiction depended more on circumstances than on geographical limits.

Not long after the Romans had passed over the Straits of Messana they stretched their hand across the Adriatic and in so doing drew near to the centre of the Greek world. The situation in Illyria was the cause of this.

When the Aetolians were on the point of capturing the Acarnanian city of Medeon, about the year 231, 100 Illyrian ships with 5000 soldiers on board sailed into the Ambracian Gulf, fell upon the Aetolians and compelled them to raise the siege. This expedition of the Illyrians was instigated by King Demetrius of Macedonia. Soon afterwards the Illyrian king Agron, who had led the expedition, died of the effects of excesses in which he had indulged out of delight at his victory. His widow Teuta assumed the government on behalf of her minor son. She authorized or rather allowed her Illyrian subjects to make raids as they thought fit. In this way they pillaged various places in Elis and Messenia, then they took the important city of Phoenice in Epirus, but surrendered it again when the Epirotes called in the aid of Aetolians and Achaeans. The Epirotes were so cowed that they offered friendship to the Illyrians. Roman ships, however, had also been captured recently by the Illyrian pirates, in consequence of which a Roman embassy, consisting of C. and

L. Coruncanius, made its appearance at Teuta's court. Teuta declared that the Illyrians had by custom the sole right to carry on piracy (a time-honoured practice, by the way, with the Aetolians also), whereupon L. Coruncanius replied that steps would be taken in Rome to change the custom. For this he was murdered on his way home by orders of the queen. The Romans of course now resolved to go to war with the Illyrians (230 B.C.).

In the following year Teuta sent out a still greater expedition. Dyrrachium was attacked and made a defence; but Corcyra was taken by the Illyrians, in spite of the assistance rendered by the Achaeans and Aetolians to the Corcyreans. But at this stage a Roman fleet of 200 ships appeared under the consul Cn. Fulvius, and one of the Illyrian officers in Corcyra, Demetrius of Pharos, surrendered the city to the Romans with the consent of the inhabitants. The Romans also occupied Dyrrachium, and various Illyrian tribes, as well as the city of Issa, submitted to them. Illyrian insolence was now at an end. Teuta, who had retired to Rhizon, a fortified place inside the Gulf of Cattaro, sued for peace in the year 228; she announced her willingness to pay tribute and never to send more than two unarmed ships beyond Lissus. In this way the foundations were laid of Roman sovereignty in the Adriatic. Posthumius, the Consul of 229, who had remained there with 40 ships, now despatched envoys to the Achaean and the Aetolian Leagues, to explain the action of Rome in those regions, and the message was received with the warmest thanks. The Romans then informed the Athenians and the Corinthians of what they had done, and they too expressed their thanks. The Corinthians admitted the Romans to the Isthmian Games, the Athenians even allowed them to take part in the Eleusinian mysteries; the latter also conferred on them the *isopolitia*, a sort of honorary citizenship.

Thus with the year 228 the Romans are recognized by the Greeks as Greeks, at all events so far as descendants of

the Trojans, which they claimed to be, could be Greeks, a preliminary to the Roman epoch in the history narrated by us.

NOTE

For the contents of this chapter I refer the reader to the well-known histories of Rome. I have related the early career of Hieron in the second volume of my History of Sicily, in which the political condition of the island is described in detail. Cf. Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager*, vol. II, pp. 252-356, for the First Punic War.

CHAPTER XII

THE GREEK WORLD ABOUT 220 B.C.—1. THE WEST AND GREECE PROPER

WITH the year 220 or thereabouts we enter the second period of the history treated in this volume, that of the preponderant influence of the Romans on the affairs of the Greeks in the East as well as in the West. It is therefore a convenient opportunity for describing the condition of the whole of Greece at that time, and in the first place from a political point of view.

The most considerable Greek city in the far West was the Phocæan MASSALIA, which has hitherto not been often mentioned in our narrative, and will not be so in future, as it took little part in the great movements of Greece.¹ It was a trading city of importance, ruling within a restricted and promoting civilization within a wider circle, but maintaining only the most necessary connection with the great world of politics. It is remarkable that Massalia was on friendly terms with Rome at an early stage. The two cities had a common treasure-house at Delphi, in which the Romans deposited their gift from the booty at Veii in 395 B.C. The conquest of Rome by the Gauls moved the Massaliotes to come to the aid of their hard-pressed friends with money contributions, in return for which they received certain privileges in Rome, called in Greek *isopolitía*, *atelia* and *proedria*, i.e. they could become Roman citizens if they liked, no taxes not paid

by Roman citizens were demanded of them when they stayed in Rome, and good places were given them at public spectacles. Subsequently, in the Second Punic War, the Massaliotes gave active support to Rome. Their manners and customs were well spoken of, their constitution was aristocratic; 600 senators appointed for life, called *timuchi*, were entrusted with the most important decisions. The trade of Massalia with the interior of Gaul was very considerable. The settlements extended up the Rhone; commercial intercourse reached as far as Britain. Massalia diffused Greek civilization among the neighbouring Gallic tribes; it also taught them the cultivation of the olive and the vine, and how to build city walls of stone. Massalia itself was a seat of genuine Greek learning; grammar, philology and geography were specially studied there. Yet the number of writers produced by Massalia was not great; the only really important one was Pytheas, who navigated the ocean as far as Thule, *i.e.* the north of the British Isles, at the end of the fourth century B.C., and made astronomical observations of latitude in the course of his voyage. His labours were so far from meeting with the approval they deserved, that Polybius actually calls him an impostor.

THE GREEK COMMUNITIES IN ITALY are confined to a few cities; of important places only Neapolis, Taras, Rhegium and Locri are left.² The three first-named still appear in 193 B.C. as independent allies of Rome, whom they supply with ships for the war against Antiochus. The autonomy of these states is shown not only by their right of asylum, but also by their continuing to strike coins, and in silver as well as in bronze. I discuss the details in the note.

RHEGIUM had placed itself under the protection of the Romans in 279, who stationed a Campanian legion there under Decius Jubellius. These soldiers, as we have seen, obtained possession of the city by stratagem in 271, and pillaged it, like the Mamertini at Messana. But they did not hold it for long; in 271 or 270 the Roman consul Genucius recovered it

from the mutineers. Rhegium now regained its freedom and continued to issue coins, and, as it would appear, especially for the trade with Sicily, for they have the same weight as some of the Sicilian coins.

The history of LOCRI is also illustrated by its coinage. In 277 the Locrians drove out the garrison placed in their city by Pyrrhus. They had to submit once more to the king of Epirus in 276, but soon afterwards recovered their independence again. Pyrrhus minted some fine coins in Locri (see above, notes to chap. viii.); after their emancipation the Locrians struck staters with the head of Zeus on the one side and a symbolic type on the other, a standing Pistis placing a wreath on a seated Rome. The head of Zeus, however, has a distinct resemblance to that on the Pyrrhic coins.

While Locri gives up striking silver coins farther on in the third century, the coinage of the BRETTIANS at this very time stamps them as an extremely artistic and well-to-do people.³ They struck fine coins in all three metals, of gold and silver on the standard introduced by Pyrrhus. The types also recall those of Pyrrhus, for they point to a favourite cult of Poseidon and Thetis, and Thetis of course was the mother of Achilles. Such an abundant coinage proves complete independence of Rome, whom the Brettians, as we know, afterwards deserted for Hannibal. Although by extraction the aboriginal inhabitants of the country, they were Greeks in point of civilization. Their capital was Consentia. We have no information as to their constitution, nor as to the relation in which the smaller Greek cities of the country stood to them, of which Petelia, Caulonia, Nucria, Terina and Temesa probably dragged out a miserable existence at this time.

The LUCANIANS, who had become less Greek, coined only in bronze.

In SICILY⁴ in the year 220 besides the Roman province there was the kingdom of Hieron, which embraced a large

part of the east coast, and the independent community of the Mamertini in Messana. In addition to Syracuse, Hieron possessed the cities of Leontini, Megara and Tauromenium in the north, Acrae in the interior, Neeton and Helorus in the south. He was a clever ruler, a man of the stamp required by the times. He was at peace with every one. To the Romans he rendered service in every way; he was in the West what Attalus was to them in the East. But his attitude to Carthage also was a friendly one, for he considered peace between the two great powers a guarantee of his own existence. Good relations on a footing of equality, however, he kept up specially in the East, with Egypt and Rhodes. Agathocles had been on good terms with the former; he had probably married a stepdaughter of Ptolemy I., Theoxena. On the occasion of a famine in Egypt, Hieron presented the king of that country, we do not know which, with a splendid ship laden with grain, a description of which has come down to us through Athenaeus. The coinage of Syracuse too bears traces of the connection of the city with Egypt. The lively intellectual intercourse between Alexandria and the great Sicilian city is shown by the poetry of Theocritus, which will be discussed farther on (chap. xiv.). Hieron's relations with Rhodes were just as friendly. He assisted it with money, machines, reduction of duties etc. when it was devastated by the terrible earthquake of Ol. 138 (227 B.C.). A proof of the brisk traffic between Sicily and Rhodes, which continued in after times, is supplied by the number of jug-handles with a Rhodian stamp found in Sicily; the vessels had contained Rhodian wine, which had been exported to Sicily. Hieron ruled mildly, without attaching much importance to the externals of sovereignty. His interest in agriculture, one of the vital industries of the island, is proved by the fact that even in the time when the Romans governed the whole of Sicily, the levy of the tenth was settled in accordance with Hieron's law.

In Greece we have two single states of importance and two leagues : Athens, Sparta, the Aetolians and the Achaeans.

SPARTA is in an altogether unfortunate position. Its natural development is interrupted ; it had attempted a laudable reform of its abuses, which the jealousy of other Greeks had prevented with the aid of the Macedonians. It can neither live nor die ; it becomes a burden to itself and to Greece.

ATHENS, on the other hand, maintains its former power by wisely restricting itself to what is possible.⁵ It leaves the affairs of Greece to take care of themselves, does not join either the Aetolians or the Achaeans, but enters into friendly relations with the peace league of the maritime powers, Egypt, Pergamum and Rhodes. The merit of this policy is due in the first place to the brothers Euryclides and Micion, whom Philip of Macedonia consequently removed by poison.

Of the Leagues⁶ that of the AETOLIANS is the oldest. The history of this people has been referred to more than once.⁷ At Chaeronea they were allies of Philip, but as they occupied Oeniadae and held it against the wish of Alexander (vol. iii. p. 365), they got into conflict with the Macedonians and drew nearer to the Athenians. They were allies of Athens in the Lamian War ; they were the only Greeks who did not submit to Antipater. They sided with Polysperchon, who was a native of a mountain region not far from Aetolia, against Cassander, and had become so powerful by the year 305 that in concert with the Athenians they sent word to Demetrius that it would be better for him to come to Greece, to resist Cassander's encroachments, than to go on besieging Rhodes. The good relations with Demetrius ceased however as soon as he had obtained possession of the greater part of Greece. The Aetolians were now masters in Locris and even in Phocis ; Delphi was in their hands, and that, as we have seen (chap. ii.), served Demetrius as a pretext for removing the Pythia to Athens, where he could pose as their

patron. In the year 289 Aetolia became the scene of the war between Demetrius and his rival Pyrrhus. Demetrius invaded Aetolia, and left his general Pantauches there when he went on to Epirus. Thereupon Pyrrhus appeared and defeated Pantauches. After the murder of Seleucus by Ceraunus the Aetolians helped Antigonus Gonatas to take possession of Macedonia. Then came the strange war of Areus against the Aetolians. Their position grows clearer when the Gauls break into Greece. They defend Thermopylae, and now become the acknowledged protectors of the Amphictyonic League. As such they found the new festival of Soteria, which the other Greeks recognize. In the year 272 the Molossian king Alexander divided Acarnania with them. Being in possession of such important points as Delphi, Thermopylae and Naupactus, they held a commanding position in central Greece, which they improved by the incorporation of Boeotia in their league, which however was not permanent. According to Polybius they concluded a treaty with Gonatas for subduing the Achaeans in concert with him. As time went on they extended their sway still farther. They conquered not only their kinsmen of Elis, but also Phigalia, Tegea, Mantinea and Orchomenus, the island of Cephallenia, and eventually they were joined by the island of Ceos, and still farther afield by Lysimachia, Cius and Calchedon. We find them after the year 220 in alliance with Egypt. This prodigious extension of their influence shows that they were also powerful at sea. They were notorious pirates. They evidently asserted their sea-power only by a volunteer fleet, which could be disavowed at discretion by the authorities of the League.

What was the constitution of the Aetolian League? On external points, *i.e.* as regards the names of the authorities and of the deliberating and voting bodies, we are well informed, but not so well in reference to the important question, from whom the decisions of the League really

emanated.^s The head of it was the Strategus, and beside him we find a Hipparch, a Grammateus and a Tamias. Of deliberating and voting bodies there are the Apokletoi, a Sunedrion or Boule and a Koine Sunodos, the Panaetolikon, the assembly of the Aetolian people, which met every year in Thermon after the autumnal equinox, decided questions of peace and war and elected the officials of the League. The Boule is a smaller Council; the Apokletoi are either the whole body of Sunedroi or perhaps only a committee of them. But who had the right of voting in the Assembly of the League? No doubt all the Aetolians. But was the right confined to them? What was the practice when the League extended beyond the borders of Aetolia? This expansion was shown in a striking way by the Aetolians identifying themselves to such an extent with the Delphic Amphictyony that besides the Panaetolikon in Thermon the Pylaeian Council held at Thermopylae or Delphi occasionally served as the Aetolian assembly. Subsequently states of the Peloponnese, remote islands, and even cities of the Hellespont entered the League. What rights did these distant members possess? Did they take part in the deliberations and decisions in Thermon? Had they definite duties provided for by the constitution of the League, and if so, what were these? The general view now is that the enlarged Aetolian League was simply an alliance of the various states for mutual protection against external attack, or was a sort of insurance against raids of the Aetolian pirates or robbers themselves. In that case the more distant members would not have voted on purely Aetolian League affairs. But even then there remains the question: did all non-Aetolians belong to this category? Who was after all entitled to take part in the deliberations of the League? The states on the continent of central Greece perhaps? All this is unknown to us. It is probable however that if the League met at Thermopylae, at least all the members who lived in Greece proper were entitled to vote.

It might even be assumed that this assembly was specially intended for the affairs of the larger League.

The other League, which has made the most stir in history, is that of the ACHAEANS.⁹ Consisting of only four cities in the year 280 B.C., it afterwards embraces, in the first place, all the existing cities of Achaia. Strengthened in its organization, in 255 B.C., by the reduction of the number of strategi to one, in 251 it became of importance for Greek affairs in general through the accession of Sicyon. It was joined by the following cities, mostly brought over by Aratus: Corinth (243), Megara, Troizene, Epidaurus, then Heraea and Cleonae, Megalopolis in the year 233 and later on by most of the other Arcadian cities, finally by Argos, Hermione, Phlius, and perhaps even by the island of Aegina. As soon as the League appointed Antigonos Doson its commander-in-chief instead of the distant sovereign of Egypt, it became a tool of Macedonia. Subsequently for a brief space it included the whole of the Peloponnese. In the year 220 this was far from being the case; Sparta was still independent.

The constitution of the Achaean League was similar to that of the Aetolian, and was perhaps modelled on it.¹⁰ We find with the Achaeans Assembly of the League, Council and officials as with the Aetolians. Of the officials the Strategus, who had ten colleagues called Demiurgi, was the most important; next came, as among the Aetolians, the Hipparch, and then a Nauarch, whom the Aetolians did not have, although they engaged far more in naval war than the Achaeans, and finally a Grammateus. There can be no doubt that there was a Boule, but we do not know how it was composed. There were two general meetings of the League in each year, and in the case of the Achaeans it is clear that every state which belonged to the League also had the right of voting at these meetings. In what way however the members of the League enforced their views is unknown. Each city had a single vote, but how was the vote recorded?

Were there deputies elected by the various cities, or did any one who liked and was able to do so attend and consult with his fellow-citizens as to what vote the city as such should give? Assuming that deputies to the Assembly were chosen in the different cities, did they receive instructions prescribing the course they were to pursue or did they vote according to their own discretion? On all these points various opinions have been formed from the accounts which have come down to us. Perhaps at the meetings of the League the members were not unfrequently guided by circumstances in these matters. Polybius rightly points out that the Achaeans had common laws, measures and coins, officials, councils and judges. We may probably assert that the Achaean constitution was good in itself, and that it denotes a step in advance in the political life of Greece; but it is equally clear that the constitution was not perfected in detail, and that it was not invariably applied in a proper manner. The separatist tendencies of the Greeks and the interference of foreigners prevented the salutary effects which might have been anticipated.

The Strategus was not re-elected at once under the rules, and consequently Aratus always held the office alternately with some one else. How strange however the position of the Strategus might be is shown by the incident after the death of Lydiades which has been already related. The Achaeans met in Aegium and decided that no more money should be advanced to Aratus for the continuance of the war, adding that if he wanted to go on with the war he might do it at his own cost. This implies that Aratus as Strategus had the right if not to begin a war, at all events to continue it at his good pleasure, and that his orders in the course of a campaign had to be obeyed. If the Achaeans wanted to prevent the Strategus from doing something which they did not like, they could do it in the form of a refusal of ways and means, an analogy with modern constitutional practice which

apparently has not yet been noticed. The liberty accorded to him at the same time of doing as he pleases at his own expense is not so much modern as naïve. This story shows moreover that an Achæan strategus, if he only had plenty of money at his disposal, could do what he liked. And Aratus was in this position. He spent large sums of money, which no doubt mostly came from gifts by the kings, in engaging mercenaries and bribing traitors. In this way the wealthy clever man could carry out a policy of a highly personal kind.

Although the constitutions of the Aetolians and Achæans resembled each other, the spirit of the two Leagues was different. This difference was inherent in the character of their main component parts. The Aetolians were country people, who had always had a league and a centre; the Achæans were city folk, broken up into perfectly independent *poleis*. The Aetolians are generally described as champions of the democracy, the Achæans of the aristocracy. This, as Dubois especially has pointed out, is not the case. It is true, however, that the Achæans were ruled for the greater part of the time by well-to-do people, which cannot be proved in the case of the Aetolians, and it is a fact that the Achæans under Aratus led the resistance of the propertied classes to the socialist Cleomenes. The Aetolians on the whole are the ruder, the Achæans the more refined. The former are frankly unscrupulous and make a practice of doing everything they please, laying the blame for what is wrong on the shoulders of private individuals, who have done it without the consent of the League; the Achæans wrap things up in finer language, but act in precisely the same way as the Aetolians.

These attempts however at forming leagues are in the highest degree remarkable; the Greeks of the pre-Macedonian era had certainly not advanced so far on the path of unity.

It has been observed that the history of the Leagues shows

that the Greeks had drawn nearer to one another since the time of Alexander. This is true; it appears not only from the existence of the Leagues in general, but also from the special fact that, if Aratus had not prevented it, even Sparta and the Achaeans would have united in a single great league. Such a body would undoubtedly not have continued without change, but its existence would for the nonce have been a piece of good fortune for Greece.¹¹

That a league of this kind would not have had a quiet life may be inferred from the fact that the condition of Greece, as it was in the year 220 B.C., and had been before the rise of Cleomenes, was due to an inherited situation of which it was the natural development. At that time there were, as we saw, four powers in Greece, two leagues and two single states. The Aetolian League comprised central Greece and Elis in the Peloponnese, the Achaean League a great part of the Peloponnese and Megara; but in central Greece Athens remains independent, as Sparta does in the Peloponnese. Athens is on friendly terms with the Aetolians, Sparta as a rule hostile to the Achaeans. It is in this point that the progress in the political development of the races of Greece is above all discernible. In the fifth century B.C. there were only two states of importance in Greece, Sparta and Athens, in the fourth three, by the accession of Thebes. Subsequently, in the third century, while Thebes loses its importance, the states whose development had lagged behind that of the three, take a start and form the two Leagues. That these populations too should come to the front is a fact of great significance, and it may safely be said that a history of Greece which omitted to notice this advance of the backward communities would be incomplete. It constitutes in fact a manifestation of the vital force of Greece.

But we may say more than this. The development of the political situation in Greece followed the old fundamental divisions of the Greek people. For what are these four groups or

powers but the representatives of the famous Greek races of Dorians, Ionians, Achaeans and Aetolians? Of course the boundaries are not sharply defined. The Achaean League included all the Peloponnesians who were not inclined to accept the control of Dorians, with the exception of the Eleans, who, as racial kinsmen of the Aetolians, preferred to join them rather than any one else. The vacillation of Argos and Corinth between the Achaean League and Sparta at the time of Cleomenes reveals the uncertain position of these communities as between Dorians and Achaeans. And the remodelling of the Amphictyonic League by the Aetolians in their own interest was also in the spirit of the old days. For what had it been but a federation of the small races of central Greece? It was natural enough that Aetolians should be able to play a part in regions where Dolopes and Aenianes had once been powerful. The League reverted in a way to its old provincial isolation.

It was necessary to point out all this in order to make it clear that in the third century B.C. we are still in the full current of the natural development of Greece, and that no gulf divides the Greek world of the third century from that of the fifth and fourth. In the third century Athens pretty much retains her old character, and so does Sparta. The former is the cultivated, the latter the uncultivated capital. The Achaeans are dwellers in provincial cities, the Aetolians country folk. Aratus is a provincial who takes up politics on a grand scale, and has such a profound respect for a crowned head that he is glad to receive the support of one in his policy of protecting the propertied classes against tyrants or the lower orders. The policy of the Aetolians is marked by boorish violence, that of the Achaeans is cunning with limited mental horizon.

To make the transition from the situation in the fourth century to that in the third quite intelligible, we may add the following remarks. As early as the fourth century there

were Greek communities around Athens and Sparta which obeyed these two states with reluctance. Of these communities the most vigorous coalesced in the two Leagues, and henceforth they throw considerable weight into the scale. But Sparta and Athens still subsist. This made complete unity a difficult matter. If at a pinch a form for a close alliance between the Aetolians and Athens could be discovered, it was not to be expected that the Achaeans would permanently submit to Sparta or Sparta to the Achaeans.

I now come to MACEDONIA, the condition of which was referred to *inter alia* in chapter v.¹² I cannot agree with those writers who consider the existence of this kingdom in the third century B.C. of value to Greece. In the fourth century the position was somewhat different. Philip, the son of Amyntas, no doubt injured the Greeks, but partly for this reason, because Demosthenes and his party did not understand that he ought to have been encouraged and not hampered in his aspiration to sovereignty in Asia, and Alexander did much more good than harm to the Greeks. The successors of Alexander could only be harmful to the Greeks, because they meddled in their affairs without bringing them anything in the way of compensation. Against this interference there was a reaction in Greece between 280-220. Among the Antigonids there were individuals who commanded personal respect. The alternation of sobriety and gifted frivolity in the first sovereigns of this house is interesting. The three Antigonus's are sober-minded, the two Demetrius's, Poliorcetes and Demetrius the Handsome, the father of Doson, are frivolous; of Demetrius the son of Gonatas we know too little. Eventually the race degenerates, not physically, for Philip and Perseus were fine men, but intellectually. The Macedonian people, on the other hand, remained to the end the sturdy peasant folk that they had always been.

The THESSALIANS were still seemingly independent, but

in reality at the beck and call of the kings of Macedonia, so far as they had not thrown in their lot with Aetolia.¹³

The CRETAN REPUBLICS had the peculiarity of being always ready for war with one another¹⁴ and of being pleased when foreign generals came to help them. The island was a permanent practical school of war for officers; a man who had not learnt his trade could serve an apprenticeship there and perfect himself, if he was not engaged at home and was anxious not to get out of practice. Crete was a sort of trial-ground for military science, a *corpus vile*, on which adepts made their experiments. Areus went there, so did Philopoemen after the battle of Sellasia, and the practice was continued. Dorylaeus, Mithridates' general, fought in Crete for Knossos against Gortyna. Both these cities were among the most warlike of the island; they were always contending either against each other, or together against others, such as Cydonia or Lyctus. It is remarkable that Gortyna was fortified by Ptolemy Philopator. What interest could the Egyptian monarch have had in fortifying a city in the interior of Crete? Did Gortyna supply him with mercenaries, or did he do it as contractor for a money payment, like Attalus in Aetolia (chap. xiii. note 6)? Rhodes too had relations with Cretan communities, especially with Knossos and Hierapytna; it made common cause with them against the pirates, who were recruited mainly from Crete, and of course occasionally became troublesome to Crete itself. Hierapytna was on the sea; it annexed Praesus, which lay farther east and possessed a large territory, and in this way became one of the most important cities of Crete in the second century B.C. Still farther east was Itanus, on the sea, where Alexander-coins were struck between 300 and 250.

NOTES

1. Massalia. See vol. i. p. 292. Cless, in Pauly, 4, 1624-34; the coins, Head, H. N. 7, 8; according to them the Ephesian Artemis and Apollo Delphinus were the principal deities of the city. Pytheas, Christ, § 363; most detailed account of him by Müllenhoff, *Deutsche Alterthumskunde*, I. See the topographical and historical sketch of Massalia in Stark, *Städteleben, Kunst und Alterthum in Süd-Frankreich*, Jena, 1855, pp. 34-47 and 584-587, with plan. Niese, 1, 489-494.

2. Tarentum, Locri, Elea and Neapolis lend the Romans ships in the First Punic War, Polyb. 1, 20. Neapolis, Rhegium and Tarentum supply them with ships in 193 B.C., Liv. 35, 16.—For Taras and its coins see Evans, *The Horsemen of Tarentum*, Num. Chron. 1889. Taras altered its standard about 280-270; its didrachms are reduced to 116 gr. (Campanian system) and then to 100 gr. The same change was made by Heraclea and Thurii, whereas coins of this kind do not occur at Metapontum and Croton. True, it cannot be proved that, as Evans says, Metapontum was taken by the Lucanians shortly before 300, but Croton was conquered by Agathocles in 299 (Diod. 21, 3). The influence of Pyrrhus on Tarentum also appears in the coins: elephant, head of Zeus, Pallas Promachus, as on coins of Pyrrhus struck in Syracuse (Evans, 140, 170).—Tarentum continued to coin after 272 (E. 163). It was a *civitas foederata*, like Heraclea, and according to Cic. *pro Balbo* (22) even had a *singulare foedus*, consequently had the power of coining, and that it did so is proved by a discovery of coins there, which were struck on the system of Pyrrhus, but evidently in somewhat later times (E. 165, 169). Even the great issue of Roman denarii in 268 did not, according to Evans (171), lead to the cessation of coinage by Tarentum. We find at this time a resemblance between the coinage of Taras and Neapolis (E. 175), and in Teate (Teanum) too in Apulia didrachms of similar types and the same weight occur (E. 176). On the other hand, in 228, according to Evans (193), the coinage of Tarentum was really stopped by order of the Romans. At that time the Romans introduced the Campanian *Victoriatus* (about 52 grains, Head, H. N. 30 = $\frac{1}{2}$ Campano-Phoenician stater) in other places also; in 229 Dyrrachium, Apollonia and Corcyra had to strike their drachms on the model of the *Victoriati* (E. 193). In Italy *Victoriati* were minted at Croton, Luceria and elsewhere.—In the end Thurii is the only city which follows Taras in its coinage (E. 167, 168).—Rhegium, Head, H. N. 76, 95. The pieces of 50 and

8 grains are of 4 and $1\frac{1}{2}$ *litrae* respectively.—Locri, Head, 88, 89; fig. 59 is the stater with the head of Zeus, on the right Pistis placing a wreath on the seated Rome.

3. The Brettians, Head, 77, 78, and Evans.—The Lucanians, Head, 57.

4. Sicily. Brief survey of the history of the coinage at this time in Head, H. N. 101; cf. Head, Coinage of Syracuse, and Evans, Horsemen.—Agathocles, see above, chap. vii. Democracy, 289-287. Bronze with the head of Zeus Eleutherios. Hicetas, 287-278. Gold with his name; a silver coin with the head of Persephone, rev. quadriga, is conjecturally assigned to him. Bronze: head of Zeus Hellanios, rev. eagle on thunderbolt. The latter are perfectly imitated in the contemporary Mamertini coins, only that these describe the head of Zeus as Ares.—Pyrrhus, for general remarks see chap. viii. The coins struck by him in Sicily are (Head, Syr. 56): firstly, those with his name, silver and bronze coins having the head of Persephone with flowing hair, copied from those of Hicetas, rev. Athene fighting, Macedonian type; weight of the silver coins, 90 grains, Head, 58, 2. In addition the following Syracusan coins seem to have been struck under Pyrrhus: gold: head of Persephone, rev. biga, Head, Syr. pl. 10, 9; bronze: same head, rev. torch in wreath of acorns, pl. 10, 10, and head of Heracles, rev. fighting Pallas. The head of Heracles is a Macedonian type; Pyrrhus honoured Heracles with games after the conquest of Eryx; Plut. Pyrrh. 22; Diod. 22, 10.—Hieron II. His coins according to Head: gold: head of Persephone, rev. IEPΩNOΣ , biga. Silver: (a) with IEPΩNOΣ , head of Pallas, rev. Pegasus (weight as in Pyrrhus' coins, 90 gr.); (b) with ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ IEPΩNOΣ , beardless head, rev. quadriga, 432 gr. = 32 *litrae*; (c) with $\text{ΣΥΡΑΚΟΣΙΟΙ ΓΕΛΩΝΟΣ}$, beardless head, rev. biga, 8 *litrae*; head, rev. eagle on thunderbolt, 4 *litrae*; some also have XII.; (d) with $\text{ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΑΣ ΦΙΛΙΣΤΙΑΟΣ}$, head of queen Philistis, for whom see Holm, Geschichte Siciliens, 2, 491; she wears a veil like Phthia on the coins of Pyrrhus and Arsinoe on those of Philadelphus, rev. team of horses; the Philistis coins are of 18, 16 and 5 *litrae*; (e) gold and silver: with the inscription ΣΙΚΕΛΙΩΤΩΝ , evidently referring to the inhabitants of Neeton, Helorus, Acrae, Megara, Leontini and Tauromenium, which belonged to Hieron's kingdom. The distribution of the portraits on the coins is remarkable. Hieron put his own head on the heaviest pieces, that of his wife on the next in size, that of his son on smaller ones, and his own again on copper. The agreement of Hieron's standard with that of the Ptolemies is interesting. Cf. the important remarks of Imhoof, Porträtköpfe, p. 21.—Hiero-

nymus coins gold, silver and bronze; his own head, rev. winged thunderbolt.—The Democracy, 215-212, coined in such variety that we cannot give details here; see Head, *Syr.* pl. 13, 1-13.—Relations with Egypt in Hieron's coinage, *Syr.* p. 72. Character of Hieron's rule, *Polyb.* 7, 8. His relations with foreign countries: Olympia, *Paus.* 6, 12, 2-4; 6, 15, 6; Rome, *Diod.* 25, 14; *Liv.* 24, 21; *Plut. Marc.* 8; Egypt, the ship, *Athen.* 5, 209.—Tauromenium. Coins, Head, *H. N.* 166. Pieces of 90 grains, called octobols by Head (*H. N.* 60), also found among the Brettians, approximately in Rhegium (*H.* 95), and perhaps also at Acragas.—The Romans allow bronze coinage in places which have never had a mint.

5. Sparta. It is remarkable that kings' coins were struck at Sparta in the third century. Those known to us, which have only been discovered of late, are as follows: tetradrachms of Areus, Head, *H. N.* 364; more recently a tetradrachm of Nabis with inscription NABIOΣ, *Bull. Corr. Hell.* 1891, 416, and in Lambros *Ἀναγραφὴ*, *Ath.* 1891. Some tetradrachms, which Bompais was inclined to ascribe to Doson as ruler of Sparta (see Head, 364), may have belonged to Cleomenes.—Athens. Unfavourable verdict of *Polyb.* 5, 106 on the condition of Athens under Euryclides and Micion, who are alleged to have flattered all the kings; repeated by Hermann-Thumser, § 135 (Euryclides and Micion denounced as "venal orators"). This is unjust, for Philip had them poisoned (*Paus.* 2, 9), consequently they did not flatter the monarch who was the most powerful and the most dangerous for Athens, and they therefore proved themselves excellent patriots. With a correct perception of the general situation they renewed the old connection with Egypt; cf. *Plut. Ar.* 41. Their names on coins, Head, *H. N.* 319; but perhaps these were descendants of the two famous men.—Names of Phylae, Hermann-Thumser, § 135; *Gilb.* 1², 222.

6. The Leagues. Modern authors: A. Freeman, *History of Federal Government*, I. Lond. 1863; new ed. Lond. 1893; W. Vischer, *Abh. in the 1st vol. of his Kleine Schriften*; M. Dubois, *Les Liges étolienne et achéenne*, Par. 1864.—For the Aetolians see also Gilbert, 2, 21-32 and the writings quoted there of Brandstätter, *Gesch. des aitol. Landes*, 1844; Kuhn, *Entstehung der Städte der Alten*, pp. 87 seq.—For the Achaeans Gilbert, 2, 104-123, and the writings he quotes of Helwing, 1829, Merleker, 1831 and 1837 (Merleker also wrote about the Cleomenian war, 1832); Wahner, 1854, Weinert, 1881; Baier, *Stud. z. ach. Bundesverf.* Würzb. 1886; Mahaffy, *Problems*, 176-186; Busolt, *Gr. Staatsalterth.* 2nd ed. 1892, pp. 347 seq.; Töpffer, *Achaia in the new edition of Pauly's Realencyclopädie*, and for the Aetolians Wilcken in the same work, 1, 1115-1127.

7. The Aetolians. Demetrius celebrates the Pythia in Athens, Plut. Dem. 40, not, as Droysen (2, 2, 280) supposes, because the Aetolians had prevented the Greeks from coming to Delphi, for which there was no reason, as they must on the contrary have wished the festival to go off brilliantly under their presidentship, but because Demetrius wanted a pretext to cut a figure himself.—Aetolia and the Boeotians, see above, chap. x.—Areus opposes the Aetolians on behalf of the Amphictyones, Just. 24, 1; Dr. 2, 2, 334, 335; v. Wil. 259. But the Aetolians controlled the Amphictyones. Areus represented Macedonian interests in Sparta (see above, chap. ix.); it was probably an attempt of the Macedonian party among the Amphictyones to dislodge the Aetolians from their position in the League; see above, chap. ii. note 23.—The relations of the Aetolians to the Amphictyonic League, Lüders, *Die dionysischen Künstler*, 83, 112, 113.—The Aetolians in the league with Gonatas against the Achaeans, Polyb. 2, 43; 9, 34. If the Aetolians were allied with Lysimachia, Aenus and Maronea (Polyb. 15, 23; 17, 3), this combination was directed against Macedonia, which is why Philip wanted to take these places.—The Aetolian Timarchus fights in Ionia, Polyæn. 5, 25; Front. 3, 2, 11.

8. According to Freeman the constitution of the Aetolians may be compared with the old constitution of Switzerland, which also admitted places closely connected with the cantons but not possessing the same privileges; the Achæan constitution with that of North America. The Aetolians mercenaries, like the Swiss.—The Aetolians on good terms with Egypt, Polyb. 4, 30.—According to some writers the Aetolians enter the Delphic Amphictyony as early as 338, according to others not till 278.—Complaints by the Achæans of Aetolian interference in Amphictyonic affairs, Polyb. 4, 25.—The Aetolians protect independent states which cannot get on alone. But on the whole they are barbarous in character; cf. Polyb. Bk. 4. Description of the Aetolians by their enemy Philip, Polyb. 18, 4, 5.—The Aetolians are mercenaries themselves, the Achæans employ mercenaries: on the one side vigour, on the other wealth.—Fine silver coins, Head, *H. N.* 283; only ΑΙΤΩΛΩΝ, no names of particular places. Types: allusions to their victories over the Macedonians and the Gauls; Gardner, *Types*, pp. 35, 102; pl. xii. 40, 42. It is curious that the least civilized races, such as Cretans and Aetolians, should attach the most value to beautiful coins, just the reverse of the Athenians.

9. The Achæans. For the founding of the Achæan League cf. Gilbert, 2, 106, note 5. The four first members lived farthest to the west. In the year 220 the Aetolians march to Phigalia by Patruc, Pharae and Tritaea, Polyb. 4, 6.

10. Constitution of the Achaeans. High praise of it, Polyb. 2, 38. It never was completed however; Philopoemen even introduced changes, see below, chap. xviii. Up to the end there were important constitutional controversies, and the constitution was certainly never committed to writing; custom decided, and custom admits of disputes. Gilbert (2, 114) denies the existence of a separate βουλή; but when we read of the Achaeans in Polyb. 2, 37: νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ σταθμοῖς καὶ μέτροις καὶ νομίμασι πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄρχουσι βουλευταῖς δικασταῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς, the word βουλευταῖ cannot possibly be used to denote the members of the legislative assembly. And when according to Polyb. 22, 10, Eumenes offers ἑκατὸν καὶ εἴκοσι τάλαντα δώσειν τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς ἐφ' ᾧ δανειζομένων τούτων ἐκ τῶν τόκων μισθοδοτεῖσθαι τὴν βουλὴν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς κοιναῖς συνόδοις, is it not clear that βουλή here must be a committee? Certainly there is no reason for assuming from this passage that there were 120 members of the Council, as many writers imagine. Finally, as Greek writers often express themselves inaccurately in technical matters, we must look at the spirit of the institutions. And when we do this, the inference is permissible that, if the Aetolians had a Council, the far more aristocratic Achaeans are pretty sure to have had one. The activity of Aratus after all presupposes a committee with which he could always act in concert. Gilbert also (2, 115) practically recognizes the 10 Demiurgi as a deliberative body. Busolt assumes two kinds of Assemblies of the League, ordinary, which were small, and extraordinary, which were large. These points are quite obscure.—Singular resolution of the Achaeans (Plut. Ar. 37): μὴ διδόναι χρήματα αὐτῷ (Aratus), μηδὲ μισθοφόρους τρέφειν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ πορίζειν, εἰ δέοιτο πολεμεῖν. If it appears from Polyb. 4, 5 seq. that the Aetolians occasionally carried out raids without the permission of the authorities, yet the above resolution shows that among the Achaeans even official permission was sometimes given to the Strategus to wage war on his own responsibility *i.e.* to pillage, only he had to do it at his own expense. The story in Plut. Ar. 25 proves the same thing. Aratus leads the levy of citizens (cf. Polyb. 4, 9) against Argos, but then retires, whereupon the Achaeans are impeached for breach of the peace before Aristippus tyrant of Argos and condemned by Mantinea to pay a fine of 30 minae. So the levy follows the Strategus in an attack on an ally. What is the good of having an Assembly of the League, if things of this sort take place? Occasionally the army itself is the popular gathering. In Polyb. 4, 7 the ἐκκλησία in Aegium decides βοηθεῖν τοῖς Μεσσηνίοις καὶ συνάγειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τοὺς Ἀχαιοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις, ὃ δ' ἂν τοῖς συνελθοῦσι

βουλευομένοις δόξῃ, τοῦτ' εἶναι κύριον. The army becomes a political body by delegation from the Assembly of the League. This recalls the customs of less civilized peoples, such as the Macedonians and the old Germani, whereas the great political genius of the Romans draws a sharp distinction between the people voting and the people under arms. — Dubois (174) infers from Polyb. 2, 58 that it was open to a member of the League to secede from it. But the word ἐθελοντήν in cap. 57 only means that the particular withdrawal referred to took place voluntarily, it does not mean that it was permitted.—The Achaeans struck League coins of no particular beauty. The silver ones have AX as monogram, the more interesting copper ones have the two names, e.g.: AXAION AITEON, AXAION AΛEION, A-ΣΙΚΥΩΝΙΩΝ, A-ANTIFONEON (Mantineia) etc. Head, H. N. 351, 352. Cf. the Catalogue of the Coins of the Achaean League, by Maj.-Gen. M. G. Clerk, Lond. 1895.

11. Greater amalgamation of the Greeks in the period subsequent to Alexander, Dub. 213-216.—In the third century the position is as follows: Athens remains what it had been, the centre of the intellectual education of the Greeks and the head-quarters of aspirations to political liberty; Sparta exhausts her strength completely; the Aetolians form the nucleus of a union of the less civilized western Greeks with the exception of the Acarnanians, their traditional enemies, and of Boeotia, which never submitted to the League; the Achaeans gather round them those inhabitants of the Peloponnese who are in sympathy with Achaia. The Arcadians belong to this category. But the ancient cities of Mantineia, Tegea and Orchomenus refuse to obey the Achaean *parvenus*, while the more recently founded Megalopolis feels the necessity of following some leader, at one time Macedonia, at another the Achaeans, and besides is fond of acting on abstract principles.—The *symmachia* under Macedonia mentioned by Polyb. 4, 9 (see above, chap. x. note 13) comprised the Achaeans, the Acarnanians, the Phocians and the Boeotians. But in 4, 5 Polybius does not mention the Phocians and Boeotians. Consequently with the death of Doson the importance of the League dwindled a good deal. According to Polyb. 4, 13, the assembly sat in Corinth under the presidency of king Philip.

12. Macedonia. According to Polyb. 5, 10, the Antigonids wanted to be συγγενείς of Alexander (it is to be hoped not merely on account of Alexander's statements in Arrian, 7, 9, 6); hence the name Perseus of the last king and the head of Perseus on the coins of Philip V.

13. The Thessalians treated somewhat slightly by Polyb. 4, 76. They simply belonged to the Macedonians.

14. For Crete, Polyb. 6, 46.—The relations between Rhodes and Crete, see below, chap. xxi.—Onossus, Cydonia, Lyctus, Gilb. 2, 217.—Gortyna fortified by Ptolemy Philadelphus, Str. 10, 476, 478.—It is very noteworthy that some Cretan cities joined the Chremonidean alliance; see above, chap. ix. p. 195; it was done no doubt out of friendship for Egypt.—Fine coins of western and central Greece in P. Gardner, Types, pl. xi. and xii.

The organization of the Leagues in the third century presents an unmistakable advance in comparison with the older federations, with that of Attica, for instance, but more in point of principle than of actual fact. The individual members of the Leagues had a freer right of voting; the questions were evidently decided by a majority of the communities which voted, and there was an attempt at a representative constitution. This was all very well in theory. But things took a somewhat different shape in practice. The members of the Leagues did not always do their duty, and the strategi often violated theirs. Sometimes representation was suspended, and the people itself was left to decide in some fashion or other, or the strategus even was allowed to act as he pleased. In reality it was always the personality of the leader which turned the scale and imparted its character to the League (Aratus, Philopoemen). The truth is that the Greeks had not the respect for forms and for the letter of the law which is requisite for the permanent establishment of a representative constitution, and which in antiquity characterized only the Romans, but them in the highest degree. It is true that in their case the personal element eventually to a great extent took the place of the law.

CHAPTER XIII

THE GREEK WORLD ABOUT 220 B.C.—2. THE EAST

THE picture which we have to unfold here is an extremely checkered one. We see a medley of republics and kingdoms, both in an unsettled condition, the former as regards the degree of their freedom, the latter as regards the extent of their boundaries. They are all influenced and menaced by peoples of non-Greek extraction, especially in the north and east. In many cases it is hard to say whether a state really exists as such, as the influence actually wielded by more powerful neighbours and the right to the same seldom correspond.

In the north, from the Bosphorus to the Chersonesus Taurica, to which I shall refer in chap. xxv., the Greek element is concentrated in the cities on the coast, which have a good deal to put up with from the barbarians in the interior, but maintain their independent civilization for the very reason that these tribes are utterly uncivilized and are therefore unable to bring any intellectual pressure to bear on Greeks.¹ On the other hand, the Thracian cities, from Macedonia to the Bosphorus, are often subject to the influence of Macedonia; Egypt and Syria, although not for a permanence. True, Abdera ceased to issue coins after its submission to Philip, the father of Alexander, and must therefore be considered as absorbed in the Macedonian empire; but Maronea and Aenus for a long time proved their freedom by an extensive coinage, and the

same holds good of Thasos, while its sanctuary gave Samothrace a certain amount of independence. Sestos and Lysimachia stood in need of foreign protection, Lemnos and Imbros belonged to the Athenians. Byzantium, which had suffered from the Celts, was obliged to pay them permanent tribute, at first every now and then sums up to 10,000 gold pieces, and then 80 talents annually. In 220 B.C. the finances of the Byzantines were so exhausted that they appealed for assistance to their friends among the Greeks, and on meeting with no response they levied a duty on merchandise exported from the Pontus. This pressed heavily on all the commercial states, and the Rhodians, as their acknowledged spokesmen, demanded the withdrawal of the measure, and on Byzantium refusing, declared war on her. The Rhodians had Prusias of Bithynia on their side, while the Byzantines counted on Attalus, who, it is true, controlled only the immediate territory of Pergamum at that time, and on the kinsman of the Seleucids, Achaeus, who took the title of king just then. But the Rhodians alienated the latter from them by ransoming his father Andromachus, who was a prisoner in Alexandria, and the Byzantines suffered so much in the war, not from the Rhodians themselves but from Prusias, that they decided to give up their duty.

The cities of the western coast of Asia Minor and of the neighbouring northern coast had a very fluctuating history in the third century.² Their legal position as described in chap. v. remained unchanged. Heraclea and Cyprus, Lampsacus and Abydos were just as independent about the year 220 as in 275. The Ionic cities became more involved in the quarrels between Seleucids, Ptolemies, Attalids and Antigonids, while those of Caria were less so, because in this region only Egypt and Rhodes were concerned, and they did not get in each other's way or treat their dependants too oppressively. In the year 218 B.C. Cyme, Smyrna, Phocaea, Aegae, Temnos and Colophon went over from Achaeus to Attalus. These cities had already

had relations with Attalus and only submitted to Achæus under compulsion. Smyrna's sympathies were a good deal with the Seleucids, whereas Ephesus and Samos were the head-quarters of the Ptolemies' power, as stations for the fleets and points for collecting mercenaries. Chios, which acted in concert with Rhodes and Athens as intermediary between Philip and the Aetolians in 218, was more independent. Polybius has defined the position of Egypt in these regions in the passage where he describes the importance of that country before the fourth Ptolemy. He says that the earlier Ptolemies put pressure on the kings of Syria by the possession of Coelesyria and Cyprus, that they were powerful neighbours of the rulers of Asia and the Islands through holding the most important places from the coast of Pamphylia to the Hellespont, and that they watched the position in Thrace and Macedonia, as they were masters of Aenus, Maronea, and still more distant cities. These statements of Polybius show that the official or poetic assertions of the Adule inscription and of Theocritus, mentioned in the 9th and 10th chapters, contain a good deal of exaggeration. The only islands in the possession of the Egyptians were Samos and perhaps Cos and a few smaller ones; in Asia Minor they had only some points on the coast; the important communities there were more their allies than their subjects. Consequently the water-way to the Black Sea was free, as Bithynia too was a peaceful state, but both Macedonia and Syria tried to obtain control of it, while Egypt and Aetolia rather protected it from a distance.

We have just made ourselves acquainted with the position of Rhodes.³ It was on the seas what Athens had once wished to be, the protector of the weak. But while Athens had not been contented with this part, but had wished to rule as well, and thereby incurred unpopularity, Rhodes laid no claim to supremacy over its friends and was therefore generally popular. True, gratuitous protection was only possible after Alexander's time, when there were no more Persians to be

encountered, but only pirates, whom a single powerful state could deal with at a pinch. But the reason why this position was gladly conceded to Rhodes was that it had won the admiration of the whole Greek-feeling world by its heroic defence in the years 307/6. The extent of its popularity was shown on the occasion of the terrible earthquake which annihilated the city of Rhodes in 227. Presents which facilitated the rebuilding of what had been destroyed flowed in on all sides, much as Hamburg was loaded with gifts after the fire of 1842, and these donations came especially from the kings, who counted it an honour to be able to spend their treasure in this way, while the republican Greeks readily left them the privilege of being generous to independent cities.

Next to the ambition of reigning sovereigns the Gauls are still the active force in political movements in Asia Minor.⁴ To the national elements already existing in this country they add a new one, which separates the others physically, but occasionally brings them together morally. They were divided, as we saw in chap. iv., into three tribes, which at first had three different plundering-grounds: the Tolistoboi (Tolistoagii) the west, Aeolis and Ionia, the Trocmi the north, the shores of the Hellespont, the Tectosages the interior. The subsequent position of their permanent homes corresponds pretty much to this; the Tolistoboi settle in the west, the Tectosages in the centre, the Trocmi farthest eastwards. It has been rightly pointed out that the region left to the Gauls is the least fertile of the cultivable countries of Asia Minor. Yet this point must not be emphasized too much. It must not be forgotten that Galatia was the home of the old Phrygian civilization, which after all could not dispense with agriculture: the husbandman Gordius lived in the heart of the later Galatia. In modern days the construction of the railway to Angora has shown that these districts are even now very fertile. From these settlements the Galatae now and again renewed their raids on the

surrounding countries. The special object of their attacks was of course the fertile territories of the Greek communities and of Pergamum, while the kings and the smaller potentates had rather occasion to avail themselves of their aid in their own feuds and predatory excursions. Thus it came about that they were on good terms not only with the Bithynians, but also with the kings of Pontus and with Antiochus Hierax, while besides the rulers of Pergamum Seleucus II. was their chief opponent. The Gauls whom Attalus sent for and Prusias destroyed came from Europe. The constitution of the Gauls, as a modern historian has remarked, combined in a highly ingenious way the defects of a republic and a monarchy. Each of the three tribes was split up into clans, which were independent in themselves and were governed by so-called tetrarchs. By the side of these chiefs were judges and generals. The council of the tetrarchs met in a grove of oaks (*drynemeton*); but it had only judicial powers; each clan did what it liked.

Of the kingdoms let us consider Bithynia first.⁵ The Thracian Bithynians came from Europe to Asia Minor perhaps in the seventh century, and settled on the banks of the central and lower Sangarius, the river which, rising in the heart of Phrygia, instead of going westwards to the gulfs of Cius or Astacus, whither lakes and valleys seem to invite it, flows northwards into the Black Sea. Through Memnon we know the names of three Bithynian suzerains: Didalsus, Boteiras and Bas, between 400 and 325. From 325 to 278 the son of Bas, Zipoites, ruled, first as an independent prince and latterly as king. He was succeeded by his eldest son Nicomedes, who brought the Gauls into Asia to hold his own against his brothers. He founded Nicomedia near Astacus, which now fell into decay, and protected Greek civilization, as did his successors (see below, chaps. xviii. and xxi.). He reigned up to 250 B.C. We have referred to the disputes about his succession above (chap. ix.). Ziaelas, who obtained

the throne, was murdered by Gallic mercenaries about the year 228. His son and successor Prusias I. (from about 228 to about 185) will occupy our attention later on. In spite of the low moral standard of its rulers Bithynia was a bulwark of civilization owing to its protection of free navigation to the Black Sea.

The interesting geographical relations of Bithynia to Galatia remain to be considered. The Sangarius is the principal river of Galatia, the western section of this province may in fact be regarded as the high table-land of Bithynia. In spite of this there was little internal connection between the two countries. One would suppose that the Sangarius would have united them, but this was not so. The whole of its middle course, where it flows from east to west, is in an impracticable defile, and the roads cross the plateau at a distance from it; even now the railway from Nicomedia to Angora avoids it. The communications between Bithynia and Galatia were very inconvenient up to the time of the Romans. The Galatae therefore could perfectly well serve the purpose for which the kings of Bithynia had intended them, *i.e.* form a sort of military frontier protecting Bithynia, and yet, owing to the difficulty of intercourse, not give that country trouble by making their appearance there when they were not wanted. The natural communications of Galatia, which was really Phrygia, went westwards up to the time of the Romans, not however to the valley of the Caicus and Pergamum, but more south to the upper Hermus and so to Sardes and Smyrna.

The next kingdom, of constantly growing importance, was that of Pergamum.⁶ The name alone indicates its intrinsic difference from the other kingdoms of Asia Minor. It is not formed by a people like Bithynia or Cappadocia, nor by part of a people, by a province, like Pontus; it is created by the sovereigns of a city, which in its name recalls the Greek heroic age, but was never of much political importance as a

community, and whose sovereigns bear Graeco-Macedonian names. The importance of Pergamum lay in the strength of its citadel, and thus the Pergamene kingdom was that of a feudal lord. It is also clear that the Attalids were Greeks, not Macedonians, statesmen, not soldiers. Their position has a distant resemblance to that of their Cardian namesake, who was in the first place a politician and moneyed man. But Philetaerus was not an idealist like Eumenes of Cardia, he was more like Ptolemy in character: both were governed by the maxim — a little, but that little certain. The natural territory of Pergamum is the valley of the small river Caicus, which flows into the gulf of Elaea south of Lesbos. In the north it is bounded by a mountain range, over which a road led to Adramyttium. From this range two spurs run in a southerly direction, on one of which, surrounded by two rivers, was the citadel of Pergamum, about 1000 feet above the level of the sea. In this region, called Teuthrania, the Greeks had according to legend dwelt in very ancient times. We saw above (chap. ii.) how the treasurer of Lysimachus in the citadel of Pergamum, Philetaerus of Cius, revolted from his master and joined Seleucus, but kept Lysimachus' money for himself. The prudent employment of this treasure by him and his descendants was the source of the greatness of his house. The power of the kings of Pergamum was a money-power, much as that of the Mermnads had been 400 years before in the same country. When the Gauls began their incursions, there was no one in that part of the world powerful enough to care to quarrel with the wealthy and prudent Philetaerus without urgent motive; on the contrary, people applied to him for protection. Pergamum opposed the Gauls, just as the Mermnads did the Cimmerii. The feudal lord became a territorial sovereign. On the death of Philetaerus in 263, he was succeeded by his nephew Eumenes I. (263-241), and then by another nephew Attalus I. (241-197). The latter took the title of king after he had

defeated the Gauls (see chap. x. and the note to this chapter). Attalus had a very checkered existence: for a brief space master of Asia, as was said with exaggeration, and then once more confined to his citadel, the reason being that he had no people behind him. Pushing his influence into the heart of Aetolia, and a champion of the Greek cause, he was subsequently compelled to send for a force of Gauls, with whom he eventually was unable to undertake anything. But Attalus remained a power even in misfortune; he was not to be crushed. As early as his reign Pergamum became famous for its art.

Before we come to eastern Asia Minor, which was occupied by kingdoms of another kind, we have to ascertain what really belonged to the Seleucids in the west and south.⁷ The ancients regarded them as in the main having nothing to do with Asia Minor at all; this appears, if we leave the Adule inscription out of account as a partisan document, from Polybius, who as a rule refers to suzerains in Asia Minor. Only Syria and the country to the east of it are assigned to the Seleucids. They have no authority whatever in the watersheds of the Sangarius, the Halys, the upper Sarus and Pyramus, or about the Tatta Lake and Mount Argæus. Farther south-west however Egypt and Rhodes are powerful. The following observations will show what else belonged or adhered to Syria. We find, proceeding from east to west, a number of cities the names of which point to Seleucid origin. They are (leaving out Seleucia on the Calycadnus, close to Syria and founded by Seleucus Nicator) Laodicea Catacecaumene in Lycaonia north of Iconium, Antiochia on the frontier of Pisidia and Phrygia, Apamea Cibotus, near the sources of the Maeander, probably laid out by Antiochus II. to make up for Colossæ, Antiochia on the Maeander, perhaps founded by Antiochus I., Stratonicea in Caria, a settlement of Antiochus I., Themisonium in the northern part of the Indus territory, so called after a courtier of Antiochus II., and finally Lysias, between Apamea and Ipsus, evidently named after a general of

Seleucus Nicator. According to this Lysias was founded in the period preceding the invasion of the Gauls, Stratonicea, Apamea and probably Antiochia on the Maeander after it by Antiochus I., Themisonium and probably Laodicea on the Lycus by Antiochus II., Laodicea Catacecaumene and Antiochia in Pisidia at some uncertain date. Consequently, after Seleucus Nicator had consolidated his influence near the steppe by means of Lysias, we have to note the efforts of Antiochus I. to penetrate from there south-west into the heart of Caria, after which Antiochus II. plants himself in the Cibyratis (Themisonium, also Eriza, see the note) and secures the route which leads thence through Laodicea on the Lycus to the valley of the Maeander. Besides these places, the names of which and other records show them to be decidedly Seleucid, there are a few others, in the case of which these indications are somewhat fainter and which cannot be assigned to the period now under our consideration with so much certainty. They are Nysa in the valley of the Maeander and the two cities of Tralles and Alabanda, which bore Seleucid names for a time. Other places, although they do not have Macedonian names, were, according to trustworthy records, inhabited by Macedonians, as, for instance, Thyatira, north of Sardes, Nacrasa, north of Thyatira, Cadi on the upper Hermus, Blayndus and Peltae in the territory of the Maeander. But it does not follow that the founders of these places were Seleucids; they may have been colonized by Macedonians at an earlier period. In the case of the Myso-Macedones too on the central Maeander and the Macedones Hyrcani on the lower Hermus the date of settlement is uncertain. On the other hand, the Macedonian colonies in Synnada and Docimium in the interior of Phrygia may be attributed with certainty to the age of the Diadochi; Docimus was a general of Antigonus in Phrygia. These facts explain the expansion of the power of the Seleucids in western Asia Minor. Their head-quarters were Phrygia, southern Lydia and central Caria, and besides this they held

the route leading thither from Cilicia Campestris, which belonged to them, along the edge of the desert. It was they who were the pioneers of this route. Antioch in Pisidia and Lysias were their extreme points in these regions, if we except Amorium, which lay far to the north-east, in the neighbourhood of Pessinus on the road leading from Celaenae-Apamea to the Phrygo-Galatian capital, and had Macedonian inhabitants. Perhaps also they were in possession of the route from Pamphylia *via* Cibyra and Themisonium to the Lycus and the Maeander. Yet it is possible that they penetrated into the Cibyratis only from the side of the Maeander, from the north. At any rate their principal territory was the valleys of the Maeander and the Hermus, as well as the upper valley of the Cayster. The lower part of this valley can hardly have been subject to them; in this direction Ephesus, which, as we know, inclined to the Ptolemies, was too near. Just as little did the sea-coast of Caria and Lycia recognize their supremacy, and in the case of Pisidia and Pamphylia too it is probable that they were more at the disposal of the Ptolemies than of the Seleucids;⁸ Cilicia Aspera, with the exception of the mouth of the Calycadnus, where Seleucia lay, and a few points on the coast, such as Antiochia on the Cragus, must also have been more Ptolemaic than Seleucid.

We now come to the north-east. Here not much is to be said of Paphlagonia,⁹ which ranked as semi-Greek from Homeric times owing to the names of its rulers. It was split up into small principalities and cut off from the world. The only road in the country was in the south, running from west to east. On the coast was Sinope, which undoubtedly was connected with the interior. Of more importance was Capadocia, which lay south-east of Paphlagonia and included the valleys of the upper Halys, the Pyramus and the upper Sarus, as well as the country around the volcano of Mount Argaeus.¹⁰ Its oldest historic sovereign was Ariarathes I., who was crucified by order of Perdiccas in 322. Eumenes of

Cardia held the country for a time, and then Antigonus, after whose death Ariarathes II., the son of the first, came to the throne. He was succeeded by Ariaramnes, about 280-230, then by Ariarathes III., about 230-220, who married Stratonice, a daughter of Antiochus II. Her sister became the wife of Mithridates of Pontus. The latter received Phrygia Magna as dower, the former probably Cataonia. Antiochus was evidently not in possession of Magna Phrygia or Cataonia, otherwise he would not have given them away. We know that the Cappadocians really possessed Cataonia subsequently, so that it is possible that the dowry consisted of the recognition of a state of things already in existence at that time. On the other hand, the rulers of Pontus had Magna Phrygia at most for a couple of years in the second century B.C.; consequently the dowry in this case was only a permission or invitation to take possession of it, which however was a very difficult matter, as Galatia lay between Pontus and Phrygia Magna. The successor of Ariarathes III., the fourth of this name (220-163), was the first of all the sovereigns of the East to take the modest title of Eusebes. We shall refer to him later on. The word *Katpatuka* had originally denoted the whole of the third Persian satrapy, then was confined to the eastern section of it, and finally attached to the centre of that eastern part. This Cappadocia in the narrower sense is a high plateau with hot summers and severe winters, and was at that time a country of villages, not of cities; cattle-breeding was the chief occupation of its inhabitants. The principal deity, called Zeus by the Greeks, was worshipped in the temple of Venasa, in the province of Morimene, and at the source Asbama near Tyana; another native god was held to be Apollo; the female deity, called Ma, had her abode at Comana on the Sarus.

We now come to Pontus, properly Cappadocia on the Pontus, the country north of the mountain range which stretches east of the Halys and separates the central plateau from the coast.¹¹ Just as the plateau is arid and in places even

unfertile, so the coast-land is well watered and rich in products. The principal river is the Iris, which, like all the more important rivers of northern Asia Minor, first flows from east to west and then makes a curve to the north. It receives the Lycus on its east bank. This gives rise to two fine parallel valleys, which unite in a single one running northwards. East of the mouth of the Iris there is a smaller separate valley, that of the Thermodon, the legendary home of the Amazons. Still farther east the Paryadres range comes so close to the coast that no room is left for valleys of any length; but this coast too, the district of Trebizond, is well watered and cultivated. In the year 302 B.C. a young Persian noble called Mithridates, whom Antigonos wished to put to death, took refuge in this country. He was a native of Cius, which his ancestors had possessed. His grandfather, a son of the first Mithridates known to us, was the Ariobarzanes who played an important part in the fourth century, his father was Mithridates II. The latter incurred the suspicion of Antigonos, who put him to death. He himself was to have shared his father's fate, but he was saved by his friend Demetrius Poliorcetes. Demetrius had promised not to tell Mithridates what was in store for him, and wrote the words "Fly! Mithridates!" in the sand. In the country to which he fled he was first a robber-chief and then king (about 280). His kingdom included a bit of Paphlagonia as well as Cappadocia on the Pontus. He reigned up to about 266; then came his son Ariobarzanes, up to 250 or 246; then the latter's son Mithridates, the second king, who assisted Antiochus Hierax with a force of Galatae about the year 241 (battle of Ancyra), but then went over to Seleucus and was presented by him with Magna Phrygia on his marriage with Stratonice. Mithridates married one of his daughters to Achaeus, the other to Antiochus III., and so had friends in both camps. In the year 220 he attacked Sinope, but the latter appealed to Rhodes, and the Rhodians gave the Sinopeans 140,000

drachmas ($23\frac{1}{2}$ talents), for the purchase of munitions of war. The time had not yet come for the old Milesian colony to fall into the hands of the rulers of Pontus.

We have now completed our journey round the centre of Asia Minor, the northern part of which was inaccessible owing to the Gauls who were settled there, while the south was difficult to traverse because of the expanse of desert in that direction. But the Seleucids had established a route along the fringe of this desert by means of fortified cities, and so they were able by dint of great exertions to achieve something in Ionia and Caria, not much, it is true, for they had no naval power. Phoenicia was almost entirely in the hands of Egypt.

It must be admitted that most of the members of this house were not deficient in energy. The reign of Antiochus I. Soter was a very stirring one. If he earned his surname by his exploits against the Gauls, on the other hand he was defeated by Eumenes of Pergamum shortly before his death. His interest in the East is proved by the building of the wall round Margiana¹² and by his relations with the Indian rajah Amitraghata, the son of Tchandragupta. But how could a sovereign residing in Syria or Babylonia wield permanent power in Ionia or Margiana when he had barely a safe road across the steppe to Ionia, and when Margiana could be reached only by a narrow route at the edge of the Iranian steppe, which is much worse than that of Asia Minor, the route which Alexander had taken? Under Antiochus II. Theos (261-246), the difficulties increased. First of all came the quarrel with Egypt, then the disturbances in Asia Minor continued, and finally the remote East was lost, while the character of the king, as is shown by his conduct to his wives Laodice and Berenice, was wanting in firmness. At the outset Antiochus II. maintained the old relations with India. Amitraghata had been succeeded by his son Açoka, who has become famous by his conversion to Buddhism. But of what use was

the friendship with India when Antiochus no longer had any territory which bordered on that country and when he eventually no longer controlled even the narrow dangerous routes by which his troops could get to the East! And towards the end of his reign these provinces and communications were, as has already been remarked in chap. ix., lost to him through the creation of two empires, the Bactrian and the Parthian, of which the former wrested from the Seleucids such of their possessions in the East as still retained any value, while the latter occupied the route by which alone these eastern countries could be reached. Between the years 240 and 220 the outlook was bad for the Seleucids in the east as well as the west. Both in Iran and in Asia Minor almost every region, which was not worthless steppe, was in hostile hands. Yet they still had the plains of Cilicia in the west and Persis in the east, both countries of great value in themselves and good starting-points for distant enterprises. The Seleucid empire was consequently a genuinely Asiatic one in combining great pretensions with limited actual area, and a European one in that its nucleus, the Seleucis, was really a group of Greek communities. Its strength lay in the European element. The position of the Seleucids was not good in the west, but much worse in the east.

In the latter region the revolt had been started by Diodotus, the governor of Bactria, about 250 B.C. Sogdiana and Margiana had joined him.¹³ These events led the brothers Arsaces and Teridates, two chiefs of the Parpi, a nomad tribe hitherto settled in Bactria, also to declare their independence and proceed westwards. They were the founders of the empire of the Parthians.¹⁴ Parthian tradition maintained that they had slain the Seleucid governor of Parthia—this name is older—and that Arsaces had become king as early as 250 B.C. It is a fact that the Arsacidian era was the year 248 B.C. We have seen in chap. x. that Callinicus would not accept his reverses and that he tried to fight it out both in the east and

in the west, but eventually without success. Arsaces organized his empire and took the title of Great King. He died about 210 and his memory was revered among his people.

The Parni, who took the name of Parthi, were near kinsmen of the Iranians. They fought on horseback with bows and arrows, alternately attacking and simulating flight. They formed a small aristocracy in the conquered country ; of 50,000 cavalry who confronted Antony only 400 were free men. They professed the Iranian religion ; but their sovereigns valued Hellenic culture, and called themselves Philhellenes in Greek on their coins.

Still more Greek in character was the government of the Bactrian empire, the history of which will be dealt with later on (chap. xix.).

If the Seleucid sovereigns kept up their energy for a long time, this was by no means the case in Egypt as early as 220, and much less so subsequently.¹⁵ In this part of the world serious aspiration ceases with the fourth Ptolemy. An account of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus has been given in chap. ix. His leading quality was prudence, and his favourite occupation diplomacy. He was on equally friendly terms with Rome and Carthage and did not break with either of them. Love of science and art, which adorn a court, he possessed in a high degree ; he was a genuine representative of the second generation of new dynasties, of that which is able and ready to enjoy what the first has acquired, like Solomon after David, Periander after Cypselus, Hieron after Gelon, in his whole character and conduct inviting comparison with Lorenzo il Magnifico. He took an interest in geography and natural science, had Ethiopian elephants captured, and despatched missions to investigate the marvels of Arabia and India. It was a pleasure to him to show people the curiosities collected in his palace. I refer to the scholars and poets of his court in chaps. xiv. and xx. He himself was a pupil of the Peripatetic philosopher Straton, whose doctrine of the omnipotence of

chance did not bring him the mental tranquillity which he longed for. Once he saw from the windows of his palace some poor Egyptians consuming their modest meal in the sand on the river-bank and exclaimed: "Would that I were one of them!" In spite of this he tried to discover something that would give immortality. Like Solomon, Philadelphus perceived with sorrow that everything which a mere pleasure-seeker can attain to is vanity.

His son Ptolemy III. Euergetes was of a different character. He was more energetic, was fond of war and a brilliant soldier. The position which Arsinoë had occupied under his father was taken in his reign by Berenice, who was the better woman of the two.

The three first Ptolemies were each able men in their own line: the first as soldier and statesman, the second as statesman, the third as soldier. The fourth, Philopator, was neither the one nor the other. I discuss him here to show that the power of Egypt was bound to decline immediately after his accession, for in that country everything depended on the character of the sovereign. Philopator was malicious, base and dissolute. With his boon companions, the so-called Geloiasts, men and women, he indulged in wild revelry, and marched through the palace or even through the streets of Alexandria as a new Bacchus with a cymbal in his hand. He put to death his brother Magas and even his mother Berenice, and was controlled and exploited by his minister Sosibius, by a certain Agathocles and his sister Agathoclea, as well as by the mother of these two, all utterly abandoned and contemptible creatures. It has been a consolation to many that he was at all events a poet; he wrote a tragedy called *Adonis*, on which Agathocles, as a good courtier, composed a commentary—they were living in the head-quarters of philology. He paid honours to the ancient poets; to Homer he actually erected a temple, in which the bust of the poet was surrounded by the statues of the seven cities which claimed him as their

countryman. It was a pleasure to him to embarrass the learned men around him by difficult philological questions—they served him in fact as court-jesters. He wished to have the Stoic philosopher Cleanthes in his train, and when neither he nor Chrysippus would come, he put up with Sphaerus, who had become accustomed to the society of sovereigns by living with Cleomenes,—but the philosopher must very soon have found out the difference.

All these monarchs have left their names on Egyptian temples, as enlargers or embellishers of them.

The spread of Egyptian influence in Asia is proved by names of cities. The Phoenician city Ace was long called Ptolemais; another Ptolemais was in Pamphylia. There were cities of the name of Arsinoe in Coelesyria and Cilicia, and in Cilicia also a Berenice. For a time even Patara in Lycia received the name Arsinoe from Philadelphus; the capital of the Ammonites was called Philadelphia. Coelesyria and Phoenicia were long subject to Egypt; western Cilicia and Pamphylia were much under its influence, and Lycia to a certain extent. The fact that no cities are known to have been founded by the Ptolemies north of Lycia, seems to me to support the view expressed above that there can be no question of regular Egyptian rule in the rest of Asia Minor; the Ptolemies only possessed or protected a few isolated points there.¹⁶

I conclude this chapter with a brief survey of the political condition of the Greek world in the year 220. There are two classes or groups at this time among the powers which are of general political importance, the warlike and the peaceful class. The league of peace, the existence of which is proved more by facts than special records, is occasionally confronted by a combination of the warlike powers. The latter are Macedonia and Syria. In both these countries enterprising monarchs have ascended the throne, Philip and Antiochus. They understand each other and try to support

one another, although inadequately ; they are not far-sighted enough and are too absorbed in the advantage of the moment for this. They are military powers, but would of course like to become naval powers. Among states of the first rank Egypt belongs to the second category, to the pacific ones. It foregoes further expansion of territory, because it feels that it can no longer exercise due control ; but it is anxious not to lose anything, and therefore attaches importance to a good army and navy. The Ptolemies have undisputed sway over Cyrene and Cyprus, their possession of Phoenicia and Coele Syria is contested ; they are the most influential power in western Cilicia, in Pamphylia and perhaps in Lycia, they have a few points in Caria, besides Ephesus and Samos, and even some cities in Thrace. But in every district of Asia Minor Egypt holds her ground only with the consent of the inhabitants. This makes the Ptolemies still more inclined to the maintenance of the *status quo* and favourable to peace, and they are always on good terms with the second pacific state, which is a pure peace-power, with Rhodes, whose friendly relations with Egypt from the days of Poliorcetes onwards were seldom interrupted. Rhodes is supported by other independent states, such as Heraclea, Cyzicus, Chios, Byzantium (whose war with Rhodes was only an exception and not carried on directly) and Athens. A somewhat dubious appendage of this group is Aetolia, whose position in the Hellespont and on the Bosphorus obliges it to stand well with the peace-states, who are all naval powers, and which supplies Egypt with a large number of mercenaries. Of land-powers Pergamum is almost the only one we find on this side,—if it would not be more correct to advance the paradox that this kingdom is also in reality a naval power ; for how else could it have kept Aegina ? Through Aratus Achaia sinks into a dependency of ambitious Macedonia. Egypt and Rhodes are besides on good terms with Hieron of Syracuse, whose position also is bound up with the mainten-

ance of peace. And finally, all these pacific powers are good friends with Rome, whose rôle, as we shall see, is by no means that of the ambitious intriguer. This antagonism between Macedonia and Syria on the one hand, and Egypt, Rhodes, Pergamum, Athens and Aetolia on the other, lies at the root of the conflicts which will engage our attention in the period extending from 220-146.

If we consider the above antagonism from a geographical standpoint, special interest attaches to the condition of Asia Minor, where the greatest variety prevails ethnographically as well as politically. Here we see monarchies by the side of republics, peoples by the side of cities. The most prominent members of this whole from an intellectual point of view are the cities of the west, homes of Greek civilization and of civic freedom. They owe their safety to the disunion among the monarchies, and remain independent internally, even when to all appearances they belong to monarchies. Thus the foundations are laid of Asia Minor's splendour in the time of the Romans.

Of no less interest however is a glance at the Aegean Sea and its shores and islands. This ancient scene of Greek history has not yet lost its importance. The two conquering powers push towards it from two sides — Macedonia from the north, Syria from the south-east; both would fain become naval powers, but cannot compass this in the long run. The naval powers which confront them fall into three categories — (1) republics which uphold culture: Rhodes, Athens and some smaller ones; (2) a republic of dubious value for civilization, Aetolia; (3) two monarchies, one, Pergamum, of liberal tendencies; the other, Egypt, despotic at home. Egypt and Aetolia, overlapping each other crosswise, undertake, the former in Thrace, the latter in the Bosphorus, the protection of the water-way to the Black Sea, to the security of which Athens and Rhodes also contribute. From the ports of Crete pirates scour the sea, which consequently is

to a great extent the home of arbitrary power, but yet again, in contrast to the great continents, is also the refuge of freedom.

Of all these states Macedonia plays the least creditable part from a political point of view. Syria after all serves the cause of liberty by its city communities, Egypt by its encouragement of culture in Alexandria and by its alliance with Rhodes. But Macedonia has once more become what it was before the days of Philip, son of Amyntas, a state bent on self-aggrandisement by force and fraud, and devoid of the loftier aims pursued by Philip and Alexander.

NOTES

1. Thrace. For the history of Maronea and Aenus about the beginning of the second century B.C. see below, chap. xviii.—Lysimachia, Aenus and Maronea Egyptian about 222, Polyb. 5, 34. Lysimachia then joins the Aetolians, Polyb. 18, 3; it is destroyed by the Thracians and restored by Antiochus III., Polyb. 18, 51.—Kleinsorge, *De civ. graec. in Ponti ora occ. st. rebus*, Hal. 1888.—For Byzantium cf. Frick's article in Pauly, 1, 2, 2601 seq., for the third century esp. 2609; Byzantium paying tribute to the Gauls, Polyb. 4, 46. Coins, Head, H. N. 230 seq. After 270 Alexander or Lysimachus - coins are struck on the Attic standard in these regions. War between Byzantium and Rhodes (Prusias), Polyb. 4, 38, 39, 42-52. According to c. 50 the Byzantines once more put forward Tiboites as a rival to Prusias (see above, chap ix. note 10), but Tiboites died. The Rhodians appeared *προέσταναι τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν* (c. 47); in so doing Rhodes adopts the standpoint of Isocrates (vol. iii. of this work, p. 454). See below, note 3, and chap. xxii.

2. Asia Minor, Attalus, Achaeus and Greek cities, Polyb. 5, 77. These cities come back to Attalus, *ἐπὶ ταῖς συνθήκαις αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πρότερον*. Aegae is Nimrod-Kalessi, see below, chap. xxi. note 6; for Temnos, see Ramsay, *Hist. Geogr.* 108.—The kings of Pergamum, protectors of city life in Asia Minor, in rivalry with the Seleucids, with Egypt and Rhodes. Philetaerus assists Pitane with a money contribution on the occasion of the purchase of a plain from Antiochus, Fränkel, p. 150. See also below, chap. xxi.—Smyrna, C. I. Gr. 3137; see above, chap. v. note 12; Ephesus,

see above, chap. v. note 12. Timarchus, etc., chap. ix. note 4. Ephesus in relations with Aradus about 170 B.C.; Head, H. N. 667; in both cities Alexander-coins Cl. 5 and 6, Müller, Numism. d'Alex. le Gr. See also below, chap. xvii. Coinage in Ionia, 301-190: Cat. Br. Mus. Ionia (Head), pp. xlv., xlvii. Attic tetradrachms of Lysimachus in Smyrna, Erythrae, Ephesus, Magnesia; Ptolemaic coins in Ephesus. The autonomous coinage of silver is much curtailed, yet specimens exist from Teos (Phoenician standard), Erythrae, Ephesus, Samos and Miletus (Rhodian standard), Magnesia (Attic standard), Miletus, 250-190 (Persian standard); Priene does not begin to coin until the third century, on the other hand Chios, strange to say, hardly coined at all between 350-190, although it was powerful enough. —Bolis in Ephesus, Polyb. 8, 18. Ephesus and Samos Egyptian stations, Polyb. 5, 35.—Power of Egypt in western Asia Minor, etc., Polyb. 5, 34; the Ptolemies ἐπέκειντο Syria, παρέκειντο Asia and the Islands. Light thrown on the position of Egypt in Asia Minor by Liv. 33, 19, 20. In c. 19 cities in Cilicia, Lycia and Caria (names not given) are described as in ditione Ptolemaei; in c. 20 Caunus, Myndus, Halicarnassus, Samos called sociae Ptolemaei. The Ptolemies wielded just as much power as they could, Usener, Epigramm von Knidos, 49.—Mediation of Chios, Polyb. 5, 24; Liv. 27, 30.—Abydos independent and courageous, Polyb. 16, 29 seq.

3. Rhodes. The earthquake of 227 and the assistance given by the kings, Polyb. 5, 88-90; cf. Dr. 3, 2, 178 seq.—The remark of Polybius (c. 90) is noteworthy, that it is seemly for the kings to bestow gifts on the 'Hellenes,' in return for which they obtain εὐνοια and τιμή. Consequently the conferring of honours in return for presents received is quite in order, and Polybius further remarks that τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐκάστοις τηρεῖν was a special characteristic of the Hellenes. This ought to be placed to the credit of the Athenians as well; see above, chap. vi. note 1.—The Rhodians oppose Demetrius of Pharos, who pillages the Cyclades with λέμβοι, Polyb. 4, 16, 19.

4. For the date and circumstances of the settlement of the Galatae in Asia Minor see Koepf, in the Rhein. Mus. 40, 123. He pronounces (with reference to Paus. 1, 8, 2, Str. 12, 566 and Just. 25, 2) Livy's narrative (38, 16) to be the most credible; that of Memnon is similar. Attalus, Prusias and the Aegiosagae, Polyb. 5, 77, 78, 111.—For the constitution of the Galatae, Reinach, Mithrid. 87.—For the fertility of northern Galatia, see the Beilage to the Allgem. Zeitung of Jan. 12, 1893.

5. Bithynia. Th. Reinach, Trois royaumes de l'Asie min. Paris, 1888, pp. 89-152; see above, chap. v. note 11.—For the cities founded in Bithynia, Astacus, Nicomedeia, etc., see Kuhn,

Entstehung der Städte d. Alten, 373-376.—Character of the central Sangarius, Ritter, 18, 650.—The Bithynians are not fond of conquest; they surround themselves with weaker or semi-barbarous states, the small communities in Mysia, the Galatae and the Paphlagonians.—What was the position at that time of Phrygia Epictetus, the upper course of the Tymbres (Pursak), with Cotyaeum (Kutahia) and Dorylaeum (Eskischehr), so named no doubt by a general of Mithridates? It can hardly have been subject to the Seleucids. Probably only Cadi, which was included in that district, was Seleucid; see below, note 7, and in general Ramsay, *As. M.* 145.

6. Pergamum. See chaps. ii. and v., chap. x. note 2, and chap. xxi. Modern works: Meier, Pergamon, Ersch u. Gruber, 3, 16, 353 seq.; Hesselmeyer, *Die Ursprünge der Stadt P.*, Tüb. 1885; Th. Reinach, *Les origines de la ville de P.*, *Rev. Histor.* 1886. See also the *Royalty of Pergamum* by Mahaffy (*Hermathena*, IX, No. xxii.), with whose views I agree to a great extent. Teuthrania was connected with the legends of ancient Greece: Thrämer, *Pergamos*, Leipz. 1888.—Pergamum, protected by other territories to the north, by mountain ranges to the east, had a more powerful neighbour only in the south, the Seleucids, whom it hindered from getting to the Hellespont.—In regard to the wars of the Attalids with the Galatae I follow Koepf, *Ueber die Galaterkr. der Att.*, *Rhein. Mus.* 40, 114-132. Cf. however Gaebler, *Erythrae*, Berl. 1892. It was generally assumed that there was only one great victory, and Niebuhr thought that it was won over the Gauls as mercenaries of Antiochus, Droysen, over the Gauls as a people; Koehler, *Hist. Zeitschr.* 1882, pp. 1 seq., agreed with Niebuhr. But, as Polybius says (18, 41): *νικήσας μάχη Γαλάτας ὁ βαρύτατον καὶ μαχμώτατον ἔθνος ἦν τότε*, it would appear that not only bands of mercenaries are meant. The inscriptions have since revealed several victories. The victory over the Tectosages was won at the sources of the Caicus; that is the defeat *ἐν Μυσία*, Paus. 1, 8, 2. Attalus probably took the title of king on the strength of this victory. Polyaeus (4, 19) mentions a battle, before which Attalus had the words *βασιλέως νίκη* written on the entrails of the sacrificial animals. As Antigonus was king, this battle must have been fought only against Gauls, according to Koehler about the year 240. About the same time (according to Gaebler, however, about 235; see above, chap. x. note 2) the Tolistoagii had won the great victory over Seleucus for Antiochus and Mithridates at Ancyra, to which Trogus prol. 27 and Just. 27, 2, 11 refer. The Galatae now marched once more against Pergamum, on this occasion as allies of Antiochus, in

239 B.C., and were defeated at the Aphrodision, close to Pergamum itself. It must have been at this time that Antiochus took refuge with his father-in-law Ziaelas, who was subsequently slain by Gauls. A third battle in Hellespontine Phrygia mentioned in an inscription is not known from other sources. Prusias I., who had been on the throne since 228, must have left Antiochus in the lurch, and the latter withdrew from Asia Minor. Attalus therefore obtained "*majorem partem Asiae*" according to Just. 27, 3. But this was not of long duration. For the war between Attalus and Hierax we have the reference from Porphyrius in Euseb. 1, 253 Sch. Coloe was near Sardes.—Attalus built the walls of Elaesus for the Aetolians: 'Α. τὴν περὶ αὐτὸ κατασκευὴν ἀναδεξαμένου τοῖς Αἰτ., Polyb. 4, 65; as a genuine Attalid he made some money in this way too.—The comparison between the Pergamum rulers and the Mermnads might be pushed rather far. Points of resemblance: (1) Geography: the territories much the same; most of the cities founded by the Attalids were in Lydia. (2) Money the basis of power with both. Importance of the coinage: electrum, cistophori. (3) Character of civilization Greek in both cases. From Gyges to Croesus friendly intercourse with Greek sanctuaries; Ephesus not badly treated. The same with the Attalids; Ephesus in a way a second capital. In Paus. 1, 36 Attalus is called ὁ Μυρσίς in an Athenian inscription; consequently the Pergamene kings did seek a provincial basis for their power.

7. Cities founded by the Seleucids in Asia Minor. Cf. the well-known appendix in Droysen, 3, 2, esp. 278, various papers of Ramsay and other travellers which cannot be enumerated here and about which information is given in Sal. Reinach's *Chroniques d'Orient*; Schuchhardt, *Athen. Mittheil.* 13, 1 seq.; G. Radet, *De coloniis a Macedonibus in Asiam cis Taurum deductis*, Par. 1892, with the fine map, and *La Lydie*, Par. 1893. Besides Radet's map the following should be consulted: Kiepert's large map of western Asia Minor (executed in 1886) and his map to Sterrett's Wolfe Expedition, Boston, 1888.—Of ancient authorities the inscriptions (cf. Radet) and the coins (cf. Head, H. N.) convey a good deal of information; two much-quoted passages of Steph. Byz. on Ἀντιόχεια and Θυάτεια are difficult to make anything of.—For the cities founded by Seleucus I. see above, chap. v. Radet (50) attributes the following to him: Laodicea Catacecaumene and Thyatira, with Doedye near Thyatira, Acrasus, Nacrassa; to Antiochus I. Radet (51) ascribes Apamea, Seleucia Sidera, the Pelteni, Blaundeni, Cadeni, Mysomacedones (against the Galatae), Laodicea on the Lycus, Antiochia on the Maeander, Nysa, Magnesia near Mount Sipylus. Antiochus II. according to Radet

(53) founded Eriza and Themisonium, and settled four communities around Magnesia on the Sipylus range, among them the Hyrcani. For Antiochus III., see below.—SELEUCIA ON THE CALYCADNUS. Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 956, and see above, notes to chap. v. Autonomous coins from the first century B.C. onwards, Head, 610, Str. 14, 670; St. B. *Σελεύκεια* and *Ἰγρία*. Annual Olympic games; oracle temples of the Sarpedonian Apollo. Seleucia was visited by Radet, and in 1891 by an Austrian expedition under Heberdey and Wilhelm. Remarkable features: a street of porticoes and a stele of the beginning of the second century B.C. with an inscription of 94 lines containing resolutions of various Greek communities in honour of Eudemus of Seleucia, a courtier of Antiochus III.—Site: Kiepert's map in Sterrett's book.—LAODICEA CATACECAUMENE. The country is not volcanic. Cless, in Pauly, 4, 766; Ramsay, Athen. Mittheil. 13, 233 seq. and Asia Minor, 86. Site like a theatre. On a northern branch of the southern military road; it was a central point, the road to Mazaca diverged from it. Coins of the Empire, Head, 596. The modern Jorghan Ladik, Kiepert's map in Sterrett.—ANTIOCH IN PISIDIA, colony from Magnesia on the Maeander, Str. 12, 577, afterwards called Caesarea, had a sanctuary of Men Askenos (incorrect readings in Str. 12, 557, 577); coins of the Empire, Head, 589. The modern Zalowadj. First sermon of the Apostle Paul to the Gentiles and conversion of them in Antioch, Acts of the Apostles, 13. Kiepert, Westl. Kleinas. IX, and in Sterrett.—In the neighbourhood SELEUCIA IN PISIDIA, called *συνήρα*, also ad Taurum, Head, 592, Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 956, Ritter, 19, 482. Site west of Eghendir Göl, Kiepert in Sterrett.—Apollonia also in the neighbourhood, see below, chap. xxi. For traces of Macedonia in the whole of this country, Radet, *De coloniis*, pp. 35-37.—APAMEA CIBOTUS. Cibotus = chest, story of Noah, whose ark is said to have rested on the spot, a legend first naturalized there by the Jews settled in Phrygia under Antiochus III.; cf. Babelon, *Mél. numism.* 1, 165-174, Head to the same effect, 558. Apamea was near the rise of the Maeander, at the source of its tributary the Marsyas. It took the place of the neighbouring Celaenae and became the most important trading city of the interior of western Asia Minor. Celaenae had had the advantage of being on the northern main route (expedition of Xerxes), which was also a section of the southern one as far as Ipsus-Julia, so that all the traffic between the valley of the Maeander and the interior went by Celaenae. Apamea enjoyed the same position, and to the south was connected with Phrygia by a road leading through Sagalassus in Pisidia. This route, from Pamphylia to Phrygia had been

traversed by Alexander. Coins with chest, containing two persons, above dove with olive-branch and the inscription ΝΩΕ, Head, 558, fig. 316. Cf. G. Hirschfeld, Berl. Ak. 1875, and Hogarth, Journ. Hell. St. 1888; Radet, 31. Ruins near Dinêr, Kiepert, Westl. Kleinas. IX, and in Sterrett, also Radet, map in his *La Lydie*.—**LAODICEA AD LYCUM**. Cless, in Pauly, 4, 764, 765. On the borders of Lydia, Phrygia and Caria (Kydrara near it, Herod. 7, 30), it took the place of the neighbouring Colossae. Founder according to St. B. s.v. *Λαοδίκεια*, Antiochus II. Radet (52) assumes, in consequence of the confused statements of St. B. s.v. *Ἀντιόχεια*, that Antiochus I. was the founder. The modern Eskihişsar. Sheep-breeding, woollen industry, worship of the Carian Men, medical school. Coins, Head, 565; the oldest are cistophori, the latter ones of bronze with very varied types. In the Middle Ages replaced by the neighbouring Chonae. North of Laodicea lay Hierapolis, famous for its petrifying waters, Str. 14, 630. The cross-road from the Propontis to Pamphylia went by Laodicea (Radet, Lydie, 34); the route was through Sardes, Philadelphia, Laodicea, Themisonium, Cibyra, Attalia. See Kiepert, XI, Radet, map to La Lydie.—**ANTIOCHIA AD MAEANDRUM**, attributed to Antiochus I. on the strength of the confused and partly incorrect statements of St. B. *Ἀντιόχεια*. Babelon, Mél. numism. p. 17, thinks it was not founded till the reign of Antiochus III.; he places a tetradrachm of this city after 168 B.C. Cf. Head, 520. Antiochus III. no doubt transferred 2000 Jewish families to Lydia and Phrygia (Jos. Ant. 12, 2, 3); but is it possible that such an important city could have arisen there between 197 and 190? The modern Tscherkess-köi, Kiepert, XI, and Radet's map.—**STRATONICEA** on the upper Marsyas in Caria, according to St. B. built by Antiochus I., near the temple of the Chrysaorian Zeus held in special reverence by the Carians. This temple was the centre of the *ἔθνος Χρυσάρειον*, consisting of *comae* which in Strabo's time belonged to various cities (Str. 14, 660); cf. Kuhn, Entstehung der Städte der Alten, 368-370. Coins, Head, 530: silver and bronze from the second and first centuries B.C. The modern Eskihişsar, Kiepert, XI. Stratonicæa was on the route Ephesus—Magnesia—Tralles—Alabanda—Idymus (on the Ceramic Gulf). It was at Eskihişsar that Sherard found and copied Diocletian's famous edict de pretiis rerum.—**THEMISONIUM** on the Cazanes, a tributary of the Indus, Dr. 3, 2, 270, the modern Karayuk-Bazar, Kiepert, XII.—**ERIZA**. Inscriptions, Radet, 35; Iskhian-Bazar, according to Ramsay, south of Themisonium, Kiepert, XII. The road, Ramsay, As. M. 49, Radet, Lydie, 34, 35.—For the Cibyratis, Polyb. 30, 9 (ruler Pancrates), and Ritter, 19, 800-854.—**NYSA**, founded by an

Antiochus, according to the confused account in St. B. Ἀντιόχεια, discussed by Dr. 3, 2, 270 ; cf. Head, 351, Radet, De coloniis, 51, 52 and 27. Near Sultan-Hissar on the southern slope of the Messogis range. Kiepert, XI, map in Radet.—TRALLEIS, cf. Pauly, 6, 2, 2073 ; according to Plin. 5, 108 also called Evanthia, Seleucia and Antiochia. Originally an Argive colony, Str. 16, 649. In the valley of the Maeander above the modern Aidin ; railway station. Kiepert, XI, map in Radet. Bronze coins of the Roman period with ΣΕΛΕΥΚΕΩΝ, Head, 555, Radet, 26. Tralleis was the name of Thracian mercenaries and of a district of Illyria. See Fränkel, Inschr. p. 16. Founded by Antiochus III, Radet, 54. Cf. especially the interesting remarks of Ramsay (As. M. 88 and 112), who says : "Tralles from its position was the most powerful fortress in the Maeander valley, and therefore was a stronghold, first of the Seleucid kings, as is inferred from the names Seleucia and Antiocheia, which for a time supplanted that of Tralleis, and after 190 B.C. of the Pergamenian rule, as is shown by the great numbers of cistophori coined there."—ALABANDA in Caria, near the Marsyas, was also called Antiochia, according to coins which bear the same magistrate's name, and yet have, some ΑΛΑΒΑΝΔΕΩΝ, and others ANTIOXEΩΝ. Detailed discussion of this in Babelon, Mém. numism. 1, according to whom Alabanda was called Antiochia only under Antiochus III. Now Arab-Hissar, Kiepert, XI.—THYATIRA, Str. 13, 625 ; according to St. B. *h.v.* founded by Seleucus I. (supposed to have been *θυγάρις* !), on the Lycus, north of Hermus, said to have been Pelopia in earlier times. Now Akhissar, on the railway which leads from Smyrna into the Caicus valley, Kiepert, VIII ; map in Radet. For Doedye, Radet, 16.—NACRASA, C. I. Gr. 3522, Schuchhardt, Athen. Mittheil. 13, 1 seq. Near Bakir, north of Thyatira, Head, 551, Kiepert, VIII, and map in Radet. Not the same as the neighbouring Acrasus (Radet, Lydie, 306).—MACEDONES HYRCANI and MYSOMACEDONES, Plin. 5, 120, the former on the lower Hermus, opposite Magnesia, the latter on the central Maeander. Cf. Ramsay, As. M. 124, and Radet, 17, where the other Macedonian military colonies near Magnesia on the Sipylus (κάτοικοι in the *χωρία*) are mentioned ; cf. C. I. Gr. 3137 = Hicks, 176 = Ditt. 171 (interest taken by Antiochus I. and II. in Magnesia, *ibid.* line 100) and Radet, 28, for the Mysomacedones.—BLAYNDUS, C. I. Gr. 3866, north of the Maeander, the modern Suleimanli, Head, 559 : autonomous coins of the second and first centuries B.C., Kiepert, VIII ; map in Radet. The neighbouring Dionysopolis Attalid ; see below, chap. xxi. In the case of Naerasa, Blayndus and the two next succeeding cities, there had evidently been no renaming of the place ; *yndus*, termination occurring in Caria (Myndus) ; *asa* the

same (Mylasa); *da* (see below, Synnada) in Caria, also in Cilicia.—**PELTAE** on the Glaucus, affluent of the Maeander, north-west of Apamea, Head, 567: autonomous bronze coins probably of the first century B.C. Near it Eumenea, see below, chap. xxi. Kiepert, IX; map in Radet.—**CADI**, near the source of the Hermus, not far from Aizanoi, see below, chap. xxi. Radet, 23; Head, 560. Now Kedûs; Kiepert, IX; map in Radet.—Cities with Macedonian inhabitants on the central Hermus and its tributaries in Maeonia: Radet, pp. 20-22, and map.—**LYSIAS**, between Ipsus and Apamea, Ramsay, *As. M.* 143, Radet, 39; seems to have been named after Lysias, the general of Seleucus Nicator (Polyaen. 4, 9, 5). Near Karadj-Euren (?), Kiepert, IX.—**SYNNADA**, *St. B. h.v.* Diod. 20, 107, in the year 302 B.C., Dr. 3, 2, 267, 268 (with Docimeum). For Docimus, Radet, 47. The modern Tschifut-Kassaba, Kiepert, IX, map in Radet, Head, 569; autonomous bronze coins of the first century B.C.—**DOCIMEUM**, Head, 562, Radet, 40, Ramsay, *Athen. Mittheil.* 139, Kiepert, IX, now Itchi-Karahissar. Afium-Karahissar, on the summit of a steep rock in the plain north of Synnada, was, according to Hirschfeld, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1891, No. 44 (view approved by Radet, while Kiepert, *Firma* (Kiepert, *neuester Atlas der alten Welt*) has not yet adopted it) and Murray, *Handbook*, 131 (Acroenus), the place called *Λεόντων κεφαλὴ* in *Plut. Them.* 30.—For the neighbouring places Prymnessus and Acroenus, cf. Radet and Ramsay.—It is remarkable that **AMORIUM**, south of Pessinus, had Macedonian inhabitants. True, it was on the route taken by Alexander. Is it possible that it was an extreme outpost of the Seleucids against the Galatae? Radet, 40; Dr. 3, 2, 198; Ramsay, 230. Now Hamza Hadji.—**ANTIOCHIA AD CRAGUM** on the coast of Cilicia Aspera; see Pauly, *l.l.* 1128; visited by Heberdey and Wilhelm in 1891 (two streets of porticoes, splendid marble temple); cf. Ritter, *Kleinasien*, 19, 389. Is it not probable that this city was not founded until the reign of Antiochus III? He had a fleet, as we know.

8. Relations between Egypt and Aspendus, *Ath.* 4, 174.

9. Paphlagonia. Reinach, *Mithrid.* 88; Ramsay, *As. M.* 191; *ibid.* 28 for Sinope.

10. Cappadocia. Reinach, *Trois roy.* 1-88, and several passages in *Mithrid.*; in *Tr. r.* 5 and *Mithrid.* 9 Reinach quotes the older works.—According to *Diod.* 31, 19, there was a succession of ancient Cappadocian kings, of whom the first, Pharnaces, was married to the sister of Cambyses, the father of Cyrus. But this is improbable, see Reinach, *Tr. r.* 10 seq.—Stratonice no doubt had Cataonia for her dowry, Reinach, *Tr. r.* 18, on the strength of *Str.* 12, 534. In Reinach, *Tr. r.* pl. 1, 7, there is a coin of

Ariarathes III., which is an imitation of the coins of Lysimachus and Philetaerus; the Pallas on the reverse is probably intended to represent Ma; the imitation is due to the influence of the Macedonian Stratonice.

11. Pontus. Cf. Reinach's works already quoted; in his Mithridate, Paris, 1890, he cites all the older ones. For the early Mithridates, cf. Reinach, Tr. r. 159, Mithrid. 5. Neither the genealogy nor the chronology however of these sovereigns is settled; I have followed Reinach. Ariobarzanes is the potentate mentioned in vol. iii. of this work, p. 305. According to Just. 38, 5, Mithridates II. receives Phrygia as the dowry of his wife from Seleucus Callinicus. Before this he had been an ally of Hierax; consequently he went over to Hierax's enemy in return for the promise of Phrygia. Perhaps it was the Epictetus which was in question, see above, note 5. Evidently Seleucus was not in possession of it and made a present of it for that reason, and Mithridates certainly never got it.—Mithridates and Sinope, Polyb. 4, 56.—According to Polyb. 5, 90, Lysanias, Olympichus and Limnaeus were *δυνάσται* in Asia about 227; see below, chap. xxix.

12. Building of the wall round Margiana, chap. ix. note 5. The coins of Antiochus I. and II., chap. ix. note 4; those of Seleucus II., etc., chap. x. note 2.

13. The Bactrian empire. A. v. Sallet, Die Nachfolger Alexanders in Baktrien und Indien, Zeitschr. f. Num. 1878; v. Gutschmid, Gesch. Irans, 28, 51, 63 (from Chinese sources). For coins, besides v. Sallet, Head, 701 seq., Cat. Br. Mus. by Gardner, 1886; papers by Cunningham in the Num. Chron. especially 1888; E. Drouin, Chronol. et Numism. des rois indoscythes, Rev. Num. 1888. Cf. P. Gardner, New Chapters, p. 434.

14. The Parthians. Cf. the section dealing with the subject in Spiegel's Eranische Alterthumsk. vol. 3, the article by Cless in Pauly, vol. 5, and v. Gutschmid's Gesch. Irans, p. 28 seq., as well as Mommsen, R. G. 5, 341 seq. The coins in Head, 691-696, based specially on P. Gardner's Parthian Coinage, Lond. 1877; P. Gardner, New Chapters, 435. The coin of a sovereign named Andragoras, before 250, is remarkable, Head, 691, and P. Gardner, Types, pl. xiv. 2.—That 248 B.C. is the date of the Arsacidian era appears from Babylonian tablets; see Strassmeier in the Zeitschr. für Assyriologie, III 2 (1892).

15. Egypt. See the exhaustive articles by Cless under Ptolemaei in Pauly; Cless rightly compares Philadelphus with Lorenzo de' Medici. Chronological difficulties in the case of Sphaerus, Sussehl, 1, 73, 74. Rühl, Der Schatz Ptol. II., N. Jahrb. 1879. For Ptolemy IV. see Mahaffy, Empire, 243-288, who points out that he

took an interest in foreign affairs. His relations with the Jews according to the turgid accounts of the 3rd Book of Maccabees, *ibid.* 267 seq.

16. Interest displayed by the four first Ptolemies in Egyptian religion and art.—PTOLEMY I. He restores the sanctuary in the temple of Luxor in the name of Alexander II., Baed. 2, 130; also that of Karnac, B. 2, 151, 153, both dedicated to Râ. The Diadochi stele in the Museum at Cairo (B. 1, 318) mentioned above, in chap. v. note 13, is from him.—PTOLEMY II. The following are from him: a stone in Kûs (Apollinopolis parva) near Coptus, B. 2, 113; a pylon of the temple of the war-god Mentu in Karnac, B. 2, 161, and the temple of Isis at Philae, where he is depicted in the act of bestowing gifts on Isis, B. 2, 324, 325.—PTOLEMY III. erects a pylon in Karnac, where he is represented in Greek costume sacrificing to Chunsu of Thebes, B. 2, 131; cf. 1, 152; he continues the building of the Mentu temple in Karnac, B. 2, 161; begins the Horus temple in Edfu, B. 2, 273, 274, thus becoming the creator of one of the finest and best-preserved buildings in Egypt (inscription, B. 274); he builds a small temple in Syene, B. 2, 305; a temple of the triad of Thebes, Ra, Muth, Chunsu, in the oasis el Charge, B. 2, 389.—PTOLEMY IV. His name is in Karnac (B. 2, 135) in the great peristyle court; he enlarges the temple of Karnac, B. 2, 161; founds the temple of Hathor in Dêr el Medine on the western bank of Thebes, B. 2, 211; adds to the temple of Edfu, B. 2, 274 and the small temple of Syene, B. 2, 305, both works of his father, also to the temple at Pselchis (Dakke) above Syene, B. 2, 350, 354. Cf. Mahaffy, *Empire*, 272; under Ptolemy IV. Ptolemaic influence reaches farther south, consequently is more extended than in previous reigns. Philopator lauds his ancestors as Euergetae, but he put his mother to death.—Ptolemis—Ake, Head, 676; Pauly, 6, 1, 243; Baed. Pal. 235.—Ptolemis in Pamphylia, Pauly, 11, Head, 588.—Arsinoe in Coelesyria, Pauly, 1, 2, 1776, No. 17.—Arsinoe in Cilicia, Pauly, 11, No. 13, now Marasch, visited by Heberdey and Wilhelm in 1891.—Berenice in Cilicia, Pauly, 1, 2, 2352.—Patara-Arsinoe, Radet, 34.—For Philadelphia, see above, chap. ix. note 2.

CHAPTER XIV

THE CULTURE OF THE GREEK WORLD BETWEEN 300 AND 220, ESPECIALLY AT THE ROYAL COURTS

WE now turn from the political situation to the state of culture in the middle of the third century B.C. There is no need to point out that the ideas which Athens had mainly put in circulation since the year 300 (see chap. vi.) continued to operate throughout the whole of Greece. But the Greeks of that age were subjected to influences of another kind, proceeding from the royal cities, influences which were at work in the field of *belles-lettres* and of erudition. For the most brilliant seats of Greek culture in those times were not the independent cities, but rather such as owed their origin to sovereigns, rulers who, like the leading tyrants of ancient Greece, a Pisistratus and a Hieron, a Periander and a Polycrates, sought to impart greater splendour to their courts by encouraging art and literature. By the side of these royal cities Rhodes must be mentioned as a centre of civilization, not only of intrinsic importance, but also of external brilliancy. But still more peculiar and more grand in its way was Alexandria, for it was there that regular institutions for promoting the study of science were founded, for the first time in the world, so far as its history is known to us. We must therefore discuss the capital of the Ptolemies first, not exhaustively, it is true, for reasons which will shortly be explained. The other royal residences will also not be

described in detail until later, for their prime belongs to a subsequent epoch.

Alexandria was planned by the famous architect Dinocrates and built twelve miles west of the westernmost mouth of the Nile, that of Canopus; so that the mud carried into the sea by the Nile, which the current sweeps in an easterly direction, could not block the harbour.¹ It lay between the Mareotis lagoon and the sea, on a neck of land about two miles broad, which however it did not entirely cover to the south. Off the coast was the island of Pharos, famous since the days of Homer. By connecting it with the mainland by a dam seven stades in length, Alexander created two harbours, united by two canals which crossed the Heptastadion, and both, especially the eastern one, protected by projecting spits of land. The western harbour was called that of Eunostus, no doubt after the son-in-law of Ptolemy I, a king of Soli in Cyprus. This harbour was joined to the Mareotis lake by a canal. More important however than the western harbour was the eastern one, which was close to the most aristocratic part of the city; at its entrance, on the north-eastern extremity of the island of Pharos, was a huge lighthouse, according to mediaeval statements originally about 650 feet in height, which became the model of, and gave its name (*pharos*) to, all constructions of this kind. Opposite this point the promontory of Lochias ran into the sea. As Lake Mareotis was connected with the Nile and the Nile with the Red Sea by a canal, the products of the East could, as was stated above (chap. v.), easily find their way to Alexandria and be shipped thence to other countries. The climate of the city was noted for its mildness. Alexandria was covered by a network of streets intersecting each other at right angles, most of which were only 23 feet, and the two most important ones 46 feet broad. Of these two one ran in a S.E.-N.W. direction from the Mareotis to the great eastern harbour, the other from south-west to north-east, through the length of the city up to the Canopic Gate;

they were bordered by rows of columns. The city was rich in public buildings. The finest were undoubtedly those which formed the palace-quarter, close to the harbour in the north-east, the area of which is stated to have been one-fifth to one-third of the whole city. This district included gardens, enclosures for foreign animals, an arsenal, barracks for soldiers and sailors, tombs, among them that of Alexander; here too perhaps was the Museum. In the rest of the city also there were many public edifices, such as theatres, amphitheatres, stadia, and various sanctuaries, the most imposing of which was the Sarapeum, situated on rising ground, which also contained a library. On another artificial eminence in the city, ascended by a spiral path, was the shrine of Pan. The quarter which contained the palace, afterwards called Bruceum, was the abode of the Macedonians and the leading Greeks; in the western division, the old Rhacotis, dwelt the natives. The numerous Jews had a special quarter in the east of the city.

A city with a population composed of four such completely different elements, Macedonians and well-born Greeks on a level with them, European mercenaries and merchants, Asiatics, including Jews, and Egyptians, could hardly have had a uniform constitution. The various nationalities might have been independently organized, but this was the case with the Jews only, not with the Greeks. And the fact is significant, for there can hardly have been a Greek community of such importance outside Egypt without self-government. And this Greek element is to give a name to the whole epoch! The very extensive Graeco-Macedonian necropolis of Alexandria has been found in the south-west of the city, that of the mercenaries in the east.

The Ptolemies retained their Greek religion, but showed themselves well disposed towards that of Egypt. This was in accord with the traditions of the Greeks, who from time immemorial had assumed a different attitude towards the

Egyptian religion from that of the Persians. The identification of Greek and Egyptian deities was of long standing. Ptah is Hephaestus, Thot Hermes, Ra Helios, Ammon Zeus. The Ptolemies went still farther in this direction; they created a new Greek god, who was really an Egyptian one. Ptolemy Soter had, so it was said, in consequence of a dream ordered the worship of a foreign deity, whose whereabouts was at first unknown, until it was discovered that he was the Hades of Sinope. The name given to him in Egypt was Sarapis. The interpretation of this new name was a puzzle to the Greeks in Plutarch's time. Here too nineteenth-century research has brought light; Sarapis is Asar-Hapi, *i.e.* Osiris-Apis, the embodiment of Osiris of the nether world. This is why there was a Sarapeum in Memphis, near the tombs of Apis, with which it was excavated by Mariette. The Greeks looked on Sarapis as Zeus and Hades in one person. The most famous statue of the god, a work of Bryaxis, was in Alexandria; perhaps it had found its way to Egypt from Sinope. By the creation of Sarapis Ptolemy won the sympathies of the Egyptians, especially of the inhabitants of Memphis, who were zealous worshippers of Apis. Subsequently the new god became, together with Isis, who however ranked first of the two, the representative of the Egyptian religion in general for western countries; there he quite took the place of Osiris.²

The most famous creation of the Ptolemies, however, was the Museum. Here too Greek ideas and institutions were blended with those of Egypt. It was a place where scholars lived and worked together. There had been establishments of this kind in Egypt in the old days, *e.g.* under the 19th and 20th dynasties; in Greece the feeding of deserving citizens at the public expense was a familiar practice, while of late endowments had been made by heads of schools of philosophy, which facilitated the life in common of men united by similar aspirations. Plato's Academy, which was under the protection of the Muses, had given the impulse. This accounts for

the selection of the name of Museum for the scientific institute of Alexandria, the founding of which was, it appears, suggested by the Peripatetic Demetrius of Phalerum to the first Ptolemy.

Its external appearance was that of a group of buildings which served a common purpose: temple of the Muses, library, porticoes, dwellings and an *oikos*, or hall, for the meals which were taken together. Its inmates were a community of scholars and poets, on whom the king bestowed the honour and the privilege of being allowed to work at his expense, and with all imaginable assistance ready to hand. It was a foundation which had something of the *Institut de France*, and something of the Colleges at Oxford and Cambridge. The managing board was composed of priests, but the most influential post was that of the librarian, much as in the British Museum the Principal Librarian is the head of the whole establishment.³

The library of Alexandria under the control of this official was the richest of antiquity; between Ol. 123 and 125 (288 and 240 B.C.) it contained about 532,000 manuscripts. The Ptolemies were anxious to possess an authentic copy of every work in existence, belonging of course to Greek literature, and especially of the poets, and they spared neither trouble nor expense to attain this object.⁴ In devoting their energies to the classification of these books and to the settlement of the texts, the librarians as well as the remaining members of the Museum and the other scholars living in Alexandria founded philological and aesthetic criticism, and this branch of learning has ever since looked up to the great philologists of Alexandria. Yet mathematics and natural science were also studied. I shall refer to them below (chap. xx.), confining my remarks in this chapter to poetry, which also flourished under royal patronage in Alexandria. The pursuit of science was of longer duration there, and did not reach its culminating point until afterwards, about the year 200; it

therefore seems best, in order to treat the one and the other as a whole, to deal with poetry now and take science later on. To the poetry of Alexandria I shall add what was achieved in the same branch elsewhere, for the representatives in other countries of the styles of poetry specially cultivated in Alexandria are dependent on Alexandrian influence. On the other hand, the assumption that there was an Alexandrian school, from which everything produced in this city is supposed to have issued, as from a single fountain-head, is incorrect.⁵

The poetry which flourished at that time in the capital of Egypt was a regular court-literature. Besides the many thousands of natives, Asiatics and more or less barbarous mercenaries, the city was inhabited by a few hundred Greeks and Macedonians who had taste and leisure for Greek verse—for most of the merchants and mercenaries of Greek extraction could not have paid much heed to such matters—and this small circle formed the public of the writers whom we now have to describe. Their poems moreover were produced with the aid of erudition. The old poets were studied so attentively that people learnt from them what to imitate and what to avoid, and most of the poets of Alexandria were also scholars, in fact really more scholars than poets. Timon called the members of the Museum, the learned poets, “the men fattened in the hen-coop.”

Alexandrian poetry begins with elegies. This in itself is significant. Elegies are artistic compositions of no great length, half epic, half lyric in style, in which reflection predominates. That suited the Alexandrian public. The elegy was a short poem adapted for a highly-cultivated luxurious society, which does not like to dwell too long on the same subject.

The first among the elegiac and the Alexandrian poets in general was Philetas of Cos, to whom Ptolemy I. had entrusted the education of one of his sons.⁶ He was supposed

to be emaciated from study, and yet was famous as an erotic poet. That a pedagogue and book-worm of this stamp should be at the head of Alexandrian poetry is characteristic of it. A younger man was Callimachus of Cyrene, who was made head-librarian by the second Ptolemy and also enjoyed the favour of the third, Euergetes.⁷ He was a great scholar, his synopsis (*πρίνκες*) of the history of literature being specially famous. Among his elegies the *Aitia* were conspicuous, in which he related the mythical origin of customs, a convenient mine of aetiological distortion of history for later investigators. Epigrams and hymns of his have come down to us. He was at daggers drawn with his pupil and rival Apollonius, a native of Alexandria or Naucratis, but called the Rhodian because he resided permanently in that island.⁸ The quarrel between master and pupil arose out of a difference of opinion on a point of principle, viz. how the poets of that age should discharge their task. Callimachus took the correct view that a new epoch demanded a new style of poetry, and that short poems met its requirements better than long ones, while Apollonius held that Homer's example should still be followed. It was fortunate that in his *Argonautica*, which is still extant, he contented himself with four cantos, instead of writing twenty-four. The two rivals also pursued each other with abuse in verse. Callimachus compared Apollonius to a pig wallowing in its own filth; the younger man only called his master wooden-head, which was polite by comparison but not much to the point, for if one of the two deserved this epithet, it was rather he himself. Callimachus was very often obscure, Apollonius not unfrequently tedious.

The other epic poets of Alexandria we notice quite briefly. Rhianus of Crete related legends and stories of various countries; his *Messeniacæ* has become a historical source by its reproduction in prose in Pausanias. Euphron of Chalcis, who lived first in Athens, and then in Antioch as librarian of Antiochus III., an ill-favoured and immoral individual, wrote

with studied obscurity. One of his epics was called *Mopsopia*, which was supposed to be an ancient name of Attica. What educated man could have guessed that? Didactic poetry was also much cultivated at that time. Its leading representative was Aratus of Soli in Cilicia, who lived in Pella at the court of Antigonos Gonatas, but was in friendly relations with all the notable poets of the age, as well as with Antiochus I. His chief work was the *Phenomena*, a metrical version of the astronomy of Eudoxus. It contains some fine passages, and the Romans vied with each other in translating it. Another didactic poet of note was Nicander of Colophon, who lived at the court of Pergamum and wrote on counter-poisons, a subject which must have deeply interested the courts of that age (cf. chap. xviii.). His *Heteroeumena*, or metamorphoses, served as a model to Ovid.⁹

A more attractive branch of the poetic art, however, arose at that time, and was at once brought to a since unrivalled perfection—bucolic or pastoral poetry.¹⁰ It has nothing Alexandrian about it; its creator only lived in Alexandria for a time and was only partly indebted to the group of poets there for stimulus to poetic composition in general. Theocritus, the first and the greatest of all bucolic poets, was probably born at Syracuse, soon after 300 B.C. Early in his life he resided in Cos, where he seems to have formed an association in concert with some friends, the members of which called themselves shepherds. Afterwards, about the year 270, he went to Alexandria. Here he sang the praises of Ptolemy Philadelphus. His expectation of reward being disappointed, he returned once more to Sicily and celebrated Hieron in the same hope, and, as it would appear, with the same want of success. It was probably during this fresh sojourn in his native country that the idea occurred to him of devoting himself specially to pastoral poetry, for which Sicily was full of suggestion. It was the home of the legend of the shepherd Daphnis, beloved by Artemis, which Stesichorus had already

treated. Accordingly Theocritus sang of the shepherds of Sicily and Italy; in his Idylls he depicted them as a set of simple, sometimes rude, men; but this very contrast to the courtly civilization of the age pleased the public, as did the graceful and faithful description of the landscapes which formed the background for his figures. Bucolic poetry has never fallen into oblivion since the time of Theocritus, and it has often become the fashion again; but none of his imitators has ever rivalled Theocritus. He is the only one among the Alexandrian poets who belongs to the literature of the world.

In the early days of the Ptolemaean court an attempt was also made to revive tragedy. Dramatic competitions were instituted, and a constellation of seven tragic poets even rose above the horizon. The loss of their tragedies, however, is not much to be regretted when we reflect that one of the best of the seven was Lycophron of Chalcis, who composed the still extant *Alexandra*, a narrative of the prophecies of Cassandra, a work the sole claim of which to distinction is that its bombastic erudition has given Byzantine scholiasts an opportunity of displaying their learning and so of bringing ancient history, especially that of Lower Italy, into hopeless confusion.¹¹

Comedies of course were also acted in Alexandria; but nothing new of importance was created. The choliambics of Herondas are interesting. The indecent buffoonery of Sotades of Maronea was best suited to the society of the court. The poet himself, however, fell a victim to his own foul tongue. Having ridiculed Philadelphus at the court of Lysimachus, the former had him arrested at Caunus and thrown forthwith into the sea. The marionette theatre was so popular at the court of Alexandria that the great mechanician Heron, the gifted designer of engines of war, had to construct the machinery required for setting the puppets in motion. Another kind of extravagant poetry was cultivated chiefly at Tarentum, Rhinthon being its leading representative.¹²

The whole of this literature bears a thoroughly Greek character. True, it can be shown that many ideas and similes of the writers above mentioned are borrowed from Oriental literature; but they are merely isolated flowers, which can be easily woven into an already existing wreath; the subject-matter and the tone of the poems are thoroughly Greek. The study of the East by the Greeks of Alexandria led to the composition of more or less learned works, which will be referred to later on, in chap. xx. But these writings cannot be ranked as polite literature, which in Alexandria produced only epic and elegiac poems of value, and no real comedy, no history of importance, no oratory, no philosophy. In the department of polite literature, where form is all-important, the production of the monarchies is confined to entertainment of a superior or inferior kind; everything capable of contributing to the moral or intellectual elevation of the people still has to come from republics, in the third century as well as in the preceding ones.

To what an extent mere amusement, devoid of all higher meaning, was prized in Alexandria is shown by the description of the procession with which Ptolemy Philadelphus celebrated his accession, quoted by Athenaeus from a book by Callixenus of Rhodes.¹³

This pageant took place in the stadion of Alexandria and lasted the whole day. It consisted of a series of separate processions, devoted to various gods or personages; it began in the morning with the procession of the morning star, and concluded in the evening with that of Hesperus. Athenaeus has specially described the procession of Dionysus, from which I give a few extracts. First of all came a crowd of satyrs and Sileni, among them forty gaily-painted satyrs with golden ivy-wreaths, then a car drawn by 180 men with a statue of Dionysus, 15 feet high, which poured wine out of a golden goblet; in front of it was a golden jar containing fifteen measures, or 135 gallons, of wine, a golden table with a golden

censer and two golden bowls on it, covered by a roof of ivy and vine leaves, from which hung garlands, fillets, masks and cymbals; the car was followed by men and women with wreaths and serpents in their hair. On another car—for everything was represented on cars, just as nowadays in the case of historical and similar processions—was placed a statue of Nysa, 12 feet high, which was made to stand up, to pour milk out of a golden dish and to sit down again by means of machinery. Another car bore a wine-press, 36 feet long by 21 broad, and full of grapes, which sixty satyrs led by a Silenus trod to the strains of the flute, so that a continual stream of must flowed from it. On another car was a bottle made of panther-skins, containing 3000 measures, 27,000 gallons, of wine, which gradually poured out of it. Then came a silver jar holding 600 measures, about 5400 gallons, which had statues on the rim, on the handles and on the base, and was surrounded in the middle by a golden wreath inlaid with diamonds. Farther on the return of Dionysus from India was brought on the scene. The god, 18 feet in height, was seated on an elephant; in front of him on the elephant's neck was a satyriskos $7\frac{1}{2}$ feet high—all on a car. This was followed by 500 girls in purple chitons, with golden belts. Then came 120 satyrs in gold or silver attire, and after them satyrs riding on donkeys, cars drawn by elephants, ostriches and camels, mules harnessed to cars with tents on them, in which sat captive women; camels laden with incense, myrrh and spices, negroes with 600 elephants' tusks, hunters with 2400 dogs, 150 men with trees, to which all kinds of animals were fastened; parrots and other birds in cages; all sorts of wild beasts, ending with an Ethiopian rhinoceros. Another remarkable feature consisted of women seated on a car, who represented cities liberated from Persian sway, a homage to Alexander and Ptolemy. Then a golden thyrsus, 135 feet long, was carried by, and after that the royal army, 157,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry,

marched past. The whole of this interminable pageant, which evidently repeated and surpassed in splendour similar scenes in ancient Egypt, was at once a religious and a political function; it was an honour paid to the gods, especially to Dionysus, who corresponded to Osiris, with whom again the king of Egypt was ranked as an equal, and a proof to subjects and foreigners of the wealth and the power of the king. People were to take care not to quarrel with such a monarch! I must refrain from reproducing from the same source the account of the splendid summer-house in the palace-garden, adorned by statues and paintings of Sicilian artists; nor can I go into the description of the grand ships which the Ptolemies and Hieron constructed, all matters related by Athenaeus. Display of pomp was traditional in the East; if Ptolemy Philadelphus did more in the above pageant than was customary, it was because he felt the need of making himself popular in every way. This striving for popularity is also proved by Theocritus' Idyll of the two Syracusan ladies, who go to see the festival of Adonis arranged by Arsinoë in the royal palace of Alexandria. A queen who admitted plain citizens' wives into her palace in this way must have been popular. That mechanical skill was highly developed in Alexandria is clear from the foregoing. I shall refer again to this subject in chap. xx.

If there were few Greek communities in Egypt, and hardly one that was really autonomous (Strabo mentions Ptolemais as one), that did not prevent there being many groups of Greek inhabitants in the country. To this category belonged the cavalry in the Fayûm near Crocodilopolis (see chap. ix. note 2). The hellenization of Egypt constantly increased. Eventually the regular Egyptian records, the hieroglyphics, for instance, ceased to be understood. This, however, was not till the time of the Romans, and was connected with the rise of Christianity; the Ptolemies paid marked honour to the indigenous civilization.

The other royal courts I only refer to incidentally here. Their character was on the whole the same as that of the Ptolemaean court. The magnificence of the city of Antioch is certainly very remarkable, even compared with Alexandria; but Antioch reached the zenith of its splendour later than the Egyptian capital, and will therefore not engage our attention until the year 146 gives us an opportunity of once more describing the intellectual condition of the Greek world (chap. xx.). The court of Antioch also endeavoured to render services to literature; we have, however, already mentioned the writers who lived there. Pergamum too will be discussed at a later stage (chap. xxi.).

But there is one city of the west which must be mentioned here, as it has already lost its importance in the next succeeding period—Syracuse, the capital of King Hieron, the largest and by its position and walls the strongest Greek city of the time. It was composed of five separate parts: firstly the island of Ortygia, then on the mainland to the east Achradina, adjoining it to the west Tyche and Neapolis, and Epipolae in the extreme west. Cicero has described the beautiful city in his speech against Verres from the accounts of Timaeus (third century B.C.). It was planned on such a grand scale that the large island of Ortygia served exclusively as a citadel at that time, no ordinary citizens, but only courtiers and mercenaries, being allowed to live there; the extensive quarter of Epipolae contained a second upper citadel, the remains of which are still extant.¹⁴

Of the other cities of Hieron's kingdom, besides Tauro-menium, with its beautiful position, the less known Acrae enjoyed considerable prosperity, as is proved by the remains still in existence.¹⁵

Taras was unquestionably almost as brilliant as Syracuse, but neither the historical notices nor the remains enable us to give a clear idea of the city.¹⁶

Finally it must be pointed out here that the most famous

of the sarcophagi of Sidon, the so-called Alexander sarcophagus, is a striking proof of the perfection of sculpture at the close of the fourth century B.C.¹⁷

NOTES

1. Alexandria. Description in Strabo, 17, 791-799; Diod. 17, 52; Plin. 5, 10, 11; Plut. Alex. 26.—Of modern writers Mahmoud Bey, *Mém. sur l'ant. Alexandrie*, Copenhagen, 1872 (Mahmoud Bey worked for Napoleon III.; he was the first to clear up the topography by researches on the spot; the earlier works are obsolete). Mahmoud Bey's investigations have been utilized and amplified by H. Kiepert, *Zur Topogr. des alten Alex.*, Berlin, 1872 (*Zeitschr. f. allgem. Erdk.* VII); Wachsmuth, *Alexandrien*, N. Reich, 1876; Baedeker, *Unterägypten*, with plan; Neroutzos, *L'anc. Alex.*, Paris, 1888, with large plan. Neroutzos deals specially with the burial-places, and complains of the destruction of what has been found. There is now a museum of Graeco-Roman antiquities in Alexandria, and endeavours are being made to save as much as possible from the remains; cf. Botti, *Il museo di Aless. e gli scavi di 1892*, Aless. 1893. Cf. also the plans in Brockhaus *Konversationslex.* I (14th ed.); Jankó, *Das Delta des Nil*, *Jahrb. der Kön. ung. geolog. Anstalt*, III, 9, Budapest, 1890. No agreement has been arrived at on important points of the topography of Alexandria. A comprehensive reconstruction of its topography is a great *desideratum*. Cf. also Judeich, *Caesar im Orient*, Leipzig, 1885.—Modern Alexandria includes mainly the western section of the ancient city and the much-enlarged heptastadion, as well as the island of Pharos. The western harbour is now the more important one. C. Wachsmuth has pointed out the connection of its name, Eunostus, with that of the son-in-law of Ptolemy I. Polybius (34, 14) enumerates three elements of the population of Alexandria in his time: the native, ὁξὺν καὶ πολιτικόν (educated), the μισθοφορικόν, πολλὸν καὶ ἀνάγωγον (uneducated), ἐξ ἔθους γὰρ παλαιοῦ ξένους ἔτρεφον, ἄρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἄρχεσθαι δεδιδασμένους διὰ τὴν τῶν βασιλείων οὐδένειαν, τρίτον δ' ἦν γένος τὸ τῶν Ἀλεξανδρέων, also not very πολιτικόν, but yet better than the mercenaries, for they are Ἕλληνες ἀνέκαθεν. But they were almost annihilated by Physcon, who often left them to the mercy of the hired soldiers. After that the Oriental element preponderated still more. Privileged position of the Jews in the city, Momms. 5, 491. Herondas, *Mimiamb.* 1, 28 seq., sums up the charms of Alexandria. "You

can form an idea of the deafening babel of tongues which prevailed in Alexandria under the Ptolemies and in the time of the Roman Empire, when you reflect that papyri in the Greek, Arabic, Coptic (all three dialects), Persian, Hebrew, Syrian and Latin languages have been found in the ruins of Arsinoë;" Krall, *Die etruskischen Mumienbinden des Agramer National-Museums*, Wiener Akad. phil.-hist. Cl. Bd. 41.—Places of worship and entertainment in the east of Alexandria: Eleusis with the Thesmophoreum and Canopus with the Sarapeum; people went to them by boat on the canal (διδρυξ), Str. 17, 800.

2. Sarapis. Tac. Hist. 4, 81-84; Plut. Is. 28; Clemens Alex. Botr. p. 20; Macr. 1, 7.—Cf. Plew, *De Sarapide*, Königsberg, 1868, who concludes from the statement in Arr. 7, 26, that Sarapis was worshipped in Babylon in the life-time of Alexander, that the god worshipped in Sinope and Babylon was Semitic and the resemblance of name with Osiris-Apis a chance one. But there is no other mention of Sarapis in Sinope and Babylon, and it is therefore permissible to believe in the Egyptian origin of the god. His occurrence in Babylon would in that case certainly have to be explained in another way. Cf. also the article Sarapis in Baummeister; Bruun, *Griech. Künstler*, 1, 384; Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, 187. P. Gardner, *New Chapters*, p. 443, calls him a "forerunner of Christianity." For the diffusion of his cult see Drexler, *Isis*, in Roscher's *Lexikon*; Lafaye, *Hist. du culte des divinités d'Alexandrie*, Paris, 1884. Cf. finally Poole, *Catal. of Greek Coins*, Alexandria, 1892, p. lix. seq., who ingeniously explains the derivation from Sinope by the fact that near Memphis there was a *Σινώπιον ὄρος*; this, however, was Se-(t-)n-Hapi, "the hill of Apis"—Egyptian and Greek Sarapeum near Memphis, Baed. 1, 410, 411; famous excavations by Mariette; the former contained the tombs of the bulls of Apis, the latter built in Greek style, a temple *in antis*, with statues of Greek philosophers and thinkers, consequently on the lines of the Museum. The Sarapeum in Memphis one of the origins of monasticism, Meyer, *Gesch. Aegyptens*, 401.—Splendid Sarapeum in Alexandria; cf. Ruperti on Tac. Hist. 4, 84. There was also another smaller one in Alexandria.

3. The Museum. Papers entitled *Das alexandrinische Museum von Parthey*, Berlin, 1838; Klippel, *Gött.* 1838; Göll, *Schleiz*, 1868; Weniger, Berlin, 1875; also Susemihl, 1, 7; Weinberger, in the *N. Jahrb.* Bd. 145, pp. 268-272.—The Museum was the first example of a permanent institution for the cultivation of pure science founded by a government; that was something great. There were no pupils in the Museum; the teaching establishment, of which we know nothing, was close by—a University

near the Academy. There had been a high school with savants living together under Ramses II. in the Ramesseum at Thebes, Baed. 2, 188; a high school in Chennu, Baed. 2, 289.—*ἱερεὺς ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ Μουσείῳ τεταγμένος*, appointed first by the king, afterwards by Rome, Str. 17, 794.

4. The Libraries. Ritschl, *Die alexandrinischen Bibliotheken*, Breslau, 1838. The article *Bibliotheca* in Pauly, 1, 2374. Christ, 379. Susemihl, 1, 6, and 335-344. Nourisson, *La biblioth. des Ptolémées*, Alexandr. 1893, I have not seen. The librarians were: Zenodotus, Alexander and Lycophron, then probably Callimachus, then Eratosthenes, Aristophanes, Aristarchus.

5. Literature. Matter, *Essai historique sur l'école d'Alexandrie*, 2nd ed. Paris, 1840-44. Couat, *La poésie alex. sous les trois prem. Ptolémées*, Paris, 1882. Christ's and Susemihl's often-quoted works. Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, chaps. 11, 12.—For the character of Alexandrian culture in general, see below, chap. xx.

6. Philetas. Chr. 336. Susem. 1, 174-178. A friend of Philetas was Hermesianax of Colophon, for whom see Chr. 337; Sus. 1, 184-187.—Phanocles, Chr. 338; Sus. 1, 190 seq.

7. Callimachus. Chr. 339; Sus. 1, 358-373. He was *νῖδς Βάπτου*. It was he who said: *μέγα βιβλίον μέγα κακόν*; he therefore preferred to write 800 small-sized ones, which, however, still required elucidation. Epigram of Apollonius against Callimachus, Anth. Pal. 11, 275.—O. Schneider, *Callimachea*, Lips. 1870-73, 2 vols.—The grand hymn of Cleanthes to Zeus in Stob. Ecl. 1, 2, 12.—Verses of Isyllus found in an inscription at Epidaurus; v. Wilam. Phil. Unters. Bd. 9.

8. Apollonius. Chr. 322, 323. Sus. 1, 383-393. He understands how to describe localities and moods, but his poem lacks unity. Callimachus' criticism of him was therefore right.

9. For the poets mentioned in the text, cf. esp. Christ and Susemihl. Von Wilamowitz (Ant. von Kar. 167) calls Nicander the most unrefreshing specimen of pre-Christian poetry.

10. Bucolic poetry. For its origin and character, as well as for Theocritus, etc., see Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum*, 2, 298-324, with the notes, as also Chr. 328-334, and esp. Sus. 1, 196-235, an extremely copious and solid chapter. According to Paton, *Inscriptions of Cos*, pp. 354-360, Theocritus had hardly anything to do with Alexandria.—For borrowings from Oriental poetry see Holm, *Gesch. Sic.* 2, 499.

11. Tragedy. Chr. 346, 347; Sus. 1, 269-283. For Lycophron, *ibid.* 272-279.

12. Comedy and the like, Chr. 348 seq.; Sus. 1, chaps. 6, 8. Seven mimes of Herondas in dialogue and choliambic metre have

now been brought to light from an Egyptian papyrus ; editions of Kenyon, Rutherford, Bücheler and Crusius. Cf. also the *Athenaeum*, 1892, 1, p. 758.—Epigrams, Chr. 343-345.

13. The pageant in Alexandria, *Ath.* 5, 196 seq. ; also in Müller, *Fragm.* 3, 58 seq.—What was called gold was probably for the most part gilt. A 'golden' thyrsus 135 feet long shows us what we are to think of these displays. The object was to dazzle the mob. The whole patronage of art by the court was also directed to outward appearances ; cf. the remarks of Diels in the *Archäolog. Gesellschaft* of Berlin à propos of Herondas, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1892, No. 3. The criticism of the Alexandrian school, which moved on the same lines, afterwards passed into Pliny, etc. Even great artists were prized only for their fidelity to nature, *i.e.* for deceiving the eye, and we still endeavour to justify and explain worthless criticism of this kind ; cf. vol. iii. p. 437.—See below, notes to chap. xx.—Cf. Kamp, T., *De Ptolem. Philad. pompa Bacchica*, Bonn, 1864.

14. Syracuse. See Holm, *Gesch. Sic.* 2, 325-334.

15. Acrae. *Judica*, *Le Antichità di Acre*, Mess. 1819. Schubring, *Akrae-Palazzolo*, *Jahrb. f. class. Phil. Suppl.* IV, 1864.

16. Taras. Lorentz, *De civitate Tar.*, Numb. 1883, and the same writer's *De rebus sacris et artibus Tar.*, Clev. 1836.—For the Sicyon refounded by Demetrius Poliorcetes see Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, 301.

17. For the sarcophagus of Sidon, see the splendid work of Hamdy-Bey and Th. Reinach, Paris, 1892, and Th. Reinach in the *Gazette des Beaux-Arts*, Paris, 1892. Cf. Studniczka in the *Jahrb. des K. D. Arch. Inst.* IX, 4, 204-244, and P. Gardner at the meeting of the Hellenic Society, May 1895 (*Athenaeum*, 1st June 1895). Gardner assigns (1) the Lycian sarcophagus to the 2nd half of the fifth century (similarity to the riders of the Parthenon frieze) ; (2) the Tomb of the Satrap to the same period (resemblance in style to the Nereid monument) ; (3) the Mourning Women to the middle of the fourth century—this is possibly the tomb of Straton II. (Attic style) ; (4) the so-called great sarcophagus, which he is inclined to consider as the tomb of Abdalonymus (resemblance to the Amazon sarcophagus in Vienna), to the end of the fourth century. Instead of the mythical Abdalonymus Laomedon is now suggested (Judeich's interpretation).

For the subjects treated in this chapter the two copious articles in Pauly-Wissowa's *Realencyclopädie*, *Alexandreia*, by Puchstein, and *Alexandrinische Litteratur*, by Knaack, should also be consulted.

CHAPTER XV

BEGINNING OF THE ROMAN PERIOD—ANTIOCHUS AND PHILIP
—THE LEAGUE WAR—THE SECOND PUNIC WAR—
SYRACUSE—PHILOPOEMEN (220-205 B.C.).

WE now come to the intervention of the Romans. That Rome should have been able to interfere in the affairs of Greece was due to the character of this unique city, and this character of hers explains the whole course of her history. Rome was a typical city in a country and amid peoples in which rural life predominated, and besides this composed originally not of one but of several nationalities. This origin obliged her to seek security in a rigidly-organized legal system. But the strictness of that system again was a source of attraction to all those who felt inclined to take an active part in a larger and yet free government, and just as outsiders liked to become Romans, so Rome herself gave a ready welcome to foreigners and offered them a better position than was usual in republics. Rome solved the problem of affiliation of foreign communities better than her chief predecessor in the political sphere, Athens. She did not, as is often said, enter on a career of conquest deliberately. Rather was she drawn by her manifold relations into conflicts, in which right was not always on her side, but in which, however, she believed that she was maintaining a right. She took territory from the vanquished to enrich her own citizens. But this does not warrant the assertion that the acquisition of

territory was the main object of the wars of Rome. Even in antiquity it was often admitted by foreigners that Rome on the whole observed a generous attitude towards other states. And it is of great importance that the Romans, by the gradual expansion of their power and extension of their rights of citizenship, acquired, in an ever-increasing degree, the capacity of comprehending the character of foreign communities and of being just to them.

The Romans did not interfere in the affairs of the Greeks until after they had taken possession of the Carthaginian section of the island of Sicily, and their intervention was provoked by the growing activity of King Philip of Macedonia, who allied himself with Carthage against Rome. The natural consequence of this was that the Romans tried to create embarrassments for him in his own sphere of power. On the other hand, the Greek world of the East remained for the present untouched by Roman influence, and it is to this that we must first devote our attention.¹

From 222-187 the reigning monarch in Syria was Antiochus III., known as the Great, the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, and successor of his elder brother Seleucus Ceraunus.² He was only twenty years of age when he came to the throne, and was under the influence of his minister Hermeas, a Carian. Among the many questions which preoccupied this not ungifted sovereign, two especially pressed for solution: his relations with the East and with Egypt; Asia Minor, so far as it concerned the Seleucids at all, had just been retaken from Attalus by his kinsman Achaeus, and this country therefore was for the moment not a source of anxiety to the king. On the other hand, Egypt was very powerful; by its possession of Phoenicia, Coelesyria and even Seleucia ad Mare it threatened Antioch, which it actually cut off from the sea. The new king of Egypt, however, Ptolemy IV. Philopator (222-204), whose character we have already sketched in chap. xiii. (p. 289), frittered away this favourable

position. His minister Sosibius first of all contrived so far to gain over Cleomenes (who was in high repute with the numerous mercenaries serving in Alexandria, there being no less than 3000 Peloponnesians among them) that he raised no objection to the murder of Berenice and of Magas, and then Sosibius, having no further use for him, put him out of the way. Cleomenes wished to be allowed to return to Greece, where the death of Doson seemed to promise a successful career for an opponent of Macedonia. Sosibius prevented this and at last by means of false representations persuaded the king to imprison the restless Spartan. When Cleomenes saw that he had no chance of being set at liberty he determined to put a speedy end to his intolerable position. With the handful of faithful followers who had been left to him he escaped from prison, and called on the people of Alexandria to rise in defence of their freedom. When the Alexandrians remained tranquil, he endeavoured to seize the royal palace, and on this too failing, he took his own life,—a man of whom his political opponent Polybius says that he was a born general and a born king. He is the only great statesman whom Greece can show after the year 323. Agis is more high-minded, but not so vigorous. Solon in the sixth, Pericles in the fifth, Alexander in the fourth century, are on a far higher plane. But then all three had the great advantage of being on a level with the best civilization of their age. Spartan narrowness was unable to produce a greater figure than Cleomenes. These four men represent four stages of Greek political development. Solon is the ideal legislator, Pericles the ideal ruler by the power of intellect, Alexander the ideal conqueror and civilizer, Cleomenes the ideal example of the man who unites the people by force. And, strange to say, all four saw with their own eyes their failure to attain their ends. Solon lived to witness the *tyrannis*, Pericles the plague and the ingratitude of the people, Alexander had to turn back from India, Cleomenes was defeated and died in exile. In the fate of

these great men is reflected something of the destiny of the Greek people.

We now return to Egypt. The condition of this country, the king of which was a puppet in the hands of the favourite for the time being, held out some prospect of success for vigorous action on the part of the ambitious Syrian monarch. Just then, however, Persis and Media had revolted under the brothers Alexander and Molon, and the question therefore arose whether Antiochus should, as his general Epigenes advised, take the field against them in person, or, as Hermeas proposed, leave this campaign to others and attack Egypt himself. He followed the advice of Hermeas, but, owing to the skilful measures taken by the Egyptian general Theodotus, accomplished nothing, while in the meantime Molon extended his rule up to the Euphrates. Thereupon Antiochus marched to the east himself and was victorious; Molon and Alexander committed suicide. Antiochus now put to death Hermeas, who had induced him to take the life of Epigenes, and received the homage of the ruler of Atropatene, Artabazanes. He then, although Achaeus now revolted from him in Asia Minor, led an army against Egypt. This war was made easier for him by Theodotus coming over to his side and surrendering to him Tyre, Ptolemais and a number of ships of war. At this point Sosibius and Agathocles hit on the crafty idea of keeping Antiochus at arm's length by negotiations, in order to complete their own preparations in the meanwhile. Rhodes, Cyzicus, Byzantium and the Aetolians pleaded for peace with Antiochus, and when the latter eventually refused to accept the conditions and renewed the war, he was defeated at Raphia in the year 217. He was obliged to give up Phoenicia and Coele Syria, but retained Seleucia, which had been taken in 219, and now was free to deal with Achaeus.³ He blockaded him in Sardes. Sosibius wanted to rescue him and entrusted the task to a Cretan named Bolis. The latter, however, preferred to do a stroke of business on his own account.

He placed himself in communication with a fellow-countryman in Antiochus' service, and got Achaeus out of the citadel of Sardes, but only to deliver him to Antiochus, who put him to death. In this way the Syrian monarch had recovered the small tract of Asia Minor which had been subject to the Seleucids, *i.e.* part of central Lydia, Phrygia, Caria, extending from Sardes to Stratonicea in the south and to Apamea in the east, and the route from it to Cilicia Campestris. He was now desirous of reconquering the distant east, especially Parthia and Bactria, and with this object undertook a great expedition, which earned him the title of 'the Great' with his indulgent friends.

We have only unconnected accounts of this campaign, which is a repetition of that of his father Callinicus (see chap. x.). In the year 209 Antiochus was in Ecbatana, where he melted down the treasure of the goddess Aine and took it away with him. He then marched with 100,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry to Parthia and Hyrcania. The defeated Parthians took refuge in the city of Syrinx, the Greek inhabitants of which put them to death, but were nevertheless obliged to surrender. In 208 a move was made against Bactria, where the dynasty of Diodotus had been overthrown by Euthydemus of Magnesia. Euthydemus retreated to Zariaspa and declared that he would if pushed to it summon the nomad tribes into the country; thereupon Antiochus recognized him as king. A treaty with the Indian rajah Subhagasena procured Antiochus a few elephants. He now returned by Arachosia and Carmania to the west and compelled the Gerraeans to supply him with silver, frankincense and myrrh. Antiochus behaved like a regular Asiatic monarch; he made distant expeditions, at the end of which everything is just as it was before. Bactria and Parthia remained independent. In the eyes of the Carmanians he was no doubt a great man, and he might have considered himself one by comparison with his fellow-sovereign of Egypt.

The latter had difficulties about this time with the native element, whose self-importance had increased because 20,000 Egyptians had fought at the battle of Raphia. But the rebels were subdued and punished. The complications which Ptolemy Philopator is supposed to have had with the Jews of Alexandria are related only in the third book of Maccabees, and that is more of a romance.⁴ Philopator was a devoted friend of the Romans, to whom he entrusted the guardianship of his son Epiphanes in his will. Thus Rome became the protector of Egypt, and she never relinquished this position. From henceforth the importance of Egypt belongs exclusively to the history of civilization.⁵

We now come to Europe. The reigning sovereign in Macedonia (220-179) was Philip V., who ought to have made a point of subduing the Aetolians to secure a more decisive control over Greece than had been hitherto attainable. Athens too was independent, but held aloof as much as possible from political complications which concerned the continent of Greece, so that it could for the moment be left outside Philip's calculations. And the Aetolians gave him ample occasion for occupying himself with them. Two Aetolian aristocrats, Dorimachus and Scopas, made Phigalia a centre for ravaging Messenia on their own account. Besides this, to get to Phigalia they had marched straight through the territory of Patrae, Pharae and Tritaea, as if Achaia belonged to them. When the Messenians asked the Achaeans for help, Aratus undertook to deal with the Aetolian freebooters, but he set to work so clumsily that he was defeated at Caphyae in Arcadia. The Achaeans, however, were members of the league founded by Doson during the war with Cleomenes, which included the Thessalians, Boeotians, Acarnanians and Epirotes as well as Macedonia; this league therefore might be of service. Philip accordingly convened a meeting of the league at Corinth, in which war with the Aetolians was decided on. But in this so-called League

War⁶ Philip was the only one of the allies who did anything, and he could not accomplish much because he divided his energies. The Spartans had gone over to the Aetolian side, and Philip thought fit to take this opportunity of asserting his supremacy in the Peloponnese as well. But he had neither the resources nor the ability for achieving success at two different seats of war. The Achaeans ought to have carried on the war in the Peloponnese, but they were unable to do so because Aratus had neglected their military organization, and the leading cities now preferred to suspend their payments into the league treasury and keep mercenaries on their own account, with whom of course nothing could be done. Philip at first confined his operations to the north, in 219 B.C. He marched to Ambracia and halted to besiege the swamp-girt fortress of Ambracus, while Scopas traversed Thessaly with the Aetolians and even destroyed Dium in Macedonia. Philip then took Oeniadae, and returned to Macedonia, where he dismissed his soldiers to their work in the fields; the Aetolians in the meanwhile ravaged Dodona. In the winter of 219/218 the king opened his campaign in the south. He made a rapid march into the Peloponnese and surprised and defeated the Aetolian freebooters at Stymphalus. Then he took Psophis by storm, moved into Elis and obtained possession of the whole of Triphylia in six days. The Aetolians evacuated it entirely, after having sacked the places which had joined them. The winter of 218/217 Philip spent in Argos. In the following year (217) he persuaded the Achaeans, as they were unable to do anything in the field, at all events to supply him with money, and he continued his campaigns on a still larger scale. He equipped a fleet, with which he landed in Cephallenia; but he failed to take Pale owing to the treachery of his advisers Apelles and Leontius. On the mainland he was more successful; he took Thermon, the assembling-place of the Aetolians, and pillaged it from end to end by way of revenge for the fate of Dium. He then

turned rapidly to the east, landed at Lechaëum and marched into Laconia, which he ravaged right down to the sea, cleverly managing to escape northwards again in the neighbourhood of Sparta. The Aetolians in the meanwhile devastated the Peloponnese on their own account. The naval powers, Egypt, Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium, now tried to bring about a peace, and Philip consented, especially as his friend Demetrius, the ruler of Pharos on the Illyrian coast, whom the Romans had expelled, advised him to do so. The Romans had just been defeated at Lake Trasimene, and it was a question whether the power of Macedonia might not be used against Rome with decisive effect. The Greeks too were inclined for peace. At a conference held at Naupactus, Agelaus of Naupactus pointed out that danger might shortly threaten them from the west, whether from Rome or from Carthage, and that it was therefore advisable to be united. As neither side had vanquished the other, this peace (217) left everything as it was.⁷ The war had resembled the Archidamian War (vol. ii. pp. 329 seq.): a series of inroads into the enemy's territory without decisive result. There was only one difference between the two, and that was that in the League War cities were stormed, which had not occurred in the Archidamian War. But Philip was the only combatant who achieved this, and not his opponents or his allies. As soldier and general Philip is far above his Greek contemporaries; he was prompt, decided and clear-sighted in detail. But he had great defects as a statesman: he was lacking in farsightedness and consistency. That his consent to the peace was not due to a sound grasp of the general political situation but rather to instability of character, is shown by the feebleness of his action in the most important dispute in which he was ever involved, his quarrel with Rome.

In the spring of 216 he marched against the Illyrian Scerdilaidas, the ally of the Romans, and tried to take the city of Apollonia. As soon as he heard, however, that a

Roman fleet was approaching, he returned to Macedonia. After the battle of Cannae he roused himself so far as to make an alliance with Hannibal,⁸ but when the Romans heard of it and left a fleet in the Adriatic, he made no attempt whatever to intervene in the struggle in Italy, but once more invaded the Peloponnese. His object was to seize Ithome, which was to serve with Chalcis and Acro-Corinthus as a third point for oppressing Hellas, but the attempt to take it failed twice. The first time he allowed Aratus to dissuade him from his purpose, the second time he actually attacked it, but without success, and Demetrius of Pharos lost his life on the occasion.⁹ In 213 he poisoned Aratus, who, having sunk into an adviser of Philip, had done his utmost to keep him out of mischief.¹⁰

When Aratus died, the position of Rome had improved.¹¹ In 216 indeed Rome had received a serious blow through the death of the aged Hieron, who was succeeded by his grandson Hieronymus, a firm friend of the Carthaginians. True, Hieronymus was murdered and freedom proclaimed, but at this point two brothers of semi-Carthaginian extraction, Hippocrates and Epicydes, seized on the government of Syracuse, which now drew still nearer to Carthage. The Carthaginians sent an army to Sicily and made Acragas their fortified head-quarters in the island. But Rome, although she had to oppose Hasdrubal in Spain, and was still fighting Hannibal in Lower Italy, already felt strong enough to despatch the Consul M. Claudius Marcellus to Sicily with orders to take Syracuse (214 B.C.). The siege was of long duration, as the city was not only admirably protected by nature and art, but was also defended by the genius of its great citizen Archimedes with every resource at the disposal of the science of the age. The year 212 witnessed successes and defeats of Rome in the distant scenes of its conflicts. Hannibal took the city of Tarentum; the Romans held the citadel. More serious for Rome was what happened in Spain. Two brothers, the Roman generals P. and Cn. Cornelius

Scipio, lost their lives there ; the Roman army was almost cut to pieces ; a handful of men only were brought in safety by the eques Q. Marcius to the left bank of the Ebro. On the other hand, Syracuse fell in the same year. Marcellus got possession of part of the wall surrounding the huge city at a point where there was only open country behind it, and thus penetrated into the large space between the fortress of Epipolæ on the one side and the four eastern quarters of the city on the other, and eventually the most important of these, the island of Ortygia and the lofty Achradina, fell into the hands of the Romans through the treachery of the Spaniard Mericus. During the sack of the city Archimedes was slain. The booty was great ; many works of art were taken to Rome, where they adorned the temples of Honour and Virtue dedicated by Marcellus and erected side by side. From that time the fortunes of Carthage rapidly declined. In 211 Capua was taken by the Romans, a city of Greek civilization, rivalling Rome in wealth and splendour. This made Campania Roman once more, for Neapolis had never wavered in its loyalty to Rome. In the same year the Consul M. Valerius Laevinus captured Acragas ; the city fell, like Syracuse, through the treachery of a leader of mercenaries, on this occasion actually a Numidian, named Mutines. The whole of Sicily was now Roman again, and the province, which up to 216 had included only the greater part of the island, in 211 embraced the whole island with the formal exception of Messana, which was independent, as well as of Tauromenium and Neeton. The political position of the various communities as regards Rome henceforth differed, according as they had joined Rome of their own free will or by compulsion ; that of Syracuse was among the worst. In the year 210 fortune began to smile on the Romans in Spain also. Young P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the Publius who was slain, achieved great things there ; he even conquered Carthago Nova. In 209 Q. Fabius Maximus performed the parallel to the exploit of Marcellus ;

he took the rival of Syracuse among the Greek cities of the west, the wealthy Tarentum. This too was accomplished by treachery, committed by the leader of the Bruttians. That was a consequence of the system of hired troops. Why should a Spaniard, a Numidian, a Bruttian serve the Carthaginians when they were unlucky and only provided pay, while the Romans were successful and gave handsome rewards for treachery into the bargain? It is worthy of note that examples of such disloyalty were not so common among mercenaries of Greek extraction. After Hasdrubal's daring attempt to repeat his brother's exploits, an attempt which ended in 207 on the Metaurus with the death of the general and the destruction of his army, it was all over with Carthage. In 206 Scipio returned from Spain to Rome, and in 205, although Hannibal was still in Lower Italy, proceeded to Sicily, to collect the army which was to cross over to Africa for a decisive attack on Carthage itself. Hannibal therefore was obliged to leave Italy, where he had really created a kingdom, to protect his native country. But Scipio defeated him in the year 202 at Zama, and in 201 the Carthaginians accepted the peace offered by the Romans, which placed them in a state of permanent dependence on their conquerors; henceforth they were unable to go to war at all without the permission of Rome. Lower Italy had to pay dearly for joining Hannibal. Greek civilization, which had taken firm root in the country of the Bruttii, was wiped out. In 194 colonies of Roman citizens were settled in Temesa and Croton, and in Scylletium in 192; Latin colonies were planted in Thurii in 193 and in Hipponium in 192. The Ager Bruttius with the Sila Silva became state-domain of the Roman people.

We must now hark back a few years, to glance at what had taken place in the meanwhile in Greece. Philip was at war with Rome, but did not venture to attack the Romans, and the latter at first did not consider it necessary to commence hostilities. But in 211, when they had a somewhat freer

hand, they thought it advisable to oppose him indirectly, and they concluded an alliance with his enemies, the Aetolians, the Eleans and the Spartans, as well as with reigning princes in Thrace and Illyria, and with Attalus of Pergamum, who was appointed general of the Aetolian League in 209. The Spartans at that time were under a tyrant, Machanidas. The Achaeans were almost the only allies of Philip. But they were now able to render more assistance than before, because they had (208) an able general, Philopoemen,¹² mentioned above (chap. x.), born in Megalopolis in 253, who had re-organized their military system and revived their warlike spirit, after the death of Aratus had enabled him to devote himself to the League. Philip drove the Aetolians out of Acarnania and defeated them at Lamia in 210; in 208 he lost Oreus to the Romans, but defeated Attalus at Opus. Egypt, Rhodes, Chios and Athens tried in vain to bring about peace. Philip then dislodged the Aetolians from Elis, while Philopoemen routed Machanidas at Mantinea in 207 and killed him in battle with his own hand, a feat in the style of Alexander or Pyrrhus. The sole result of this battle for Sparta was that Machanidas was replaced by the far worse tyrant Nabis. Eventually Philip retook Thermon, and in 205 the Aetolians resolved to make peace with him, without first consulting Rome, as they were bound to do. Soon afterwards he made peace with Rome as well; he ceded a bit of Illyria to the Romans and received Atintania in return.¹³

Both these treaties of peace were only a truce. Philip still nursed a grudge against Rome, and Rome was now annoyed with the Aetolians for having made a separate peace with Philip.

NOTES

1. Authorities for the history of the period from 220-146 B.C. —The history of this period formed the subject of the work of POLYBIUS, for whose character and career see below, chap. xxiv. Only books 1 to 5 have been preserved in their entirety. Of

these books 1 and 2 contain the introduction, bk. 1 describing the First Punic War and the war of the Carthaginians with their mercenaries in Africa, and bk. 2 the relations of Rome with Illyria, the wars of the Romans with the Gauls, and the history of the Achaeans up to the death of Cleomenes. Bk. 3 relates the Second Punic War up to the battle of Cannae (216). Bk. 4 passes over to Greece and narrates the beginning of the League War, the war between Rhodes and Byzantium and the affairs of Sinope (cc. 38-56), then the progress of the League War (cc. 58-87) up to the spring of 218 B.C. Bk. 5 continues this subject up to May 217 (cc. 31-87), then comes the war between Egypt and Syria for Coele Syria, with other exploits of Antiochus (cc. 31-87), the earthquake of Rhodes and its consequences for the city (cc. 88-90); disorders in Greece up to the peace of 217 (cc. 91-105); condition of Athens (c. 106); Egypt, Philip and Illyria, Prusias and the Gauls (cc. 107-111). The fragments preserved of the 6th bk. relate to the constitution and military system of Rome, those of the 7th to the Second Punic War and Syracuse (cc. 2-8); Philip and Hannibal (c. 9), Messene and Philip, 215 (cc. 10-14), Antiochus and Achaeus (cc. 15-18). Bk. 8 gives the siege of Syracuse up to 214 (cc. 5-9); Philip and Aratus (cc. 10-14), Philip takes Lissus (cc. 15, 16); imprisonment of Achaeus (cc. 17-23); Thrace, Media (cc. 24); Babelon, cxxx. n. 21, is inclined to refer the fragment of 25 on Antiochus and Armorata to Antiochus IV.; Tarentum (cc. 26-36); fall of Syracuse (cc. 37, 38).—Bks. 9 and 10 contain the history of Ol. 142, including Philopoemen (cc. 21-24); Antiochus and the Parthians (cc. 27-31, 48, 49); Greek affairs, etc. (cc. 41-48). Bk. 11, attempt of the Rhodians in 207 to persuade the Aetolians to make peace (cc. 4-7); Philopoemen and Machanidas (cc. 8-19); Antiochus in Bactria (c. 34). Bk. 12 is almost entirely taken up with a searching criticism of Timaeus—*περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος*, 25 seq.—I give the most important of the contents of the remaining books quite briefly. Bk. 13, the Aetolians; Philip, Nabis; Antiochus.—Bk. 14, c. 11, Ptolemy IV.—Bk. 15, cc. 20-24, Philip V.; 25-36, Ptolemy V.; 37, Antiochus III.—Bk. 16, cc. 1-20, Attalus, Rhodes and Philip; Nabis; 21, 22, Egypt; 24-35, Philip; 36-38, Greece; 39, Antiochus.—Bk. 18, Philip; a little about Asia and Egypt.—Bk. 20, Greece and Antiochus.—Bk. 21, Roman victories over Antiochus, the Aetolians and the Galatae.—Bk. 22, Greece and Asia up to 184.—Bk. 23, esp. the year 183.—Bk. 24, esp. 182-180. Bk. 25, beginnings of Perseus, Rhodes and Lycia.—Bk. 26, Antiochus IV.—Bk. 27, esp. 170.—Bk. 28, 169.—Bk. 29, 168, Perseus, Ptolemy and Antiochus IV.—Bk. 30, history of the Pergamene rulers and the Rhodians.—Bk. 31, Pergamum, Syria, Egypt; flight of Demetrius from Rome.

—Bk. 32, the Ptolemies, Syria, Greece.—Bk. 33 goes down to 153.
—Bk. 34, geographical matter.—Bk. 35, Spain.—Bk. 36, Third Punic War.—Bks. 37-39, Greece, conclusion.—The incorporation of the fragments into the different books cannot always be depended on.
—LIVY. Bks. 21-30, 218-201 B.C., 31-45 up to the end of the war with Perseus, 167 B.C. Livy follows Polybius where he can; cf. Nissen, *Krit. Untersuch. über die Quellen der 4. und 5. Dekade des Livius*, Berlin, 1863.—JUSTINUS. Bks. 29-34, with the accompanying prologues of Trogus. Bk. 29 contains a very fair account of the political situation about the year 220, and then an inadequate narrative of the facts relating to Philip. Bk. 30, condition of Egypt under Philopator; Philip and his Greek opponents and friends, T. Quinctius. Antiochus is mentioned only in the prologue. Bk. 31, war of the Romans with Antiochus. The prologue supplies a good deal that is wanting in Justinus, who makes up for this by plenty of superfluous fine phrases. Bk. 32, death of Philopoemen; Philip and Demetrius, Perseus; war between Prusias and Eumenes; death of Hannibal, Philopoemen and Scipio; the prologue has a more minute account of the war in Asia. Bk. 33, war with Perseus; supplemented in the prologue. Bk. 34, defeat of the Achaeans; Justinus develops his political standpoint. The history of Antiochus and Popilius now appears for the first time; supplemented in the prologue.—In bk. 35 we have the accounts of Demetrius I. and Alexander Bala.—The fragments of DIODORUS. While bk. 26, which extends from 217-207, deals almost exclusively with the west, the fragments of bk. 27 (207-201) contain something, but not much, of the east: Nabis, the Cretans. In the following books this is not so; the fragments of bks. 28-31 are almost confined to eastern matters. Bk. 28, 200-193; Philip, Antiochus, bk. 29, 192-172: Antiochus and his successors; Philip and Perseus; the Ptolemies; bk. 30, 171-168: war with Perseus. Bk. 31, 167-151: Bithynia, Syria, Cappadocia, Pergamum, Rhodes, Crete. On the other hand, in bk. 32 (150-146) there is as much about the west (Carthage) as about the east (Achaia, Syria). The foregoing summary and the remarks in note 1 to chap. ix. justify the same conclusion in regard to Diodorus' mode of work and principles of arrangement in these books as we drew in vol. iii. pp. 15, 16, from an examination of his earlier books, viz. that, in order not to be too prolix and too unequal in chronology, he gives less space at one time to the west and at another to the east according to his own judgment and discretion, the practical result of which is that he cannot be always complete, and that it cannot be inferred from his non-mention of any fact in the designedly neglected divisions that he does not admit it. It is true

that we are dealing now with fragments, but we must bear in mind that they were selected and preserved on account of the interest attaching to their details, and so they also clearly show what subjects Diodorus treated with greater minuteness. We are therefore justified in concluding that in bks. 22-26 he gave a decided predominance to the west, in bk. 27 a slight one to the east, in bks. 28-31 a marked one to the east, and that in bk. 32 he treated the east and the west alike. And it may be said that, from the point of view of universal history, he was not wrong in so doing. For between the years 280 and 220 (four books, 22-25) Pyrrhus, the First Punic War and the exploits of the Carthaginians in Spain were of greater general interest than what happened in Greece and the east at the same time, and similarly from 217-207 (bk. 26) the main interest centred in the war with Hannibal (from 280 onwards 74 years in five books). On the other hand, the east, which includes Greece, becomes of more importance for universal history than the west, as soon as Rome occupies herself almost exclusively with those regions; this holds good of bks. 28-31, which embrace 50 years, from 200-151, during which Rome has little to do with the west.—The giving of a preference to certain groups of facts is a general characteristic of universal history, and is undoubtedly natural, nay even necessary. No universal history is possible without the omission of much that is important in itself, but not essential for the connection of the work. This should not be forgotten in Roman history.—Of **APPIAN** bk. 6 *Ἰβηρική*, 7 *Ἀντιβαϊκή*, 8 *Λιβυκή*, *Καρχηδονική καὶ Νομαδική* are less important, 9 *Μακεδονική* is more so. Bk. 10 *Ἑλληνική καὶ Ἰωνική* is lost, but 11 *Συριακή καὶ Παρθική* preserved. Appian evidently made copious but desultory use of Polybius for the period now under our consideration; cf. Nissen, *Krit. Unters.* p. 114; see also Harnack, *Appian und seine Quellen*, Vienna, 1869.—Of **PLUTARCH** the following belong to this period: Philopoemen, Fabius Maximus, Marcellus, Titus Quinctius, Cato Censorius, L. Aemilius Paulus. For Plutarch's source in the biographies of the Greeks see Haug, Tübingen, 1854, in those of the Romans, Peter, Halle, 1865; also Nissen, *Krit. Unters.* pp. 280 seq.; W. Schwarze, *Quibus font. Plut. in vita L. Aemilii Pauli usus sit*, Lips. 1891.—On the authorities for the history of the East cf. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, vol. 1, Introduction.—Of modern writers cf. from now onwards esp. Hertzberg's work, quoted in note 1 to chap. ix., which only treats the East incidentally; Flathe, *Gesch. Macedoniens und der Reiche, welche von maced. Königen beherrscht wurden*, vol. 2, 1834; and for the position of Rhodes, Rospatt, *Die Politik der Republik Rhodos*, in the *Philologus*, vols. 27 and 29.—In the

history of the ancient world, the highest achievements of which are products of city communities, Rome occupies a special position, by its faculty of incorporating other *poleis* as well as by the imposing development of its legal system (see below, chap. xxiv.). Would it be out of place to draw an inference from this as to the obscure beginnings of Rome and to say that there must after all be some truth in the tradition, which has been again questioned of late, that Rome was originally composed of several different elements? Does not such an origin make it easier to account for the wonderful power which the Romans had not merely of appreciating foreign constitutions and laws, but of assimilating them to such an extent that foreigners, while not losing all their own idiosyncrasies, yet became Romans?—Cf. for the development of the *polis* W. Warde Fowler's excellent book, *The City-State of the Greeks and Romans*, London, 1893.

2. Antiochus III. Principal authority Polybius, esp. from 5, 40 up to the end of the 21st book; subsequently Livy, esp. from bk. 31 onwards. Justinus, bk. 31; notices in Joseph. *Antiquitates*; App. Syr. 1, where it is said that he was called μέγας Ἀντίοχος for his campaigns in the east.—See the article on him in Pauly, 1, 1, 1131-1135 with the older works quoted there, Heyden, *Res Ant. III. gestae*, Monast. 1877, Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, lxxvii.-lxxxvi. and Wilcken in Pauly-Wissowa.—His coins, chap. xvii. of this volume, note 12.—Power of Egypt about the year 222 B.C. see above, chap. xiii. note 2.—Death of Cleomenes, Polyb. 5, 35-39.

3. Preparations of the Egyptians, Polyb. 5, 62-65, where valuable information is given about the military system of the Ptolemies; e.g. ἱππεῖς περὶ τὴν αὐλήν are mentioned, also Thracians and Galatae, who are called κάτοικοι (see above, chap. xiii. note 7) and ἐπίγονοι, i.e. original settlers and their descendants. Cf. the Greek inscriptions in Neroutzos, *L'anc. Alex.* p. 101. Battle of Raphia, Polyb. 5, 82-86. The Peace, 5, 87.—Seleucia ad Mare, wrested from the Ptolemies by Antiochus (Polyb. 5, 58-61), was in the possession of Syria in 196 B.C. (Liv. 33, 41), and therefore was in all probability not reconquered by Egypt.—Epigenes, Ditt. 173; Fränkel, Nos. 29, 30, with Koehler's notes; Athenaeum, 1892, Dec. 10.—The exploits of Antiochus in the east, Polyb. 8, 27-31, 48, 49. It must have been at this time that he settled Jews in Phrygia, to strengthen his hold on that country, Jos. Ant. 12, 3, 4.—For the two Achaeus's cf. Wilcken in Pauly-Wissowa, 1, 206.

4. Rebellion in Egypt, Polyb. 5, 107; cf. Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 213. For the third book of Maccabees, Schürer, 2, 743-745.

5. Philopator and the Romans, Polyb. 9, 44; Liv. 23, 7, 10.

Philopator's mediation between Philip and Aetolia, Polyb. 5, 100. Relations of Philopator with Gortyna, Str. 10, 476, 478.

6. The *συμμαχικὸς πόλεμος* is related in Polyb. 4, 3 seq. See Töpffer, Achaia, in Pauly's R. E. 3rd ed. Geographical details in Oberhummer, Akarnanien. See also Arci, Peloponn. al tempo della guerra sociale, in the Studi di stor. ant. pubblic. G. Beloch, II, Roma, 1893.

7. In the Peace of 217 B.C. the Aetolians kept Phocis and Locris according to Gilbert, Staatsalt. 2, 25.—The Achaeans agreed to pay Philip 50 talents down, and 17 talents a month besides, Polyb. 5, 1. This payment of subsidies was discreditable to Greece, because it showed that wealth was coming into favour among the Greeks instead of manly vigour. Formerly the kings had supplied money, and the Greeks men. The reversal of this practice in Achaia was the fault of Aratus, who had let the military organization of the League deteriorate to such an extent that about the year 220 the cities would not pay their contributions to the League and tried to get on alone, Polyb. 4, 60. Philopoemen improved this state of things.

8. Philip's alliance with Hannibal, Polyb. 7, 9; cf. Pauly, 5, 1483.—See also Mommsen and Robert, Philipp V. und die Larisäer, in the Hermes, vol. 17.

9. Demetrius of Pharos, Polyb. 4, 66; Just. 32; his death, *ibid.* 3, 19.

10. Aratus called Philip's *καθηγεμών* by Polyb. 7, 14. Death of Aratus, Polyb. 8, 14. It is true that, as Shuckburgh remarks on this passage, *τῶν πρὸς τῇ τοίχῳ πτυσμάτων δίαϊμον* is no real proof that Aratus was poisoned, although, we may add, arsenic might undoubtedly produce such an effect. This story, by the way, shows that the nasty southern habit of spitting in all directions, even on the walls, was common at that time in the best houses in Greece.

11. Second Punic War. Conquest of Syracuse, Cavallari-Holm, Topographia archeologica di Siracusa, Pal. 1883, and Lupus, Die Stadt Syrakus im Alterthum, Strassb. 1887.—For Taras see the writings of Lorentz and Viola quoted in the first vol. of this work, p. 301.—Fate of the Bruttium country, Nissen, Italische Landeskunde, 1, 537.—The legal position of the various communities of Sicily in regard to the Romans is explained by Cicero in his speeches against Verres.

12. Philopoemen. See the references in Hermann, Staatsalterth. § 188, where Freeman's verdict is also given; van Gorkom, Utrecht, 1843, takes a different view; Mahaffy, Greek Life, 441; Peter, Studien zur römischen Geschichte, 1863. After the death of Cleomenes, in 219, there are kings in Sparta: Agesipolis, of

the Agiadae family, and Lycurgus, who did not belong to any royal line, then Machanidas in 211.

13. The agreement of the Romans with the Aetolians about the division of the spoils ("truly disgraceful" for Rome, Hertz. 1, 35) in Liv. 26, 24, is in accordance, as Freeman (*Hist. of Sicily*, 3, 56) rightly remarks, with the old Greek practice, which the pious Nicias observed at Hyccara, Thuc. 6, 62. It is therefore not so very disgraceful for the Romans if viewed from the standpoint of ancient international law.—The Peace, Polyb. 11, 4-7; Hertz. 11, 46, 47. In it Rome represents Pergamum, Athens, Sparta, Messenia, Elis; Philip Bithynia, Thessaly, Epirus, Acarnania, Boeotia and the Achaeans. Rome therefore has already become one of the protecting powers of Greece.

CHAPTER XVI

THE EAST—GREECE—PHILIP DEFEATED BY ROME (205-192 B.C.)

WE now come to the period in which the pride of the king of Macedonia was humbled, while that of the king of Syria found fresh aliment in successful undertakings.

Once more we begin with the East. In Egypt the year 204 was marked by the death of the vicious Ptolemy IV. Philopator, whose foreign policy had been fairly well managed by Sosibius.¹ Under his successor, his son by his sister Arsinoe, Ptolemy V. Epiphanes (204-181), who was four or five years old at his accession, the character of the government remained of course the same, but with this difference, that the ministers changed more rapidly and were removed with greater violence; with the tender age of the king the assassination of a minister was the only sure method of putting an end to his influence in a state like Egypt. Occasionally even the not over moral people of Alexandria undertook the part of vindicator of an outraged morality. In any event they were better than the men who governed them. From this time forward the Egyptian government was simply a tyranny of capricious and immoral despots, slightly tempered by popular revolt and foreign influence. At first Sosibius and Agathocles ruled together under Epiphanes; then Sosibius disappears in some unknown way, and Agathocles governs alone with his kinsman. Against them the Macedonians of Alexandria rose

in revolt. Agathocles was obliged to deliver up the young king, and was put to death with his crew. His fall had been compassed by Tlepolemus, who now exhibited little skill as minister. He was overthrown by the former Aetolian general Scopas and the Acarnanian Aristomenes. After a time Aristomenes put Scopas out of the way (196 B.C.), but did not maintain his position long, for Epiphanes, who had meanwhile grown up, wanted to show his power and had him poisoned. During the rest of the king's life Polycrates and Aristonicus ruled the state; Epiphanes was a puppet in their hands. Compared with him even Antiochus of Syria was a great man, who could achieve success, especially when he covered his rear, as he did, by allying himself with Philip of Macedonia.

In the war between Egypt and Syria fortune shifted from side to side. At the beginning Scopas reoccupied Palestine. But then he was defeated (in 198) by Antiochus near the sources of the Jordan on Mount Paneum; he held out for a time in Sidon, but was subsequently obliged to fall back towards Egypt. Jerusalem also now fell into the hands of Antiochus. Under these circumstances it may appear strange that the peace now concluded (197/6) was not more advantageous to Antiochus in Syria. It was agreed that Epiphanes should marry Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus, and that the latter should receive Coelesyria, Phoenicia, and Palestine as her dowry. It is true that Egypt and Syria were to divide the revenues of these provinces, and this made the cession of the country to Egypt only a nominal one.² But Egypt at the same time renounced its possessions in Asia Minor in favour of Syria by a secret treaty, and that was a great success for Antiochus (see chap. xvii. note 2).

In its domestic affairs the government of Epiphanes underwent just as many changes as in its foreign relations. The importance of the foreign element had been increasing for some considerable time. Philopator had employed Egyptians in war and by so doing had inspired them with a consciousness

of their strength. That had emboldened them, revolts had broken out, which the government suppressed in a sanguinary fashion. The same thing went on under Epiphanes : besides tumults of foreign, especially Aetolian, mercenaries there were risings of natives, the most important of which ended with the capture of Lycopolis. The ministers accordingly thought it advisable to conciliate the native element, and they attempted it by the solemn installation of the king on the Egyptian throne in the temple of Ptah at Memphis in 195 B.C.—the ceremony called *Anacleteria* by Polybius. The same policy was also carried out by donations to the priests, of the kind which had been customary from the time of Ptolemy I.; their gratitude for this act of favour of Epiphanes is revealed by the famous Rosetta stone.³ In the end Epiphanes became involved in a quarrel with his brother-in-law Seleucus IV., and as the Aetolians, who had been humbled by Rome, were no longer suitable auxiliaries for Egypt, the king tried to obtain the assistance of the Achaeans. But before he accomplished this he died, poisoned by his 'friends,' *i.e.* his courtiers, councillors of state, ministers. The end of his reign was worthy of the whole course of it. The reigns of his sons will occupy our attention later on.

We now turn to Graeco-Macedonian affairs.⁴ The position created for him by the war with Rome was intolerable to Philip. But he could not pluck up courage to attack the Romans. He wanted to indemnify himself in the east and the south, and with this object he struck up an alliance with Antiochus. The latter was to obtain the whole of Syria, and he himself to conquer as much of Asia Minor as possible. This policy however brought him, even more than Antiochus, into conflict with the states belonging to the great peace league, of which Rhodes, Pergamum and at that time (197) Egypt were the leading ones, while Athens, Byzantium, Chios were more in the second rank. On this side too was Aetolia, which protected Lysimachia, Chalcedon and Cius. But in the background again, as a reserve support to all these states, stood

Rome, and the narrowness of Philip's political horizon is revealed in this very idea of his, that he could make conquests in the south and east at the expense of Rhodes, Pergamum, Egypt, Aetolia and Athens without incurring the displeasure of the Romans, whom he nevertheless feared and shrank from attacking directly. The result was that he was able to achieve successes for a time, but only to lose all his gains at one blow. Philip had a particular grudge against the Rhodians, who, in his opinion, interfered in matters which did not concern them. High politics, he thought, was an occupation for kings. His general Heraclides was made to play the old trick of pretending that he had been insulted by his master and was therefore obliged to take refuge in a foreign state. He came to Rhodes, and after a friendly reception there, set fire to the arsenal, vanished from the city and reappeared at Philip's court as his general. If this stroke was not of much use to the king, elsewhere, against weaker antagonists, he was all the more successful (201 B.C.). He engaged in piracy through the agency of the Aetolian Dicaearchus, supported the Cretans against the Rhodians and occupied the Cyclades, which were under the protection of Egypt, also the Hellespontine cities allied with Aetolia, Lysimachia, Chalcedon and Cius, and finally Thasos as well. The Rhodians, who had not yet been openly attacked by Philip, addressed remonstrances to him about his treatment of Cius. At the very moment when he was selling the Cians into slavery, his envoys at Rhodes had to declare to the people in the theatre that he had pursued a lenient policy in Cius out of consideration for Rhodes, whereupon the Rhodian Prytanis, who had just heard the truth, informed the people what the king's leniency really was. After that Rhodes, Chios and Byzantium treated him as an enemy. Philip now attacked Chios and Samos and devastated the territory of Pergamum. Attalus then tried, in concert with the Rhodians, to bring the war to an issue at sea, but without result. He and the Rhodian admiral Theophiliscus

fought with some success off Chios, but as Attalus' ship was captured, while the king himself escaped to land and Theophiliscus died of his wounds after the battle, Philip claimed the victory, and in a second naval engagement off Lade the Rhodians were really beaten. Their fleet withdrew to Cos, and Philip took some places in Caria which belonged to the Rhodians. At the close of the year 201, however, he returned to Europe; he had been hard pressed in Caria, and had besides been informed that his various opponents were coming to an understanding among themselves.

Athens, with whom Philip, as ally of the Acarnanians, who had been affronted by the Athenians, was also at enmity, became the centre of the negotiations, and the Romans, who had now a free hand for other undertakings owing to the peace with Carthage in 201, placed themselves at the head of his antagonists. The leading part was taken ostensibly by Attalus. It was a moment which recalled the ancient glory of Athens when Attalus, accompanied by the Roman envoys, was conducted in solemn procession into the city from the Piraeus, whither he had proceeded from the island of Aegina, which belonged to him. He communicated his proposals in a written document, which was read aloud in the Assembly, and in which he invited the Athenians to join him, the Rhodians and the Romans against Philip. Envoys from Rhodes spoke to the same effect, and Athens resolved on war with Philip. The Rhodians received the *isopolitia* in Athens, which had already been bestowed on the Romans, and a phyle was called Attalis after Attalus. The Rhodian fleet retook most of the islands of the Aegean from Philip. On the other hand, Philip's general Nicanor devastated Attica, but withdrew when summoned to do so by the Roman envoys. The latter addressed a similar peace reminder to the Epirotes, Athamanians, Achaeans and Aetolians, and then sailed to Asia, to protect the interests of Rome in that quarter and if possible bring about peace between Egypt and Syria. Philip would now

have required all his prudence merely to maintain the position which he then held. It was still possible, as war had not yet been declared by Rome. But he behaved with still greater recklessness and thereby accelerated his fall.

In the year 200 his general Heraclides took the cities of Maronea and Aenus, which were subject to Egypt, the latter by treachery; he himself captured Elaeus, Alopeconnesus, and some other places, and then attacked Abydos, which he wanted to have at all hazards for crossing over to Asia. Attalus and the Rhodians did not venture to help the city, and it had to surrender. Before Philip made his entry into Abydos, M. Aemilius, a member of the Roman embassy which had started for Asia, came to remonstrate with him about his attacks on the friends of Rome. Philip was worsted in the discussion, and broke it off with empty phrases. The inhabitants of Abydos had sworn to one another, when Philip refused them a safe conduct, not to fall alive into his hands, and they kept their word. Most of them took their own lives. Philip, who was annoyed at losing all the money which he had hoped to make by selling the citizens, indulged in the equally tasteless and contemptible joke that he would gladly allow them three days to hang or stab themselves. In the interval they would of course have been placed in safe custody and then sold.

By the autumn of the year 200 a Roman army under P. Sulpicius Galba was in Illyria, and C. Claudius proceeded to Asia with 20 ships and 1000 men. On the way he took Chalcis, but abandoned it afterwards, because he was not strong enough to hold it. Philip attacked Athens, but had to fall back at the Dipylon, and revenged himself by laying waste the surrounding country, not even sparing the tombs. When Attalus' troops approached from Aegina and the Romans from the Piraeus, he retreated to the Peloponnese, where he promised the Achaeans to help them against Nabis if they would send him their forces to Euboea. But the Achaeans

did not comply with this ill-concealed request for aid; they could not forget that he had tried to poison Philopoemen. Philip accordingly marched northwards again, and vented his rage on Attica, which he ravaged more severely than before, this time actually breaking the statues in pieces. If Philip accomplished nothing in Greece in this fashion, the Romans did just as little in Macedonia; nor were they more successful in 199. A change did not take place till 198, when Macedonia was assigned to the Consul T. Quinctius Flamininus as his official district. In the course of the war, which was at first carried on in Epirus, a meeting ensued north of Dodona on the Aous between Titus and Philip, who was now inclined for peace. When, however, Titus demanded the evacuation of Thessaly, the king broke off the negotiations. Titus succeeded in turning Philip's strong position, and the latter retreated to Macedonia, after laying waste Thessaly by way of farewell. The allies of Rome, the Aetolians, also ravaged Thessaly, but Titus tried in vain to take the fortified city of Atrax near Larissa, and then went into winter quarters at Anticyra in Phocis. His brother Lucius conquered Eretria and Carystus with a fleet of Roman, Rhodian and Pergamene ships. Titus now endeavoured to persuade the Achaeans to join the league against Macedonia, and succeeded, after the opponents of Rome, the representatives of Argos, Megalopolis and Dyme, had left the league assembly. Argos, on the other hand, sided with Philip.

Titus would not have been sorry to come to terms with Philip at this stage, as, if the war dragged on, there was a prospect of a successor to him being sent out in the person of one of the new Consuls. A second meeting of the two leaders therefore took place, this time on the Malian Gulf near Nicaea, early in 197 B.C. With Titus appeared envoys from Attalus, from the Rhodians, the Achaeans and the Aetolians, to present their demands, some of which related to special points and others to interests affecting the Greeks generally.

Attalus, for instance, demanded the rebuilding of the shrines destroyed by Philip near Pergamum, the Aphrodision and the Nicephorion, the Rhodians the restoration of their *peraia*, and the abandonment of all places occupied in Asia. A two months' truce was agreed to, during which the negotiations were to be continued in Rome. But here no agreement was arrived at. Philip declined to give up Demetrias, Chalcis and Corinth, and the upshot was that the war went on and that Titus was charged with the conduct of it as well as with the settlement of Greek affairs. It was about this time that Philip played another trick, which revealed his character in all its deformity. He wanted to make an ally of Nabis—secondary matters were occasionally of more consequence to him than essentials—and naturally had to pay him a price. The simplest plan seemed to be to make him a present of Argos, which had just joined Macedonia. The tyrant of course treated the Argives atrociously, and that was a matter of indifference to Philip; but the strangest part of the business was that Nabis remained more loyal than ever to the Romans. Thus a scoundrel was outwitted by a still cleverer one, the king by the tyrant. Philip had gradually turned out to be an unscrupulous individual, absorbed in petty calculations, and yet making an impression on a good many people by his command of military detail and his gift of speech—a remarkable proof that a crown is an extremely dazzling ornament.

In the spring of 197 Titus, after forcing Boeotia to revolt from Philip, marched into Thessaly, where a battle was fought not far from Pherae and Scotussa, near the hills called Cynoscephalae. The Roman formation in separate *manipuli*, which could be easily handled, and the cohesion of which was not broken by inequalities of the ground, as was the case with the Macedonian phalanx, on this occasion (see above, p. 177) prevailed over the arm which for a century and a half had been famous throughout the world. The victorious Roman

right wing fell upon the equally victorious Macedonian right wing from the rear—a phalanx with its rigid array could hardly have accomplished this feat—and the phalanx fled. Of the Macedonians 8000 men fell on the field, and 5000 were taken prisoners; the Romans too lost as many as 700 men. Philip, who had already filled up the ranks of his army with boys and old men, could not continue the war. He sued for peace, and Titus acceded to his wish with all the more readiness because he did not think it politic to annihilate Macedonia and allow the Aetolians to become too powerful. The latter now demanded, on the strength of the treaty of 211, the immovable spoils, *i.e.* the cities in Thessaly formerly occupied by them and now given up by Philip. The Romans did not wish them to get these, and maintained that the treaty in question had become inoperative through the Aetolians having made peace with Philip in 205 without consulting the Romans. There was much truth in this. Philip, moreover, was all the more disposed to accept the terms which he had formerly rejected, because he had received three other blows: the Rhodians had reconquered Caria as far as Stratonicea, the Macedonian garrison of Corinth had been defeated in a sortie, and Leucas had fallen into the hands of L. Quinctius, the consequence of which was that the Acarnanians went over from Macedonia to Rome. A Macedonian embassy proceeded to Rome, and with it Philip's son, Demetrius, as hostage. The terms fixed by the Senate and accepted by Philip, and the execution of which was superintended on the spot by the usual commission of ten Romans of rank, were as follows: the Greeks in Europe under Philip's rule were handed over to the Romans, those in Asia he set at liberty, he paid the Romans 1000 talents and surrendered to them all his ships of war but five. Livy adds that he was not allowed to have an army of more than 5000 men, or to wage war outside Macedonia without the permission of the Romans.⁵ Of the allies of the Romans the Aetolians were the least satisfied with the result.

As their claims to the cities in Thessaly met with no support, they preferred a complaint of a more general nature. Greece, they said, had only changed its master, as Philip had made over the cities held by him to Rome. This grievance was soon removed by the Romans, but Roman influence did no doubt take the place of that of Macedonia in Greece.

The results of the war were communicated to the Greeks at the Isthmian Games, in 196 B.C. In the presence of Titus a herald read a proclamation stating that the Romans and the proconsul and imperator, T. Quinctius, having vanquished Philip, declared the following communities to be independent: the Corinthians, the Phocians, the Locrians, Euboea, the Magnetes, the Thessalians, the Perrhaebi and the Phthiotian Achaeans. The apprehensions to which the Aetolians had given utterance were now for the most part dispelled. The rejoicing was great, the herald had to repeat what he said, and Plutarch relates that some birds, which happened to be flying by, were stunned with the noise and fell to the ground. Titus was made the object of a tumultuous ovation.⁶

Among the points of detail settled by the ten envoys and Titus may be mentioned that Phocis and Locris were included in the Aetolian, and Corinth, Triphylia and Heraea in the Achaean League, and that Oreus and Eretria did not fall to Pergamum but remained independent.

In modern days this proclamation of Titus has been called a piece of acting: Rome, it is said, declared Greece to be free, while her real intention was to be master of it. This amounts to a charge, firstly of arrogance—for it was not the province of the Romans to proclaim the freedom of the independent Greeks—and secondly of hypocrisy. The first insinuation is untrue, the second improbable. The Romans did not declare the Greeks in general to be free, but only those communities which had been ceded by Philip to Rome, and they acted rightly in so doing. But there is no warrant for the assertion that they secretly intended to let this freedom remain a

dead letter. It is possible that many Romans wished to influence the policy of the Greeks; but this has nothing to do with the proclamation at the Isthmus, which was an appropriate solution of a purely practical question.

The settlement of affairs in the Peloponnese was still a source of difficulties, as Nabis refused to surrender Argos. Titus convened a meeting of the allied Greeks at Corinth, where war with Nabis was resolved on. Even Philip, who, it is true, had every reason for being angry with Nabis, sent troops. Titus forced his way into the city of Sparta, but withdrew from it when it was set on fire by its defenders, and then concluded a treaty with Nabis in which the latter complied with the demands made by Titus, not only renouncing Argos, which had in the meanwhile freed itself, but also his possessions in Crete, which fell to Rome, and giving up his fleet besides. The Laconians who were hostile to Nabis were allowed to settle as an independent community in southern Laconia (195). By this means Nabis was cut off from the sea—a very unpleasant predicament for a pirate.⁷

In the year 194 the garrisons in Demetrias, Chalcis, Oreus, Eretria and Acro-Corinthus were withdrawn by the Romans. This was an unselfish but not a prudent policy, for they had the means of knowing that Antiochus was preparing to make his influence paramount in Greece.

Thus the defeat of Philip left Greece in a not unsatisfactory position. Historians ought to recognize this and in general try to see things as they really were. But this is not done as a rule. The stereotyped view is that the Greeks at this time, about the year 200 B.C., were degenerate, and the Romans not straightforward. In reality the Greeks possessed much the same sterling qualities as of old—that there was no lack of heroism among them was proved by the citizens of Abydos, who were not a whit behind the Saguntines or the inhabitants of Saragossa or Puebla in desperate courage—and the Romans were as little self-seeking as one state can be with

another. True, the Greeks could not agree among themselves, but that is no proof of degeneracy. Were the Guelphs and the Ghibellines degenerate because they fought it out to the bitter end? Or the Cavaliers and the Roundheads? Or the Chouans and the Republicans? If the Greeks of the first half of the second century B.C. had only talked and not acted, then we might speak of decay. But they fought when it was necessary, and Philopoemen and the citizens of Abydos would be a credit to any age and any people.

Nor must we be unjust to the Romans of that time any more than to the Greeks. Against a monarch like Philip they championed the cause of civilization. When we go farther and examine their relations with the Greeks in general, the first significant point is the circumstances which led to their intervening in the affairs of Greece: it was done to curb the insolence of the Illyrian pirates, with whom the Greeks themselves were unable to cope. Another point of significance is that their most loyal allies were the peace powers—Rhodes, Pergamum and Athens. Finally, Roman intervention in Greek affairs took place in the main at the request of the parties concerned, and for a very legitimate reason. From time immemorial the Greeks were disunited, and from time immemorial they felt the necessity of overcoming their want of union. To attain this object they never shrank from submitting to foreign influence. From the time of Pyrrhus onwards the Roman Senate had enjoyed the not undeserved reputation of great wisdom and firmness, and therefore any steps in the nature of arbitration taken by this body seemed to the Greeks not inappropriate, and at all events advantageous. And the action of Rome through Titus was only of a useful kind. That this was not so later on was due not only to the interminable squabbles of the Greeks themselves, but also to the fact that the character of the Romans gradually changed. The love of power predominated more and more in them. About the year 200 B.C. the existence of the Roman Senate

was a decided benefit for the Greek world; a hundred years later perhaps only a bitter necessity.

We must not try to see merely ambition and greed of territory in everything which Rome does on the invitation of outsiders or otherwise. Without the possession of a great moral force Rome would not have annexed the world. It was not done by her great generals. Other peoples had just as many of them, and Hannibal was without a rival. Rome did not prevail by force or stratagem, but by the ever-growing power of attraction of a state based on a unique system of law, a republic which did not aim at the direct control of other republics, but which left all the variety of existing institutions in the states under its protection well-nigh untouched.

The assertion that Rome worked by attraction and in obedience to a natural law does not exclude the fact that in individual cases policy, *i.e.* calculations of a special kind, was also an ingredient in her success, and policy which was at one time guided by ideas, at another by practical considerations. But this was of secondary importance for the total result. The unconscious magnetism was the main thing. A current, which was daily growing more irresistible and overwhelming the refractory elements, among them especially the kings, swept the populations of the Mediterranean littoral, which were anxious for peace, into the orbit of Rome.⁸

NOTES

1. Egypt. Polyb. 5, 35 seq.—Syria and Macedonia against Ptolemy V., Polyb. 3, 2; Liv. 31, 14. For Ptolemy V. Epiphanes, Mahaffy, *Empire*, 289-327. Rome and Egypt, chap. xvii. note 2, and Mahaffy, 296-298. According to Mahaffy M. Lepidus was not guardian of the king, as he has been represented to be.—Battle near Mount Paneum, Polyb. 16, 18. Site of Paneas (Caesarea Philippi) on one of the sources of the Jordan, Baed. Pal.² 265.

2. We have no exact information of the terms of the peace, allusions in App. Syr. 4 and Liv. 33, 40, 41. According to c. 41

the rumour was spread of the death of Ptolemy, wrongly called Philopator by App. 4. According to Liv. 11. the date of the peace was 196 B.C. The marriages, App. Syr. 5. Wedding at Raphia, 194/3 B.C. Liv. 35, 13. See also Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 2, 52.—As regards the dependency of Phœnician cities on Egypt cf. Head, H. N. under Sidon (670), Tripolis (673), Tyre (674), and Six, *Num. Chron.* 1877, p. 192; Aradus (Head, 665 seq.), strange to say, sided with the Seleucids and not with the Ptolemies; it struck a good many coins with Alexander types, has its own era (259 B.C.) and from 170 onwards the Ephesian bee. Cf. Aradus in Babelon's *Mél. numism.* Paris, 1892.—The taxes farmed by the Ptolemies, Jos. Ant. 12, 4.

3. Concessions to the priests, to counteract 'Mahdis,' Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, 439. For the importance of the Jews in Alexander the Great's Empire, *ibid.* 469, 470. Cf. Letronne's edition of the *Inscription grecque de Rosette*, in vol. 1 of Müller's *Fr. Histor. Gr.*, Paris, Didot. Letronne discusses the revolts with which the Ptolemies had to contend; for the chronology, note 16, for the capture of Lycopolis, note 42. The form of the Greek text of the inscription recalls a psephisma: line 8 εἶπαρ, line 36 ἐδοξε. Cf. Mahaffy, *Empire*, 301-305 and 316-327 (Greek text with commentary).

4. Philip V.; Hertzberg, 1, 53 seq.—Heraclides in Rhodes, Polyb. 13, 4, 5. Polyæn. 5, 17, 2.—Dicaearchus erects altars to Ἀσέβεια and Παπανομία wherever he lands, Polyb. 18, 54, 37; cf. Diod. 28, 1.—The Rhodians angry about Cius, Polyb. 15, 12.—Philip's attack on Pergamum, Polyb. 16, 1; Diod. 28, 5, where it is stated that the ἱερὰ of Pergamum had γλυφὰς θαυμαζομένας; consequently Pergamum was famous for its art as early as 200 B.C.—Naval battle, Polyb. 16, 14, 15.—Execution of two Acarnanians in Athens, Liv. 31, 14.—Congress in Athens, Polyb. 16, 25, 26. According to Paus. 1, 36, an alliance was concluded through Cephisodorus between Athens, Attalus the Mysian, Ptolemy, the Aetolians and the Cretans. Head (H. N.) connects the coins of Cnossus (p. 390), Cydonia (392), Gortyna (395), Hierapytna (397), Polyrrhenion (403) and Priansus (405), which are modelled on Athenian coins, with this alliance.—Aegina purchased from the Aetolians by Attalus, and therefore a point of support for the rulers of Pergamum in Greece, Polyb. 23, 8; cf. Fränkel, No. 47. Eumenes and Attalus resided a good deal in Greece.—Phyle Attalis, Polyb. 16, 25; Hermann-Thumser, § 135; Gilb. 1, 190, 191.—Philip playing the wit with M. Aemilius, Polyb. 16, 34; Liv. 31, 18. Polybius says rightly of Philip: ἐξαπορίσας, and Livy quite as correctly that Philip was not accustomed to free speech. It is now asserted that the Romans wanted to make Philip

declare war, and that consequently the answer, with which he avoided this trap, was a subtle one (Momms. 1, 710). The first of these assertions would appear to be mistaken; the Romans had no objection to declare war themselves. As for Philip, if he suspected a trap and wanted to avoid it, he might have followed the old diplomatic method of the Greeks (cf. the Peloponnesian War) and have rejoined with a counter-complaint. If instead of this he dragged in the person of the envoy—he might, he said, have replied with much greater asperity, and would have done so if Aemilius had not been such a handsome young man!—that was not so much subtle as impudent.—Philip's character, Polyb. 18, 3. —For T. Quintius, Polyb. 18, 12. Meeting at Nicaea, Polyb. 18 (17), 1 seq.; Liv. 32, 32 seq. Philip, who shrank from no atrocity, by way of a change paraded his piety there; φοβεῖσθαι μὲν ἔφησε Φίλ. οὐδένα πλὴν τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀπιστεῖν δὲ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν παρόντων. This reference to the fear of God as contrasted with the fear of men shows knowledge of the Oriental culture of the age (Proverbs of Solomon); the *mot* was repeated by Racine in the famous line of *Athalie*, 1, 1: Je crains Dieu, cher Abner, et n'ai pas d'autre crainte, and by Fénelon, *Téléme.* 5; and in our own day by a well-known personage. See above, chap. iii. note 15.

5. Conditions of peace, Polyb. 18, 44; Liv. 33, 30. Aenus and Maronea seem to be tacitly left to the king; see chap. xviii. note 2.—See also Nissen, *Untersuchungen*, 144 seq.—Fresh development of coinage in Euboea after 196, Cat. Br. Mus. Centr. Greece (by Head), 1884, p. lxiv.; gold drachm, pl. xix. 1.

6. The Isthmian Games, 196 B.C. Polyb. 18, 46 seq. Liv. 33, 32 seq. The erroneous assertion, which is still occasionally heard, that "the Hellenes" were declared to be free on this occasion, is due not only to Zonaras, 9, 18, but also to Polyb. 18, 46, according to whom all the Greeks are made free διὰ κηρύγματος ἐνός. This, however, only means that the effect of Titus' proclamation was that all the Greeks were now free. Most of them had been so, those in Europe made over to Rome by Philip became so now. The Romans, in taking over from Philip the Greeks under his rule and then setting them free themselves, no doubt acted like Napoleon III. with Lombardy and Venice; Greece was to be made to see on which side power lay.

7. Participation of Eumenes in the war against Nabis also proved by the inscriptions, Fränkel, Nos. 60, 61. Conditions of peace with Nabis, Liv. 34, 35, and 28, 30, 31. See also Meischke, *Symbolae ad Eum. II. hist.*, Lips. 1892, p. 46.

8. It is not correct to treat Rome and her opponents in this age,

when the latter are kings, as powers on the same footing. The kings make conquests, Rome does not, at least not as a matter of principle. The splendid eulogy of Rome 1 Macc. 8, 1 seq. shows in what repute she stood as late as the close of the second century B.C. According to this view Rome is just and wise and a protector of the nations. The 320 men who rule there and who every year appoint a head of the state, who humble hostile peoples and monarchs, but keep faith with friends, made an impression on the whole world. This last characteristic, that of 'keeping faith,' was the very thing in which the kings were deficient, although few of them were as bad as Philip. Of course Rome did not always do justice to her reputation; but that is a universal human failing. In that age monarchy was still synonymous with egoism, republicanism with self-government by the whole body of citizens. Kings it is true often respected the autonomy of Greek cities, but they waged war in their own interests, and that led to the cities becoming involved in their quarrels. This appeared to be less the case with Rome. The contrast seemed to be the following: with the kings arbitrary power, brute force, and characters of a low type; with the Romans respect for the law and high-minded statesmen; was it not clear on which side the balance of advantage lay? Finally, did not Rome also accomplish what was never brought about in the Macedonian group of states—internal peace over a vast area? Hertzberg (1, 97) tries to prove that the Greece of that age was no longer "morally sound," and adduces much damaging evidence. Yet patriotism and love of liberty had not died out, and that after all was something noble. Hertzberg holds that Macedonian rule had at that time ceased to be a foreign rule for the Greeks. But it was a monarchical domination, and the Greek communities had no need of such control. After all, it is clear that Philip wanted to lord it over Greece only for his own advantage. Why should Greece quietly put up with that? Rome no doubt was a foreigner in language and civilization, but she had such a profound respect for Greek culture that intellectually she was more in touch with the Greeks than were the Macedonian kings.—The situation in Italy in the thirteenth century may be compared with that in Greece about this time. Here too a mind as lofty as that of Dante saw nothing unpatriotic in the wish that a foreigner, to wit the Roman Emperor, might be peacemaker. Communities with sovereign powers and jealous for their independence, which cannot accustom themselves to close confederacies, require a superior, moderating authority.—A. W. Schlegel, in his elegy of *Rom*, has rightly remarked of the Romans of that age: "Called to be umpires of the nations and a terror to kings."

CHAPTER XVII

THE ROMANS IN CONFLICT WITH ANTIOCHUS, THE AETOLIANS AND THE GALATAE (192-189 B.C.)

ANTIOCHUS III. would have acted in his own interests if he had supported Philip against Rome.¹ True, it was difficult for the kings to make durable alliances, because their whole state-craft was reduced to a system of robbery, the victim of which might be the friend of the moment just as much as the enemy for the time being, and after all the sole object of the alliance between Philip and Antiochus was that neither should hinder the other from robbing third parties. But Philip had come into conflict with Rome through this policy, and after a time Antiochus did the same.

In the peace with Macedonia the Romans had disposed of cities in Asia which Antiochus looked on as his own; it is true that their motive was only to make them independent, but that annoyed Antiochus all the more, and now that Philip had been unsuccessful, he laid claim to everything which the latter had taken or wished to take. During the Macedonian War he had made conquests in Cilicia, Lycia and Caria at the expense of Egypt, and had thereby become involved in a quarrel with the Rhodians. They called upon him not to sail in a westerly direction beyond the Chelidonian promontory. He set their mind at rest on this point, but tried to seize all the more on the mainland. Caunus, Myndus, Halicarnassus and Samos, which were allies of Egypt, were protected by the

Rhodians, but Antiochus took Ephesus and made it his headquarters. He also wanted to obtain the rest of Asia Minor and then occupy Thrace. For he was a descendant of Seleucus, who a century before had vanquished Lysimachus, and he held that what his ancestor would have added to his dominions, if he had not unfortunately been suddenly murdered, lawfully belonged to him. He therefore quite took Philip's place in Anterior Asia and Thrace in threatening all the more or less independent states, although it must not be overlooked that the whole conduct of the Seleucids towards the Greek element was not marked by anything like the severity displayed by Philip. They never seem to have treated a community as Philip did Abydos and many others. It was therefore possible for Antiochus to find allies in Greece, for which Philip had in the end looked around in vain. As early as 196 Antiochus had crossed over to Thrace and rebuilt Lysimachia, which had been destroyed by Philip. There he was visited by Roman envoys, who called on him to leave the Greek cities of Thrace and Asia their freedom and not to take what belonged to the king of Egypt. He replied that in acting as he did he was only standing on his rights, and that the king of Egypt made no complaint about him, on the contrary, they were both in perfect agreement. Ptolemy was his ally and his good son-in-law into the bargain. Thus Rome had to swallow insult as well as injury.² The tension existing between Antiochus and Rome was soon enhanced by the fact that Hannibal, who had been obliged to leave Carthage at the instance of the Romans, visited Antiochus at Ephesus, in 195, and was enrolled by the king among his advisers. For the moment Antiochus avoided war with Rome, but he prepared for it by addressing friendly overtures to Byzantium and to the Galatae, by making peace with Ptolemy, as already mentioned, and not only that, but also by concluding an alliance of kinship with Ariarathes of Cappadocia. He even attempted to bring over Eumenes of Pergamum, who had just

ascended the throne, in 197, to his side. In this, however, he was not successful. On the contrary, Eumenes did his utmost to make the Romans declare war on the Syrian monarch.

In 194/193 negotiations took place in Rome as to the future settlement of affairs in Asia.³ Rome was now generally recognized as umpire in all Greek controversies, and in these matters the Senate paid special attention to T. Quinctius, who had celebrated a brilliant triumph over Macedonia and did not aspire to more military glory. The Romans demanded of Antiochus, who, like the other parties concerned, had sent envoys to Rome—ostensibly to conclude an alliance with Rome, for he would not admit her competency to interfere in the affairs of Asia—that he should either leave Europe alone or recognize the right of Rome to protect the Asiatic Greeks. The Syrian envoys Menippus and Hegesianax, however, declared that they were not empowered to cede territory, and further negotiations were therefore transferred to Asia, whither the same Romans who had already visited Antiochus in Lysimachia proceeded as envoys. They travelled by Elaea and Pergamum to Ephesus, where Hannibal also was staying. The chief of the mission, P. Villius, consorted with him, which made Antiochus suspect that the Carthaginian was thinking of reconciliation with Rome, and in the ensuing war he did not consult him when he should have done, to his own great detriment. The king would not comply with the demands of the Romans, especially as a prospect of obtaining allies was held out from Greece. The Aetolians maintained that the Romans had not given them their fair share of the Macedonian spoils, and they offered Antiochus, in case of a war with Rome, not only their own very valuable assistance, but also that of Philip of Macedonia, of Amynder of Athamania and of Nabis. Philip's adhesion would perhaps have been decisive, but he did not join the combination; the two other potentates were of no use for a contest with Rome. In Apamea, where the negotiations were conducted, Antiochus intimated to

Villius and Sulpicius through his minister Minnion—for he himself, with genuine Oriental arrogance, had ceased to hold personal intercourse with the Roman envoys—that the cities in Asia belonged to him, including Smyrna, Lampsacus and Alexandria Troas, which had not yet even submitted, but that he was prepared, if Rome would become his ally, to recognize the independence of Rhodes, Byzantium, Cyzicus and a few others. This was extremely condescending on the part of a man who thought himself a match for the Romans. His confidence, however, did not go so far as to make him willing to attack the Romans in Italy, which of course was what the Carthaginians would have liked. But he was ready to go to Greece and make war on the Romans there.

The war was begun by the incorrigible Nabis.⁴ He could not stand being debarred from the opportunity of indulging in piracy, and in 192 B.C. he suddenly attacked the port of Gytheum. The Achaeans, to whose league the country of the 'free Laconians' belonged, threw a garrison into the place, but they could not proceed forthwith against an ally of Rome and they requested the Romans to interfere. The latter were ready to do so, but did not hurry themselves, and so the strategus of the Achaeans, Philopoemen, began operations on his own account. Nabis defeated his small fleet and took Gytheum. But on land he was worsted by Philopoemen and he fled to Sparta. Titus, the permanent commissioner of Rome for Greek affairs, now interposed, and made the Achaeans conclude a truce with Nabis and evacuate Laconia. Thus Nabis' part had come to an end without any advantage to the opponents of Rome, and now it was the turn of the Aetolians, who had instigated him. The assembly of the Aetolian League decided, in presence of Titus, to call in Antiochus, in order to liberate Greece from the Romans with the aid of the Aetolians. Titus asked for a copy of the resolution, but the strategus Damocritus replied that he would deliver it at the head of an army on the Tiber. The malady of rhetoric

had infected even the practical peasant folk of Aetolia. They began the war by obtaining possession, through their adherents among the Magnetes, of Demetrias, which had been evacuated by the Romans in 194; they had made the Magnetes believe that the place was to revert to Philip, who had undoubtedly ranged himself entirely on the Roman side. He hoped to reap considerable advantage by energetic support of Rome, and he adopted this policy all the more readily because it enabled him to revenge himself on Antiochus, who had been infatuated enough to set up a pretender to the Macedonian throne in the person of a brother-in-law of Amynder, a certain Philip of Megalopolis. On the other hand, the Aetolian Thoas did not succeed in taking Chalcis. Sparta, however, nearly fell into the hands of the Aetolians. The reason of this was that Nabis, when he was in difficulties, had summoned Aetolian troops to his aid, and their commander Alexamenes slew the tyrant at a review, in 192 B.C. If the Aetolians had contented themselves with simply exploiting the military resources of Sparta, they would probably have enjoyed the fruits of this alliance for a considerable time; but they sacked the city, and that was more than the Spartans could stand; the latter put the rabble to the sword, and Sparta actually joined the Achæan League. This was something unprecedented, and according to modern ideas on the passion of the Romans for interfering everywhere and encouraging the disunion of the Greeks the question would have arisen as to what the Romans might say to it. They said nothing whatever. What the Greeks did at this time was a matter of indifference to them, so long as no complaints reached them and the Greeks did not assume an attitude of direct hostility to them. This was the sound principle by which Titus was guided, to interpose as umpire in case of dispute, but for the rest let everything go its own way. The Greeks after all were free. Besides this, the Romans were anxious to keep the Achæans in a good humour, as their hostility in the war

with Antiochus and the Aetolians would have been very troublesome.

Thoas now sailed to Asia and persuaded the king to come to Greece. He had, it is true, not yet conquered Smyrna, Lampsacus and Alexandria Troas, and had been prevented from taking Pergamum by a force of Achaean auxiliaries, who entered the city just in time, nevertheless he came, but with only 10,000 infantry, 500 cavalry and six elephants, on board 100 ships of war and 200 transports, and landed at Demetrias, in the autumn of 192.⁵ The Aetolians held a meeting of the League in the neighbouring city of Lamia, at which Antiochus was elected their general. Strange to say, he was still not yet at war with Rome, and not even with the Achaeans. Formally he had just as much right to be in Greece as the Romans: both had been requested by Greeks to settle their affairs, first of all the Romans and then Antiochus. Of course a war was the end of it; but Antiochus was such an experienced diplomatist, so correct, as people say nowadays, that he ingenuously attempted to capture cities while preserving this correct attitude. He invited Chalcis to join him, and said that the Chalcidians could do so as he was not at war with Rome. They declared, however, that they would first ask permission of their allies the Romans. The Achaeans he besought to remain neutral. Syrian envoys appeared with this request at the meeting at Aegium, where Titus also was present. But they did not gain their point. And it was not intimidation on the part of Rome which frustrated the attempt. Philopoemen, whose sole preoccupation was the welfare of his people, came to the conclusion that they required a close union with Rome, and the Achaeans decided on war with Antiochus and the Aetolians instead of neutrality. This brought the diplomatic stage of the conflict to an end. Antiochus now attacked Chalcis, which was defended by only 500 Pergamenians and 500 Achaeans, and took it. He despatched 1000 men, to Elis, which was still in the hands

of Aetolia, to harass the Achaeans from there. Another country in which Antiochus gained a footing was Boeotia. In this part of the world disturbances had broken out after the defeat of Philip, as early as 197, in which the Macedonian party had got the upper hand through the Boeotians who had returned home after serving in Philip's army; their leader Brachyllas, however, was murdered by some partisans of Rome, whereupon hundreds of Roman soldiers were killed one by one by exasperated Boeotians. Titus had severely punished the inhabitants of the district in which most of these murders occurred, and this made the hatred of Rome in Boeotia still greater than before. The Epirotes too sent word to Antiochus that they were ready to join him if he came to Epirus. Before the close of the year 192 Antiochus made an attempt to obtain possession of Thessaly; he conquered Pherae and Scotussa, and at Cynoscephalae, to the annoyance of Philip, buried the still uninterred remains of the Macedonians who had fallen there, but withdrew from the siege of Larissa to Chalcis, when he heard of the approach of a Romano-Macedonian army. These were the troops of the Praetor Baebius, whom the Romans had sent to Epirus when they learnt that the king of Syria had landed in Greece; for up to this point they had concentrated their forces in Italy and Sicily, as they had no means of knowing which way Antiochus would turn, and had a higher opinion of his powers of mischief than he deserved.

In the beginning of the year 191 the Roman people decided on war with Antiochus, and the Consul M. Acilius Glabrio was charged with the conduct of it. About 40,000 men were placed at his disposal. Antiochus had gone to Acarnania, where he had conquered Medeum; on receiving the news of the Consul's landing in Apollonia and of the further advance of Baebius and Philip towards Thessaly, he returned to Chalcis, to await reinforcements from Asia. These however only brought his army up to 10,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry,

to which 4000 Aetolians were added. It is a proof of true Oriental arrogance that the Syrian monarch should have thought he could fight Rome with this force. That he might be able to hold Thermopylae with it for a time against an attack from the north, was no doubt an idea not devoid of sense, when it is borne in mind that the Aetolians closed the passes to the west ; but even this was unsuccessful. Glabrio's legate, the famous M. Porcius Cato, who had been Consul in 195, marched across Mount Oeta and took the king in the rear. The latter thereupon retired to Chalcis, where he arrived with only 500 men, and then sailed to Ephesus. Boeotia and Euboea surrendered. The Aetolians still had fortified points near Thermopylae, especially Heraclea and Lamia. Glabrio took the former, and Philip was on the point of taking Lamia when the Consul forbade him to do so ; it was not advisable that the king of Macedonia should have another opportunity of claiming an extension of territory in these regions. The Aetolians now announced their willingness to submit. Titus wanted to grant them lenient terms, but Glabrio differed. He demanded the surrender of two leading Aetolians and of the chiefs of the Athamanes, whereupon the Aetolians preferred to continue the war. They defended Naupactus. Titus in the meanwhile persuaded the Eleans and Messenians to join the Achaean League, so that it now embraced the whole of the Peloponnese. In return the Romans took Zacynthus under their protection ; Coreyra they had already. As Philip had meantime made progress in Thessaly, Titus thought it expedient to see that the Aetolians were not too hard pressed. The siege of Naupactus was raised, and an armistice granted to the Aetolians, to enable them to send an embassy to Rome and ascertain the terms which the Romans were willing to grant them.

The war in Europe was practically over ; the hostilities with the Aetolians, which still dragged on, were bound to end sooner or later in the defeat of that mountain people.

The important point now was to vanquish Antiochus in Asia, and the Romans addressed themselves to this with a deliberateness which might provoke astonishment, if it had not been the natural outcome of a legitimate confidence that there was no reason for hurrying themselves. They began by sending a fleet into Asian waters. The Praetor C. Livius sailed with Roman, Neapolitan, Locrian, Rheginian and Carthaginian vessels to Greece, picked up some Roman ships which were lying ready in the Piraeus, and then joined a fleet from Pergamum, so that in the end he had 150 decked and 50 open ships, with which he defeated the Syrian fleet, of only 100 sail, commanded by the Rhodian exile Polyxenidas, at Corycus between Chios and Ephesus, in the year 191 B.C. The Aetolian envoys were now informed in Rome that the Aetolians would have to conclude an offensive and defensive alliance with the Romans and pay the sum of 1000 talents, if they wished for peace.

For the year 190 L. Cornelius Scipio, the brother of Africanus, and C. Laelius, the well-known friend of the Scipios, were elected consuls. The honourable and lucrative task of bringing the war in Asia to an end was of course entrusted to L. Cornelius, and as it was beyond his powers, his brother accompanied him as legate. In the meanwhile Glabrio had taken Lamia, and L. Cornelius granted the Aetolians, who could not make up their minds, a fresh truce of a year's duration, thus ridding himself of the troublesome siege of Naupactus. He then went to Asia, but not by sea; he preferred the long circuitous route by land. This was safer; why should he unnecessarily tempt the gods of the sea and of the storms, who had played Rome many a trick in the First Punic War? The Romans were convinced, and rightly, that it was a matter of indifference whether Antiochus got a few thousand more soldiers together in the interval. At sea indeed the king was a somewhat formidable opponent. The Roman fleet took Sestos, but Antiochus provisioned Lysimachia, and

Polyxenidas defeated the Roman fleet under Pausistratus off Samos, whereupon Phocaea, Samos and Cyme went over to Antiochus. The Praetor Aemilius now undertook the conduct of the whole naval campaign. His first idea was to proceed southwards with his whole force, to encounter a new fleet which Hannibal was to bring up from Phoenicia—this was the way in which Antiochus managed to employ one of the greatest generals that have ever lived. But on being driven back from Patara, Aemilius returned to the north, and left the Rhodians to beat off the Phoenician fleet, which they did in a victorious engagement off Side. After that Aemilius too gained a decisive naval victory over Polyxenidas off Myonnesus; he took thirteen of his eighty-nine ships and destroyed twenty-nine. This frightened Antiochus, who had in the meanwhile made an unsuccessful attack on Pergamum, so much that he abandoned Lysimachia and thus enabled the Romans to get to Asia without inconvenience. Aemilius conquered Phocaea, which was afterwards barbarously treated by the Roman soldiers against his wish.

Antiochus now made an attempt to obtain peace. He took advantage of the fact that a son of Scipio Africanus had become his prisoner of war, to open negotiations with that representative of Rome. But when Africanus intimated to him that he would have to give up all Asia Minor north of the Taurus—it was not much in reality, for he had, as we know, little that was securely held there—he rightly came to the conclusion that he could not be worse off if he continued the war, and he resolved to hazard a battle. It took place in the autumn of 190 at Magnesia on the Sipylus, in the absence of Africanus, who was lying sick at Elaea. The Romans were over 30,000 strong, the Asiatics about 80,000; among the latter was a motley crew of men on dromedaries and on hooked chariots, and fifty-four elephants, but also a Macedonian phalanx of 16,000 men, drawn up in ten divisions fifty broad and thirty-two deep. The battle was won by the Romans,

without the infantry of the legions taking any part in the engagement. The allies threw the Asiatic contingents and the elephants into confusion; by this means the phalanx, on which the fugitives rushed, was broken up, and the result was as in so many of the battles of antiquity—an easy slaughter by the conquerors. The Romans are said to have lost twenty-four cavalry and 300 infantry, the Asiatics 50,000 men. Anterior Asia lay open to the Romans, who established their headquarters at Sardes. Here Antiochus sent word that he was ready for peace and Scipio directed him to send envoys to Rome, where a decision would be taken. Envoys from the other states in Asia also made their appearance in Rome; the gathering became a congress, at which Rome on this occasion had only to issue her orders.

The Senate laid down the guiding principles which the usual commission of ten had to apply on the spot. This last was done in the course of the year 189. The arrangements in question led to the following settlement in Asia Minor: the main point was that Antiochus renounced all conquest on this side, *i.e.* on the Roman side, of the Taurus. It is true that a difference of opinion arose as to the meaning of the word Taurus. It undoubtedly meant the range north of Cilicia. But did it also include that north of Pamphylia? And could Pamphylia therefore be claimed by the king of Syria? The authorities in Rome came to the conclusion that this was another range and that Pamphylia was on this side of the Taurus. It would in fact have been strange if a defeat had been the means of giving Antiochus a province which no Seleucid had ever been able to thoroughly conquer. Besides this, Antiochus had to deliver up his elephants and all his ships of war but ten, and those that were left to him were in future not to appear west of the Calycadnus. He was therefore not allowed even to coast along the Cilician Taurus, which was consequently left to itself, *i.e.* made over to pirates. By this prohibition the Romans themselves encouraged the

piracy which subsequently gave them so much trouble in Cilicia Aspera. Antiochus had to pay 15,000 talents to Rome and 500 to Eumenes. Some enemies of the Roman people were to be surrendered to Rome, including Hannibal, if Antiochus was able to do it.

This peace did not deprive Antiochus of much that really belonged to the Seleucids, as appears from chap. xiii. He gave up a great many claims and a series of isolated points. In reality the Taurus as interpreted by Rome had always been the boundary of effective Syrian power, and the peace only confirmed the actual *status quo*.⁶

The country now completely liberated from Syrian influence was settled as follows: the Greek cities which had sided with Rome remained or became independent; those which had joined Antiochus of their own accord were made tributary to Eumenes. Consequently the following were henceforth free, besides Cyzicus, Lampsacus and Alexandria Troas: the sorely-tried Abydos, Dardanus, Ilium, which also received Rhoeteum and Gergis, Notium, Mylasa, Clazomenae, which obtained the island of Drymassa, Miletus, Chios, Smyrna, Erythrae, Cyme and Phocaea. Eumenes' share was a large one: in Europe the Chersonese and Lysimachia, in Asia Phrygia on the Hellespont and Phrygia Magna, Mysia, Lydia, Lycaonia, the Milyas, of cities especially Tralles in the interior, and Ephesus and Telmissus on the coast. Ephesus had belonged to Egypt before Antiochus had taken it; but Egypt had given up her northern possessions of her own free will, and could no longer lay claim to any of them. Telmissus, which was in Rhodian territory, was given to Eumenes so that the kingdom of Pergamum might have a harbour in the south. Rhodes received Lycia and Caria south of the Maeander. It is true that the Lycians soon complained of the Rhodian rule, and Rome declared her intention had been that the Lycians should be friends and not subjects of the Rhodians, which doubtless made the

tribute to Rhodes dwindle. Rome took nothing for herself in Asia.

As the definitive settlement of the affairs of Asia did not take place till the year 189, the Romans had sent reinforcements to the east at the close of 190. The Praetor Fabius Labeo intervened with the reinforced fleet in the concerns of the Cretans, to whom he issued a peace manifesto, and Gortyna did surrender some Roman prisoners. He then removed the Syrian garrisons from Aenus and Maronea. With the army, however, the Consul Cn. Manlius Vulso made an expedition against the Galatae,⁷ many of whom had served in the Syrian army, and in whose country he hoped to renew the old glory of the Manlii in the wars with the Gauls and to win rich booty. He marched from Ephesus by a long southern *détour* into their country. They were now paid out in their own coin, *i.e.* thoroughly well pillaged. Only the Trocmi escaped this fate, as Manlius did not cross the Halys.

It was not till the beginning of the year 188, when Manlius was proconsul, that the settlement of Asia was officially proclaimed. Manlius proceeded first to Apamea on the sources of the Maeander, then to Perge in Pamphylia, which was surrendered by Antiochus' commander, and then back to Apamea, where the peace and the alliance between Syria and Rome were sworn to by him; Roman envoys administered the oath to Antiochus. Ariarathes of Cappadocia, who had fought with the Gauls against Rome, was allowed, on the intercession of his son-in-law Eumenes, to make peace with Rome and was recognized as her ally.

The war with the Aetolians now came to an end as well. They had so far roused themselves as to drive Philip out of Athamania and even to occupy the country of the Dolopes and Amphilochia (190). This was not in itself unwelcome to the Romans, as only Philip suffered by it. But their success made the Aetolians arrogant, and the Consul of the year 189, M. Fulvius Nobilior, had therefore by no means an

easy task to perform in the renewed war against them. The campaign centred in Ambracia, which was besieged and defended according to all the rules of art. The Romans got possession of it only by an honourable capitulation, and were prudent enough, on the intercession of Rhodes and Athens, which consequently appears on the scene as a respected power in this case, to offer better terms to the Aetolians than before, provided that they seriously sued for peace. Rome demanded only the half of the indemnity which she had hitherto asked, and if the Aetolians had to abandon their claim to all the territory which they had lost in this war, it is not quite so certain that they had to give up the Dolopes country, which they had just conquered. Ambracia was not badly treated, only the Romans removed the numerous works of art which had adorned the city since it became the capital of Pyrrhus to Rome—they had not been made for Ambracia and probably there were almost as many art connoisseurs in Rome as in Ambracia at that time. Of course the Aetolians as allies were linked to the destinies of Rome. If Rome had treated them more leniently than they could have expected themselves, this was due to the fact that, looking to the uncertainty of the relations with Macedonia, she did not wish to make irreconcilable enemies of them, and Rome attained this object. The Aetolians have not unfrequently been described as a predatory state, and we have alluded to this aspect of their character. Of course they were not so in the same sense as the Galatae, for they were Greeks. This is why they were treated differently from the Galatae by Rome. It is not, however, altogether without significance that these two states were subdued by Rome about the same time and for the same reason, viz. that they had taken the side of Syria.⁸

Finally, a direct result of the defeat of Syria was that Egypt, which Antiochus had managed to alienate from Rome, once more became a Roman dependency.

NOTES

1. Our authorities are chiefly Livy, bks. 35-38, with the fragments of Polybius, bks. 20, 21, and Appian's *Συριακή*, where the Rhodian admiral is called Pausimachus. In chaps. 4 and 5 Appian is not well informed as to Egyptian affairs.—Cf. C. Meischke, *Symbolae ad Eumenis II. historiam*, Lips. 1892, pp. 67 seq.—Efforts of Antiochus in the year 197 according to Livy, 33, 19: *Ant. per omnem oram Ciliciae, Lyciaeque et Cariae, tentaturus urbes quae in dicione Ptolemaei essent, simul Philippum—exercitu navibusque adjuturus*.—Antiochus makes conquests in Asia Minor and quarrels with Rhodes, in 197, Liv. 33, 20, 21. The Rhodians protect the freedom civitatum sociarum Ptolemaei (Caunus, Myndus, Halicarnassus, Samos), Liv. 33, 20; see above, chap. xiii. note 2.—Antiochus on the Hellespont and in Thrace, in 196, Liv. 33, 38-41. That Antiochus took Ephesus in 197 must be inferred from Polyb. 18, 41, where he is represented as wanting it, and from Liv. 33, 38 (196 B.C.), where he is described as using it for his winter quarters.

2. During the war between Rome and Philip the situation in Asia had undergone a change which has hitherto not always been viewed in a correct light, viz. Antiochus had contrived to make his victory at Mount Paneum in 198 lead up to a direct understanding with Egypt, in which the latter country made some important concessions to the Syrian king without consulting its ally, Rome; it gave up its possessions in Asia Minor and Thrace in return for the right of making provisional use of southern Syria, which had already fallen into the hands of Antiochus. In consequence of this arrangement, which was at first kept secret from the Romans, Antiochus appears in the character of a pretender even in Thrace, and in 196, at Lysimachia, makes the following reply to the Romans, who stand up for Ptolemy's claims in Asia Minor: *quod at Ptolemaeum attineat cui ademptas civitates querantur, sibi cum Ptolemaeo et amicitiam esse et id agere se ut brevi etiam affinitas jungatur*, Liv. 33, 40. That means that the Romans had been outwitted by Antiochus and the Egyptian ministers, whose duty of course it was to have informed Rome of the change in the situation, and that Antiochus had thus become very dangerous. This makes it impossible to agree with Ihne (*Röm. Gesch.* 3, 71; similar view in *Baed. Unteräg.* 2, 111) that the Romans had left Egypt in the lurch. It was Egypt rather which left Rome in the lurch and gave up an ambitious policy by

making this agreement. It had a right to do so. And besides, a rotten state like Egypt was no longer able to indulge in an ambitious policy, and if the ministers—for the king, apart from crimes which he committed on his own account, was a puppet—were induced by Syrian bribes to take this line of an understanding with Syria, Egypt itself was no better and no worse off than before. But it gave Rome a right, not only to try to draw Egypt once more into her orbit, but also to take the place in the pacific league of maritime states which had thus become vacant through the voluntary renunciation of Egypt, and so prevent the free navigation to the Pontus, which she had successfully defended against Philip, being blocked by Antiochus. Egypt now withdrew of her own free will; Rome consequently had to double her stake. The year 197 is therefore of great importance in the history of Anterior Asia. Egypt resigns the position which it had held there for a century in favour of Antiochus, who was able to say to the astonished Romans: "Spare yourselves unnecessary trouble, Egypt does not want your assistance." But it was this very success which led to his ruin. If he had had the sense to admit that it was better for him to give up Thrace, then Rome in all probability would have left him Asia. But by his idea, firstly, that he was bound to claim Thrace and secondly, that it was even his mission to protect the independence of Nabis, Amynder and the Aetolians, he speedily lost, not only his recent acquisitions, but also what he had formerly possessed in Asia Minor.

3. Negotiations in Rome in 194/193, Liv. 34, 57-59. T. Quinctius claims the *patrocinium libertatis Graecorum* for the Romans, 34, 58.

4. Nabis and the Eleutherolaconians, as they were afterwards called, Hertz. 2, 111, 159, and esp. Rühl, *Der letzte Kampf der Achaier gegen Nabis*, N. Jahrb. 127 (1883). See also Töpffer's article *Achaia* in Pauly's R. E. Cruelty of Nabis, Polyb. 13, 6-8; his wife Apega, 13, 7; 18, 17. Death of Nabis, Liv. 35, 35. Pergamene troops also took part in the war against Nabis, as is proved by inscriptions in Pergamum, Fränkel, 62, 63; see Töpffer l. l. and Meischke, *Symbolae ad Eum. II. histor.*, Lips. 1892, pp. 47 seq., who deals with the whole of this war.

5. For details of the war see Livy and Polybius. The Achaeans rescue Pergamum, Ditt. 208; Fränkel, 64; Töpffer, *Achaia*, in Pauly.

6. The conditions of the peace of 189 B.C., Polyb. 21, 45-48; Liv. 38, 39; App. Syr. 38; Paus. 7, 11.

7. The war with the Galatae, Liv. 38, 12-27.—For various points connected with the march of Manlius related by Livy (38,

12-15) see Ramsay in Reinach's *Chronique d'Orient*, pp. 314 seq. and his *Hist. Geogr. of Asia Minor*, 421. Manlius went from Ephesus in a great curve by Antioch in Caria, Tabae, the Cibyratis and Termessus in Pamphylia. Did he want to deceive the Galatae as to his intention?—For the further war with the Aetolians and the peace with them, Livy and Polyb. 21, 27-32.

8. Antiochus III. was not ungrateful to the Greeks who had met with misfortune through helping him. He removed some Aetolians, Cretans and Euboeans into the quarter of Antioch which he laid out, O. Müller, *Antiqu. Antioch.* § 18, according to Libanius, p. 309.—For his coins see Babelon, lxxvii.-lxxxvi.; for those of Molon and Achaeus, lxxxvi. seq. On the coins of Antiochus there are portraits of him in all ages. Sir Edward Bunbury (*Num. Chron.* 1883) divides them into five classes, which are easily recognizable on the plates of the Catalogue of the Bunbury Collection, published by Sotheby, 1896. The excellent reproductions make this catalogue highly instructive for the coins of the Seleucids. There are gold coins of Antiochus, of 100 drachms, and therefore called *μναια*, Bab. lxxxi.—There are also traces of Antiochus' activity in Europe in the coinage (Bab. following P. Gardner): 1. Bronze coins of Hephaestia in Lemnos, with a head, which seems to be that of Antiochus: Lemnos had given Antiochus a good reception. 2. Coins of Carystus with the head of Antiochus (according to Six, in the *Numism. Chron.* XIV, p. 301, it is rather the head of Alexander, son of Craterus, king of Euboea about 250 B.C.). 3. Coins of Chalcis, with a veiled head formerly considered to be Hera (rev. Demeter on quadriga), supposed to be a portrait of the daughter of Cleoptolemus (called Euboea by Antiochus) whom the king married in Chalcis; Polyb. 20, 8; Liv. 36, 11. 4. Aetolian coins with the head of Antiochus (acc. to Six, l. l. p. 297, rather Demetrius of Macedonia, about 235-233). 5. Acarnanian coins with an anchor; a coin with an elephant has also been discovered, acquired by the Brit. Mus. in 1891. 6. Coins of Arynander of Athamania, with the female head of Chalcis.—Perhaps also a coinage of Antiochus III. in Lycia; P. Gardner in Bab. lxxxvi. The Seleucid era (312 B.C.), which appears in 310 on city coins of Tyre, does not occur on royal Syrian coins until 201 B.C., also in Phoenicia.—With the defeat of Antiochus III. a new period in the coinage of Asia Minor begins; cf. Head, *Cat. Br. Mus. Ionia*, p. xlviii. The Attic standard is now generally adopted there, and the Alexander-coins are taken as types: head of Heracles, rev. Zeus Aetophoros. The coins are distinguishable from the earlier ones by their broad flat shape. "Thus Alexander as the founder of the liberties of the Asiatic Greeks, though not perhaps solely on that account so

much as for the sake of commercial expediency, was honoured by a posthumous revival of his coinage" (*ibid.* p. xlix.). The various cities are denoted by emblems in the field. Some of them strike tetradrachms with local types. For the cistophori see below, chap. xxi. note 4.—Cf. besides, Wilcken's article Aetolia, in Pauly-Wissowa, 1, 1113-1127; Kumpel, Die Quellen zur Gesch. des Krieges d. Römer gegen Ant. III., Hamburg, 1893 (Progr.); almost everything is derived directly or indirectly from Polybius.

CHAPTER XVIII

ROME AND PERSEUS (189-168 B.C.)—THE EAST ABOUT 169

THE further development of the affairs of Greece under Roman influence took place at first in Europe, and in Greece as well as in Macedonia. In the former the republics themselves desired the intervention of Rome, in the latter Rome's interest demanded it.

The root of the disturbances in Greece lay in the impossibility of establishing there a permanent order, even over a small area, based on the freely-given consent of the parties concerned. Even the constitution of the Achaeans was always in an embryo state, and Philopoemen, by striving to improve it, and by attempting considerable changes in it for this purpose, himself gave the signal for more dissension than ever. To destroy the preponderance of the Achaean nucleus of the League, he had the assemblies held in other places besides Aegium, and to diminish the influence of the large communities, he made the small ones, *e.g.* those which had been hitherto dependent on Megalopolis, regular members of the League.¹ This may have been a wise and useful measure, but it offended the old members of the League and gave rise to the belief that its constitution did not protect vested interests. The actual impulse, however, to the outbreak of open war was given by Sparta in her annoyance at her exclusion from the sea, which of course deprived her of the possession of the market for mercenaries at Taenarum. She made a fruitless attempt to

capture Las, a place on the way to Taenarum. Philopoemen demanded the surrender of the disturbers of the peace. But the enraged Spartans instead of complying killed thirty persons belonging to the Achaean party, notified their withdrawal from the Achaean League and appealed to Rome for protection. For this the League declared war on Sparta. The Consul M. Fulvius induced the disputants to keep the peace for a time and to refer the question to the Roman Senate. The Senate pronounced a decision, but of so ambiguous a nature that each side thought it was in its favour. Philopoemen advanced up to the walls of Sparta. The Spartans sent eighty alleged guilty persons into his camp, and of these seventeen were at once put to death by their countrymen serving in the Achaean army, and the rest executed on the following day. Philopoemen then reinstated all the exiles in Sparta, expelled those who had taken possession of their property, and pulled down the walls of the city. Of course some Spartans complained of these summary proceedings in Rome. Philopoemen defended himself, but in spite of this a Roman commission under Caecilius Metellus arrived in 186, which sat in Argos and condemned the conduct of the Achaeans. The latter, however, paid no heed to it, and when two Spartans, Areus and Alcibiades, again preferred a complaint in Rome, the Achaeans sentenced them to death in their absence. They tried to justify this conduct in Rome, but without success. A new embassy under Ap. Claudius quashed the sentence passed on the two Spartans, and declared that Sparta was certainly a member of the Achaean League, but that individual Spartans were not amenable to the criminal jurisdiction of Achaia and that the city was entitled to have walls. Subsequently, in 179, when Callicrates had come to the helm on the Achaean side after the death of Philopoemen, the opponents of the Achaeans were allowed to return to Sparta. On which side was right and on which wrong in these quarrels, nobody can now say, and

probably no one knew any more about it at the time. Each side could quote resolutions or precedents for its conduct. When the Achaeans said that the Romans had no more right to trouble their heads about the treatment of Sparta by Achaia, than the Greeks had about that of Capua by Rome, this was absurd in point of fact, but would have been technically correct if the Achaeans themselves had not appealed to Rome, in order to enlist her on their side. Consequently a remark of this kind was simply a specimen of dialectical skill, which at the most might annoy the Romans, but probably did not even achieve that result.

Another quarrel, however, was attended with really melancholy consequences, that between Achaia and Messene. The latter, not without the approval of Titus and at the instigation of its oligarchs, especially Dinocrates, revolted from the League, which was being conducted on democratic lines by Philopoemen. Philopoemen thought he could coerce Messene, as he had already done on one occasion, but he was taken prisoner and had to drink the poison-cup in prison, in 184 B.C. He was not so old but what he might have rendered services to his country for some time to come; now there was no one left among the Achaeans who possessed ability alike as general and statesman and at the same time had a stainless character. The honest Lycortas, who compelled Messene to submit in 183, was not equal to the occasion as a statesman.

The Romans had ended by no longer interfering directly in these complications, but they had nevertheless declared that it was a matter of indifference to them if Sparta, Argos and Corinth withdrew from the League. This was considered then and is considered even now as a fresh proof of arrogance. But as all the Greeks appealed to Rome, she was entitled to give her opinion. In no case was she bound to keep the members of the Achaean League in it by force, and it is clear that the majority of the Spartans did not want to join the Achaeans. In forming an opinion of Greek politics, people

are easily led by feelings of the moment, which, however, show by their contradictions that they cannot form a basis for a just verdict. At one time the Romans are to effect a moral revival of Greece, at another to pay no heed to the country, even when the Greeks desire it; when the Greeks accept presents from foreigners, that is denounced in the third century as a sign of moral decay, whereas in the fifth no one has any objection to make to it. Besides, people let themselves be too much influenced by the dialectic of the opponents of Rome. Their assertions are generally accepted as gospel truth by the moderns,—as if the Greeks had not long been masters of dialectic. Philopoemen's death was a special misfortune for Greece for this very reason. He at all events was no dialectician, but a man of action.

The independent states of Greece gave the Romans only trouble and labour, Macedonia caused them serious anxiety.² Philip had thought that he could gain a great advantage by taking sides against Antiochus and the Aetolians. He had wrested cities in Thessaly from the Aetolians, had occupied Aenus and Maronea, which the Romans had liberated from the Syrian garrison, and he wanted to keep his spoils. But the Romans decided that he must surrender them all. Modern historians consider this unfair. It is clear, however, that the Thessalians were happier under their own chiefs than under the Macedonian king, and also that Aenus and Maronea were better off under Eumenes than under Philip, who, when he could not keep Maronea, forthwith put to death some more of the inhabitants, and then poisoned the man who had carried out his orders. The Romans therefore at all events acted in the interest of those who did not want to make over the cities to a man of this stamp. Were they then under any legal obligation to let him have Aenus and Maronea? The history of the two cities given in the note shows that Philip had no claim to them, and there is no trace of any promise on the part of the Romans to give them to him. Philip thought

that he had deserved this reward for the assistance rendered to the Romans, while Rome was of a different opinion. The Romans must have best known what concessions they ought to make to a man who could only be bound to them by hope and fear. Unfortunately the innocent, his subjects and his family, had to suffer most from the wrath of the king at the indignity offered him. He raised the taxes, which were already high enough, so as to be prepared for a fresh war with Rome, removed the Greek inhabitants of his maritime cities, in whom he had no confidence, into the interior to Emathia, and put Thracians in their place, all of which of course was not accomplished without acts of cruelty. Finally he vented his rage on his own son Demetrius. The latter had been very well treated by the Romans, who thought that they would acquire in him a supporter of their influence in Macedonia. But this aroused the apprehension of his elder brother Perseus, an illegitimate son of Philip, but designated as his successor, and he, by his speeches and by a letter supposed to be written by Demetrius to Titus, but forged by himself, managed to prejudice Philip against Demetrius to such an extent that Philip had him poisoned (182). The aversion to Rome in some modern writers goes so far that they attribute the responsibility for the murder of Demetrius partly to Titus, on the ground that the latter had made the father mistrustful of the young man by the favour shown to him. It seems therefore to be considered as a matter of course that in a case of this kind a king like Philip was bound to put to death a son who had incurred his suspicion, and the opinion is evidently held that the Romans ought to have known this too, and have taken it into consideration.³ Philip lived to the year 179, his sole punishment for his many crimes being probably only the humiliating consciousness that he, a master of cunning, had been outwitted by his son Perseus, a much feebler intellect, for he discovered the trick that had been played on him. He wanted to disinherit Perseus and

appoint a distant relative, Antigonus, nephew of Doson, as his successor. But he did not effect this; he died, and Perseus after all ascended the throne, in 179 B.C.

Perseus was a man of quite a different stamp from his father, not so intensely sour and malicious, but also not so talented, except in one important point, in diplomacy, that is to say if propensity for intrigue can be called diplomatic talent.⁴ That he brought about the murder of his brother is nothing remarkable in a sovereign of that age, and certainly not in an Antigonid (see above, chap. iii.). Poliorcetes had been the most brilliant specimen of an Antigonid, and a comparison with him is best calculated to illustrate the character of Perseus. He is a complete contrast to Poliorcetes both in his good and bad points. Poliorcetes was as brave as a lion, full of kindly feeling, dissolute, prodigal, a man of action, no statesman. Perseus was regular in his domestic relations, dignified in his demeanour, and not really a soldier; he made vast and very fair plans, but when he had to act in critical though not desperate situations, he was hampered, at one time by over-anxious consideration for his treasury, which was always full and had always to remain so, at others, and in a marked degree, by needless despondency. He owes the sympathy of posterity to the fact that he was the first of the later successors of Alexander and the first king of Macedonia to adorn the triumph of a Roman general. With his character Perseus would have been a more dangerous antagonist of Rome than Philip or Antiochus, if he had only been able to keep a cool head in emergencies, for as an intriguer he accomplished a good deal, and he certainly had no lack of hatred of Rome.

He endeavoured to bring about a coalition against the Romans, who regarded him with mistrust from the outset, because he had made away with their friend Demetrius. By means of an amnesty on his accession he secured a good many friends, even in Greece, where he counted adherents among the Achaeans, the Aetolians and Boeotians. He entered into

relations with Byzantium and Rhodes, sent an embassy to Carthage, and tried to set Eumenes, Seleucus and Antiochus, Ariarathes and Prusias in motion against Rome. He gave his sister in marriage to Prusias and married the daughter of Seleucus IV. Of course he pointed out to all of them that Rome was aiming at the destruction of Macedonia, and that this would be a calamity for the whole of the East. The powers listened to his communications, but did not stir a finger for him while there was time to do so; what they did when it was too late, we shall see before long. He alarmed the Romans directly by his progress in the north, where he brought the Bastarnæ over to his side and encouraged King Cotys in Thrace, but drove out the Roman ally Abrupolis and murdered Artetarus, an adherent of Rome, in Illyria, and secured the co-operation of Gentius. For a long time the Romans let things slide; they had enough to do in Liguria, Corsica, Sardinia and Spain. At last, after a Roman embassy had received the reply from Perseus that he considered the treaty between his father and Rome as null and void, they were induced, mainly by the urgent entreaties of Eumenes, to declare war against him. The Macedonian envoy Harpalus was unable to obtain any distinct information as to Rome's demands. It is unmistakeable that the Romans had resolved on the complete overthrow of the king, perhaps even on his deposition, from the outset. But if Perseus refused to recognize the validity of the treaty between his father and Rome, was it not his business to say what he really wanted? And if he was silent on the point, had he a right to complain if he also was not told beforehand what Rome intended to do with him? There can be no doubt whatever that both Rome and Perseus were determined to impose the severest terms on each other in case of victory.

The Romans decided to commence hostilities in 171. They declared that Perseus was attacking allies of Rome, and making preparations against her, and when the king wished

to know what special demands he would have to comply with to obtain peace, he was told that the generals would supply him with this information. The general appointed for Macedonia was the Consul P. Licinius Crassus. His army consisted of 50,000 men, besides a contingent of Achaeans and Pergamenians. Perseus could not get together more than 43,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry. On the artful advice of the Roman legate Q. Marcus Philippus, who was staying in Thessaly, he sent once more to Rome, to try to settle the quarrel, but received no answer. The Aetolians, Acarnanians, and Thessalians, also the Boeotians, with the exception of Haliartus and Coronea, joined the Romans; Rhodes contributed ships. P. Crassus marched through Epirus to Thessaly, where he took up a position near Larissa; the fleet repaired to Chalcis. Perseus began the war with skill and good fortune. He occupied the Pass of Tempe, and defeated the Romans twice, at Mount Callinicus and at Palanna; he then offered to conclude a treaty with Rome on terms advantageous for her, but received the reply that he must submit unconditionally. If the Romans accomplished nothing in the field, they made up for it by pillaging weak Greek cities, such as Haliartus, which they captured, Thebes and Coronea, which surrendered, and even the friendly Chalcis. This conduct aroused great indignation in Greece, and the Romans could now no longer depend on the Aetolians or the Epirotes.

In the year 170 the Consul A. Hostilius Manlius was in command of the army and L. Hortensius of the fleet, both as incapable as their predecessors. Hortensius allowed all his transports to be captured, and exacted contributions in consequence. On the Abderites delaying payment of what was demanded, he sacked Abdera and had the inhabitants sold as slaves. Hostilius did nothing at all, and an attempt of the Romans to attack Macedonia from the north failed owing to the dubious attitude of Gentius, king of Illyria. On the other hand, so many complaints of the arbitrary

proceedings and the cruelty of the Roman commanders were received from Greece that the Senate was obliged to curtail the powers of the generals as regards the exaction of contributions. P. Lucretius, who had plundered Chalcis, was even condemned to pay a money fine. In the winter of 170/169 Perseus took the Illyrian city of Uscana, which was garrisoned by a force of 5000 men. His attempt, however, to take Stratus in Aetolia failed.

In the year 169 the Consul Q. Marcius Philippus at last made a successful offensive movement. He turned the Pass of Tempe and took up a position to the north of it, between Olympus and the sea. This ought to have been his destruction, for he was now in a plain, closed to the north and south by passes which Perseus had occupied, that of Tempe and of Dium, and to the west by Olympus; and if Perseus had possessed courage and generalship, he might have given the Romans a reminiscence of the Caudine Forks. But, instead of this, he thought he was lost, withdrew his troops from both the passes, gave orders to set fire to the arsenal of Thessalonice, some fifty miles off, and to sink his treasure at Pella in the sea. When he had recovered himself a little, he reoccupied the position at Dium. The Romans had thus opened the door into Macedonia; they did nothing more, however, on land, and their attempts to capture Cassandria, Torone and Demetrias with their fleet were unsuccessful.

In the space of three years therefore Rome had accomplished as good as nothing against a small state like Macedonia. This emboldened Perseus to concert further measures of defence, and especially to try if he could not after all obtain allies; and this again inspired some of the powers who had up to this point been on the side of Rome, with the idea that they might take an independent line and see if Macedonia could not after all be saved and a better position be secured for themselves thereby. Perseus had been treated so harshly by the Romans that even states who were otherwise devoted to

them might come to the conclusion that it would be of advantage to themselves also if Rome did not always get her own way. Rhodes openly attempted to put an end to the war; Eumenes went to work in a more underhand way. This we are told by Polybius. The part assigned to Eumenes by this writer has been considered so incredible that his account of it has been described as a "silly invention." It is impossible, so it is said, that Eumenes could have wished to revolt from Rome. But that he would have wished it if it had appeared advantageous to him, is certain. The sole question then is whether he could have thought it his interest to change sides, and this depended on Rome's prospects of eventual success in the war with Perseus. If she did not vanquish Macedonia, it was a bad look-out for her friends in Asia. It is therefore quite intelligible that a prudent sovereign of Pergamum would take steps to prepare for the contingency of Rome being obliged to give up her influence in Asia. But it is also said that he could not have opened negotiations with Perseus, because he himself had instigated the war against him. If this holds good, then a power which has begun a war can never make peace. If Eumenes did drive Rome into war with Perseus, that was an additional reason for the latter, if he was aware of it, to come to terms with such a powerful potentate, and this was the very point which was of importance to Eumenes.⁵ That Rhodes adopted a menacing attitude towards Rome, is proved by facts. In her case it is more easily accounted for by the existence of two parties, of which the anti-Roman was at that very time gaining the upper hand in consequence of the mistakes committed by the Roman generals. But even in the case of Pergamum a similar explanation is not out of the question. There was probably an anti-Roman party here too, and many persons may have thought that Rome's fortunes were decidedly on the decline. Even prudent monarchs allow themselves to be influenced firstly by one party and then by another. By their conduct as hitherto exhibited in this war—military

incapacity and cruelty practised on the weak—the Romans could not inspire much affection or much fear in Asia. It was fortunate for Rome that she did after all vanquish Macedonia in 168.

We will now consider the situation in eastern Greece at that time, with special reference to its development in the last twenty years, so as to explain the position of the various states at the time when Macedonia was resisting Rome, and show in what direction things were tending in case Rome was not soon victorious.⁶

The reigning sovereigns were as follows: in Syria, Seleucus IV. Philopator, 187-175; Antiochus IV. Epiphanes, 175-164. In Egypt: Ptolemy V. Epiphanes, 205-181; Ptolemy VII. Philometor, 181-146; Ptolemy IX. Euergetes II. Physcon, 146-117. In Pergamum: Eumenes II., 197-159. In Bithynia: Prusias I., 225 up to about 185; Prusias II., about 185-149. In Cappadocia: Ariarathes IV. Eusebes, 220-163; Ariarathes V. Eusebes Philopator, 163-130. In Pontus: Pharnaces, from about 190 up to about 169; Mithridates Philopator Philadelphus Euergetes, about 169-121.

By his unsuccessful war with Rome the Syrian king Antiochus III. had lost the prestige which up to that point had surrounded him in consequence of his brilliant exploits in the East.⁷ It was then that Armenia made itself independent. While he was on the march to Elymais to plunder a temple there, for the purpose of replenishing his exhausted treasury, he was slain with his soldiers by the Elymaeans, in 187. He was succeeded by his sons, Seleucus IV. and afterwards Antiochus IV. Seleucus had a difficult task to accomplish, but he was courageous and would even have intervened, in 179, in favour of Pharnaces of Pontus in the war between that sovereign and the rulers of Pergamum, Bithynia, Cappadocia and Paphlagonia, who were always quarrelling with each other but were united on this occasion, if he had not been prevented by a prohibition from Rome. With Egypt he lived

outwardly in peace, yet the interference of his minister Heliodorus in the affairs of Palestine, related in the not very trustworthy Second Book of the Maccabees, would have brought about a war with Egypt, if Seleucus had not been murdered by Heliodorus, just as Ptolemy had been by his 'friends' six years before. Heliodorus wanted to become king himself, and this would have been acceptable to the Romans, but Eumenes and Attalus of Pergamum put him on one side and arranged for the accession of the brother of Seleucus, Antiochus IV., passing over Demetrius, the son of Seleucus. Antiochus IV., called Epiphanes, was even more enterprising than his father. We shall revert to this characteristic figure later on (chap. xx.); we confine ourselves here to his relations with Egypt. We know (see above, chap. xvi.) that on the marriage of the sister of Antiochus IV., Cleopatra, with Ptolemy V. Epiphanes, Coele Syria was in some obscure way placed at the latter's disposal.⁸ Ptolemy Epiphanes, who was once more under Roman influence from the year 189 onwards, had been, as we are aware, murdered in 181, and his younger son Ptolemy VII. Philometor had succeeded him, with Cleopatra as guardian, after the speedy death of an elder one, Ptolemy VI. On the death of the latter in 173 the enterprising Antiochus IV. laid claim to Coele Syria, and as the king of Egypt would not part with it, a war broke out between Syria and Egypt. Here too the details are very uncertain. We know, however, that Antiochus vanquished Philometor and managed to bring him over to his side, and that then, at the desire of the people, who were displeased with this conduct of Philometor, his brother Euergetes Physcon took up the government, and also that Antiochus was thereupon once more victorious over the Egyptians. We give a few details of this contest below, on p. 395. The following was the position at the beginning of the year 168: Epiphanes, who, when he marched against Egypt in 171, had apologized to the Romans for so doing, held a portion of that country, but the war had not been brought to a decisive issue,

Egypt still offered resistance. In these circumstances the forces of both states, of Syria as well as of Egypt, were not free to act for the nonce. Egypt could not help Rome, and Syria could not damage her. But at any subsequent moment the position might change, and then it might be anticipated that Antiochus would win a decisive victory over the Romans. But in that event Syria would undoubtedly at once interpose in favour of Perseus.

In Asia Minor we take Bithynia, Cappadocia, Pontus and Pergamum in their order.

Prusias I., king of Bithynia (225 to about 185), was the most important sovereign of the dynasty.⁹ In his reign the rivalry of his state with Pergamum found marked expression. He was also an opponent of Byzantium, which had possessions on the Asiatic side of the Bosphorus and wanted to terminate the war between Attalus I. and Achæus, whereas this war was not unacceptable to Prusias, and Bithynia therefore sided with the Rhodians in the dispute with Byzantium about the duties referred to above (chap. xiii.). In 213 Prusias fought against some European Gauls, who had been brought over by the Pergamenians and were ravaging the country from Arisbe in the Troad, and defeated them. He sided with Philip of Macedonia against Rome, Aetolia and Attalus, and attacked Pergamum; he was included in the peace of 205. Subsequently, when Philip extended his operations in Asia and had destroyed Cius as well as Myrlea, these places were made over to Prusias, who founded the city of Prusias in place of Cius and Apamea in that of Myrlea. But in the impending war with Rome Prusias did not side with Philip; he had noted where the preponderance of power lay. Instead of this, he endeavoured to make use of the confusion to obtain Heraclea. In that, however, he failed; he was wounded at the attack and remained lame for the rest of his life. He also prudently held aloof from Antiochus' war with Rome. On this occasion he thought he might get Phrygia Minor, but

Eumenes obtained it, and Prusias out of vexation received Hannibal at his court. His son and successor Prusias II. ruled on the same lines as his father. He married a sister of Perseus. He waged war with Eumenes II. of Pergamum, and availed himself of the assistance of Hannibal. But he was obliged to break off the war by order of Rome, and declare himself ready to surrender Hannibal. Thereupon Hannibal committed suicide, in 183 B.C. Prusias then formed an alliance with Eumenes against Pharnaces of Pontus. In the war between Perseus and Rome he remained neutral. His subsequent history we shall discuss later on (chap. xix.), Bithynia never plays a bold, but always a crafty game; it invariably looks to its own immediate advantage, regardless of previous connections; it often opposes friends of Rome, but never Rome herself, and in the end, when the latter puts forth her strength, always submits to her will. In so doing the kings of Bithynia often behave in a low-cringing way, which attains the desired effect; the Senate allows the contemptible buffoons, who eventually obey Rome's orders, to continue on the throne.

Ariarathes IV. Eusebes,¹⁰ the king of Cappadocia, who succeeded his father Ariarathes III. at a very early age, was at first an ally of Antiochus III., but after the battle of Magnesia became an adherent of the Romans and a friend of Eumenes II. of Pergamum, who married Stratonice, his daughter by his first marriage. By his second marriage with Antiochis, daughter of Antiochus III., he had at first no children, and his wife therefore foisted two spurious ones on him, Ariarathes and Orophernes. Afterwards she bore him Mithridates, who succeeded his father as Ariarathes V. Eusebes Philopator, 163-130. We shall refer to him subsequently. Ariarathes IV. fought with the Galatae against Rome, but Rome pardoned him (see above, chap. xvii.).

In 169 B.C. a very vigorous and enterprising sovereign had probably just died in the kingdom of Pontus—Pharnaces.

whose reign seems to have begun about 190, but who appears for the first time in history in the year 183.¹¹ From 220-183 we hear nothing whatever of the kingdom of Pontus. While Pergamum and Rhodes had been handsomely rewarded by the Romans in 189, and Bithynia, Paphlagonia and Cappadocia had at least endeavoured to obtain a share of the Syrian booty, Pontus had kept quite still. It had not stirred either during the war with Antiochus or during the war with the Galatae. But when the Romans had left Asia, Pharnaces rose, in league with the Galatae and Mithridates, king of Armenia Minor, and in concert with Seleucus IV. of Syria. He attacked Sinope and conquered it, in 183 B.C. The inhabitants of Cotyora and Cerasus had to people the city of Pharnacea, which took the place of Cerasus. In the west he took Tius and threatened Heraclea. He devastated Paphlagonia, while Mithridates sacked Cappadocia. This gave rise to a great war between Pharnaces and Mithridates on the one side, and Eumenes, Prusias, Ariarathes and Morzius of Paphlagonia on the other, to a certain extent between eastern and western Asia Minor. Seleucus IV. would have supported the eastern powers if Rome had not prevented it. Rome seems in other respects to have used the required pressure to bring about a peace, which restored the *status quo*, with the exception of the incorporation of Sinope in Pontus, which was not cancelled. The terms have been preserved by Polybius. Pharnaces had to withdraw from Paphlagonia as well as Tius, and disgorge his spoils; Mithridates had to pay 300 talents (179). The following were included in the peace: the ruler of Armenia, Artaxias, also a certain Acusilochus, the prince of the Sarmatae, Gatalus, in Europe, the cities of Heraclea, Mesembria, Chersonesus and Cyzicus. It is clear that Pharnaces had relations approximating to those which we find subsequently in the case of his great relative Mithridates Eupator, and he was no doubt, like him, a decided opponent of the Romans. He died about the year 169 B.C. His suc-

cessor, who will be discussed in chap. xxv., observed more caution in his dealings with Rome.

We come finally to Pergamum.¹² Here Attalus I., to whom Polybius gives high praise as a trustworthy and clever man, had been succeeded in 197 by his son Eumenes I., who was not his equal in real capacity. He was considered a cunning fellow, and if it is true that he first of all incited the Romans against Perseus, and then was ready to go over to the latter, he must have thought in both cases that he would serve his own ends by it. Exaggerated partisanship for Rome in 172 seemed useful to him because he had offended the Romans in 175 by removing Heliodorus and installing Antiochus IV., and the evolution to the side of Perseus in 169 not less so, because he had begun to doubt of the success of the Romans. His brother Attalus, however, was obliged to continue to pose as a loyal friend of Rome, which he indeed was up to a certain point ; thus the dynasty was safe, whatever happened.

This was the situation in the East in the years 169/168 B.C. Of the opponents of Rome Pontus was powerful, but inactive ; Bithynia was always on the side of the stronger, and had a remarkable knack of discovering where the greater strength lay ; Cappadocia did not count for much, and Pergamum had to keep its eyes open not to get into trouble. For if Rome did not vanquish Perseus and Pergamum were to remain loyal to her, then the Attalids would be set upon by all their neighbours. On the other hand, it was perhaps possible for the kingdoms of Asia to shake off the influence of Rome. And that this was the wish of many statesmen in the East is clear. The Asiatic who had received a Greek education still had a consciousness of his own importance.

This being the position of affairs, endeavours of Perseus to find allies, or at all events interceders, were not without hope of success. He applied to Syria, Pergamum, Bithynia and Rhodes.¹³ Syria did nothing, because it was sufficiently occupied with Egypt ; Bithynia attempted friendly remonstrances

in Rome; Pergamum and Rhodes went further. According to Polybius' account negotiations took place between Eumenes and Perseus as to what the Macedonian monarch was to give the king of Pergamum if the latter remained merely neutral or brought about a peace between Macedonia and Rome. For the first of these services Eumenes demanded 500 talents, for the second 1500. Perseus declined the first, as being dishonourable for both parties; he accepted the second, but wanted to deposit the money in Samothrace. Eumenes, however, was afraid that in that case Perseus would simply fetch it away after the service had been rendered, and the business fell through. Polybius ridicules the folly of the two sovereigns, but we shall see from the story of Gentius that Eumenes was in the right. The Rhodians openly took up the line, as honourable as it was dangerous, of trying to enforce peace, if need be by joining Perseus. With this view they received embassies from Perseus, and having given assurances of their loyalty in Rome in the spring of 169, they shortly afterwards called on the Consul Marcius in Greece to cease interrupting maritime trade by war. Marcius of course requested them to apply to the Senate. They complied; they addressed a summons simultaneously to Rome and Perseus to make peace, and in 168 actually sent a mission on the same errand to Aemilius Paullus shortly before the decisive battle. They thus did their best to offend Rome, and that in the interest of a Perseus, a man with whom it was not easy to negotiate without being duped or disappointed.

The Galli and the Illyrian king Gentius experienced this at that time. Twenty thousand of the former were prepared to enter the service of Macedonia, but Perseus was ready to pay five thousand only. This did not suit them, and so he had to do without them and was a loser by it. He also displayed avarice, combined with gross dishonesty, in his dealings with Gentius. He had promised to pay him 300 talents, and had allowed Gentius' messenger to affix his master's stamp to the

silver which made up this sum, which Perseus was to send to Illyria immediately. He sent 10 talents at once to Gentius; the rest of the stamped silver followed more slowly. As soon as Gentius had received the 10, he imprisoned some Roman envoys, thinking that he was sure of the rest, and so broke with Rome. Thereupon Perseus had the 290 talents, which had not yet passed the frontier, brought back. The business had been done for 10 talents, why should he spend more money? It is characteristic of the prejudice of modern historians against the Romans that they should defend Rhodes, Eumenes and Perseus against Rome and in the way in which they do it. Rome, it is said, should not have taken offence at the stupidity of Rhodes; Perseus did not commit mean actions out of avarice; Eumenes was calumniated. Rome, it is further asserted, appears at a disadvantage with her arrogance, and her cunning in falsely accusing Eumenes with the sole object of being able to treat him badly. In reality it is not calumniating Eumenes to say that he wanted to make Rome's failure serve his own interests. Perseus was undoubtedly, as the ancients have portrayed him, a miser who sinks into a common cheat in order not to part with his treasure, and the Rhodians only behaved imprudently, but not meanly; but in politics on a great scale is not imprudence often more dearly paid for than baseness? Do not those often come worst off who, relying on a formal right, meddle with the disputes of their more powerful neighbours?

The fate of Macedonia was decided in the year 168.¹⁴ The position had in the end become extremely critical for Rome, as Macedonia actually made a great naval effort and had control of the sea from Thessalonica, so that at sea Perseus held almost the same position against the Romans as Philip, son of Amyntas, had once done against the Athenians. But the blow fell, as it was bound to do as soon as Rome despatched a tolerably honest and able general to the scene of action. This took place in 168, when L. Aemilius Paullus,

son of the general who had fallen at Cannae, was entrusted as Consul with the command against Macedonia. He had already held the consular office, fourteen years before, and was a man of acknowledged honesty, great dignity of demeanour and lofty disposition. He was closely related to other aristocratic families in Rome. His eldest son became a Fabian by adoption; the second was adopted by the son of the victor of Zama; he was the subsequent conqueror of Carthage. The Romans collected such a large force that the army which fought against Perseus himself amounted to at least 50,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, and that operating against Gentius to 30,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry. With the latter the Praetor Anicius at once conquered Scodra, and conducted Gentius, who surrendered, to Rome. Perseus, who was still at Dium, was induced by a turning movement of Scipio Nasica to retreat on Pydna, and here was fought the battle in which the king was completely defeated. On this occasion too the broken ground caused gaps in the phalanx, and the Roman maniples forced their way into them. The Macedonian cavalry fled. Twenty thousand Macedonians are said to have been slain, and ten thousand taken prisoners; the Romans are supposed to have lost only a hundred men. With this defeat all was lost for Perseus. None of his advisers remained with him; the cities surrendered. Accompanied only by some Cretan mercenaries, he arrived in Amphipolis, the inhabitants of which begged him to go elsewhere as soon as possible. He left 50 talents with his Cretan soldiers, and fled with 2000 talents and his family to Samothrace. But here it occurred to him that he might be given up to Octavius, who was cruising in the neighbourhood. He determined to fly to Thrace, and embarked a large portion of his treasure on a Cretan ship, intending to go on board at night. But when he came down to the shore, the captain had treated him as he had treated Gentius: he had disappeared with the money. The tutor of his children now gave up the

youngest of them, the queen managed to escape to Syria, where she afterwards married her brother Demetrius I., and Perseus himself surrendered with his eldest sons. He was brought into the Roman camp, where he was no longer treated as a king.

It was a settled thing that Macedonia was not to remain a monarchy. The details of its future constitution were arranged by the usual commission of ten legates. The people were disarmed, except in the frontier districts; the taxes were reduced by one half; the mines and the royal domains were left unworked. The leading Macedonians had to go to Rome. The country was divided into four districts, each of which had *connubium* and *commercium* only within its own area and consisted of free cities or rural communities, which assembled in four *sunedria*. Rome attempted to organize Macedonia on the same lines as Thessaly. The idea was that the people, which had left its unworthy king so completely in the lurch, would accustom itself to the form of four confederacies, especially as ancient Greek cities, like Amphipolis, formed part of this new political fabric. If the result was different, if pretenders soon found followers, this does not prove that the new state of things was worse than the old; it only shows that loyalty does not die out, even towards illegitimate and in the end incapable dynasties, as that of the Antigonids had been. Illyria remained independent.

The position was more awkward in Greece, where many had mentally sided with Macedonia—theoretical considerations often operate at a distance—and where Perseus, who was no longer so near a neighbour of the Greeks as his father, may have appeared to many a Greek in the advantageous light of a champion of freedom.¹⁵ On the other hand, some of the adherents of Rome in that part of the world had behaved with great cruelty. Thus in Aetolia Lyciscus had put to death 500 opponents with the aid of Roman soldiers, for which, it is true, A. Baebius, who had allowed the soldiers to perform

the degrading office of executioner, was afterwards punished. The only Greek power, however, that was still of importance was the Achaeans, who were ruled over at that time by the philo-Roman Callicrates, to the great repugnance of the Achaean people, who rightly considered servility to Rome, as practised by him, to be a disgrace. Callicrates and his party accused the malcontents of being traitors to the Roman cause. Similar charges found vent in the rest of Greece, and a regular persecution of all Greeks who were not entirely devoted to Rome was started by their opponents, who found a welcome opportunity of gratifying their private grudges in this manner. Those who were specially inculcated were to defend themselves in Rome. Among them were men from Aetolia, Acarnania, Epirus, Boeotia and especially from Achaia; the latter were picked out by Callicrates, and the imprudent remark of one of them, of Xeno, who was confident of his innocence, that he was ready to prove it in Rome, had the unfortunate result that his removal and that of others to Rome did not at first appear in the light of a cruelty. There were more than a thousand of them. The worst of it was, however, that when they had arrived in Italy, no one thought of bringing them before any tribunal, and, as the Romans did not know what to do with them, they were distributed among different places, where they led a miserable, uneasy existence. The Aetolian Andronicus and the Theban Neon, on whose advice Thebes had joined Perseus, were executed. Athens received the territory of Haliartus.

The fate of the friends of Rome who had proved disloyal to her was as follows. The Rhodians,¹⁰ who had adopted a menacing attitude towards Rome, rushed into the other extreme after her victory. They begged for forgiveness, and imprisoned the chiefs of the party which had just come into power. Of these Polyaratus had to undergo many experiences before he fell into the hands of the Romans. He fled first of all to Egypt, then to Phaselis, then to Caunus, and lastly into

the interior to Cibra, the tyrant of which, Pancrates, delivered him up to the Rhodians and consequently to the Romans. In Rome the Praetor M. Juventius brought forward a motion, without first consulting the Senate, that war should be declared against Rhodes, in 167 B.C. He evidently wanted to be entrusted with the conduct of it, to make large booty. But sensible people saw that there was no reason for destroying Rhodes; Cato spoke against it, the tribunes intervened, and the motion was rejected. Some steps however had to be taken against Rhodes. Its old neutrality was abolished; it joined the Roman alliance. Besides this, it lost Caria and Lycia. It seemed especially hard to the Rhodians that with these they had to give up Caunus and Stratonicea, as to which they asserted that they were not part of the booty taken from Antiochus, but that the former had been purchased by them from a general of Ptolemy, and that the latter was a present from Antiochus, the son of Seleucus, and that both brought them in a yearly revenue of 120 talents. They afterwards seized Calynda, in the interior, which had revolted from Caunus. But another measure of Rome they felt almost more keenly. Rome made the island of Delos a free port, by which a considerable portion of the trade of the eastern Mediterranean passed from Rhodes to Delos. The Rhodians maintained that in consequence of this measure their yearly revenue from dues dwindled from a million drachmas (166 $\frac{2}{3}$ talents) to a hundred and fifty thousand drachmas (25 talents).

Eumenes was not treated as harshly as Rhodes; besides, Rome could not find so much fault with him.¹⁷ Attalus, the brother of Eumenes, came to Rome to congratulate the Romans on their victory and to ask for help against the Galatae, who had once more invaded the territory of Pergamum. This was his officially acknowledged mission; at the same time he was of course to find out whether Rome had any unpleasant design against Eumenes. He was given to understand that Rome was dissatisfied with Eumenes, but had no complaint to

make against him, Attalus, and that he might ask for what he liked. A division of the kingdom would not have been unacceptable to the Romans. Attalus hesitated, but was persuaded by the physician Stratius, who accompanied him as political adviser, not to separate his own cause from that of his brother, and he asked for Aenus and Maronea. This was a politic move: instead of a diminution, he modestly asked for an increase, of the power of the kingdom of Pergamum. Of course this did not suit the Romans; they preferred to give the two cities their independence. To the Galatae the Romans sent envoys, who bade them keep the peace. But they did not succeed; the Galatae no doubt were aware that the Romans would be pleased if Eumenes had some annoyance to put up with. These envoys, who were to settle matters generally in Asia, gave audience in Sardes for the space of ten days to all who had any complaint to make against the king of Pergamum. Eumenes wanted to defend himself in person in Rome, but as soon as he reached Brundisium he was informed that the Senate had decided not to receive any more kings, and that if he wanted anything, he might say what it was at once, otherwise he could leave Italy. He chose the latter alternative. Nothing more was done to this "rogue," as Polybius calls him; he had got well out of the scrape, and eventually Pergamum actually defeated the Galatae in open battle.

Prusias had arrived in Rome in good time, and he had set about conciliating the Romans in a clever way. He appeared in public in the dress of a freedman—toga, shaven head and hat—kissed the threshold of the Senate, and hailed the Senators as preserving deities. This amused the Senate, who rightly assumed that a man who thus lowered his own order had reached such a point of moral degradation as to be a fitting instrument of a stronger power. He was allowed to return to Asia as a friend of Rome, and also to make things a little unpleasant for Eumenes.

We must now revert for a moment to the disputes between Syria and Egypt, to which we have already briefly alluded (p. 383), to add a few details and relate the upshot of the quarrel.¹⁸ Antiochus IV. Epiphanes had, as we saw, pressed Ptolemy VI. Philometor hard. He got possession of his person, and treated him in a friendly way, conquered part of Lower Egypt and had himself crowned in Memphis, in apparent agreement with Philometor. Thereupon the Alexandrians (*i.e.* especially the Roman party) revolted, and made the brother of Philometor, Euergetes II. Physcon, king. Epiphanes was dislodged from Egypt; only Pelusium was held by him. Physcon and the liberated Philometor came to an understanding with each other. Antiochus now attacked Egypt again, and the employment of the Achaeans was unsuccessful. It was at about this stage, just before the issue of the contest, that we left matters when we last referred to them (p. 383). The king of Syria now demanded the cession of Cyprus as well as of Pelusium. At this point came the decisive battle at Pydna and with it the whole face of affairs changed, even in the East. The opponents of Rome lost heart; the Romans acted promptly. In Egypt especially they were determined that the occurrences of 196 should not be repeated (see chap. xvii. note 2); Syria should not outwit Rome a second time. Popillius Laenas appeared as envoy in the camp of Antiochus outside Alexandria, and handed the king a communication from the Senate summoning him to leave Egypt at once. Antiochus declared that he would consider the matter. Thereupon Popillius drew a circle in the sand round the king with his stick and said: "Before you come out of this circle, tell me what I am to report to the Senate"; the king allowed himself to be intimidated and declared that he would comply with the wishes of the Senate. He gave up Pelusium. Popillius sailed to Cyprus and ordered the Syrian fleet to leave the island, and it did so. But Coele Syria, Phoenicia and Palestine were kept by Antiochus. Egypt was once more what it had

been, a country which could be governed by its sovereigns as they thought fit, provided they did nothing against Rome.

Before Aemilius Paullus returned to Rome he travelled through Greece with his son Scipio Aemilianus and with Athenaeus, a brother of Eumenes. At Olympia he sacrificed to Zeus, at Delphi he erected statues of himself in place of those of Perseus, at Athens he admired the walls which connected the city with the Piraeus, but which can hardly have been in a fit state for war. At Amphipolis he held Greek games: dramatic performances, gymnastic contests and horse races. The booty made in Macedonia was then brought on board the fleet, the arms which he did not want to take with him were piled in enormous heaps and burnt, and Cn. Octavius conducted the fleet to Italy. Aemilius himself marched with the army to Epirus, where the districts which had joined Perseus were sacked, in order that the soldiers who had not made enough booty in Macedonia might also get something. A hundred and fifty thousand people were sold as slaves. Each cavalry-soldier received 400 *denarii* from the proceeds, and each foot-soldier 200. But they were not satisfied.

The Senate decreed a triumph to Aemilius Paullus, to Octavius as commander of the fleet and to Anicius as conqueror of Gentius.¹⁹ The people was requested in the usual way to confer the *imperium* within the city on the recipients of the triumph during the three days of the ceremony. But Ser. Sulpicius Galba, who had served under Aemilius as tribune of a legion, and who had quarrelled with him, used his influence against the grant to Aemilius, and there were many soldiers who voted with him, for they were annoyed with the general for not giving them sufficient opportunity for plunder. The motion of the Senate was only carried with difficulty. The triumphal procession of the victor of Pydna was a brilliant one, owing to the amount of treasures displayed to the people and the spectacle of the humiliation of Perseus and his children. But the *triumphator* himself was in deep distress, his two

younger sons had just died. The triumphs of Octavius and Anicius served by their simplicity only to enhance that of Aemilius.

After the triumph Perseus was thrown into prison and at first forgotten, so that only the compassion of his fellow-prisoners saved him from starvation. He was then allowed to spend the rest of his life in Alba on the Lacus Fucinus. His eldest son died soon after him; the younger one lived longer and became an excellent turner and writer in the municipal administration of Alba.

NOTES

1. Greece. S. Hertzberg, 1, 142 seq., where the necessary references are given, and also Töpffer, Achaia, in Pauly. Philopoemen's reforms, Hertz. 1, 158. Callicrates and his adherents, Hertz. 173 seq.

2. Aenus and Maronea as examples of the vicissitudes of those times. Taken by Philip from the Egyptians, Liv. 31, 16 (200 B.C.). Liberated by the Romans from the garrison of Antiochus, Liv. 37, 60 (189 B.C.); consequently Antiochus had taken them, of which there is no special record. In Aenus a party for Eumenes, another for Philip, Polyb. 22, 9. Garrison of Philip in the two cities, Polyb. 22, 15 (185 B.C.); Philip therefore had retaken them. Dispute about them between Philip and Eumenes, Liv. 39, 27, 28. Maronea cruelly treated by Philip, Polyb. 22, 17; Liv. 39, 34. Aenus and Maronea asked for by Attalus, Liv. 45, 20, but declared independent, Polyb. 30, 3. L. Postumius sent against the Aenians, Liv. 45, 27. After this one cannot agree with Ihne (3, 156) in finding it hard that Philip had to give up Aenus and Maronea. Repeated taking of other people's property does not after all give even a king a right to it. Poison the favourite weapon of the king: Aratus, Philopoemen and Demetrius, his accomplice in Maronea. The Romans are certainly not to blame for not giving a man of this stamp what did not belong to him.—Removal of the inhabitants by Philip, Liv. 40, 3.

3. The responsibility for Demetrius' death thrown on Titus by Ihne, 3, 160, and Hertz. 1, 142.

4. Good article on Perseus by Cless, in Pauly, 5, 1361-1368.—At first a treaty between Perseus and Rome, Polyb. 25, 3: ἀνανεωσάμενος τὴν φιλίαν τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους; afterwards Perseus rejects

the advances of the Romans, Liv. 42, 25 ; his misfortune is therefore partly due to his own fault.—According to Liv. Ep. 41 Perseus “miserat ad Carthaginienses legatos.” Rome demands that Perseus shall simply submit, Liv. 42, 30, 36, 62.—Not long ago it was stated that a box containing Alexander-coins had been fished up in the harbour of Saloniki ; this may have been part of Perseus’ treasure.

5. The part attributed to Eumenes by Polybius is described as a “silly invention” by Mommsen, 1, 782. As a matter of fact the rulers of Pergamum were credited with playing a double game as early as 175 B.C., App. Syr. 45 : τὸν δ’ Ἡλιόδωρον Εὐμένης καὶ Ἀτταλος ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν βιαζόμενον ἐκβάλλουσι, καὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον ἐς αὐτὴν κατὰγουσιν, ἐταιριζόμενοι τὸν ἄνδρα· ἀπὸ γὰρ τινῶν προσκρουμάτων ἤδη καὶ οἷδε τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὑπεβλέποντο. So here we have another instance of a too ideal view being taken of kings. See also below, note 13, where I discuss this point at length.

6. By giving the sketch of the situation in Greece about 169 B.C. I endeavour to comply with the legitimate wish expressed by Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 942.

7. Syria. I give here the most important historical results of the latest researches, chiefly in numismatics, especially those of Percy Gardner (Cat. Br. Mus. Seleucid Kings of Syria, 1878), and of Babelon, who follows him. Cf. the excellent survey and critique of authorities in Schürer, Gesch. d. jüd. Volkes, 1, 127-137. The chronology uncertain, see also chap. xix. notes 9 and 10.—Seleucus IV., Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 941, 942. Not incapable in his war with Rome (Polyb. 21, 4, 6, 8 ; Diod. and others), he came to the throne in difficult times, when Armenia had already revolted (Str. 11, 528) under the old satraps of Antiochus, Artaxias in the north (Araxes valley with Artaxata) and Zariadres in the south (Sophene on the Tigris). Yet he was enterprising ; Rome prevented him from assisting Parnaces, Diod. 29, 24. Conflict with the Jews, 2 Macc. 3, 4. Seleucus murdered by Heliodorus, App. Syr. 45. See above, note 5. Heliodorus consequently was considered as too dependent on Rome. Coins, Bab. lxxxix.-xci. : Seleucus has a highly-developed forehead and chin. Coins of his seem to have been struck in Tyre and in Sidon, as well as in Laodicea ad Mare.—Antiochus IV. Epiphanes. Thanks of a community, evidently of Antioch on the Orontes, to Eumenes, Attalus, Philetaerus and Athenaeus, for help in installing Antiochus, with careful imitation of the Athenian style of inscriptions, Fränkel, No. 160.—For Antiochus IV. cf. Wilcken’s article in Pauly-Wissowa, I ; from the standpoint of the history of civilization, see above, chap. xx. For his war with Egypt, see Pauly, 1,

1, 1136, where the uncertainty of the chronology is clearly apparent.—On the coins, for which cf. Bab. xci.-cxiii., we have at first ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ, then ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ is added, after that ΘΕΟΥ, and finally ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΥ; the features become more youthful, consequently more like a god, with the addition of the title. The nimbus on the diadem of the Seleucids originates with him; that of Antiochus II. Theos (Bab. pl. vi. 10) has a different appearance and rests higher up, on the hair. Nicephorus means that he was Zeus, Epiphanes signifies not so much the illustrious as the one that has appeared, i.e. Zeus or god in general. The face of his silver coins has either his head or that of Zeus or Apollo. He put up a copy of the Zeus of Phidias in the temple of Apollo at Daphne, Amm. Marc. 12, 13; cf. Bab. xcv. The head of Zeus on pl. xii. 11 is supposed, according to Babelon, to have something of the type of Antiochus, but I find in it, as well as in the much finer coin of another die in Gardner, Types, pl. xiv. 26, 14, something feminine, which the portraits of the king do not possess. The beautiful tetradrachm of Antiochus IV. (Bab. pl. xii. 12), which has the head of Apollo on the face, exhibits on the reverse the statue of Apollo in long drapery and with the lyre, a reproduction of the statue in Daphne, a work of Bryaxis, Bab. xcvi., xcvi.; see below, chap. xx. Very interesting are his bronze coins, which Head (641) classifies as follows:—1. Those struck in Syria. 2. Struck in Egypt, some of them with the portrait of his sister, Queen Cleopatra. 3. Bilingual, in Phoenicia and in Laodicea on the Lebanon. 4. Autonomous municipal coins. Babelon makes out only two categories: 1. Those without names of cities, some of them struck in Egypt. 2. With names of cities: obv. mostly head of the king with nimbus; rev. names of the cities and various types; Bab. pl. xiv. and xv. 1-8. He enumerates the following, among them five Ἀντιοχεῖς, two Ἱεροπολίται, two Λαοδικεῖς, one Ἀλεξανδρεῖς, one Ἀπαμεῖς, one of Ascalum, four of Phoenician cities. 1. Ἀντιοχείων τῶν πρὸς τῷ Σάρῳ, evidently Adana. The inhabitants of this city seem to have borne the designation Ἀντιοχεῖς only during the reign of Antiochus IV.; rev. Zeus on his throne. 2. Ἀ. τῶν ἐν Μυγδονίᾳ—Nisibis; rev. advancing Nike. 3. Ἀ. τῶν ἐπὶ Καλλιρόῃ—Edessa, Bab. ciii., disagreeing with Droysen; rev. Zeus leaning on sceptre. 4. Ἀ. τῶν ἐν Πτολεμαίδι—Ace, called Ptolemais by Ptolemy II, but Ἀντιοχεῖς ἐν Πτολ. occurs as early as Antiochus III.; rev. standing Zeus, holding a wreath. 5. Ἀ. τῶν πρὸς Δάφνῃ, the famous city on the Orontes. Bab. (civ.) refers this issue to the portion of the great city laid out by Antiochus, which in his opinion was situated in the direction of Daphne. At all events the designation

'Α. πρὸς Δάφνη was applied to the whole of the great city subsequently; see below, chap. xx.; rev. Zeus standing, as in Ace; Babelon pictures him as bestower of wreaths in the Olympian games at Daphne. 6. Ἱεροπολιτῶν τῶν πρὸς τῷ Πυράμῳ—Castabala in Cilicia, the modern Budrum Kalessi (Bent, Heberdey and Wilhelm), see below, chap. xx. note 16; rev. eagle, Bab. cv. 7. Ἱεροπ. in Cyrrhестice-Bambyce; rev. Zeus as in Nos. 4 and 5. 8. Σελευκῶν τῶν ἐν Πιερίᾳ; rev. Zeus as in No. 7 or winged thunderbolt, cf. the legend of the foundation in Malalas, p. 199. 9. Σελ. τῶν πρὸς Πυράμῳ—Mopsus; rev. standing Artemis, Bab. cvi. 10. Ἀλεξανδρέων τῶν κατ' Ἰσσον—Alexandrette (Baed. Pal. 393); rev. Zeus as above. 11. Ascalum; rev. Zeus as above; dated 169, 168 B.C. 12. Λαοδ. τῶν πρὸς τῇ θαλάσῃ; rev. standing Poseidon. 13. Λαοδ. τῶν πρὸς Λιβάνῳ—Laodicea on the Orontes; rev. standing Poseidon; Phoenician inscription, which describes Laodicea as the metropolis of Canaan. 14. Ἀπαμέων τῶν πρὸς τῷ Ἀξίῳ, a tributary of the Orontes; rev. Zeus. 15. Gebal or Byblos; rev. standing god with six wings; inscription ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΑΝΤΙΟΧΟΥ and Phoenician inscription. 16. Tyre, rev. prow of a ship and inscription as in Gebal, also ΤΥΡΙΩΝ, or Phoenician inscription, which describes Tyre as the mother of the Sidonians, dates, 175, 174, 169, 168 B.C. 17. Sidon; rev. galley or Europa on bull, or rudder; inscription as in Gebal with ΣΙΔΩΝΙΩΝ, also a Phoenician inscription, which describes Sidon as mother of Cambe (Carthage), Hippo, Citium and Tyre. 18. Tripolis; obv. head of Athene or of the king and the queen; rev. the Dioscuri or their helmets; inscription ΒΑΣ. ΑΝΤ. and ΤΡΙΠΟΛΙΤΩΝ.—Epiphania, Laerte, Berytus uncertain; Bab. cxi. note 3.—It is noteworthy that 15-18 are, according to the inscription, somewhat different from 1-14; for they are described as coins of King Antiochus, whereas the others profess to be coins of the Antiocheans, etc. Inasmuch however as they also bear the name of the citizens, *e.g.* Τυρίων, they again are not purely royal coins, but belong to a hybrid species, the existence of which may be accounted for by the independence of the large cities of Phoenicia. See also Babelon, cxxxiv. We therefore have to revert to Head's classification after all.—The designation Ἀντιοχέων suggests matter for reflection. The inhabitants of many of the above cities, which had other names, were called Antiocheans. Does this mean that the city also was called Antiochia? This is not likely, for in No. 4 there are Antiocheans in the city of Ptolemais. It is possible that in this city all the inhabitants were called Antiocheans; but it may have been that only a portion of them was so styled, viz. those who perhaps were settled there by an Antiochus.

Babelon is of opinion that under the Seleucids the appellation 'Antiocheans' denoted special privileges for those who bore the name, and that bodies of inhabitants might be raised to the position of Antiocheans, as they were then and subsequently by Rome to the rank of Roman citizens; see also Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 1, 150 and 2, 81. At any rate it is clear that the philo-Greek Antiochus IV. gave a notable impulse to Greek city life in his empire. Babelon also makes the ingenious remark that those of the cities specified which did not contain Antiocheans, placed a Zeus handing a wreath on their coins (see above, No. 4 seq.). This must have been the Zeus who crowns the victors in his games at Daphne, and he would thus put the other places on a level with Daphne or the city of Antioch, consequently confer a distinction on them.—For Armenia, see below, chap. xxv.

8. Egypt. A granite head found near Aegina is pronounced by J. Six (*Athen. Mitth.* 12, 212-222) to be a portrait of Ptolemy VII. Philometor. Cf. Mahaffy, *Empire*, 328-376 for that monarch. Another brother, Ptolemy VI., must have reigned for a short time, as Lepsius has already maintained; see *Mah. Emp.* 329. Philometor was a friend of the Jews; cf. *Mah.* 356. The latter calls Philometor "one of the best kings of Egypt." Coins, *Cat. Br. Mus.* 32, 8.

9. Bithynia. For the two Prusias's see Cless, in *Pauly*, 6, 1, 161-164; also Th. Reinach, *Trois royaumes*, Paris, 1888, pp. 102-117. Wife of Prusias I. Apamea, who according to Reinach (102) was probably the sister of Philip V. of Macedonia. War between Byzantium and Rhodes, see above, chap. xiii. note 1.—War between Prusias and the Galli, *Polyb.* 8, 77, 78, 111.—Founding of Prusias and Apamea, Kuhn, 374-376.—Prusias *ἀναστῆς* from Hellespontine Phrygia, which is also called *ἐπίκρητος*, *Str.* 12, 563.—Prusias II. called *κυνηγός*. The head of the second Prusias on the tetradrachm has a diadem with a small wing, for which see Reinach, *Trois roy.* 109. For the war between Pergamum and Bithynia see also Fränkel, No. 65, who thinks Prusias I. must have been the monarch.

10. Cappadocia. For Ariarathes IV. Eusebes see Reinach, *Trois roy.* 14, 15; coins, *pl. i.* 8, 9. There are many drachms of his in existence, which are marked with *Λγ*, i.e. the thirty-third year of his reign, 187 B.C.; at that time he had to pay large sums to the Romans as a fine for his alliance with Antiochus and consequently coined a great deal.—For Ariarathes V. and Orophernes, see below, chap. xix.

11. Pontus. Pharnaces. Cless, in *Pauly*, 5, 1434, 1435; Reinach, *Trois roy.* 168-170; Reinach, *Mithridate*, 41, 42.—Military activity of Pharnaces, *Polyb.* 24, 10; 25, 2-6; 26, 6 (text

of the treaty of peace); 27, 6, 15; Diod. 29, 22-24 (Seleucus); Liv. 40, 2, 20; Just. 38, 6. There are Attic tetradrachms and drachms of Pharnaces, Reinach, *Trois roy.* 168.

12. Pergamum. Attalus I. highly praised by Polyb. 18, 41, who even says that he *ἐναπέθανε δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς καλλίστοις ἔργοις ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐλευθερίας*—against Macedonia. See above, chap. xiii. note 6.

13. Further warfare and negotiations. The Rhodians anxious *περὶ σιτικῆς ἐξαγωγῆς*, Polyb. 28, 14. Consequently the grain from Pontus was still of importance.—The Rhodians declare in Rome that they cannot stand the unrest any longer, Liv. 44, 14; mediation of Prusias, *ibid.* Perseus sends to Antiochus, Polyb. 29, 4; Perseus and Eumenes, Polyb. 29, 5; Rhodes, Polyb. 29, 10, 11.—The Rhodians send a request to Aemilius to make peace, Liv. 44, 35.—Perseus and the Gauls, Liv. 44, 26. Perseus and Gentius, Polyb. 29, 3, 4; Liv. 44, 27.—The view which prevails nowadays, that Eumenes was badly treated by Rome, without having done anything to deserve it, is a piece of pure conjecture, which ought to be better supported than it has been, if it is to prevail against the positive assertions of Polybius. In reality there is not the slightest ground for holding that Eumenes has been calumniated. Polybius says (29, 8) of the two kings: *τοῦ μὲν πανουργοτάτου δοκοῦντος εἶναι* (Eumenes), *τοῦ δὲ φιλαργυρωτάτου*, and the motives for Eumenes' conduct stated by Polybius are very natural in a man of that kind. True, Mommsen says (1, 782) that Eumenes cannot possibly have engaged in negotiations with Perseus, for he could not have risked the work of many years for a "paltry trifle." But what he wanted was not a paltry trifle; his object was to check the influence of Rome; see above, note 5. Besides, in deciding the question whether his action was foolish, its positive effect on the Romans must be taken into account. The Romans thought, or at all events maintained, that he wanted to betray them, and yet they did not ruin him. He therefore did not jeopardize the work of many years. What Polybius asserts of Eumenes is that, although he had brought about the war between Rome and Perseus, he nevertheless wanted to save Perseus, on condition that Perseus paid him for it. And conduct of this kind is not improbable in itself, nor unlikely in a Eumenes. It has often happened that extremely clever sovereigns have changed sides during a war and have simply deserted an ally for the enemy, the reason being that they were looking to their own advantage. The policy of interests which is so cried up nowadays often leads to similar results. It is therefore not in the least surprising if Eumenes first intrigued against Rome and was afterwards

ready to mediate between Rome and Perseus. So far he only acted like many others. But now, it is true, comes the curious part of the business. He was prepared to do it only on condition that he was paid for it. To understand this we must bear in mind the history of the Pergamum dynasty. For a sovereign of that state money was the main object. These potentates, as we know, had no people behind them. They were only of importance so long as they could hire mercenaries and fit out ships. The origin of their rule has given their history its peculiar character. They began their career with a large capital, and a stolen one to boot. Philetaerus acted like Harpalus, only besides the treasure he also appropriated the fortified treasury, and that was a wise proceeding. That the "rogue" should insist on payment for helping another person in his own interest, was natural in a ruler of Pergamum. It was petty, if you like to call it so, but that is no reason for considering it improbable.—Rome had already twice experienced a deception at the hand of allies: the first time when the Aetolians made peace with Philip without consulting her, the second when Egypt came to terms with Antiochus. Had she not a right then to be somewhat suspicious of the cunning monarch of Pergamum?

14. Battle of Pydna and its consequences: see the passages in Clinton, F. H. 84.—Condition of Macedonia after 168 B.C., Liv. 45, 29-32. The four divisions were: (1) In the east the country between the Nestus and the Strymon, with Heraclea Sintice and the territory of the Bisaltae west of the Strymon—capital Amphipolis. (2) Farther west up to the Axios with the eastern portion of Paonia in the interior and, on the coast, Chalcidice, Cassandria and Thessalonice, which became the capital. (3) From the Axios up to the Peneus, with the western part of Paonia, and Edessa, Beroea and Pella—capital Pella. (4) The country west of Mount Bora, with the Eordaei, Lyncestae and Pelagonia, as well as Atintania and Elimiotis—capital Pelagonia.—Silver and bronze coins ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ ΠΡΩΤΗΣ, etc., Head, H. N. 208. See Droysen's interesting remark on this republicanizing of Macedonia quoted above, chap. x. note 4.

15. Greece. The Achaeans prevented by the Romans from sending help to Egypt, Polyb. 29, 8-10. Lyciscus, Liv. 45, 28.—Greeks summoned to Rome, Liv. 45, 31; other orders relating to Greece, *ibid.*—Ten envoys single out the Greeks who are to be brought to Italy, Polyb. 30, 13; see also Paus. 7, 10, 7 seq. The Romans do not know what to do with them, Polyb. 31, 8. Cf. Hertz. 1, 217, where it appears that the details are not clear.—Athens rewarded, Polyb. 30, 21; Hertz. 1, 219; cf. the same author, 1, 84.

16. Rhodes. Polyaratus, Polyb. 30, 9.—Complaints of the Rhodians in Rome, Polyb. 31, 7; cf. Gilb. 2, 176.—Caunus must have been annexed to Rhodes in the great crisis of 197 (see above, chap. xvii. note 2); the ministers of Ptolemy therefore, who handed over northern Asia Minor to Syria, allowed one of their generals, of course in return for a good commission, to carry out a business transaction with Rhodes. But who is Antiochus, son of Seleucus, who made the Rhodians a present of Stratonicea? Of course not Antiochus I., perhaps the young son of Seleucus III. (see above, chap. x. note 3); but why not Antiochus III.? He may have thought for a time that he could get the Rhodians over to his side thereby, which failed, it is true. If the Rhodians took 120 talents a year from two cities, we can understand that their inhabitants had good reason to be dissatisfied, and can see how mildly Athens ruled in the fifth century, when the whole of Rhodes paid only 24 talents (vol. ii. pp. 224, 225). See also chap. xx., conclusion.

17. Pergamum. Its rulers also benefit by the ideal light in which it is the fashion to view the kings. No doubt the relation between Apollonis, wife of Attalus I., and her children was an excellent one; cf. Fränkel on No. 169. But the conduct of Attalus in Rome is over-praised. His brotherly feeling had to be first aroused by very realistic arguments on the part of Stratus, Polyb. 30, 1-3. Cf. the story told in Plut. de frat. amore, 18, which also shows how anxious Attalus was to become king. For the war with the Galatae in 168 and subsequent years, which, according to Diod. 31, 14, resulted in the subjection of all the Galatae, cf. Fränkel on No. 167. See also Trog. prol. 34: wars of Eumenes and afterwards of Attalus with Selge in Pisidia.—Prusias, Polyb. 30, 19.

18. Egypt and Syria. Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 218 seq.; Clinton, F. Hell. 320-323 (Syria), 390-393 (Egypt). Four campaigns of Antiochus in Egypt are assumed: 171, 170, 169, 168. For the passages in the ancient writers see Clinton. Antiochus IV. acted like his father, Antiochus III.: just as the latter had won over Ptolemy Epiphanes, so did Antiochus IV. Philometor; on both occasions Rome spoilt the game.

19. Triumph of Aemilius, Liv. 45, 39 seq.; Plut. 32 seq.; Cless, in Pauly, 5, 1368; the passages relating to the fate of Perseus, *ibid.*—Interesting remarks on the policy of Rome towards Greece in Mahaffy, Greek Life, 444 seq.

CHAPTER XIX

THE DESTRUCTION OF CORINTH—THE GREEK WORLD ABOUT
140 B.C. FROM A POLITICAL STANDPOINT, ESPECIALLY
IN THE EAST (168-146 B.C.).

NEITHER Macedonia nor the Achaeans settled down in the position in which Rome had placed them.

In Macedonia, a man of the name of Andriscus, who was a native of Adramyttium, and pretended to be a son of Perseus, found adherents.¹ He had been surrendered to the Romans by King Demetrius I. of Syria, whom he had asked for assistance, but had escaped from Rome and had gone to Macedonia, where he had been recognized by many persons as King Philip. He even forced his way into Thessaly. P. Scipio Nasica drove him out of that country. But the Praetor P. Juventius Thalna, who attacked him in Macedonia, was defeated and slain there, in 149 B.C. This was a serious matter. Rome had just engaged in a war to the knife with Carthage, which demanded great exertions, and in Spain Viriathus inflicted one defeat after another on the Roman armies. If Macedonia were to remain independent, the suzerainty of Rome over the Mediterranean littoral would be seriously compromised. The Praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus was therefore sent in 148 with a consular army to Macedonia, the coast-line of which was watched by the fleet of Pergamum. Caecilius defeated Andriscus and obtained the surrender of him from the Thracian potentate Byzes, with whom he had taken

refuge. Macedonia was now placed under the control of a resident official, *i.e.* it became a Roman province. The jurisdiction of this official, who must have filled the office of Praetor, extended from the Adriatic (Dyrrhachium and Apollonia) up to the Aegean Sea. Afterwards, at a date which cannot be fixed with precision, but under the Republic, the Via Egnatia connected those two ports with Thessalonice and Amphipolis. This road ran north of Lake Lychnitis (Ochrida) through the country of the Lyncestae, then north of Lake Begorritis through the passes of Lynceus, by Aegae (Edessa) and Pella to the east, and is the main line of communication between those countries in the present day.²

Greece had much to endure before it attained tranquillity.³ To all appearances free, it was in reality dependent on Rome, and in recognizing this dependence by constant appeals to Rome, and yet not quietly accepting Rome's decisions, the Greeks perpetuated their internal dissensions and at last came into conflict with Rome herself. True, the pronouncements of Rome were not so clear as awards of an arbitrator ought to be, but they could not well be so. For the Greeks came to Rome with all manner of complaints, and when each side had stated its case with genuinely Greek dialectic, the Senate really did not know which was in the right, and its agents in Greece often did not know it either. Under these circumstances the best course for Rome was to do what it generally did, to say that the Greeks should come to terms with one another, and we can understand that she was particularly glad if one side got the better of the other, for in that case the dispute, which nobody could make head or tail of, was shelved for the moment. The part played by the Romans in Greece was not a brilliant one. But if they did not want to give up all their influence in Greece, which was all the more difficult because the Greeks themselves were continually soliciting their mediation, or to treat the Greeks like Salassians and Iberians, which was by no means congenial to them, then

there was no other policy for them but that which they practised, viz. to wait patiently in the hope that the Greeks would calm down in some way or other. And Rome did try to repair mistakes which she had committed. In 150 B.C. the 300 survivors of the 1000 Achaeans who were taken to Italy in the year 167 were sent home. It is true that most of these men were so embittered that they only contributed to intensify the antagonism in Greece. Taking all things together, there is no warrant for the assertion that Rome treated the Greeks "with detestable state-craft" at that time, i.e. that she stirred up disunion among them, in order to crush them afterwards. Why did this state-craft not occupy itself with Athens? The catastrophe of 146 was a kind of natural event, brought about far more by human weakness, on the side of Greece as well as of Rome, than by human perversity. The matter is really quite simple. Most of the Greeks already looked to Rome as their arbitrator. But they had not yet learnt that they could not rid themselves of this arbitrator, even if they wished to do so. This was brought home to the more turbulent section of them in the year 146, and from and after that time all of them in the main accepted the position. Let us now see how the catastrophe of 146 came about.

The signal was given by a dispute which the Athenians had in 156 with the city of Oropus, which was subject to them, a dispute which is not without interest from the standpoint of the history of civilization. The Athenians plundered Oropus, ostensibly for no other reason than that they were in urgent want of money. The Oropians preferred a complaint in Rome, and the matter was referred to the arbitration of Sicyon, which condemned the Athenians to pay a fine of 500 talents. Athens of course could not raise this sum, and she in her turn appealed to Rome by means of an embassy, which was composed of the three heads of the schools of philosophy at Athens, the Academician Carneades, the Stoic Diogenes, and the Peripatetic Critolaus. These men obtained a reduc-

tion of the fine to 100 talents. The principal effect of the mission, however, consisted in the enormous impression made by the addresses of the three philosophers on the Romans. For they did not confine themselves to an official discussion of the point which they had been sent to settle; they obtained permission to deliver speeches on other subjects, and spoke in public on topics which the philosophy of those days liked to handle, so that the Romans now for the first time got a glimpse into the dazzling dialectic of the Greeks. If what Lactantius quotes from Cicero's *De Republica* is true, that Carneades on one day proved that justice was praiseworthy, and on the following day the reverse, we can understand that the aged Cato, who was present at these addresses, was of opinion that it would be better for the morality of Rome if men of this stamp left the city as soon as possible. On the other hand, it is clear that disputes between the members of a nation, the most cultivated representatives of which plumed themselves on proving black white and white black, could not be taken very seriously by the practical Romans. What people of this sort said against each other was bound to be highly exaggerated. The fact is that the old defect of the Greeks, their passion for wrangling and taking a technical view of everything, appeared only too clearly in this case, and to their own detriment. The presence, however, of these men did a great deal to make Rome, which had long ago learnt to value Greek culture, study what was practically the most important part of it, viz. ethics.

The Athenians could not or would not pay even 100 talents, and persuaded the Oropians to wait for a time. But they placed a garrison in Oropus, whereupon the Oropians applied to the strategus of the Achaean League, the Spartan Menalcidas, who undertook, for a payment of ten talents, of which the influential Achaean Callicrates was to receive five, to induce the Athenians to withdraw the garrison. In the meanwhile, however, the Oropians had been once more

pillaged by the Athenians, and they therefore refused to pay the ten talents. Menalcidas collected the money by force, but gave none of it to Callicrates. The latter revenged himself for this by asserting that Menalcidas wanted to detach Sparta from the League. Menalcidas thereupon bribed his successor, Diaeus, to procure his acquittal. He succeeded, but Diaeus got into disrepute. To divert the minds of the Achaeans, he revived the old controversies with Sparta about the definition of the powers of the League and of the individual states. The Spartans condemned twenty-four opponents of the Achaeans to death *pro forma*, whereupon the latter went to Rome and complained of the Spartans there. In Rome Critolaus and Diaeus (Callicrates had died on the way) were the spokesmen of the Achaeans, and Menalcidas that of the Spartans, who maintained that they were not bound to obey the injunctions of the League in all matters. The Senate declared that it would send envoys to decide the point, but Critolaus and Diaeus, as well as Menalcidas, falsely informed their principals that the Senate had decided in their favour. The dispute therefore dragged on. The Achaean Damocritus marched against Sparta in 148, and was victorious, but did not conquer it, for which the Achaeans condemned him to pay a fine of 50 talents, and replaced him by Diaeus, who pressed Sparta so hard, that Menalcidas killed himself in despair. The Roman embassy, under Aurelius Orestes, now arrived in Corinth, and declared that the Romans would allow Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Heraclea and Orchomenus in Arcadia to withdraw from the Achaean League. When the Achaean officials heard this they ran out into the streets and stirred up the people. The Spartans in Corinth were taken prisoners; the warnings of Aurelius were disregarded. Rome sent another embassy, under S. Julius Caesar, to settle the quarrel if possible, but this embassy was grossly deceived by Critolaus, who was elected strategus of the Achaeans in 146; he sent out an official summons to a

meeting at Tegea, to receive the communications of Rome, but clandestinely prevented its assembling, and then told the Romans that he could do nothing without due authorization. As soon as the Roman envoys had departed, he made the assembly of the League in Corinth decide on war with Sparta, and consequently indirectly with Rome, in spite of the protest of a Roman embassy which was then in Corinth. The Boeotarch Pytheas joined him as agitator. Thebes had been condemned by Caecilius Metellus, who was still administering Macedonia and also supervising the affairs of Greece, to lose Phocis, Euboea and Amphissa, as a punishment for depredations committed by her, and the Thebans were therefore more hostile to the Romans than before. Chalcis also declared against Rome.

Critolaus marched northwards, to take Heraclea, but he was defeated by Metellus at Scarphea, and not seen again; what became of him is unknown. The Patraeans were then vanquished in Phocis and an Arcadian force at Chaeronea. Metellus took Thebes and marched to Megara. The Achaeans ought now to have made peace, to which Metellus also was inclined, in order to end the war before the arrival of the consul L. Mummius. But Diaeus, one of the Achaeans who had been detained in Italy, who now assumed the supreme command, prevented it. He took most extreme measures. He filled the gaps in the army with slaves, and tortured the head of the peace party, Sosicrates, to death. Other members of that party purchased permission to escape from Diaeus. But now Mummius appeared on the scene. He took over the army of Metellus and with it defeated the troops of Diaeus in 146 on the Isthmus at Leucopetra. Diaeus fled to Megalopolis, where he killed his wife and committed suicide. Mummius waited three days before he made his entry into Corinth, which had been deserted by most of the inhabitants. He burnt the city to the ground, put to death most of the men who were found there, and sold the women and children

as slaves. The Senate ordered that Corinth should never be rebuilt; the spot was solemnly cursed. It is now generally supposed that this decision was due to the commercial jealousy of the Roman merchants (*equites*). If this contributed thereto, it was a secondary reason; the main reasons were two in number. First of all, the importance of Acrocorinthus. With a flourishing city close to it, this extremely strong point would have to be always strongly garrisoned; when the neighbourhood was a solitude, this was not necessary. In the second place and above all, an example had to be made, as the Peloponnesians had done at Plataea and Alexander at Persepolis, which seemed all the more useful, because the general political condition of Greece was not changed. Only a few districts became Roman. This would not have been much noticed; the destruction of Corinth spread terror far and wide. That the blow fell on Corinth, as the headquarters of the government which had opposed Rome, was again a consolation for all who held that the essential character and the importance of Greece lay in intellectual elevation and civic virtue. For with the name of Corinth, which had been ennobled in the old days by grand colonizing enterprizes and subsequently by the moral worth of Timoleon, both Greeks and Romans had long since ceased to associate lofty ideas; it had become to them a synonym for low debauchery. With the disappearance of Corinth ideal Greece lost nothing; its fall cannot be compared with that of Miletus, Eretria, or Thebes, only with that of Sybaris. What the Achaeans themselves thought of Corinth eighty years before is shown by the fact that they made a present of it to Doso after the battle of Sellasia. Mummius, who was a very worthy man, does not seem to have allowed any unnecessary cruelty in Corinth. Art treasures he sent, as in duty bound, to Rome. His proclamation, that any one who lost works of art on the way was to replace them, which has been much laughed at as showing utter want of connoisseurship, was a highly

practical order, as it brought home to the carriers the salutary conviction that they would have to discharge their duty with great care if they did not want to make themselves liable for large sums of money. Polybius, who came to Corinth after its destruction, saw a costly picture being used as a board for the dice with which Roman soldiers were amusing themselves. The dice-playing of Roman soldiers reoccurs at a far more important moment of history, as a symbol of power which, without an idea of the grandeur of what it has annihilated, enjoys itself after the performance of its duty.⁴

The consequences of the events of 146 were scarcely visible materially and legally, but morally they were of the highest significance. The Greeks had become aware that it was of no use to try to assert a doubtful formal right against an actual superiority; from and after that time they became reconciled to their lot as independent states, occupied only with their own affairs, and bound to live at peace with one another and to accept the decision of Rome in quarrels between city and city. Legally, on the other hand, the effects of the defeat of the Achaeans and their allies, the Boeotians and Euboeans, were felt only by them and not by the whole of Greece. The settlement was made by the commission of ten, whose work Polybius finished after their return to Rome. The immediate territory of Corinth, Thebes and Chalcis became the property of the Roman people. In other respects all the communities, even the Achaean, remained as free as they were before; even the Achaean League was not permanently abolished. For a long time, it is true, the Romans would not allow the same person to have landed property in several communities (no *commercium*, only *egktesis*), but even this prohibition was soon withdrawn and it can only have applied to communities which had been at war with Rome. According to Pausanias the Greeks henceforth paid tribute to the Romans; this too can only hold good of those who had been vanquished

in war, and the details are quite unknown. On the other hand, Rome introduced aristocratic constitutions very widely in the Greek communities, following the old custom of the Greeks themselves, who had always tried as much as possible to provide their allies with constitutions similar to their own. For a long time, on a mistaken view of the facts and law, it was maintained that Greece became a Roman province in 146. When this assertion proved untenable, it was said that Greece became a part of the province of Macedonia, and this view still obtains. But it is not tenable either. All that can be urged in favour of it are the two following points: firstly, that a number of Greek cities afterwards had the year 146 as their era, and secondly, that the Proprætor of Macedonia decided disputes in Greece. The first is an honorary matter, a compliment to Rome, which is voluntary, without legal significance and has nothing to do with Macedonia, and the second only amounts to this, that Rome used the Proprætor of Macedonia as commissioner for Greek affairs. Otherwise the decision of Cæcilius Metellus in regard to Thebes would prove that Greece was a Roman province before the destruction of Corinth. It is therefore clear that Greece in general, and not merely Athens and Sparta, was quite independent in point of form even after 146. I discuss the confusion, to which the arbitrary use and definition of the word 'province' gives rise in these matters at the present day, in a note.⁵

That Carthage also was destroyed by the Romans in the year 146, is well known. But this date was of great importance too for the affairs of the East, the second home of the Greeks, and we must now take a glance at the situation in that quarter.

In the part of Asia which was more or less directly under the influence of Rome, nothing happened to materially alter the position of affairs. Our reason for discussing principally the history of Cappadocia here, with a brief reference to that of Bithynia and Pergamum, and passing over that

of Pontus for the present, is not only that Pontus is farther removed from Roman influence, but also because we shall have a great deal to say about that kingdom in chap. xxv.

It was mentioned in chap. xviii. that Ariarathes V. came to the throne of Cappadocia⁶ in 163 B.C. Demetrius I. of Syria, to whom we shall refer shortly, tried to persuade him to marry his sister, the former queen of Macedonia, who had managed to escape to Syria (see above, chap. xviii.). But the ruler of Cappadocia declined to enter into this dangerous alliance. This enraged Demetrius, who now determined to marry his sister himself, and he did his best to make things unpleasant for Ariarathes. He supported the above-mentioned (chap. xviii.) Orophernes against him, and the latter actually seized on the throne in 158. Ariarathes, on the prudent advice of the Romans, had to content himself for the nonce with half of the kingdom, which Attalus of Pergamum helped him to occupy. After a time Orophernes was foolish enough to provoke his only protector, Demetrius, by assisting the Antiocheans against him, whereupon Demetrius threw him into prison—how he got possession of his person is unknown to us. Ariarathes now reigned alone in Cappadocia. He was the greatest sovereign that the country ever possessed, and he did his utmost to hellenize Cappadocia. He and his friend and brother-in-law Attalus became Athenian citizens and both held the philosopher Carneades in high honour. Ariarathes intervened with success in the affairs of Syria, Commagene, Armenia and Pergamum, and fell in battle for Rome against the pretender Aristonicus (see below, chap. xxv.). He called his city Mazaca Eusebea, no doubt in honour of his father. I discuss the conduct of his widow Nysa to her children later on (chap. xxv.).

In Bithynia the turbulent Prusias II., who was always quarrelling with Rome, Pergamum and his own people, was murdered, in 149, by his son Nicomedes, whom he had tried to put to death. The latter then reigned down to the year

95 with the grand title of Epiphanes Euergetes. See below, chap. xxv.⁷

In Pergamum the throne was occupied from 159-138 by Attalus II. Philadelphus, who married his brother's widow, Stratonice, sister of Ariarathes V., and did not allow his nephew to reign. He took part in the murder of Prusias II. and the overthrow of Demetrius I. He sided with the Romans against the pretended Philip and against the Achaeans.

It may be said that Cappadocia and Pergamum act in concert during the greater part of the second century, and thereby give a certain steadiness to the general position in Asia Minor. They are on the whole decidedly for Rome, and this attitude of the two states strengthens them more and more. Cappadocia's support of the Gauls in 189 and Pergamum's vacillation in 168 did neither of them harm in the long run, and both became firm friends of Rome and the Cappadocians regular Philhellenes.

The affairs of that part of the East which was withdrawn from Roman influence are very complicated and to a certain extent imperfectly known. The countries in question here are, apart from Egypt, the interior of which is not influenced by Rome, especially Bactria, Parthia and Syria. We proceed, in our brief survey, from the unknown to the known on this occasion, and begin with Bactria, most of the history of which can only be conjectured from the coins⁸ (see above, chaps. ix. and xiii.).

In this region a Diodotus was probably succeeded by a second of the same name. Afterwards we find a usurper, Euthydemus of Magnesia, at the time of Antiochus III. (see above, chap. xv.). His son Demetrius made conquests in India and in Chinese Tartary. Contemporaneously with him there appears a certain Eucratidas, whose coins were imitated by Mithridates of Parthia, whom we are about to mention. A city in Bactria was called after Eucratidas, and one in Arachosia after Demetrius.

According to coins which have been found the following sovereigns appear also to have reigned in these countries in the first half of the second century B.C. : Pantaleon, Agathocles, Antimachus and his successor Antialcidas, Plato (dated coins of 165 B.C.), and Heliocles, perhaps a son of Eucratidas, under whom two important changes set in, *i.e.* firstly, the Attic standard hitherto in use is given up, and secondly, the Greek inscription on the coins is accompanied by another in Indian language and in so-called Arianic character, derived from the Semitic. From Heliocles (about 150 B.C.) down to the last king, Hermeas, who probably reigned about the beginning of the Christian era, it is impossible to make out any chronology. Towards the middle of the second century, in the lifetime of Eucratidas, the kingdom of Bactria suffered by a campaign of King Mithridates of Parthia, called on the coins Arsaces Epiphanes Euergetes Philhellen, who reigned probably from 171-136 and was no doubt the most considerable of the Parthian monarchs. He extended his empire eastwards up to the Indian Caucasus, and then turned his attention to Syria, which after the death of Antiochus IV. (to be briefly mentioned again in chap. xx.) had experienced great vicissitudes, of which we must give a summary here.⁹

At first Antiochus IV. was succeeded by his young son Antiochus V. Eupator (164-162). The latter's minister, Lysias, increased the military strength of the country to such an extent that the Romans intervened and sent an embassy of three men to limit it. Thereupon Lysias had one of them, Cn. Octavius, murdered in Laodicea. The consequence of this was that the Romans let loose the king's cousin Demetrius, who was living in Rome as a hostage, against him. The historian Polybius facilitated his escape. Demetrius overthrew Antiochus and killed him. The new king (162-150) was at first very active; by subduing the satrap of Babylon, Timarchus, who had assumed the title of king, he even earned the surname of Soter. After that, however, he gave way to drink and

shut himself up in his fortified castle near Antioch. His political activity was not exactly of a skilful order. By attempting to get his sister, who had fled from Macedonia, married to Ariarathes V., he made the Romans his enemies, and he did not improve matters by marrying her himself; by interfering in the affairs of Cappadocia he exasperated Ariarathes. His subsequent removal of Orophernes did him no good either. The Romans, as well as Ariarathes and Attalus, the constant ally of Ariarathes, put forward a pretender in the person of a supposed cousin of his, a certain Balas of Smyrna, who called himself Alexander and passed himself off as a son of Antiochus IV., and Ptolemy Philometor was allowed the pleasure, of course with the permission of Rome, of contributing to the confusion in Syria by giving his daughter Cleopatra Thea, one of the most impudent women produced by the Ptolemy line, which had no lack of such characters, in marriage to this Alexander Balas (150-145). In return for this Balas obtained the support of Egypt. But the good fortune of this individual, whose mode of life was the same as that of Demetrius, did not last long. Philometor withdrew his favour from him and transferred it to Thea and Demetrius II., a son of Demetrius I., and shortly afterwards Balas was slain by an Arab chief (145). Demetrius II. (145-139; 130-125) had very varying fortunes; he was an extremely active and enterprising man, and he even received the surname of Nicator, which, applied to him, is no doubt only ironical. He soon became an object of detestation to his subjects. An adventurer from the district of Apamea, named Diodotus, first of all made a son of Balas king as Antiochus VI. Epiphanes, in 145, and after the latter's murder about the year 142 usurped the throne himself under the name of Tryphon (142-138). The head-quarters of Diodotus was for a time Coracesium in Cilicia Aspera, a robber's nest on a precipitous rock by the shore. Demetrius, however, was so far from losing heart that,

as no career was open to him in Syria, he set to work to win laurels elsewhere. An opportunity for this presented itself in Babylonia.

Mithridates of Parthia, who has just been mentioned, after displaying his power in the east, had conquered Media in 147, and in 145 even Seleucia on the Tigris. Thereupon the Babylonians appealed for assistance. Demetrius responded to the call. He was joined by Persians, by Elymaeans, and even by the Bactrians, represented now for the last time as independent, and at first he was successful. But in 139 he was defeated in Media and taken prisoner, and Mithridates had him carried about through the Parthian territories and shown to the people. Suddenly, however, the Parthian monarch changed his mind. He gave Demetrius, whose energy evidently pleased him, his daughter Rodogune in marriage, and wanted to reinstate him as king of Syria. At this point, however, Mithridates died, and he was succeeded about the year 138 by Phraates II., as Arsaces Philopator Epiphanes Philhellen. Parthia at that time extended from the Euphrates to Arachosia, and its monarch claimed besides, as 'king of kings,' sovereignty over the following vassal states: in the east the border countries of India, in the south Characene or Mesene at the mouth of the Euphrates and Tigris, then Persis, Carmania and Gedrosia, and in the west Adiabene. This no doubt was Oriental swagger, but at all events the rule of Macedonia over Iran and Babylonia was now at an end. In the extreme north-east too the supremacy of Greek civilization was in the same predicament. While the Parthians took Margiane about the year 140, Scythian tribes conquered Bactria and Sogdiana, the countries north of the Indian Caucasus. It was only in the Indus territory that the Greek element continued to hold its own up to about the beginning of the Christian era. And even for Demetrius II. the accession of the new sovereign in Parthia had produced a great change. The new king was not so well disposed to him as the old one,

and for the moment had no intention of reinstating him in Syria.

But if Demetrius himself was unable to do anything against Tryphon in this way, it was done by others.¹⁰ The brother of Demetrius II., Antiochus VII. Sidetes (138-129), rose against him. Tryphon soon lost his life. Antiochus married Thea, the objectionable but evidently inevitable adjunct of the Syrian throne, and as new king of Syria acted as vigorously as his brother had done. He marched against the Parthians and took Babylon, and even Ecbatana. Phraates was now in some embarrassment. Up to that time he had not been successful in open warfare. He therefore decided to adopt another mode of action with the warlike Syrian. He arranged to try three entirely different plans against him, if need be at the same time. In the first place, he opened negotiations with him in order to outwit him; secondly, he thought the present moment was favourable for liberating Demetrius; and thirdly, he resolved after all to try his fortune once more in the field. And this last plan actually succeeded. Antiochus VII. was defeated, and the energetic monarch could not get over it and put an end to his own life (129). The Parthian king now keenly regretted having set Demetrius at liberty, but as he could not catch him again, he decided at all events to make him harmless by sending a second pretender after him, a son of Antiochus Seleucus, whom he had also taken prisoner. But this was of no use, the young Seleucus sank into obscurity, and Demetrius II. actually ruled a second time in Syria. But he was still less successful now than before, and the king of Parthia had in point of fact no trouble with him. Demetrius was not a match for the difficulties in which he became involved chiefly through the continual interference of the Ptolemaean riffraff. He was seduced into beginning a war with Egypt, on behalf of the sister and consort of Ptolemy Physcon, who took refuge with him, and Physcon, who had now assumed the part of sovereign-

disturber of the peace of Syria in the place of Philometor, launched a new pretender against him, Alexander Zabinas (128-123), an Egyptian and a son of a merchant, as a supposed adoptive son of Antiochus VII. Zabinas overcame Demetrius, who was murdered about 125 B.C., probably by order of Thea, who then continued her career of assassination by sending her own son by Demetrius, Seleucus, to death after his father. After a time, however, Zabinas lost the favour of Physcon, who despatched the second son of Demetrius II. against him, Antiochus VIII. Philometor Grypus, *i.e.* hook-nose (125-96). Grypus vanquished Zabinas, who lost his life, in 122. The conqueror, however, was then opposed, perhaps as early as 116, by Antiochus IX. Cyzicenus (116-95), son of Antiochus VII., and also half-brother of Grypus, as they both had the same mother, the more than energetic Thea. We here leave the confusion in Syria, to which we shall return in chap. xxvi., to dwell for a moment on the affairs of the royal family of Egypt, which are of interest for the history of civilization.

In Egypt¹¹ the throne was occupied from 180-146 by the younger son of Ptolemy V., Ptolemy VII. Philometor, whose quarrel with Antiochus IV. Epiphanes has been narrated above (chap. xviii.). From the year 170, however, he shared the government with his younger brother Ptolemy IX. Euergetes II. Physcon (fat-paunch), who was raised to the throne by the Alexandrians in the country's need. Of course dissension soon broke out between the brothers. The elder was a good-natured debauchee, the younger a barefaced villain, who, however, posed as a scholar when he was not actually engaged in plotting crimes. Philometor was worsted and went to Rome. The Romans reinstated him and let Physcon have Cyrene. But Fat-paunch was not satisfied with this. He wanted to have at least Cyprus as well, and he asked the Romans for it. This was all the same to the Romans, and they installed him in the island. But the Cypriotes were not pleased, 'Benefactor II.' was an abomination in

their eyes; they drove him out, and the Cyrenaeans did the same when he tried to take up his quarters in Cyrene again. He appealed once more to Rome, and at last the Romans became weary of the matter and made over Cyprus to him. Viewed from Rome one was just as good as the other, and Physcon seemed to the Romans a more submissive tool than his brother. In the meanwhile Philometor displayed, as we saw, a certain activity in Syria, and even lost his life in a war there, in 146. Thereupon Physcon hurried to Egypt to obtain the throne, which the Jewish general Onias tried to get for the widowed queen and her children. Physcon married the former, Cleopatra, his own and Philometor's sister, killed his brother's son, Eupator, massacred the population of Alexandria, which was ill disposed towards him, wholesale, ill-treated his wife, and married her daughter, who was also called Cleopatra. The continued enormities of 'Benefactor II.' were too much even for the people, mercenaries and other not particularly sensitive individuals, whom he had settled in Alexandria, in the place of the slaughtered inhabitants; they set fire to his palace. Thereupon Physcon fled to Cyprus, and from there, to show that he had not changed, sent his first wife the dismembered corpse of his and her son. He then returned and got possession of Alexandria. Cleopatra I. fled, as we have seen, to Syria, but came back and made terms with Physcon, who now in the company of his two wives, the one his sister and the other his niece, and as a patron of science and native art (see chap. xx. note 22), rested from his earlier labours, which must have been somewhat fatiguing even for him. Egypt had this creature as king, partly in name and partly in reality, for fifty-three years. He did not die till 117.

We now return to the year 146, in order to take a comprehensive glance at the condition of the Greek world in those days and of the countries connected with Greek civilization.

Macedonia had lost all political importance; Rome alone

was master there. In Greece the last power which wanted to play a high game in politics had been humbled, consequently Rome's influence predominated there also. In the west Carthage was annihilated, here too Rome had no rival to fear. There were, however, a good many Greek-speaking communities, mostly in Sicily and Italy, in the latter especially Neapolis; farther west Massalia continued its commercial activity as a free Greek city uninfluenced by independent states or by kings. In the distant east we see the political importance of a large section of the Greeks destroyed by the marked rise of the Parthian empire, the king of which, Mithridates, conquers Babylonia and Seleucia about the year 145, and shortly afterwards takes Margiane, which had belonged to the Bactro-Greek kingdom. As Bactria and Sogdiana fall into the hands of the Scythians at the same time, Greek rule in the east from about 140 B.C. is confined to countries bordering on India, and even there the importance of the native element increases. In Egypt the death of Philometor brings about an apparent concentration in 146, as Cyprus and Cyrene are once more reunited to it. But this only injured the Greek cause. Physcon did his best to exterminate the Greeks of Alexandria, and won the good-will of the native priesthood by doing more for their temples than any former Ptolemy had done. In Syria we witness the beginning of a complete dissolution of the state. The Maccabees, who will be discussed in chap. xx., grow more powerful every day, and Simon, who reigns from 143-136, is allowed by the king of Syria to issue coins. The rise of the Maccabees of course means the self-assertion of the East from a religious point of view. But that the East was so strongly impelled to assert itself, was after all due to the fact that Hellenic culture was making considerable progress in general, and this we see not only in Syria, but also in the kingdoms of Asia Minor: in Cappadocia under Ariarathes V., in Pontus under Mithridates Philopator (see below, chap. xxv.),

in Bithynia under the wretched Nicomedes II. Epiphanes (149-95, see chap. xxv.).

About the year 140, therefore, we find the Greek element driven back, externally, in Macedonia and Greece by Rome, in Bactria and Sogdiana by the Scythians, in Margiane and Babylonia by the Parthians; internally, however, this repulse is complete only in Bactria and Sogdiana, it is incomplete in the countries conquered by the Parthians. For if an Asiatic religion spreads in this quarter, yet the kings of Parthia call themselves Philhellenes, and they appear to have been really such. A partial retreat only of the Greek element, combined with an advance in other respects, *e.g.* in language, is observable in Palestine. All this lost ground, however, is amply made up by the great start which, as we shall see in chap. xxiv., Greek civilization takes in Rome, which becomes thoroughly permeated and influenced by it. Of Greek states, *i.e.* those which are controlled by sovereigns of Graeco-Macedonian extraction, the following remain about the year 140: (1) republics: in Greece, in the West (*e.g.* Massalia), in the East (a large number from Rhodes up to Tanais); (2) kingdoms: Egypt, Syria, Pergamum, India; (3) in the south of Asia Minor and on the borders of Syria various republics or principalities, with which we are imperfectly acquainted (*e.g.* Olba in Cilicia, see below, chap. xx. note 16).

Politically therefore the Greek element is everywhere on the decline, intellectually however almost everywhere in the ascendant. In Syria and Egypt at this time a combination of Greek form and Oriental spirit is in course of formation, which is destined to give Christianity to the world.¹²

NOTES

1. Mahaffy's work, *The Greek World under Roman Sway*, London, 1890, now becomes of importance. Revolts in Macedonia, Hertz. 1, 248, 255, 260. The province of Macedonia, *ibid.* 260.

2. Via Egnatia, Pol. 34, 12. Tafel, *De via Egn.*, Tüb. 1841. Passes of Lynceus, Thuc. 4, 83; Kiepert, § 280.

3. Condition of Greece, Callicrates, Charops etc., Hertz. 1, 224 seq. Return of 300 Achaeans, *ibid.* 232. Position of Polybius there. "Detestable state-craft" of the Romans, Ihne, 3, 250. No doubt Callicrates had advised the Romans to interfere in the internal affairs of the Greeks, Polyb. 24, 11, 12.—For the events in Greece down to 146 see especially Töpffer's article Achaia, in Pauly's R. E. 3rd ed. The quarrel about Oropus, Paus. 7, 11, 4; cf. Hertz. 1, 241. Carneades in Rome, Lact. Inst. div. 5, 14 (Cic. de rep. 3, 6); Plut. Cat. Maj. 22. Cf. also Mahaffy, Greek World, 71.—The last events in Greece before the destruction of Corinth briefly in Paus. 7, 14. Some details at greater length in Polyb. 38, 7 seq. and book 39; see also Liv. Ep. 51, 52.—Dedicatory offerings of Mummius in Olympia, Paus. 5, 10 and 24.

4. That the Romans destroyed Corinth out of commercial jealousy, is an acute conjecture of Mommsen's, 2, 48, which, however, cannot be accepted without further ado as a fact. If the site was "so extremely favourable for trade" (Mommsen, l.l.), there was no need for it to lie desolate; Corinth could be treated in the same way as Delos. The reasons stated by me are adduced in Cic. off. 1, 11 and Just. 34, 2. It is true that Strabo says (14, 668): *πλούσιοι γενόμενοι Ῥωμαῖοι μετὰ τὴν Καρχηδόνας καὶ Κορίνθου κατασκαφὴν*.—Corinth made a present of to Dason after the battle of Sellasia, Plut. Ar. 45; Polybius in Corinth, Polyb. 39, 13.—The position of Corinth was of great importance for trade only in earlier times; after 146 it never regained its importance.

5. Condition of Greece after 146 B.C. According to Paus. 7, 16, *φόρος ἐτάχθη τῇ Ἑλλάδι* and constitutions were introduced *ἀπὸ τιμημάτων*. In the same passage the withdrawal of the restrictions imposed at first is alluded to: *συνέδριά τε κατὰ ἔθνος ἀποδιδόασιν ἑκάστοις τὰ ἀρχαῖα καὶ γῆν ἐν τῇ ὑπερορίᾳ κτᾶσθαι*. The territories of Corinth, Thebes and Chalcis became Roman *ager vectigalis*, see the passages in Marquardt, Röm. Staatsverwalt. 1, 168; Corinth, Thebes and Chalcis destroyed, *ibid.* 167. Cf. also the detailed account by Hertzberg, 1, 280-300. The two reasons of Marquardt's for the provincial status of Greece given by me in the text are to be found on pp. 171-173 of his work. In saying (p. 172) in support of his view "that the Achaean cities introduced this chronology on account of the beginning of the independence conceded to them by the Romans, is refuted by the simple fact that the two cities of Athens and Sparta, which were undoubtedly confirmed as *civ. liberae*, never used the provincial era," he "ignores" the fact that they had not been at war with Rome, and had not been vanquished, and therefore no independence had to be "conceded" to them. It was, however, "conceded"

to the Achaean cities, and they therefore had every reason to show their gratitude by adopting this chronology. Consequently the above remark of Marquardt's "refutes" nothing, and his argument does not make the era a provincial era.—For the references on this question see Marquardt and esp. Hertzberg, l.l.—Marquardt's constitutional observations (1, 167, 168) are just as little to the point as proofs of the provincial status of Greece after 146 as the above reasons of fact. They amount briefly to the following. According to Gaius provinces are liable to pay taxes; according to Paus. l.l. Greece pays *phoros*, therefore it is a province. This is technically a wrong conclusion. For even assuming that all provinces paid *phoros*, it does not follow therefrom that every country which pays *phoros* is a province. But Marquardt's real mistake consists in identifying *phoros* with vectigal. From a legal point of view *phoros* is perfectly compatible with independence of the country which pays it, that is proved by the Athenian League, the members of which, although they paid *phoros*, did not on that account intend to give up their independence. Allies can pay *phoros*. The *phoros* of an entire city must not be confused with the taxation by Rome of its individual citizens or of their landed property. Finally, it is inappropriate to apply conceptions of the jurist Gaius (in the time of the Empire) to the age of Mummius, in which the later constitutional notion of *provincia* as a dependent country with certain fixed attributes had not yet come into existence. Marquardt (340, note 5) shows himself that in those days the word *provincia* was used of countries which were independent. Marquardt's conclusion in this respect is in the main as follows: from and after 146 Greece exhibits in some places some of the attributes which were afterwards considered as characteristic of provinces, consequently it was made a province at that time, and we may confidently apply all the attributes of a province in the later constitutional sense to the Greece of those days and say that it was "provincial soil." This conclusion however is wrong, so long as it is not proved that the theory of Gaius held good about 300 years before him, and that is not proved. The mistake in Marquardt's argument also appears from some special remarks of his. On p. 340 he says: "From the time of the Gracchi at least it has been a recognized constitutional principle that property in provincial land has passed to the Roman people and that the provincials have only the usufruct of it, consequently that the province is a *praedium populi Romani* (Cic. Verr. 2, 2, 3)," and he quotes Mommsen, R. G., 2, 120 (111) for the first part of this assertion. Mommsen says here of Caius Gracchus: "To him is due the proposition, which was foreign to the older constitutional law, that all the land of subject

communities is to be regarded as private property of the State, a proposition which is used in the first instance to claim for the State the right of taxing this land at its good-will and pleasure, as was done in Asia, or of settling colonies on it, as took place in Africa." The first point to be made against Marquardt is that if the proposition was foreign to the older constitutional law and originated with Caius Gracchus, it could not have been applied to Greece in 146 (the words "at least," which are not in Mommsen, are a misleading addition of Marquardt's). This appears from another passage in Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, 3, 731. He assumes here that the "provisional condition of a city after its conquest by Rome up to the introduction of a definitive state of things" (Momms. 3, 716), which Mommsen describes for the sake of brevity as the "Unterthanen-verhältniss," and according to which "the whole territory of the subjects became the domain of the Roman people" (731), makes its first appearance in Asia through the instrumentality of C. Gracchus. According to Mommsen therefore (730) in the year 146 B.C. the right to the soil still remained with the conquered Greeks. But is Mommsen right in his assumption that C. Gracchus introduced a new constitutional right of the kind described? Where is the real proof of his assertion? Only in what he calls the exercise of this right, viz. in the taxation of Asia and the founding of the colony of Carthage. But both of these two measures can be more easily explained by the general unwritten state-law of Graeco-Roman antiquity than by a new law, the existence of which at the time is not demonstrable, and which, as we shall see in the last chapter of this work, is altogether far from clear. The province of Asia had become the property of the Roman people by testament, consequently by private right, and Africa by conquest; Rome therefore could do what it liked in both cases. It is the special mode of acquisition of these countries which explains Rome's treatment of them. By this it is not intended to deny that the treatment was the outcome of certain tendencies of the Romans, which afterwards gradually became more influential. This has been shown by Mommsen (*Staatsrecht*, 3, 730), whose view I shall subject to a criticism in the last chapter, as the importance of these matters for the Greek world seems to demand it. At any rate it may now be taken as proved, firstly, that the new proposition attributed to C. Gracchus cannot be ascribed to him with any probability, and secondly, that it can in no case be applied to Greece in the year 146. Two other points, which are not without importance, are as follows. Gaius says in the passage quoted that of the "*solum provinciale*" the "*dominium populi Romani est vel Caesaris, nos autem possessionem tantum—habere videmur.*" This

does not say, as Mommsen asserts, that "the provincials" have only the usufruct, the "nos" are the *cives Romani* as well. The meaning of the passage is this: the provincial soil is not *res mancipi* nor Quiritarian property, and consequently cannot pass from one person to another in accordance with the forms of the Roman civil law. But this did not make the possession of it more uncertain than that of Quiritarian property. In the first place, the *jus Italicum* was attainable also by provincial communities, and with the attainment of it their soil was capable of passing in *dominium*; secondly, the limitation was not attended practically with any drawbacks. This seems a bold assertion. The general idea is that if the Roman people was owner of all provincial land it could take away his possession from the holder at any moment and give it to some one else. In theory perhaps it might have had the power to do so, but such a theory was never put into practice. In reality it is a question only of two different legal views. Certain forms are in use for Romans and for communities on an approximate level with Rome, but the non-Roman is just as secure under his own. A man who is only possessor and not *dominus*, is all the same protected in his possession by the praetorian interdicts. That those who were only possessores and not *domini* were none the worse off in the Roman Empire, may be illustrated by a modern analogy. It is probably not generally known that in Great Britain everybody is in the same position as the possessores of provincial land in the Roman Empire, and yet so it is. Professor Sir Fred. Pollock says in his work, *The Land Laws*, London, 1887, p. 12: "No absolute ownership of land is recognized by our law-books except in the Crown. All lands are supposed to be held, immediately or mediately, of the Crown, though no rent or services may be payable and no grant from the Crown on record." English law down to the present day recognizes no land-owner, but only land-holders, *i.e.* literally no *dominus* of land, but only possessores. But nobody takes it into his head to assume on that account that the Crown in England can confiscate land at its goodwill and pleasure. The possession of provincial land in the Roman Empire was on a similar footing. It was practically as safe as the *dominium*. We may therefore say that in the Roman Empire the *dominium* of the Roman law and the *possessio* of the *jus gentium* existed side by side just as peaceably as the *allodium* and the *fee* do in certain countries in our own day. A Mecklenburg 'lehensträger' does not under ordinary circumstances trouble himself because his holding passes at once to the Grand-Duke in certain cases after his death, and there were no special cases of this kind for land in Roman provinces. What has just been said may be summed up into

three propositions: 1. The limitation to *possessio* in the case of provincial land had only formal consequences, as certain legal provisions took the place of others which were peculiar to the Roman law. 2. The whole theory of *possessio* as alone possible for provincial land dates from the Empire only and was not used at that time for plundering the provincials; the passage in Cic. pro Flacco 22 refers to a community of the province of Asia, which had become the property of the Roman people by an act of private right. 3. Modern analogies show, not only that it is not usual to draw strict conclusions from the letter of the law, but also that an apparently inferior position is not felt as such if it does not entail any practical disadvantages. But provincial land, it is said, was really worse off than that of Italy, because it was liable to land-tax. Fiefs, however, have obligations which are not shared by allodial holdings. Are the holders of them any the worse for it? Why did Caracalla make all provincials Roman citizens? The latter after all had to pay rather more.—The second point is as follows: the passage in Cicero about the *praedium* has not quite the meaning attributed to it. Cicero says: “quasi quaedam praedia”; it is therefore only a comparison which he draws, and in regard to the advantage and pleasure afforded by the provinces. Cicero did not intend to define the legal position of the provinces by this remark. We cannot follow Mommsen in saying (*Staatsrecht*, 3, 731, note 3) that the legal proposition, that the whole territory of the subjects became the domain of the Roman people, “clearly” appears in Cicero, Verr. 2, 2, 3. A comparison cannot “clearly” bring out a legal proposition. But there is another point besides. According to Mommsen, R. G. 3, 504, the theory that the provinces were estates of the Roman people was put an end to by Caesar. See below, chap. xxviii. note 2. What becomes of the theory then? It is not susceptible of proof in the case of Gracchus. In Cicero it is merely a comparison. Caesar put an end to it. This being so, it is permissible to maintain that the proposition that Greece became provincial territory in 146 is not proved. Our view is confirmed by Cic. in Pis. 16, § 37. Piso, who by the *lege Caesaris* was governor of Macedonia only, while the *populi liberi* were independent, also had jurisdiction over Achaia, Thessaly, Athenae, over cuncta Graecia.

As the view combated by me rests mainly on Pausanias (7, 16), it is well to examine the value of his statements more closely. He says (2, 1, 2): *Ῥωμαῖοι δὲ ὡς ἐκράτησαν τῷ πολέμῳ, παρείλοντο μὲν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τὰ ὕπλα καὶ τεῖχη περιέλλον, ὅσαι τετειχισμέναι πόλεις ἦσαν, Κόρινθον δέ, etc.* If we were to take ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες here in the sense attributed to Ἑλλάς

in 7, 16, we should have to assume an impossibility, for the Romans did not then injure any Greek city which was not at war with them. It follows from this that the word Ἑλλάς in 7, 16 is not to be taken strictly any more than Ἑλληνες in 2, 1, 2, that the *periegetes* made use of a general expression, in order not to go into detail in a matter which did not interest him and which was out of his line. From φ. ἐτ. τῇ Ἑλλ. therefore we can only infer that many persons in Greece made payments to the Romans after 146, but who they were and what they paid, was evidently unknown to Pausanias himself. How valueless these general statements of Pausanias are, appears from Zonaras, who says (9, 31): τείχη τό τῶν περιεῖλε; that is intelligible enough, and gives the other statement of Zonaras in the same place—Μ. ἐλευθέρους πάντας καὶ αὐτονόμους πλὴν τῶν Κορινθίων ἀφῆκε—a certain value. After all no value whatever can be attached to words like φόρος ἐτ. τῇ Ἑλλ. What does Ἑλλάς mean there? European Greece? Certainly not Athens and Sparta. Does it include islands? And which? Pausanias at any rate never anticipated that his expression of feeling—Greece had to pay taxes to Rome!—would ever be taken as a basis for constitutional deductions. My position is also supported by Cic. Verr. 1, § 55, according to which Mummius—urbesque Achaiae Boeotiaeque multas sub imperium populi Romani dicionemque subiecit. Consequently Cicero is quite unaware that he made the whole of Greece a province, and there is no reason for giving this fiction further currency.

Those who have had the patience to follow this disquisition will see what my conclusions must be. In the year 146 there was no theory on the subject of provincial land. If Rome vanquished peoples or cities, it did not always treat them in the same way. It took from them or left them certain rights; but those rights which it did not expressly take from them were retained by them, as is done in other countries. In 146 a number of Greek cities or races, which had been at war with Rome, were subdued by it. Their condition was changed by their defeat, that of the others was not. A district bearing the name of Hellas, which is supposed to have had a common fate at that time, did not exist either then or subsequently; later on there was only Achaia, which is very significant.

In conclusion, the general observation may be permitted that the exaggerated application of the conception of province as a district under administration or rather supervision is connected, as it seems to me, with an exaggerated systematizing of Roman constitutional law. Sufficient distinction, I think, is not drawn between

internal circumstances and relations with foreign countries. In the case of the former no doubt it is quite correct to take theory as the rule of practice, and, starting from the conception of the magistracy, to deduce from it the powers of the various magistrates and explain their official actions by them. A magistracy and different magistrates were bound to exist in the Roman state from the beginning, and the consistency in thought and action characteristic of the Romans had the effect that they always applied the leading conceptions of their constitutional system with accuracy. But influence abroad, possessions beyond the frontiers, and the nature of relations with other peoples and states, do not form part of the immutable fundamental conditions of a state, not even of a state like the Roman. Here the outside world has after all a voice in the matter, and the single state must to a certain extent conform to its ideas, so far as they are generally diffused. It was therefore impossible for the Romans to have at starting a conception of *provincia* as a geographically defined district, the soil of which was at their absolute disposal. The *provincia* of the Romans was in the first instance the official district of a commissioner who represented Rome abroad, who decided and judged, of a praetor. In Rome's relation to the allied or the conquered state, it is not, in my opinion, a Roman theory which is decisive, but, besides the recognized principles of international law, of which the independence of the community is the most important, the particular circumstances of each case. Consequently the historical view, and not the systematic theoretical one, is the more correct. The only thing that remains uniform in these matters is the relation of the officials sent abroad to the Roman people. On the other hand, the relations of Rome with the affiliated states, even down to the time of the Empire, do not fit into any uniform theory. The internal constitution of Rome stands to her foreign affairs as the *jus civile* does to the *jus gentium*. The former remains unchanged, the latter is fashioned according to circumstances. Consequently in the beginning the relations with foreign states also vary according to circumstances, and the theory according to which the same legal conditions obtain in all dependent countries does not prevail until late in the day. And so the doctrine of the *solum provinciale*, which was not thought of in 146, makes its appearance.

About the year 146 we are still in a period of which Cicero (*de Off.* 2, 8) says that Rome had the "*patrocinium orbis terrarum verius quam imperium*," a state of things which according to him was not changed until might took the place of right in domestic affairs, *i.e.* about the time of the Gracchi. The *patrocinium* stands in the same relation to the *imperium* as the *προστασία* does to

the ἀρχή with the Greeks (cf. the appendix to vol. iii. of this history). And this remark of Cicero's must not be taken as a mere *façon de parler*. True, the peace league, of which Rome was the protector, was brought about by force. But do we not see the same thing everywhere? Every state rests on the right of compulsion; nobody gives up his supposed rights of his own accord. If peace was to be established in the Mediterranean, the various autonomous states and kingdoms had to be compelled to join Rome, while abandoning their claims to rule over others and yet retaining their internal independence. Rome conquered, but not in the fashion of our day, in which the conquering state takes over the administration of the conquered one. Up to a certain point this state of things realized the ideal of the modern advocates of peace.

E. Curtius (*Stadtgeschichte Athens*, Berl. 1891, p. 246) has some very striking remarks on the relation between Greece and Rome at this time. He says that "the two originally kindred nations met after a long period of estrangement at a time when both had need of the other. . . . The nations themselves united in their worthiest representatives, and while as against the Macedonians men like Phocion could only continue to emphasize the futility of resistance, the new continental power was of such a kind that the leaders of the national party saw in it the only guarantee for the future welfare of Greece. This view of the situation was brought clearly home to both sides after the second Macedonian war by the Achaean hostages in Rome. It was a striking dispensation of Providence that the Achaeans should be the first to give utterance to the conviction that the history of Greece found its completion in the Roman Empire." We may add that the growing traffic between all parts of the Mediterranean necessitated a more settled state of affairs than Athens or Rhodes had been able to establish; Rome brought it about.

Athens. Condition after 146, Hertz. 1, 308 seq.; 320-322. Coinage in Greece after 146. In general it comes to an end, except at Athens. In the north there were still Macedonian coins (Head, H. N. 210), tetradrachms with ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΩΝ and ΛΕΓ (consequently the coinage of a legatus), and Byzantium, Odessus and other cities continued to strike Alexander-coins. Besides these, in the west Dyrrhachium and Apollonia issued coins, and in the east Thasos (an enormous number) and probably Maronea. In the Peloponnese probably only copper was coined as a rule. The disappearance of the Corinthian drachmas, which formerly had such a wide circulation and were not struck only in Corinth, is explained by the growing influence of Rome on commercial traffic. The Corinthian drachma was $\frac{1}{2}$ of a Corinthian

stater (1 Corinthian stater = 2 Attic drachmas = 130 grains) or $\frac{1}{2}$ of an Aeginetan drachma. The Romans had made their denarius equal to the Attic drachma; consequently a coin which was $\frac{1}{3}$ of 2 Attic drachmas and therefore not in a convenient ratio of calculation to 1 drachma or 1 denarius (1 denarius = about 65 grains, 1 Corinthian drachma = about 44 grains), did not fit into the commerce controlled by Rome, which, on the other hand, actually favoured the continuance of the Attic coinage and the Alexander-coins, which were on the Attic standard.

6. Cappadocia. Ariarathes V. and Attalus *Συναλλήτριοι* honour Carneades. Inscription in Athens near the Stoa of Attalus, Ditt. 220 with commentary. Ariarathes declines to marry the sister of Demetrius I., formerly wife of Perseus, Diod. 31, 28; Just. 25, 1.—Remarkable confirmation of the account in Diod. 31, 32 of the 400 talents deposited by Orophernes in Priene by the discovery of five specimens of the coin of Orophernes in Priene itself, Reinach, *Trois roy.* 45. Ariarathes V. highly praised by Diod. 31, 19. The Mazacenes *χρῶνται τοῖς Χαρώνδου νόμοις*, Str. 12, 539.

7. Bithynia; Pergamum. Liv. Ep. 50; Reinach, *Trois roy.* 103, 118; Fränkel, *Inscr.* p. 121.

8. Bactria; v. Gutschmid, *Gesch. Irans*, 29, 33, 37, 44, 58, 71, 77, 103. Yet the numismatists seem to me authoritative for conclusions to be drawn from coins. Bellew (*Inquiry into the Ethnography of Afghanistan*, 1891, and paper read before the London Asiatic Society, *Athenaeum*, 26th March 1892) assumes that the Afghan language exhibits traces of the influence of the Greek races who settled mostly in the Suleiman range after Alexander the Great; according to him even the names of the Afghan tribes are Greek.—Parthia. Spiegel, *Eran. Alterthumsk.* 3, 77; Head, 692 seq.; v. Gutschm. 43 seq. 54. The coins of Camescires are attributed by Head (697) to the Characene kingdom.

9. Syria. In this note I give details of the kings. Cf. Schürer, 1, 130 seq. Antiochus V. Eupator came to the throne at the age of nine years; somewhat older features on the coins, Bab. cxiii. cxiv. For him, Lysias and Octavius see Pauly, 1, 1, 1137, and 5, 822.—Coins of Timarchus rare, Bab. cxv.—Demetrius I. Demetrius and Polybius, Polyb. 31, 19-21; his drinking propensities, Polyb. 33, 19. Coins. Rev. besides Apollo, a female figure, acc. to Bab. cxvii. Tyche. City-coins of Tyre and Sidon with bilingual inscription of Demetrius I. and his head. Also tetradrachms and bronzes with the heads of Demetrius and Laodice, formerly wife of Perseus, Bab. cxxii.—Alexander Balas, 150-145. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 1, 131, 178. He took the title of Theopator Euergetes Epiphanes Nicephorus. The rulers of Pergamum had

already put Antiochus V. on the throne, now they did the same with his alleged son. Some coins of Alexander Balas, struck in Phoenician cities and with the Ptolemaean eagle, are of Phoenician weight, Bab. cxxv., cxxvi. In the year 161 of the Seleucid era (157 B.C.) Philometor still coined in Ptolemais; Alexander Balas continued this coinage in 162, as did his successors down to Antiochus IX. The Athenian Parthenos occurs on coins of Alexander Balas, Bab. pl. 17, 18: reminiscence of Antiochus IV. Epiphanes; it is also the common type on the coins of the Cappadocian Ariarathes IV. Alexander Balas also put a head resembling Alexander the Great on his coins, Bab. cxxix. Similar head on silver coins of Cibyra. For a coin of Cyrrhus with an owl, perhaps because Athenians lived there, Bab. cxxviii. and cxxx. Tetradrachms with the heads of Alexander Balas and Thea, struck in Seleucia, Bab. cxxx.

10. Syria continued. Cf. Pauly, 1, 1, 1138; 6, 2, 2172-74; Babelon, cxxxi.-clxi. (Demetrius II. down to Antiochus VIII. Grypus); A. Kuhn, Beiträge z. Gesch. der Seleukiden von 129-64 B.C., Altkirch, 1891.—Demetrius II. Oriental types on his coins; coins struck in Tyre, Bab. cxxxii. cxxxiii.—Antiochus VI. calls himself *ἐπιφανὴς Διόνυσος*; according to the coins he reigns from 145-142 B.C., Bab. cxxxv.; type, the Dioscuri galloping, as on the Roman denarii; also Dionysian types: torch-bearing elephant, Bab. cxxxvii.—Tryphon reigns four years and calls himself *βασιλεὺς αὐτοκράτωρ*, which no other Syrian king did. According to Strabo, 14, 668 the rise of the piratical power in Cilicia Aspera was due to Tryphon. Coracesium, the mediaeval Alaja, is compared by Leake to Gibraltar; cf. Ritter, 19, 382. Type, horned helmet (*τρουφάλεια* ?), Bab. cxxxviii.—Antiochus VII. Sidetes, born in Side, 138-129 B.C., took the surname of Euergetes. Every issue of coins at that time comprised six kinds, from the tetradrachm downwards; on the chalcus the head-dress of Isis; Seleucus IV. had built an Iseum in Antioch; Athene Parthenos on the rev. pl. 21, 13. The right of coinage granted by Antiochus VII. to Simon Maccabaeus applied only to bronze, Bab. cxliv.—Demetrius II., king for the second time, 129-125 B.C.—His head now often with a beard, because he had let his beard grow in Parthia in the fashion prevailing there.—Alexander II. Zabinas (also Zeb-), 128-123, plunders the temple of Zeus in Antioch and strikes, evidently from the proceeds, gold staters with Zeus Nicephorus. The son of the Egyptian merchant had a vein of practical humour. The lion's skin again, which adorns his head on bronze coins, recalls Alexander the Great.—Seleucus V., 125 B.C. His mother Thea, who had already put to death his father Demetrius II., puts him to death as well, and places her other son, Antiochus VIII. Grypus, on the

throne; when she wishes to take his life too, he anticipates her and kills her. She took the name of Eueretia. Tetradrachms with her portrait, rev. cornucopia (Eueretia = abundance), struck in 125 B.C., Bab. clii.—Antiochus VIII. Grypus, 125-96, took the titles of Epiphanes Philometor (very characteristic) Callinicus. After his half-brother Antiochus IX. Cyzicenus had waged war with him, the former was master of Coelesyria and Phoenicia, Grypus of northern Syria and Cilicia, Bab. clv. His portrait shows the hooked nose from which he gets his name.—On Syrian coins from the time of Alexander Balas onwards appears a picture of a building belonging to Tarsus, also represented on coins of that city, extensive remains of which, as it appears, still exist near Tarsus; it was called the tomb of Sardanapalus (visited by Alexander, vol. iii. of this work, p. 327), but (on the coins) is pronounced by Babelon (clviii.) to be the altar of a Syrian deity, who was introduced into the west and became known there under the name of Jupiter Dolichenus (Doliche a place in Commagene, cf. Roscher, 1, 1191). Cf. Carl Ritter, *Erdkunde*, part 19, 203-209, and Ed. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, 1, 203-209. A type of this kind is one of the signs of the religious reaction of the East at that time, which is shown on Syrian coins from Antiochus IV. onwards by the frequent occurrence of figures of Oriental gods.

11. Egypt. Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 221; Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, chap. xxi.; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 1, 180-182. For Ptolemy IX. Physcon, Mahaffy, *Empire*, 377-404 and also 344-352 (Rome, Philometor and Physcon). Ptolemy VIII. is the son of Ptolemy VII. Philometor put to death by Physcon. For what Physcon did for the Egyptian temples, see below, chap. xx. note 20. After he was placed on the throne by the side of Philometor, Physcon was evidently active in the Roman interest and could therefore take many liberties. The Romans had much to answer for in Egypt.

12. That this period marks the beginning of the reaction of the East against the West, is rightly pointed out by Mommsen, *R. Gesch.* 2, 59. His remarks, however, on the attitude of Rome towards this awakening of the East seem to me less satisfactory, and I discuss them here on account of their importance. According to him "the Roman Senate throws away the first substantial result of Alexander's policy," in other words, the Roman "protective power" should not have looked on quietly at the dissolution of the Syrian empire. But in saying this Mommsen asks really too much of Rome. Rome therefore was to keep the Syrian empire together. Against whom? Evidently against the Parthians. But how? No doubt, by sending armies at least as far as the Tigris.

Even if Rome had had the necessary supply of men and money always ready to hand, where were the competent generals? Rome would have had to protect the foreign empire by permanent garrisons, and for an undertaking of this kind on behalf of others Roman citizens were after all not available. True, it cannot be denied that the Romans themselves may occasionally have had a notion that they ought to do something in Syria. Strabo hints at this when he says (14, 669): *εἰ καὶ τὴν κατὰ γένος διαδοχὴν τὴν ἀπὸ Σελεύκου τοῦ Νικάτορος αὐτοὶ κεκυρωκότες ἤδουντο ἀφαιρεῖσθαι*. That they shrank from deposing any kings is hardly credible; the fact is that they did not know what they were to do with Syria after the deposition of the Seleucids without making things worse than before. Eventually the dynasty destroyed itself. Besides, Mommsen's demand credits the Senate with a politico-historical insight which it could not have possessed. We, at the present day, think we can discern that this would have been the moment to nip the incipient rise of the East in the bud; but such an idea could not have occurred to Rome, and it is not even certain that the idea would have been a correct one, *i.e.* that preventing the dissolution of the Syrian empire would have checked the power of the East. For, after all, it is unmistakeable that the reaction of the East which set in about 146 was far too deeply rooted to be arrested by the Senate of an Italian city, even if the latter sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the Tigris. The movement was one of ideas, and ideas, as the whole course of history proves, can be overcome only by ideas.—Mommsen reverts to his opinion, that Rome ought to have done something against the East, on a subsequent occasion, R. G. 5, 370, 371, where he blames Augustus for "not having extended the supremacy of Rome up to the Caucasus and the Caspian and settled scores with the Parthians." True, he adds that he does not mean by this that Rome should have "made more conquests" in the East. But what was she to do then? The Caucasus and the Caspian were no boundaries against the Parthians. Would the mountain range on the western edge of Iran be such a boundary? Was Rome to occupy the passes of it? And if the Parthians did not keep quiet with this 'scientific' frontier (to use an Anglo-Indian expression), what then? Then there would have been perpetual war at a distance of 2000 miles from Rome. Napoleon too only wanted to settle scores with Russia; he had not the slightest intention of conquering it. Rome acted rightly in letting things take their course. The only way to settle with the East is to vanquish her intellectually, and not even Greece was able to do this; Rome's whole character utterly unfitted her for it.

In Egypt the rule of Ptolemy IX. Physcon marks the beginning of the same reaction of the East directed in the first place against Greek civilization. The Philhellene Scipio inspected Egypt, but neither he nor the Roman Senate could find any pretext for proceeding against Physcon. Things took their course, and Rome could not prevent it. Under Ptolemy III. IV. and V. risings of the natives against the foreigners and the Greek element took place; Ptolemy VII. still clings to the preponderance of the Greeks, but his rule is contested and in his reign Greek culture declines in Egypt, Mahaffy, *Empire*, 358; Ptolemy IX. Physcon strengthens his hold on the country by not only thrusting the Greeks into the background but simply trying to exterminate them.

CHAPTER XX

GREEK CULTURE IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.—I. EGYPT.

II. SYRIA

Now that we have arrived at the close of an important period, which brings us near the end of Greek history in general, we have also to consider the history of its civilization. This and the four following chapters are intended to present a summary of the state of Greek culture during the second century B.C. in its principal abodes. That in the course of it the chronological limits should be occasionally overstepped was inevitable. We attach the most importance to details, from which a few general considerations will follow of themselves.

I. Egypt.¹ In chap. xiv. we endeavoured to describe the position of culture in Egypt in the third century B.C., especially in Alexandria. We saw how the first Ptolemies created a comfortable home for poets and scholars in the Museum and in the libraries, and so provided them with unexampled resources for their labours. It turned out that even poetry derived advantage from this favour shown by crowned heads. Directly, of course, the Museum and the Library promoted only science; that was already the case in the third century, and if in our description of that age we did not enter more fully into this subject, the reason was that science and erudition had not then reached their highest point in Alexandria, whereas Alexandrian poetry was of importance only in that early period. We can therefore now

give a connected account of the erudition of Alexandria, with the certainty of being able on this occasion to bring out the leading traits of the period actually under discussion.

Under the first Ptolemy lived the famous mathematician Euclides, through whom Alexandria became the great school of mathematics. The first literary critic of repute in the same age was Zenodotus of Ephesus, a pupil of Philetas.² With him begins philology, although Eratosthenes called himself a philologist before him. The Library was entrusted to him along with Alexander the Aetolian and Lycophron, and while the former arranged the tragic poets and the latter the comic ones, Zenodotus had Homer and the other poets under his special care. He also paid particular attention to Homer, and was the first to bring out a critical edition (*diorthosis*) of him. After Zenodotus Callimachus, the poet referred to in chap. xiv., was librarian under the second and third Ptolemy; he also wrote learned works, and directed the scientific studies of others. Thus one of his pupils was Eratosthenes of Cyrene, born in 275 B.C. This great inquirer, however, had also gone to seek his education in Athens, in the school of the Stoic Ariston and the Academician Arcesilaus; in Alexandria he became head librarian under Ptolemy III. He was a many-sided man and capable in all branches, but, as was supposed, not first-rate in any one of them, on which account he was mockingly called Beta, Number Two. This at any rate was very unjust as regards geography, for in that department he was first. By means of clever measurements made on a proper plan he fixed the circumference of the earth with approximate correctness. He also laid the foundations of the science of chronology by his investigations, in which he made use of the lists of the kings of Egypt; to him are due the best-known calculations of the older Greek chronology, according to which, for instance, the destruction of Troy comes 407 years before the 1st Olympiad (1183-776 B.C.). In criticizing Homer, he had the good sense not to represent the poet as an authority

in geography. If he called himself *philologos*, it may be pointed out, on the one hand, that this word, like the word *philosophos*, was a token of modesty, and, on the other hand, that the person who first assumed the title cannot have taken *logos* merely in the ordinary meaning of 'word' or 'speech,' but in a deeper sense, which approximates to that which we find in the case of a later Alexandrian scholar, of Philo.

Alexandrian philology did not remain at the level of Eratosthenes, but became more and more special and somewhat more dry. This tendency was introduced with great ability by Aristophanes of Byzantium, who, born about the year 260, went to Alexandria early in life, and became librarian there in 195. On intimating his intention of going to Pergamum, he is said to have been thrown into prison in Egypt, but eventually to have been released. The invention of signs of prosody, such as spiritus and accents, is attributed to him. The most important of his pupils was Aristarchus of Samothrace, who is said to have lived from 230-158. He was a teacher in the family of Ptolemy VII. Philometor. His Homeric studies were of special importance. His editions with marks (for instance the *obelos*, a horizontal line, —) required the commentaries of later scholars; from this it would appear that Aristarchus, in spite of his great literary fertility, was not inclined to waste his words.

The great mechanic Hero lived in Alexandria towards the end of the third and at the beginning of the second century. The famous Syracusan Archimedes was a little older. It is not quite certain whether the great astronomer, Hipparchus of Nicaea, who belonged to the second century B.C., was ever in Alexandria; at any rate he resided in Rhodes. A couple of historians who found their stimulus in Alexandria are referred to in the note.³

With the flourishing state of literature in Egypt and Asia is connected the formation of a general Greek language, the

so-called *koine*. It is a transformation of the Attic, the forms being Attic and the vocabulary and arrangement of sentences more limited, more colourless. Each individual writer took up what attitude he liked towards it. The *koine* stands in the same relation to the Attic, as Italian does to the Tuscan dialect.⁴

A caricature of a philologist was presented by King Ptolemy IX. Physcon,⁵ already mentioned above (chap. xix.), who surpassed his prototype and grandfather Philopator (chaps. xiii. xv.) both in lowness of disposition and in ostentatious love of antiquity. He even made conjectural emendations of Homer. Polybius was in Egypt under this king. In a passage already quoted (chap. xiv. note 1) he says that there were three categories of inhabitants in Alexandria: the natives, who were clever and polite, the mercenaries, who were numerous, uncivilized and overbearing in their habits, and the Alexandrians, descendants of Greeks, who were not so rough as the mercenaries. But the last class had, as Polybius says, been almost exterminated by Physcon having allowed his mercenaries to ill-treat and plunder them on more than one occasion. This was the condition of the Greek element in Alexandria in 140, a city after which it is proposed to name a great epoch of Greek civilization!⁶

What then is the character of Alexandrian culture?⁷ The answer is by no means a simple one, for this culture differed at different times. The three first Ptolemies made Alexandria the home of a court poetry of the second rank (Theocritus is not a native of Alexandria), and of an erudition of the first rank. The poetry, which soon came to an end in Alexandria itself, afterwards exercised considerable influence on Rome; Alexandrian erudition has been of importance for all subsequent ages. The whole of this culture was thoroughly Greek, without any material admixture of Orientalism; it might have developed just as well on the Bosphorus as in the delta of the Nile. But even the first Ptolemies took an interest

in the country over which they ruled, and promoted the knowledge of it. The Egyptian priest Manetho, who is not in any demonstrable relation with the Museum, wrote a history of Egypt for Greeks, just as about the same time in Syria, where similar efforts crop up, the priest of Bel, Berosus of Babylon, composed a history of Babylon from native sources for Antiochus I. In Egypt Hecataeus of Abdera went a step farther; he wrote a history of Egypt, not in order to relate dry facts and figures, like Manetho, but to make ancient Egypt interesting; according to him it had been recognized as the home of wisdom from time immemorial.⁸ Afterwards, however, another element was added, which has still less connection with the court and the government of Egypt and was due solely to the personal initiative of the Ptolemies. From the first Alexandria had been the home of natives of the country which has far surpassed the great empires of Asia in intrinsic importance, the land of Judaea. The Jews not only carried on trade there, they also cultivated their national learning. The manners and customs and the religion of this, the most peculiar race in the world attracted the notice of the first Ptolemies, and they promoted the translation of the sacred books of the Jews into Greek (the Septuagint). This was of course accompanied by independent theological and philosophical studies, and consequently there arose in Alexandria, quite independent of the Museum and the court literature, a school of research which enabled a spiritual link to be formed between the Oriental and the Greek element, and it is this intellectual tendency which became more and more important there.⁹ This appears especially about the time of the Birth of Christ. We may therefore say of Alexandria: Greek poetry soon comes to an end there; Greek erudition lives on, with fruitful results in other countries, but dries up at its source; Oriental erudition, on the other hand, becomes of importance there and develops, so to speak, into a second Alexandrian school, which has hardly anything in common with the first

Greek school. Physcon, by exterminating the Greeks of the city, enabled the "clever and polite" natives, among whom also the Jews must be reckoned, to make their culture, which was somewhat modified by their intercourse with Greeks, the most important factor of the intellectual life of Alexandria. This also made it possible for the Oriental philosophy in Alexandria to be eventually opposed by a Greek philosophy of a sophistical character, which the Ptolemies would have nothing to do with, because it encouraged the spirit of independence too much. But that does not happen till the time of the Empire.

The second century B.C. is a period of transition for Alexandria. The purely Greek culture disappears, the Oriental-Greek has just begun. I shall say a few words about art at the conclusion of this chapter.

II. The position in Syria is quite different from that in Egypt. The sovereigns of this country are more vigorous; the people is not a multitude without cohesion as in Alexandria, which alone is of account in Egypt, but, although a medley, it is one of a kind in which the nation of the rulers, the Graeco-Macedonian, predominates intellectually and materially, and even combines into thoroughly independent Greek communities. Hellenizing is practised with success in the Syrian empire. The various component parts of the state being more independent in Syria, vigorous Oriental communities are able to grow up side by side with the Greek republics in separate tracts of country, the most important of which communities are the Jews. The Seleucids did not attach the Jews to themselves like the Ptolemies; they left them alone, and even often offended them; but for that very reason the Jews remained independent, favoured by the circumstance that Palestine for a long time was a bone of contention between Egypt and Syria, and consequently had to be treated with consideration.

The capital of the Seleucids was Antioch, which subse-

quently was second only to Rome and Alexandria in size and splendour.¹⁰ It was situated on the Orontes, at a point where that river, bending suddenly to the west, receives the drainage of a lake, and then flows seawards between the Pieria range in the north and Mount Casius in the south. Antigonos had already laid out his city of Antigonía in the year 307 a little above it; after the battle of Ipsus, in 300 B.C., Seleucus founded Antioch in a pleasing, well-wooded country, unfortunately much exposed to earthquakes. The inhabitants of Antigonía had to remove thither (see above, chap. v.). Our knowledge of the topography of Antioch is derived from Strabo's description of it. According to him it was a Tetrapolis, like the district in which it lay. It had one large wall, and each of the four cities had a wall of its own. The first, according to Strabo, contained the people removed from Antigonía; the second "the bulk of the inhabitants"; the third was founded by Seleucus Callinicus (246-226); the fourth by Epiphanes. According to Libanius a city was added by Antiochus III.; this must have been a completion of the third city of Strabo. The famous statue of the Tyche of Antioch, by Eutychides, a pupil of Lysippus, a work of which we have a small copy in the Vatican, was erected as early as Nicator's time. It was also Seleucus Nicator who made the grove of Daphne, 40 stades below the city, one of the most attractive places in the world. It was 80 stades in circumference and contained temples, porticoes, baths and places of entertainment; the statue of Apollo portrayed as leader of the Muses was from the hand of Bryaxis (see above, chap. xiv.) It also had the tree into which Daphne flying from Apollo was metamorphosed. Antioch was remarkable for two streets of porticoes, and specially famous for its abundance of water; its Nymphaeum, a building with water pouring from its many apertures, became a model for similar structures in Asia and even in Rome. Posidonius' remark, that the inhabitants of Antioch in their luxury used the gymnasiums as baths, alludes

to the fact that they were the first to combine bathing establishments with grounds for physical and intellectual exercises, in other words that they were the originators of the *Thermae* established on such a grand scale in later Rome. Antiochus XIII. devoted the property of an exiled native of Antioch, named Maron, to founding a temple of the Muses and a library. Thus Antioch too had its Museum at last, just about the time when the rule of the Seleucids came to an end.

The Syrians were of lively intellect, fond of pleasure and immoral. A genuine representative of the good and especially of the bad sides of the Syrian character is found in Antiochus IV. Epiphanes (175-164 B.C.), whom we describe here as a characteristic figure of the age.¹¹

In Rome, whither he had come as a hostage, Antiochus had led the idle existence of exiled kings in the society of aristocratic Romans, and had still further developed his innate taste for Greek life. In Athens, where he stopped on his return home, he accepted the post of first strategus; he contributed to the completion of the Olympieum, and had a golden aegis placed over the theatre. He made presents to the Delphic and the Delian Apollo. His favourite worship was that of the Olympian Zeus. He built a temple to him in Daphne, with a statue, which was an imitation of that of Pheidias; he put him on his coins instead of Apollo and wanted him to take the place of Jehovah with the Jews. He evidently considered himself a manifestation of Zeus. After the failure of his Egyptian undertaking in 168, his character is marked by great eccentricity. When he heard of the festivals which Aemilius was holding in Amphipolis, he wanted to surpass them, and he celebrated still more brilliant ones in Daphne. There were processions of the kind held by Philadelphus in Alexandria (see above, chap. xiv.), athletic contests and a banquet, at which he himself played the part of buffoon, so that instead of Epiphanes he got the name of Epimanes, the madman. But there was probably method in his madness; at all events

Polybius says that he managed to deceive the Roman embassy under Ti. Gracchus as to his real feelings towards Rome. In 167 the conflict with the Jews broke out.¹² He had long attempted to thrust Greek civilization upon them, and had ill-treated them when this policy failed. In 174 he sold the office of High Priest to Jesus, called Jason, who promised to introduce Greek institutions, *e.g.* the gymnasia detested by the Jews, in Jerusalem. In 170 and 168 he plundered and massacred in Jerusalem, and at last set up a statue of Zeus in the temple of Jehovah. This was the signal for a rupture, for although some Jews embraced the cheerful pagan creed, most of them abominated it. The revolt broke out in 167 at Modein, north-west of Jerusalem. The leading inhabitant of the place, Mattathias, refused to sacrifice to Zeus, slew the king's messengers and retired with his five sons, Johannes, Simon, Judas, Eleazar and Jonathan, as well as other families, into the mountains. The war began. On the death of Mattathias in 166, his son Judas, called Maccabee, the hammer, assumed the leadership. He defeated the Syrians, took Jerusalem, with the exception of the citadel, and restored the Jewish worship in the temple. The disputes about the succession which arose after the death of Epiphanes favoured the consolidation of Jewish independence. Antiochus V. continued the war, but made no progress, although Eleazar was killed, and when Demetrius I. appeared on the scene, Antiochus even concluded a treaty with Judas. But Demetrius was victorious and the war began again. Judas, who had become High Priest, fell in 160, as did Johannes. They were followed by Jonathan, 160-143, who came to terms with the king and was recognized as a Syrian official. But he succumbed to the cunning of Tryphon, who took him prisoner in Ptolemais and then murdered him. From 143 to 136 the ruler was Simon, who made a treaty of friendship with Demetrius II., captured the citadel of Jerusalem and Joppa, and became an ally of the Romans. He was followed by his

son Johannes Hyrcanus, 136-107, who managed to maintain his prestige as High Priest, prophet and sovereign, but left the strict sect of the Pharisees for the Sadducees. His son and successor Aristobulus I. (107, 106) degenerated altogether; he was a tyrant, and called himself a king and a Philhellene.

We thus see that an ecclesiastical state grew out of the Seleucid empire, of a kind which existed also in Asia Minor, e.g. the two Comanas and Olba. In other respects Greek civilization went on developing in Syria, strongly influenced, it is true, by Oriental culture and religion. As Hellenic life had its head-quarters in the towns, it is worth while to consider the peculiarities of the other important cities of the empire.

We begin by glancing at the three other cities of the Seleucis: Seleucia, Apamea and Laodicea ad Mare. Seleucia,¹³ of which ruins still exist, lay in a country full of Greek legends, 40 stades north of the mouth of the Orontes, and 120 stades from Antioch. Its sole communication between the citadel and the port was a staircase hewn in the rock. The tomb of Seleucus Nicator was here. Seleucia held out for fourteen years against Tigranes and was therefore well treated by Pompey. Apamea on the Orontes is said to have been called Pharnace in earlier times and then Pella; Seleucus bred horses and elephants there. Laodicea ad Mare (the modern Latakieh) had the best harbour of Syria; this city, which was very independent at times, was favoured both by Pompey and Caesar; under the Emperors it rivalled Antioch in importance. The four cities of the Seleucis formed for the space of twenty years, from Alexander Balas (152-144) down to Antiochus VII. (138-129), an autonomous league, which struck bronze coins, with the inscription *adelphôn demôn*—genuine Greek civilization in the middle of the East, an interesting contrast to the inscription *adelphôn theôn* on the Egyptian coins, which still occurs just at that time. Of other Greek cities in these countries we may mention Laodicea ad Libanum, at the north-eastern

entrance of the depression between Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon; farther south, on the watershed between the Orontes flowing north and the Leontes flowing south, lies the famous city of Heliopolis (Baalbec). Laodicea was for a time the frontier fortress against the Egyptian province of Coelesyria. While Laodicea has, as it would appear, completely disappeared, Emesa (Homs), which lies not far north of it, has retained its importance. On the Orontes itself we find also Arethusa, which was not unimportant under the Empire, and the ancient city of Hamath, to which Antiochus IV. gave the name of Epiphania.¹⁴

Another region of the Syrian empire in which Greek city life was brilliantly developed is Cilicia, especially Cilicia Campestris, which is close to Antioch. It might be said that the Syrian empire eventually concentrated itself round the Gulf of Issus.¹⁵ In this fertile country, watered by three rivers, the Cydnus, the Sarus, and the Pyramus, situated in the farthest corner of the Mediterranean, just at the point where the roads from Asia Minor and Syria meet, immigrants from the most varied regions had from of old mingled with the native Cilicians. The legends of the seers Amphilochus, Calchas and Mopsus (Mallus, Mopsucrene, Mopsuestia), of Ajax, Teucer's son (Olba), of Erichthonius, Bellerophon, Tripolemus (Tarsus, Soli) point to Greece. On the other hand, Cilicia was influenced by Assyria, and then became once more independent under sovereigns who were called Syennesis. Persia conquered the country, yet it retained a good deal of its independence even under the Persians. The Seleucids held it up to the end, but evidently had to treat its peculiarities with marked forbearance. Its most important city was Tarsus, near the sea and on the Cydnus, described by Strabo as one of the most important centres of intellectual life, as a seat of excellent educational establishments, frequented not so much by foreigners as by natives, who however also resorted to other places for study. He praises the

talent for improvisation possessed by the Tarsians. Many philosophers, poets, grammarians, historians and physicians of repute were natives of Tarsus. It was the home of an important Jewish community, to which, as is well known, the Apostle Paul belonged. The following places were also of importance: Aegae near Issus, Castabala and Mopsus on the Pyramus, Olba above Soli, a sacerdotal principality, and Mallus and Rosus.¹⁶ In Cilicia one city at least belongs to this category: Seleucia, near the mouth of the Calycadnus, which vied with Tarsus in splendour, famous for its annual Olympic games and the oracle-temple of the Sarpedonian Apollo.¹⁷ A still more highly developed city life, yet even less purely Greek in character, was exhibited by Phoenicia, the most ancient home of autonomous city communities known to history. The cities of Phoenicia, among which we must also rank those of the more southern coast, always remained fairly independent amid all the vicissitudes of sovereignty. That they were incompletely hellenized is shown by the fact that the coins have Phoenician as well as Greek inscriptions.

We have to mention these three countries, however, northern Syria, Cilicia and Phoenicia, together for another special reason, viz. that they are the seat of a peculiar development of city life, the character of which is expressed by the cities being officially described as sacred and inviolable.¹⁸ The idea of the inviolability of a place, of *asulia*, is of old standing with the Greeks. The term is mostly applied only to the precincts of temples, consequently to enclosures in which safety and shelter can be had for a short time only. But even in Greece it was transferred in one special case from the sphere of private to that of public life: Elis was considered as *asulos*. This meant that it was to live in perpetual peace, in perpetual neutrality. From and after the middle of the third century, however, we find the idea applied to a whole city, to Smyrna, which had been lately resettled, and it is a Seleucid, Seleucus II., who in the year 243 declares

this city to be *ἰερὰ καὶ ἄσυλος*. By this it was undoubtedly recognized as neutral, and probably not accessible to the armed retainers of the king; it was also expressly removed from his jurisdiction, and probably exempted from the obligation to provide troops, for which it doubtless showed its gratitude by money payments and in other indirect ways. In the year 193 the city of Teos, the well-known home of the dramatic art, was generally recognized as *asulos*. We also find, however, from inscriptions on coins in the second or first century B.C. the following cities, all of which belong to the above-mentioned parts of the Syrian empire, described as *ἰερὰ καὶ ἄσυλοι*: the four sister-cities — Hanse or free imperial towns, so to speak — in the Seleucis, Antiochia, Apamea, Seleucia and Laodicea, as well as Epiphania on the Orontes founded by Epiphanes; also Aegae, Castabala, Mopsus, Olba and Rosus in Cilicia; and Tripolis, Sidon, Tyre and Ascalon. We cannot precisely define the legal notion of inviolability in the case of these cities either; but it is highly remarkable that the most important places which remained loyal to the last of the Seleucids only admitted their sovereignty with great limitations. Under the Roman emperors the privilege of *asulia* was extended to a number of other Syrian cities, and also to a few in Asia Minor, which we enumerate in the notes.

Up to the present we have referred to the west of the Seleucid empire only. In chap. v. we mentioned all that Seleucus and his immediate successors did in the east; here we will only show by an example what brilliant fruit the seed sown by them produced in one place at all events. This was Seleucia on the Tigris, in which the Greek life of Mesopotamia and Babylonia centred to such an extent that other Greek localities in these countries do not attract so much notice.¹⁹ As the region between the upper Orontes and the Euphrates consists of desert, broken only by Palmyra, which could be crossed by caravans but not by isolated travellers, we may

suppose that the daily traffic, so to speak, between Seleucia and the coast, the existence of which must be assumed in view of the Greek inhabitants of Seleucia, passed through the countries on the slope of the mountain range, which runs in a gentle curve from Antioch to Seleucia, at last near the old Persian royal road, through the important district of Commagene, to which we shall refer briefly, through Osroene and Edessa-Callirrhoe, Mygdonia and Nisibis - Antiochia, Adiabene and Assyria. Seleucia lay west of the Tigris, somewhat farther south than Bagdad. Its population—according to Pliny 6,000,000 souls—was like that of Alexandria and Antioch, a very mixed one : Syrians, *i.e.* Babylonians, Jews, Macedonians and Greeks, and of course all sorts of other Orientals. A Senate composed of 300 members is mentioned. The trade of Seleucia was very considerable. It went in a southerly direction to the sea and *via* Susa to Persia ; eastwards up the Gyndus and over the Zagrus passes to Ecbatana and on to Parthia ; northwards up the Tigris to Adiabene and Mygdonia and then to Armenia on the one hand and Melitene on the other, and into the interior of Asia Minor ; westwards to Comana in Cappadocia and Mazaca, also along the Euphrates by Zeugma, founded by Seleucus Nicator, to Antioch. Some of the Seleucids occasionally resided in the capital on the Tigris, *e.g.* Antiochus I. with Stratonice, as long as Seleucus was alive. There are many indications that the inhabitants set great store by Greek culture. The rhetorician Amphicrates was asked to deliver sophistical addresses there ; after the death of Crassus the *Bacchae* of Euripides was performed there under Parthian rule ; two philosophers named Diogenes are mentioned as natives of the city. Later on it was the home of Graeco-Christian and Mago-Chaldean lore. The city was conquered by the Parthians in the middle of the second century B.C., but did not become the residence of the kings, who probably did not feel comfortable in the Greek republic ; they lived in the large village of Ctesiphon opposite, a collection of gardens and

palaces in the style of Potsdam. Although Seleucia fell into decay subsequently, yet its patriarch retained great importance; his jurisdiction extended as far as India and China. Eventually he transferred his abode from the ruins of Seleucia to Bagdad. Cities of the name of Seleucia are also mentioned in Mesopotamia and Elymais, of the name of Apamea in Mesene, Sittacene and Ragiane, of Laodicea in Mesopotamia and Media.

The above facts leave no doubt that the Seleucids discharged the civilizing mission which had devolved on them, *i.e.* of diffusing Greek life and thought in Asia, in a highly creditable manner. If they did not patronize poetry and erudition in the fashion of the first Ptolemies, it was because they had no time to devote to such hothouse plants. Greek civilization developed of itself in the free life of Asia and under the protection of the Seleucids, and produced just as many writers as the country naturally required. It was also in the main the question of demand which governed the production of art in the Seleucid empire, and for this very reason Greek art in Asia during the Macedonian period is altogether superior to that of Egypt, which is made far too much of nowadays. I refer to this in a note.²⁰ I shall revert to many points connected with this subject in the following chapters, which deal with Pergamum and Rhodes. Syrian luxuriousness I discuss with reference to one special point only in a note.²¹

NOTES

1. Egypt. The Grammarians. General remarks of von Wilamowitz, A. v. K. 164 seq.; in the time of Callimachus there was still 'Weite des Wissens' in Alexandria, *ibid.* 165; Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 199.—Euclides, Susemihl, 1, 704 seq. Herophilus, anatomist, Mahaffy, Empire, p. 101.

2. Zenodotus. Christ, § 387; Susem. 1, 330 seq. Homer and the scholars of Alexandria, Chr. § 36. Eratosthenes, Chr. § 388; Susem. 1, 409-428; Günther, in I. Müller, 5, 1, 78.—Aristophanes of Byzantium, Chr. § 394; Susem. 1, 428-448.—

Aristarchus, Chr. § 395; Susem. 1, 457-463; criticized by v. Wil. 164. Cf. esp. Lehrs, *De Aristarchi studiis Homericis*, 2nd ed. Lips. 1865; Ludwich, *Aristarchs Homerische Textkritik*, 2 vols. Leipzig, 1884, 1885. For the Scholia of Homer, Chr. § 39; those that have come down to us go back for the most part to Didymus χαλκέντερος of Alexandria, a contemporary of Cicero, who wrote 3500 commentaries on ancient authors; Chr. § 401.

3. Heron, Susem. 1, 737; interesting quotation from Heron's Βελοποιικὰ in note 186, p. 71.—Archimedes, Susem. 1, 723 seq. Hipparchus, Günther, § 29; Susem. 1, 765-774.—Istrus of Cyrene, a pupil of Callimachus, was a historian, who wrote about Athens and Egypt, Chr. § 390; Susem. 1, 622-628; Philostephanus of Cyrene, also a pupil of Callimachus, was a collector of information about remarkable phenomena (paradoxograph), Susem. 1, 476.

4. κοινή, Chr. § 311. Standard in Susem. 1, 440. It does not differ much more from Attic than the German of 1890 does from that of 1670.

5. Ptolemy Physcon disputing on questions of erudition, Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 223. The merits of Euergetes I., *ibid.* 6, 1, 209.

6. Alexandria described by Polyb. 34, 14; see above, chap. xiv. note 1.

7. A careful study of the culture produced by Alexandria will show that it was entirely different at different periods. Although Christ says (§ 316) in reference to the court literature of Alexandria that this city "could never quite shake off the deadening influence of Egyptian priestcraft," yet it is clear that there is no proof of Egyptian priestly influence in the case of the writers discussed in this chapter or in chap. xiv.

8. Manetho. Wiedemann, *Aegypt. Geschichte*, Gotha, 1884, pp. 121-131, where the references are quoted, and Susem. 1, 608 seq.—Berosus, Susem. 1, 605 seq.—Hecataeus of Abdera or Teos, Susem. 1, 310-314; he was the authority for Diodorus' first book; he enumerated the Greeks who had gone to Egypt for their knowledge, and lauded absolute monarchy, both in the interest of Ptolemy; see Schwartz, in the Rhein. Mus. 40 (1885); also Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 199 (Philadelphus); 209 (Euergetes).

9. For the Septuagint see Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 2, 694-704. The Jewish law translated into Greek by 72 men in 72 days, according to the letter of Aristeas (Sch. 2, 819-824), on the advice given by Demetrius of Phalerum to Ptolemy Philadelphus. As Demetrius of Phalerum is said to have been banished at once by Ptolemy Philadelphus, this statement, which moreover applies only to the Pentateuch, is not considered trustworthy. At any

rate the Septuagint originated in Alexandria in the third or second century B.C. Manetho and Hecataeus were opponents of the Jews; see Schürer, 3, 770-772 and 816-819.—For all these questions see Susemihl, 2, 601-656.

10. Antioch. K. O. Müller, *De Antiquitatibus Antiochenis* Comm. I, II, 1838, 1839; also in his *Kunstarchäologische Werke*, vol. 5. Plan of Antioch according to Müller in Spruner-Menke among others, Taf. ix.; its present state, Baed. Pal.³ 418, with map; Momms. R. G. 5, 456.—Descriptions in antiquity: briefly by Strabo, 16, 750, in more detail by (1) Libanius of Antioch, a rhetorician under the Emperor Julian, of whom we have *Ἀντιοχικός* and speeches about the revolt of the inhabitants; (2) Johannes Malalas, of Antioch, historian of the sixth century, *Χρονολογία* coming down to 563, ed. by L. Dindorf in the *Corpus of Bonn*, 1831; cf. Krumbacher, *Gesch. der byz. Litteratur*, Munich, 1891, § 50. He was badly informed as to general history and also recorded much that is incorrect about Antioch.—The topography of Antioch presents still unsolved difficulties, to which Erdmann in particular has referred (*Zur Kunde der hellenistischen Städtegründungen*, Strassburg, 1883, pp. 23 seq.). They are due partly to contradictions between the statements of the ancient authorities, Strabo, Libanius and Malalas, partly to obvious mistakes of the last-named, and they are enhanced in modern writers by the latter considering the views of O. Müller and especially his description of the city laid out by Epiphanes (§ 20 seq.) as established facts, which is by no means the case. Eabelon too has been unable to form a clear idea of the plan of the great city, and when he assumes on p. lxvi. that the four quarters of Antioch were divided by the four main streets, with the Omphalos in the centre, this does not agree with his acceptance of the special wall around the quarter situated *πρὸς Δάφνην*. The topography of Antioch requires, as Erdmann has rightly pointed out, to be investigated afresh.—According to Plin. 5, 79, the whole of Antioch is called Epidaphnes; Tacitus, Ann. 2, 83, distinguishes Epidaphna from Antiochia. The site of Daphne is supposed to be the modern Bêt-el-mâ (house of water); inscription there belonging to the time of Antiochus III., Lebas-Waddington, Inscr. 3, p. 628. The statue of Apollo at Daphne was by Bryaxis; cf. Bab. xcii. with the description of it by Philostorgius quoted there. Bryaxis probably followed the Apollo of Scopas, which is traced in the so-called Palatine Apollo in the Vatican.

11. Efforts of Antiochus IV., Polyb. 26, 1; 31, 3, 4; Athen. 5, 93 seq.; cf. Hertzsb. 1, 177 and Curtius, *Stadtgesch.* 242, who also refers to the presents which Seleucus Nicator made to Athens.

Antiochus strategus of Athens (for the meaning of this office at that time see Th. Reinach, *Rev. ét. gr.* 1888, pp. 163 seq.) according to the Athenian coins, on which an elephant also appears. The golden aegis, Paus. 5, 12, 4; "Medusa head on a coin of his, Bab. xii. 7. Presents sent to Rhodes, Cyzicus, Delos, Tegea (construction of the theatre), Megalopolis (contribution to the building of the walls). He set up statues of Zeus in the temple at Jerusalem and on Mount Gerizim. See above, chap. xviii. note 7, and Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, ch. xx.—Cf. also Mommsen, *R. G.* 5, 459. Epigram and light prose thrive in Syria; Meleager, Philodemus and Menippus were natives of Gadara.

12. Reaction in Judaea owing to the revolt of the Maccabees, for which, besides the older accounts, see Cless, in Pauly, 4, 1322 seq. and esp. Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 1, 138-241. The chief authority is the 1st book of the Maccabees; see Schürer's *Introd. to §§ 4-12*. Cf. also Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, ch. xx., who acutely conjectures that the Jews may have given Alexander the Great information about the interior of Asia; this would account for the great favour in which they were with him. Cf. Mommsen, 5, 488, 489. The great extent of the Jewish Diaspora is, as Mommsen (5, 492) rightly remarks, still an unsolved problem.—Hereditary sacerdotal principalities in Asia, see below, note 16 (Olba).

13. Seleucia ad Mare, Baed. Pal. 389 with plan. Head, H. N. 661; autonomous bronze coins of the first century B.C. and silver tetradrachms struck between 104 and 82 B.C. when the city was independent. See also Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 954-956.—Apamea, Pauly, 1, 1, 1216; Baed. Pal. 400; Head, 658.—Laodicea ad Mare, Baed. Pal. 386; Head, 660; Gardthausen, *Augustus*, 1, 154.—The coins ΑΔΕΛΦΩΝ ΔΗΜΩΝ between 149 and 128 B.C., Head, 656. Coins with ΑΔ. ΘΕΩΝ still struck at that time, *Cat. Br. Mus. Ptol.* xxxix.

14. Laodicea ad Libanum, Baed. Pal. 379, corresponds to the city of Kades, near which Ramses II. defeated the Khetas; hence it was the capital of Canaan; see above, chap. xviii. note 7; Head, 663.—Emesa, Baed. 378; Head, 659; temple of the sun-god.—Arethusa, Baed. 37, the modern er-Restân; Head, 658, coins of the Empire; at that time Arethusa was called *ἱερὰ καὶ αὐτόνομος*.—Epiphania = Hamath, Baed. 398; Head, 659; autonomous bronze coins of 161-134 B.C.

15. Cilicia. For Cilicia and Tarsus see Cless, in Pauly, 6, 2, 1616-1626. *Locus classicus* for culture and study in Tarsus, Strabo, 14, 672-674.—Tarsus was evidently in touch with the Stoa, many leaders of which were natives of Cilicia: Chrysippus,

Zeno II., Antipater ; Crates too was a Cilician.—The cultivation of art in Tarsus is proved by the terra-cotta figures found there, Pottier, *Les statuettes de terre cuite*, Paris, 1890, pp. 158-189. Coins, Head, 617. Royal coins (tetradrachms) and autonomous bronze coins.—Epiphania, Head, 602 (coins of the Empire), above Issus (Gözene) according to Heberdey and Wilhelm.

16. Aegae, Head, 598.—Castabala (Hierapolis) near Budrun, explored by Bent, see Reinach, *Chron.* 719 ; Head, 603 ; see above, chap. xviii. note 7.—Mopsus or Mopsuestia, Head, 608.—Olba, Str. 14, 672, sacerdotal principality ; the temple of Zeus founded by Ajax, son of Teucer ; Head, 609 ; consequently a connection with Salamis in Cyprus. Coins from the end of the first century B.C. Site of Olba, Ramsay, *Asia Minor*, according to Bent, pp. 22, 363, 364, ruined city of Ura, visited by Heberdey and Wilhelm in the year 1892 ; an inscription of Olba was found there.—Rosus, Head, 661, *ἱερὰ ἄστυλος καὶ αὐτόνομος*. The north-western slopes of the Amanus range on the Gulf of Alexandretta, where Rosus was situated, belong more to Asia Minor than to Syria ; the country is green, whereas Syria is more bare. In antiquity this district belonged to Cilicia.—For Mallus see the papers by Imhoof, *Ann. d. Numismat.* 1883 ; Head, 605-607.

17. Seleucia on the Calycadnus, see above, chap. xiii. note 7. Autonomous coins of the first century B.C., Head, 610 ; under the emperors the city became *ἄστυλος αὐτόνομος*, also *ἐλευθέρα*. Xenarchus, a Peripatetic of the Augustan age, appears as magistrate on coins.—Seleucia in Pamphylia, Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 956, seldom mentioned.—Seleucia in Pisidia, see above, chap. xiii.—The passages in ancient writers on the various Seleucias and Laodiceas have been collected by Cless in the respective articles in Pauly.—Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 2, 50-132, treats the history and the condition of the 'hellenistic' cities in great detail : Raphia, Gaza, Anthedon (north of Gaza), Ascalon, Azotus (Asdod, old Philistine city), Jamnia, Joppa (relatively speaking the best harbour on the coast of Palestine), Apollonia (probably the modern Arsuf), Straton's tower (Caesarea), Dora, Ptolemais. Then in the Decapolis (a group no doubt created by Pompey, Schürer, 84), Damascus, Hippius (Sch. 86), Gadara, Abila, Raphana, Kanata, Kanatha (both in the Haurân), Scythopolis (Sch. 97), Pella (perhaps Fahil north of Gerasa), Dion, Gerasa (Dscherasch, imposing ruins of Roman times, Sch. 103), Philadelphia (Rabbat Ammon). The cities built by Herodes and his sons were just as autonomous (Sch. 107) : Sebaste (Samaria), Gaba in Galilaea, Esbon in Peraea, Antipatris north of Joppa, Phasaelis north of Jericho, Caesarea Panias, Julias (Bethsaida) Sepphoris in Galilaea (Dio-

caesarea), Julius or Livias east of the Jordan, Tiberias (Βουλὴ of 600 members, ἀρχων, δέκα πρῶτοι).

18. Ἱερὰ καὶ ἄσυλος. *Asulia* of Elis, Polyb. 4, 74. Smyrna, C. I. Gr. 3137 = Hicks, No. 176, about 243 B.C.; according to line 12 Seleucus declared τὸ τε ἱερὸν τῆς Στρατονίκιδος Ἀφροδίτης ἄσυλον εἶναι καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ἱερὰν καὶ ἄσυλον.—In 193 the Praetor peregrinus M. Valerius Messalla, the tribunes of the people and the Roman Senate declare, at the request of Menippus, envoy of King Antiochus, that the Teians shall be allowed to have τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν ἱερὰν καθὼς καὶ νῦν ἔστιν καὶ ἄσυλον καὶ ἀφορολόγητον ἀπὸ τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ῥωμαίων, Ditt. 204, who remarks: praeter hanc magistratuum senatusque Romani epistulam etiam decreta Aetolorum Delphorum et multarum civitatum Creticarum Tei inventa sunt, quibus Teiis jus asyli confirmatur. Cf. the remarkable decree of an Attalid deciding disputes between Teos and the artists of Dionysus there, Fränkel, No. 163 and his remarks thereon.—The references to the cities mentioned in the text are to be found in Head, H. N., in the respective places.—Under the empire the number of privileged cities increases. The following are added: in Syria Arethusa (see above, note 14), Caesarea Panias (see chap. xvi. note 1), Capitolas (Baed. Pal.³ 199), Damascus, Abila (Baed. Pal.³ 199), Gadara (B. 198), Antiochia ad Hippum (Sch. 2, 87, probably el-Hösn east of the lake of Gennesareth), Diocaesaraea (see above, note 17), Nysa (Scythopolis); on the coast: Byblus, Ptolemais, Gaza, in Cilicia Corycus, Sebaste; in the interior of Asia Minor Samosata, Tyana, Mazaca, Perge; on the coast Ephesus. Cf. Head, H. N., in the passages referring to them. Under the Empire, therefore, the *asulia* occurs especially in Syria.—The problems involved in the status of the cities have not been adequately considered; a good foundation has been laid by Usener, Ein Epigramm von Knidos, p. 38. It is probably permissible to assert that the cities in question were legally freed from the obligation of providing troops, for in Elis the *asulia* begins with exemption from military service. See also Head, lxxiv. and Index iv. The development of city life in Syria is also favoured by the proximity of the Phoenician cities.

19. Seleucia ad Tigrin. Detailed article by Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 945 seq. Fabian, De Seleucia Babylonia, Leipzig, 1869. For Greek culture there, Plut. Luc. 22; Plut. Crass. 33. Gilmore, Babylonia under the Greeks and Parthians, English Hist. Review, 1892, No. 1.

20. An important question connected with the history of civilization in the period under review, which has been discussed for a long

time and has recently been brought forward again in a somewhat one-sided way, is that relating to the character of the prevailing taste in the plastic arts in the third, second and first centuries and the place of origin of this taste. Th. Schreiber has lately dealt with this topic in his treatise *Die Wiener Brunnenreliefs aus Pal. Grimani*, Leipzig, 1888, and in a paper read to the *Münchener Philologenversammlung*, 1891, *Die Barockelemente in der hellen. Kunst* (see *Allg. Zeit.* 1891, 23rd May); cf. too his important publication, *Die hellenistischen Reliefbilder*, Leipzig, 1889. Schreiber's view is that this barocco style, as he thinks he is entitled to call the tendency of art in that time, shows itself in three things: (1) 'Raumpoesie' (following the well-known happy expression of Jac. Burckhardt); (2) material refinements; (3) scenes from every-day life, and he holds that this style originates in Alexandria. However interesting the particular observations which form the basis of these views may be, yet it is not possible to approve the combination of the above three points into a coherent whole, nor the application to them of the epithet barocco, nor their derivation from Alexandria. As regards the first, it is true that 'Raumpoesie' develops in the time of Alexander. The laying out of a number of new cities on a regular plan made it easier to arrange squares and streets, houses and gardens in a picturesque way; when people were not so much hampered by walls as they had been, the taste for artistic grouping of buildings amid beautiful natural surroundings was able to assert itself more freely. But a hundred years previously regular cities had been built on the plans of Hippodamus, and soon afterwards Dionysius made Syracuse the most beautiful city of the Greek world. The 'poetry of space' is therefore much older than Alexander and Alexandria. Secondly, as to material refinements in art, they were of old standing in Greece, as is proved *inter alia* by the chryselephantine statues. That they, as well as the representation of scenes from every-day life, were of more frequent occurrence after Alexander's time, is probably true. At any rate, however, the three characteristics adduced by Schreiber do not originate in the period after Alexander. Then the application of the word barocco to these three peculiarities must be pronounced unjustifiable and misleading. In the first place barocco is an invidious epithet: it means ugly, unrefined, odd. Again, this invidious epithet is applied to an epoch of architecture at the end of the sixteenth and especially in the seventeenth century (chief representative Bernini), while the word is used and defined in different ways. The application of this word, which is ambiguous even in modern art, to things of antiquity which have nothing to do with each other and which are unconnected with its original meaning, does not help to

make ancient art clearer to us. Material refinements in art may have some connection with the epithet barocco, but scenes from real life have none, and that the 'poetry of space' does not arise with the barocco style, but with the Renaissance, is sufficiently clear from Burckhardt. Why therefore call the art after Alexander barocco and not, as is generally and rightly done, the entirely different art of the Empire? Compare the extravagant lines of Borromini with, for instance, those of the monument of Philopappus in Athens and of the buildings of Palmyra. Now comes the question as to the origin of the tendency in art which cultivated 'raumpoesie' after Alexander's time, and incidentally also used material refinements to a certain extent and did not despise scenes from real life. Although, as we have seen, each of these things taken separately was older than Alexandria, nevertheless there is a possibility that it was the Ptolemies who made 'raumpoesie' the main basis of an artistic development of external life and in so doing were the pioneers of art, and this might warrant the assertion that Alexandria materially influenced the art of that time. Now it has certainly been stated that the Sarcophagus in Alexandria was the first example of this taste. No proof however of this statement has been furnished, while on the other hand it can be shown that the Ptolemies and the city of Alexandria were not in a position to materially influence art in this direction. The 'poetry of space' had very little opportunity of developing in Egypt. The country had but one Greek city, which lay in a plain, with no water flowing beside it; power was always concentrated in the hands of a single individual; there was plenty of erudition, but little variety in point of artistic spirit. The number of painters in Egypt is extremely small. Antiphilus (Brunn, 2, 247 seq.) painted Ptolemy hunting; Helena (Br. 2, 260) painted Alexander at Issus; for later Egyptian painters see Br. 2, 288. The only real Greek work of art of Ptolemaic Egypt, no doubt a very fine one, is the statue of the Nile. When we look about for the opposite of the above-mentioned conditions, we soon find the real home of post-Alexandrian art. Asia Minor and Syria present a complete contrast to Egypt. Here we have not one builder, but hundreds, and they not merely more or less intelligent sovereigns, but cities and private individuals as well. Here we have not a single type of site, viz. a flat sea-shore, where hills have to be made by heaping up earth, but hundreds of different ones, formed by steep or gentle slopes, by promontories or plateaus, by the banks of rivers or rushing streams, by rock or forest; the possibility of combining these elements compared with what is offered by the level site of Alexandria, is in the proportion

of a thousand to one. In places where terraces, the main element of beauty in post-Alexandrian architecture, could be formed in Egypt, the building of mausoleums was the most that could be attempted. The unique example of a large group of terraces in Egypt, Dêr-el-Bahri, is part of a tomb, and this is an imitation of Babylonian work, consequently of Asiatic origin. A comparison of the Seleucid coins with the Ptolemaic shows on which side the more untrammelled and therefore more fertile spirit lies. Nothing in Egypt can rival the 'raumpoesie' offered by Daphne near Antioch. Besides this, with the exception of the Sarapeum, all the examples of 'raumpoesie' are taken from cities in Asia, and therefore the Sarapeum, of which we know hardly anything, is no proof of the Egyptian origin of this tendency in art.—That Egypt is credited with an importance in art which it does not possess, is due to the following causes. In the first place, the poetry of the third century (see above, chap. xiv.), which is of course in close touch with the art of the period, is supposed to represent Alexandria; but its best effort, viz. bucolic poetry, has nothing Egyptian about it; it is Sicelo-Coan. Secondly, because Alexandrine poetry, which is the basis of the Roman, has influenced the mural paintings of Pompei, it has been supposed that the arrangement of the Pompeian house must have come from Alexandria, and that even the mural paintings preserved in Italy are probably of Alexandrine origin. But these conclusions are unwarranted. As regards the Pompeian house, it is difficult to see why the five hundred or so fine Graeco-Macedonian houses which may have existed in Alexandria should have provided a model for Italy, and not the tens of thousands of houses in Asia and the Islands, and even if it were so, this would prove nothing as to the origin of these latter. There is nothing to warrant the assumption that Alexandria was imitated in Asia and the Islands; on the contrary, the buildings in the Islands and in Asia were imitated in Alexandria. Then as to the landscapes. It is true that there are a few landscapes with Egyptian figures in Pompei, but most of them have utterly un-Egyptian foreground, *e.g.* rocky banks. The famous Odyssey landscapes, however, have nothing whatever Egyptian about them; that which portrays the descent into the nether world is simply a picture from Capri. The influence of Alexandria on landscape-painting is therefore inconsiderable. No doubt Egypt did exercise influence on Asia and Europe, but this was effected mainly by the cult of Isis and Sarapis. How little can be attributed to Alexandria in the field of art appears from such comprehensive articles as that of Brockhaus, for instance, Konv. 1¹⁴, 376. According to Gardner (New Chapters, 228) statues representing

abstract conceptions in pageants were due to the influence of Egyptian art; yet the statue of Kairos and the picture of Demos were more ancient. The upshot of our investigation is as follows: Alexandria was insignificant in real art, and great only in mechanical skill; it did not create any special architectural style of decoration, and in 'raumpoesie' it was far behind Asia; its influence on Asia and Europe was mostly of a religious kind. Where was there such a thing as an agora in Alexandria? And what is a Greek architecture of later times without one? Cf. also Bruckner's critique of Schreiber's Grimani Reliefs in the Berl. Phil. Wochenschrift, 1890, No. 1. Mahaffy (*Empire*, 109) speaks very approvingly of Schreiber's ideas. The arts are patronized by Philadelphus "not to their real advantage," Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 201 following O. Müller.—That Alexandria could not in the long run contribute much towards the comforts and pleasures of private life appears from the fact that after the fourth Ptolemy the Greeks in this city, who had no rights as such, were exposed to all kinds of arbitrary acts, and that in the time of Polybius Greek life was as good as annihilated.—Finally, the Ptolemies could not do very much for Greek art for the simple reason that they were very energetic promoters of native art. For what was accomplished in this respect by the four first Ptolemies see above, chap. xiii. note 16. Decline of Greek culture in Egypt under Ptolemy Philometor apparent from the Peyron papyri in the British Museum, Mahaffy, *Empire*, 358 seq.—Cartouches of Ptolemy V. Epiphanes are to be found in Philae.—Of Ptolemy VII. Philometor there existed a temple of Antaeus in Antaeopolis (Kân), now swept away by the Nile (Baed. 2, 53); traces in Diospolis parva, B. 79; a temple of Horus in Apollinopolis (Kûs), B. 113; a gate in Karnak by him and his brother Physcon, B. 140; inscription on a temple of Tutmes III. in Karnak, B. 161; inscriptions in the temple of Esne, B. 259; additions to the temple of Edfu, B. 275; he builds the new temple of Kôm Ombo, which was dedicated to Horus and Sebek, B. 290, 294; a pylon and a cella in the temple of Isis at Philae are due to him, as well as a stele with a dedicatory inscription of the king in the same temple, B. 319-324; an inscription in the temple of Debôt, B. 337.—Of Ptolemy IX. Physcon we have the following: the small temple of Ape in Karnak; Ptolemy columns with Hathor capitals, B. 169; the temple of Medamût near Karnak, B. 170; he added to the small temple of Medinet-Habu, B. 207; built a special small temple there for his ancestors, B. 208; embellished the temple of Dêr-el-Medine built by Philopator, B. 212; restored (in conjunction with his wife Cleopatra, who is mentioned also in connection with

other works carried out by him) the terrace temple of Tutmes I. in Dêr-el-Bahri, B. 249, and the rock temple in El-Kâb, B. 265 ; completed, in 142 B.C., the temple of Edfu, which Euergetes I. had begun, a work celebrated by a great festival, B. 273, 274 ; added in concert with his two wives to the temple at Ombo, B. 292, 294, where the first is called his sister, the second his wife. He did not neglect Philae, witness the inscription on an obelisk brought from Philae to England, which gave Champollion a clue in his discoveries, B. 316 : he decorates the temple to the west of the peristyle of the Isis temple built by Philometor ; important scenes portrayed ; the temple represented the house in which Horus was born, B. 320 ; he carried out work on the temple at Dakke, B. 350, 352 ; inscription of the year 136 B.C.—See also Cless, in Pauly, 6, 1, 223.—The greatest reprobate among the Ptolemies discussed hitherto, the destroyer of the Hellenic element in Alexandria, was the greatest promoter of purely Egyptian art—highly characteristic of the times and of the country. In consequence of his devotion to the native civilization of Egypt, Physcon is styled “a model regent of Egypt” by Mahaffy (*Empire*, 388). Can any one who is “worthless as a man” (Mahaffy) be a “model regent”? Must not a “model regent” have morality? Was he not regent also of the Greeks and the Jews in Egypt? At any rate he does not deserve a place of honour in a history of the Greeks. Besides, the cultures attacked by Physcon, the Greek and the Jewish, were both on a higher level than that of ancient Egypt, and Physcon himself had Greek, and not Egyptian, ideas and sentiments. Consequently the favour he showed to the old Egyptian civilization was simply a matter of policy. And if he carried out this policy in a cruel way, the aim cannot be said to have justified the badness of the means. Mahaffy rightly points out that Physcon may have had the same fate as Tiberius, whose vices were exaggerated by his opponents. This was done in Physcon’s case by his antagonists, the Greeks, but that he was an unscrupulous scoundrel is clearly established.—Egyptian art under the Ptolemies. Ptolemaic capitals : Maspero, *Archéol. égypt.* pp. 57, 60 ; see also Baed. 2, 338. The style of building became more elegant under them ; new forms, which might have occurred in the capitals for instance, were not created. Sculpture : colossal statue of Alexander II. in Balak, *Masp.* p. 229, fig. 202.—I quote here the remarks of one of the greatest authorities on Ptolemaic Egypt (which I had not read until after I had written this note), R. Stuart Poole, in the introduction to the *Catalogue of Greek Coins, Alexandria*, London, 1892, p. xxxiv, as they confirm my views and are interesting in themselves : “It might have been supposed that the wealth and magnificence of the two first Ptolemies

and their delight in shows like the Pomp of Philadelphus, could have greatly developed art, and that the love of allegory which then prevailed, would have given it a special direction. There was, however, a strong counteracting influence in the rule of science at the Museum. Moreover, the later Ptolemies were rather Egyptians than Greeks. Thus Alexandrian art was limited to the capital and stunted in its growth. On the other hand, the rule of Platonism, which succeeded to that of science, introduced another Greek influence, and gave to the temple an orderly arrangement with a view to Platonic exposition. Egyptian art, left undisturbed, pursued its natural development from the Greek principle which had been earlier implanted. The mixed art is seen in some well-known types, such for instance as those of Isis and possibly her priestesses. It resembles all uncertain and merely imitative art. Its works show want of knowledge and want of confidence. . . . At the Roman subjugation of Egypt her art had fallen far below the general level of the Greek world" (p. xxxv.). For the worship of the Nile in the Ptolemaean age, *ibid.* pp. lxx. seq. The Nile the same as Osiris; consequently the Alexandrine triad, Sarapis, Isis, Harpocrates, includes also the Nile in the form of Sarapis. A river-god was acceptable to the Greeks. The consort of the Nile was called Euthenia (= Isis).

21. For Syrian luxuriousness I refer the reader to Mommsen, *Röm. G.* vol. 5. According to the following remarks of his (p. 457) —"In the whole of antiquity there was no city in which the enjoyment of life was so much the main thing and its duties so much a secondary consideration as in 'Antioch near Daphne,' as the city was significantly called, much as if we should say 'Vienna near the Prater'" —one would suppose that the term originated in a joke, but we have seen above (chap. xviii. note 7) that it was an official appellation; it has therefore nothing to do with the places of amusement.—Mommsen also says (5, 303): "Syria, and still more Egypt, are absorbed by their capitals, the province of Asia and Asia Minor does not exhibit a single city like Antioch or Alexandria, but rests on the numerous cities of the second rank." This is not quite correct. Syria is by no means absorbed by its capital. The condition of the Greeks in Syria is different from that in Egypt and analogous to that in Asia Minor. If we cannot quote Seleucia on the Tigris, because it was not in Syria proper, yet the existence of the ἀδελφοὶ δῆμοι (see above, p. 454) prove that here too everything was not concentrated in the capital, and Tarsus was in its way completely independent.—Mommsen also discusses the rivalry between the cities of Asia Minor. I refer to this subject in a note

to chap. xxix.—For art in the Syrian empire cf. Sittl, *Archäologie der Kunst*, Munich, 1895, pp. 682-685, who also takes this opportunity to discuss the Alexander sarcophagus of Sidon; for art in Ptolemaic Egypt, *ibid.* pp. 685-688. Sittl's account also clearly shows the inferiority of Egypt.

CHAPTER XXI

GREEK CULTURE IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

—III. PERGAMUM

PERGAMUM was a kingdom of a different kind from those discussed in the preceding chapter.¹ We have already sketched its character in chap. xiii. Its sovereign was not a conqueror like the Ptolemies and the Seleucids, not a head of a clan, like the rulers of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and Pontus; he was a lord of a castle, who used his wealth to extend his influence, securing for himself and his allies peace and with it the possibility of lucrative traffic, in return for which he of course demanded and received a proportionate payment. It was money which made the Attalids great. With money they created an army and a fleet, opposed the restless potentates of Asia, and in so doing appeared in the guise of deliverers to the inhabitants of western Asia Minor, among whom Greek civilization predominated. In carrying out their plans the geographical position of Pergamum stood them in excellent stead. The valley of the Caicus does not penetrate far into the interior, and—a point which is very remarkable—it was originally not connected with it by roads, so that as a general rule it could not be much disturbed from this quarter. On the other hand, the territory of Pergamum had convenient communication with the sea by means of the port of Elaea, which enabled the Attalids to maintain relations with Greece and, from the end of the third century B.C., to create a considerable naval power.

We begin with a review of the history of the kingdom. Philetaerus of Tius, who guarded the treasure of Lysimachus in the citadel of Pergamum, revolted from him and, cleverer and luckier than Harpalus, founded a principality with his booty on the spot. He was succeeded by his brother's son, Eumenes I., 263-241, formerly ruler of Amastris near Tius, which he afterwards ceded to the kingdom of Pontus. He held his own about the year 262 by his victory over Antiochus I. at Sardes (see above, chap. ix.). He was succeeded by his cousin, another nephew of Philetaerus, Attalus I., 241-197. It was the latter who took the title of king about the year 240 in consequence of his defeat of the Celts. After vanquishing Antiochus II., who was an ally of the Gauls, he was master, as Justinus expresses it, of the greater part of Asia Minor. This grandeur was shortlived, but it left traces behind it. It was not till 223 that the king experienced reverses; up to that time the expansion of his power had been attended by very favourable conditions. The brothers Seleucus II. and Antiochus Hierax quarrelled continually till 226, and Seleucus III., who reigned from 226-223, was also unsuccessful. At this point various communities in Asia Minor once more joined Attalus, who promised to protect them. But towards the end of the reign of Seleucus III. Achaeus consolidated the power of Syria in Anterior Asia, and Antiochus III. also maintained it. Strabo's somewhat inaccurate remark, that before Eumenes II. the kingdom of Pergamum included only the valley of the Caicus, must therefore have reference to the period after 220. His further observation, that Eumenes II. (197-159), the elder son of Attalus, adorned the city with works of art and scientific establishments, is also not very happily expressed and is calculated to convey an incorrect idea of the achievements of Attalus I., for we read in Diodorus that Philip plundered the art treasures in the temples of Pergamum in the year 201 B.C. Consequently, when we bear in mind that Attalus was general of the Aetolians before this, in 209, and purchased Aegina

from them, which he made a base for playing a brilliant part in Athens, we arrive at the conclusion that the splendour of Pergamum does not begin with its "most knavish" king. Its subsequent great expansion the Pergamene kingdom owed to the Romans, whom Eumenes had vigorously supported against Antiochus, especially at sea.

We have given a general description of the site of Pergamum in chap. xiii.² The citadel of Lysimachus on the crest of the mountain was somewhat smaller than the Athenian Acropolis. In the beginning of the royal epoch the fortifications were prolonged southwards a little, and under Eumenes a fresh enlargement took place, of which traces are still in existence. The fortress now extended nearly two-thirds of a mile from north-west to south-east, and about half a mile from north-east to south-west. Outside this area, however, there were a number of dwellings, temples and other buildings. Subsequently the circumference of the walls was twice reduced, in Roman and Byzantine times. It was in the Byzantine wall that the sculptures of the altar of Zeus were discovered. The centre of public life in Pergamum under the Attalids was formed by the agora, situated on a southerly spur of the mountain. It occupied two terraces, of which the upper one, with the altar of Zeus, 865 feet above the level of the sea, was used for festivals, and the lower one, 825 feet high, for business purposes. On the western side of this lower terrace stood a small temple, supposed to have been that of Dionysus. Under the agora and the temple of Athene, which will be mentioned directly, ran a narrow terrace more than 200 yards long, on which was the stage of the theatre. The seats for the spectators extended upwards in the direction of the citadel, which was above the agora. The citadel included the sacred precinct of Athene, which was bounded by porticoes to the north and east; to the south-west, near the edge of the cliff, stood the temple of the goddess, whose cult, as the coins

also show, was the leading one of the city. If the name of Pergamum and the cult of Athene point to relations with Troy, yet the founding of the city was rather connected with the cult of Asclepius, who came from Epidaurus. The Asclepieum, however, was below, which makes it probable that the upper and lower city had a different origin. The columns of the upper story of the porticoes above mentioned had parapets between them, adorned with trophy reliefs, some of which are still preserved. Behind the northern portico are a number of chambers, which perhaps contained the famous library. When Pergamum was in its prime the royal palace probably stood north-west of the shrine of Athene; under the later empire a sanctuary dedicated to Trajan was erected there. The Roman buildings of the unwallled lower city I do not refer to here; the festal way, 16 feet in breadth, which runs westwards to the ruins of a shrine about two-thirds of a mile distant, supposed to be the Asclepieum on account of a spring close by, probably belongs to pre-Roman times. In the neighbourhood of Pergamum there are enormous tumuli with chambers in them.

We now come to the famous altar, and in connection with it the sculpture of Pergamum. The sacrificial altar proper consisted, like the altar of Zeus at Olympia, of the ashes of the victims, but this heap of ashes rose from the centre of a substructure, some 30 yards long and broad and about 16 feet high, with a flight of steps running into it on the west. The sides of this substructure were adorned with the famous frieze of the giants, 9 feet in height; round the three sides of the platform itself ran a portico, which also had a frieze with reliefs, but of less height, portraying scenes from the legends of Pergamum.

The sculpture of Pergamum³ has twice been the means in the present century of extending our knowledge of Greek art and its development, firstly, by the proof of the origin and by the appreciation of the works of art due to Attalus I.,

and secondly, by the discovery of the altar reliefs in Pergamum itself in and after the year 1878.

That the Attalids employed sculptors to commemorate their victories over the Gauls, we learn from Pliny and Pausanias. The former mentions four artists who portrayed in bronze the battles fought by Attalus and Eumenes against the Galli. Pausanias says that there were dedicatory offerings of Attalus—in what material he does not state—on the Acropolis of Athens, which represented the defeat of the Giants, the Amazons and the Persians by the Athenians, and that of the Gauls in Mysia, in figures about 3 feet in height. The famous so-called dying gladiator in the Capitoline Museum had already been recognized by Nibby as a dying Gaul, and the group in the Villa Ludovisi called *Arria and Paetus* had also been pronounced to be Gauls by R. Rochette, when Brunn proved that these works exhibited characteristic features of Pergamene art. Brunn, however, subsequently discovered that a number of marble figures, about 3 feet in height, scattered through various collections (especially in Venice, Naples and Rome), must be considered as imitations of those belonging to the Pergamum offering in Athens, and it is also highly probable that the two works in the Capitol and in the Villa Ludovisi just mentioned were really copies of the bronzes which, according to Pliny, existed in Pergamum. The small figures, representing stooping, dying or dead giants, Amazons, Gauls or Persians, are perhaps feeble reproductions of powerful originals; but the dying Gaul and the Ludovisi group are among the finest works of art that have come down to us from antiquity. Both are touching, not only on account of their subject, but also because the art of the conqueror has so nobly represented the vanquished foe.

An entirely new and very surprising glimpse into the Pergamene art of a somewhat later period is afforded us by the sculptures of the great frieze of the altar. These reliefs are a theatrical work of tremendous energy, aiming at the

display of bodies in rapid movement. The figures are not enclosed in one continuous border like the reliefs of the older art; the steps cut into the design. The frieze of the giants round the base of the altar represents as it were the dwellers in the nether world, above whom the smoke of the sacrifice rises heavenwards. The giants are not depicted as storming heaven; the gods descend to earth, to find their foes in their home and to annihilate them. For the sake of variety the giants are portrayed in every possible form; but they are not ugly, and never degenerate into caricatures. There is little trace of intellectual expression in the frieze, but that was scarcely possible. The impression conveyed by the whole work must be styled an external one; but individual groups are among the most effective ever created by sculpture. The small frieze has quite a different character; it is more picturesquely arranged, with accessories thrown in.

The coins of Pergamum are fine, but not of great variety. Among them must be counted the cistophori, which also invariably repeat the same type.⁴

A branch of Pergamenian art is presented by the terracottas of Myrina; some of those from Smyrna imitate the art of Lysippus.⁵

We must not forget, however, to point out that Pergamum did not merely contain many works of art; its whole plan and outward appearance was a work of art in itself in the sense indicated in note 20 to the preceding chapter; it was a model of harmonious arrangement, picturesque in the highest degree.⁶ Other cities also of Asia Minor became, like Pergamum, the cynosure of their district by appropriate and tasteful utilization of the inequalities of the ground, which produced views of the most varied description, from the cities over the country, and *vice versa*. To this category belongs Aegae, a possession of Pergamum, which secured the route between the Caicus and the Hermus. Very interesting pictures of cities have been revealed of late by travels in

southern Asia Minor, by those of Lanckoronski, for instance, which have *inter alia* made us better acquainted with the ancient condition of the most remote of the Attalid possessions, Attalia in Pamphylia. Streets with porticoes are found in the Pamphylian cities, just as in Alexandria and Antioch.

The policy of the Attalids was to encourage city life, in which they were imitators of Lysimachus, with whose money Philetaerus, as we know, set up in business. Lysimachus had, it is true, once banished philosophers, but he had a great idea of the importance of city life, as is shown by the founding of Lysimachia, Nicaea and Alexandria Troas, the removal of Ephesus, and the refounding of Smyrna, which, according to Strabo, became one of the most beautiful of cities. The Attalids followed their example. All their names reappear in those of the cities which they founded: Philetaeria, Eumeneia, Attalia, Philadelphia, Apollonis or Apollonia; Apollonis was the name of the mother of Eumenes II. and Attalus II. The cities founded by them, of which I give details in the notes, presented a certain contrast to those of the Seleucids, in which the Macedonian element was specially represented. The sovereigns of Pergamum favoured the purely Greek element, and this is why the Greeks were ready to join them. They did not, however, allow their capital to become an entirely independent community. They influenced the elections of officials and did not permit a city coinage. But Ephesus enjoyed every possible liberty under them. The kingdom of Pergamum belongs to the category of attempts to reconcile the independence of the communities with territorial unity; it occupies a position between the Leagues (Sparta, Athens, the Aetolians, the Achaeans) and the empires—to a certain extent Rhodes, then Syria, and finally the Roman empire. This idea, however, cannot be developed further here.

We must now discuss the importance of Pergamum in literature and science.⁷ Its court has the well-founded

reputation of having come near the Ptolemies in the patronage of both. It is, however, not very easy to form a clear idea of the scientific life of Pergamum, which is relatively speaking a simpler matter in the case of Alexandria. With the latter everything is imported from abroad and is consequently easier to trace. Pergamum, on the other hand, was in a country of ancient civilization, close to cities which had long been eminent in literature and science, the inevitable consequence of which was that a writer had no need to reside there permanently to enjoy the protection of the Attalids. The literary culture of Pergamum blends rather with that of a more extensive area. Besides this, the study of science in Pergamum was not connected with permanent institutions at such an early stage as in Alexandria, on the one hand, because the Attalids did not attain power so soon, on the other, for the very reason just mentioned. It was not easy for a student to make the long journey to Alexandria, unless he was offered special advantages there, of a material and personal kind; it was easy to get to Pergamum, even by way of experiment.

If, as it would appear, Eumenes II. was the first to make Pergamum the home of great scientific institutions, yet the earlier Attalids also contributed their share to the promotion of science. Even Philetaerus had shown himself personally well-disposed towards it. Eumenes I. maintained a close intercourse with the Academy in Athens. Arcesilaus, its president, who was a native of Pitane in Aeolis, corresponded with him, accepted money from him and subsequently composed a poem in honour of Attalus I. The pupil and successor of Arcesilaus, Lacydes of Cyrene, was also in favour at Pergamum. Attalus I. invited him to come to Pergamum, but he held that pictures should be viewed from a certain distance. Attalus took no offence and established a special garden, the Lacydeum, for him in the Academy. The Peripatetic Lycon also declined the invitation of Eumenes. Philosophers in fact had no inducement to quit the intellectual

centre of Greece, for the purpose of leading a life with less mental stimulus in a royal palace. Subsequently the Stoics proved more complaisant in the interest of learning. Attalus I. was himself an author; a passage has been preserved of a book of his, in which he describes a pine-tree in his country more than 200 feet high. Antigonus of Carystus, a philosopher who composed biographies of philosophers, but who was also an artist and wrote on the history of art, lived at his court, as did Neanthes, who wrote a history of Attalus I.; the king was also in relations with Polemon of Ilium, a narrator of travels (see below, chap. xxiii.). Under Eumenes II., when the existence of the kingdom was more secure and people did not live in constant fear of being besieged in the citadel, a regular imitation of the learned world in Alexandria sets in, and this continues under Attalus II. and Attalus III. It is true that no retreat for scholars was established, but the library became a rival of that of Alexandria, and we are told of a globe which was set up in the palace, and of a botanical and zoological garden. Pergamum also had its poets: Nicander, who has already been mentioned (see above, chap. xiv.), and Musaeus of Ephesus, who composed odes in praise of Eumenes and Attalus; it had historians, and the Athenian Apollodorus dedicated his chronicles to Attalus II.; it had grammarians, mathematicians, natural philosophers and physicians, and among them were some scientific notabilities. In philology Pergamum became famous as the residence of Crates of Mallus, who defended *anomaly* as the moving principle of language against Aristarchus, who gave the first place to *analogy*. With Crates, who came from the country of many Stoics, from Cilicia, the Stoa gained prestige in Pergamum. Crates with the physician Stratius accompanied Attalus to Rome (see above, chap. xviii.), and delivered lectures there. In mathematics Pergamum had acquired fame at an earlier period through Apollonius of Perge, who also resided in Alexandria and Ephesus, and dedicated his

famous work on conic sections to Attalus I. Biton dedicated his treatise on engines of war to an Attalus. Finally Pergamum, like Cos and Alexandria, was the seat of a school of medicine, and baths and the drinking of mineral waters also seem to have been very popular there. The last king, Attalus III., was a great student of the natural sciences. I refer to Pergamum's importance in oratory in the notes.⁸

After Ephesus formed part of the kingdom of Pergamum (189), it was as much a home of Pergamenian culture as Pergamum itself. In art Ephesus is mentioned as the native city of Agasias, the author of the so-called Borghese gladiator, now in the Louvre, a representation of strained muscles, with no pathos of expression.

The neighbouring state of Pergamum, Bithynia, already full of Hellenic cities, was also hellenized in other respects by the Nicomedes Epiphanes Euergetes (149-95?) who had put to death his father Prusias II. Father and son vied with each other in rascality (see above, chap. xviii.). The dedication of the geographical didactic poem by the so-called pseudo-Scymnus is addressed to a king Nicomedes. I have referred to the encouragement of Greek culture in Cappadocia by Ariarathes V. in chap. xix. note 6. The pretender Orophernes had only introduced Ionian luxuriousness into Cappadocia.⁹

North-western Asia Minor was allied in point of culture with Thrace and the neighbouring islands; among the latter I can only mention Samothrace here, the Cabiri shrine of which was regarded with great veneration after the time of Alexander. We find dedicatory offerings of many sovereigns there, among others of Arsinoë, the wife of Lysimachus, Ceraunus and Philadelphus, who erected a circular temple in the island, the remains of which have been lately laid bare. Of other remains discovered in the island the headless statue of a goddess of victory, now in the Louvre, is of special value; it is a votive offering of Poliorcetes for his naval victory off Salamis in 306, as is shown by coins of this monarch, from which it

appears that the Nike stood on the prow of a ship, in the act of blowing a trumpet.¹⁰

NOTES

1. For Pergamum in general see above, chap. ii., chap. v., chap. xiii. note 6 ; also Sevin, *Rech. sur les rois de Pergame*, Mém. Ac. Inscr. XII; Manso, *Ueber die Attalen*, Breslau, 1815; E. Meier, *Das Perg. Reich*, in Ersch and Gruber's *Enc.* III, 16; Wegener, *De aula Attalica*, I, Havn. 1836.—After Curtius' and Adler's papers on Pergamum in the *Beitr. zur Gesch. und Topogr. Kleinasiens*, Abhandl. der Berl. Akad. 1872, came the discoveries of Humann, which under the scientific advice of Conze and through Humann's further efforts led to the well-known brilliant results, the utilization of which is not yet concluded. The excavations were commenced in 1878 ; a list of the writings occasioned by them is given on p. 1211 of the excellent article on Pergamum in Baumeister's *Denkmäler*, pp. 1206-1287, the historico-geographical part of which is by E. Fabricius, while that dealing with sculpture is compiled by A. Trendelenburg ; it gives the best summary of all competent criticism up to the year 1886. Of regular publications the following may be specially mentioned here: Fränkel, *Fabricius und Schuchhardt, Die Inschriften von Perg.*, I, Berlin, 1890 ; H. Swoboda, *Zu den Urkunden von Perg.*, Rhein. Mus. 46, 497-570, who deals with the political institutions of the city of Pergamum in the monarchical period, the Council and the popular assembly ; the strategi were probably appointed by the kings ; see above, chap. v. note 12. Cf. Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, chap. xiv.

2. Description of Pergamum, Strabo, 13, 623 seq. Power of Attalus I., Just. 27, 3. Cyme, Phocaea, Smyrna, Aegae, Temnos, Teos and Colophon were connected with Attalus I. at an earlier date, according to Polyb. 5, 77, in 218 B.C. Works of art at Pergamum in 201 B.C., Diod. 28, 5. Aegina purchased from the Aetolians, Polyb. 22, 11. According to Polyb. 18, 2, Attalus in the year 197 demands the rebuilding of the shrines of Aphrodisium and Nicephorium, which had been destroyed by Philip. Strabo's remark therefore about Eumenes II. (13, 624), τὸ Νικηφόριον ἄλσει κατεφύτευσε, cannot prove anything material for him. It was simply a restoration. Similarly the passage in Strabo, παρ-εσκεύασε δ' οὗτος τὴν πόλιν, etc., also proves nothing. Strabo was not well acquainted with the history of Pergamum. Cf. Meischke, *Symbolae ad Eum. II. historiam*, Lips. 1892, esp. p. 42.—The kingdom of Pergamum is an example of business methods applied

to politics. The Pergamene sovereigns protected Greek cities in Asia in return for money, they built a fortress for the Aetolians. With their money they engaged mercenaries and constructed ships of war. They used their wealth and their authority to promote peace and culture, but in the end the stigma which clung to the origin of their power (Philetaerus' embezzlement) reappeared in the conduct of the last monarch, who bequeathed the whole of his kingdom, as if it were private property, to the Romans, which brought great misery into Asia Minor (see below, chap. xxv.).

3. For the sculpture of Pergamum, see the papers cited in the above-quoted article of Trendelenburg, p. 1275; brief account by Kekulé in *Baed. Griechent.* xxi. seq.—Ancient accounts, *Plin.* 34, 84 (Attalus I. and Eumenes II. are meant); *Paus.* 1, 25, 2.—As regards history it is to be noted that Eumenes II. has dealings with the Gauls in 190 and completely defeats them in 166, according to *Diod.* 31, 34. On the strength of this the merits of Attalus I. in overcoming the Gauls have of late been too much disparaged. The main point, however, was to keep the Gauls within their own province, and this Attalus I. did. It has been said that he could not have taken the title of king for his victories over the Gauls (Baumeister, 1230). But he did so. People celebrate triumphs when they think, or wish to make others believe, that they deserve them. To prove that it was not Attalus I., but Eumenes II., who was the real conqueror of the Gauls *Diodorus*, 31, 14, is quoted (l.l. 1231): *πάν τὸ τῶν Γαλατῶν ἔθνος ὑποχείριον ἐποίησε*. But that is not true, for the Galatae remained independent. Both sovereigns indulged in braggadocio, but after all Attalus I. did somewhat more than Eumenes II.—The altar of *Paus.* 5, 13, 8 only casually mentioned; description in *Ampelius*.

4. Coins of Pergamum. Imhoof-Blumer, *Die Münzen der Dynastie von Pergamon*, Berl. Ak. 1884, Head, 459 seq. and *Cat. Brit. Mus.*, Mysia, by W. Wroth, Lond. 1892. Pergamum struck city coins at an earlier stage; see *Cat. Br. Mus.* pp. 110-112 (cult of Apollo and Athene) and pp. xxviii, xxix. Philetaerus struck Attic tetradrachms with the head of Seleucus—rev. seated Pallas—an imitation of the coins of Lysimachus, on which the shield is behind the goddess. Eumenes I. and his successors issued tetradrachms with the head of Philetaerus on the face and the sitting Pallas on the reverse; only Eumenes II. (197-159) has coins with his own head, rev. the Dioscuri or Cabiri. Gaebler (*Erythrae*, pp. 51, 52) is inclined to ascribe the coins with the head of Philetaerus to Attalus I. According to Gaebler there was no "definite motive" for this change until his reign. But if Eumenes I. defeated Antiochus at Sardes (*Str.* 13, 624), why should he not

have removed the head of the father of the vanquished monarch from the coins?—The cistophori. About 200 B.C. a new coin, the cistophorus, began to be struck in Ephesus, and quickly passed into general circulation in western Asia Minor; its name was derived from the mystic box (*cista mystica*) represented on it, which was used in the mysteries of Bacchus. The reference was to certain rites in which Bacchus had been initiated by Cybele, and at which serpents crept out of boxes, Roscher, *Lex.* 1, 1086, 87. This was depicted on the coins. They are heavy Rhodian tetradrachms of about 190 grains (Head, 461), and can also be considered as Attic tridrachms or Eginetan didrachms. They soon obtained circulation, especially in the kingdom of Pergamum, and they also were current in the Roman province of Asia. It may be said that after 130 B.C. they replaced, in many cities of Asia Minor, the Alexander-coins which had been in use since 190 (see above, chap. xvii. note 8). They have a *cista* on the face with a serpent in a wreath, rev. a quiver with serpents twining round it. Cistophori were struck in the following cities: Parium, Adramyttium, Pergamum, Smyrna, Ephesus, Thyatira, Sardes, Tralles, Laodicea ad Lycum, Apamea Cibotus, and here and there in Crete. The mints are only given incidentally in monograms. The coins were a kind of international trade currency, struck in the principal trading centres of western Asia Minor. The Alexander-coins continued to exist side by side with the cistophori, being partly coined in the same cities. Ephesus, the coinage of which is described by Head, London, 1880, and in the *Cat. Br. Mus.*, *Ionian*, Lond. 1892, minted the following coins almost at the same time: (1) drachms of the Attic standard with Ephesian types; (2) Alexandrian tetradrachms, Cl. V. and VI., Müller; (3) Philetaerian tetradrachms; (4) cistophori: tetradrachms, didrachms and drachms of the Rhodian standard; *Ionian*, pp. 61-64, pl. xi, xii. Thus the most varied requirements could be met. For Ephesus see above, chap. v. note 12.

5. For the terra-cottas of Myrina cf. the splendid work *La Nécropole de Myrina*, by Pottier, S. Reinach and Veyriès, Paris, 1890, and the brief account in Pottier, *Les statuettes de terre cuite dans l'antiquité*, Paris, 1890, pp. 155-196, esp. 181 seq.; Galatae statuettes have also been found.

6. Cities. 'Raumpoesie.' Hirschfeld, Ramsay, Petersen and Radet have referred more than once to the character of the cities founded by the rulers of Pergamum. The leading principles which floated before the mind of the ancients in founding cities, especially in Asia Minor, have been demonstrated by Hirschfeld in his treatises, *Zur Typologie griechischer Ansiedlungen*, in the *Abhand-*

lungen E. Curtius gewidmet, Berl. 1884, and *Entwicklung des Stadtbildes*, *Zeitschr. der Gesellsch. für Erdkunde*, 1890. Three periods can be traced. In the first the city must have a strong position, in the second it must be convenient for traffic, in the third comfortable to live in. The first develops into the second by means of long walls. In Asia Minor the oldest cities are often on rocky eminences; when traffic increases they are moved into the plain. In the Pergamene cities convenience is much considered. Cities which are intended to replace others are generally laid out at some distance from them, at a point more convenient for traffic. The following division might be made: (1) old cities, (2) founded by the Seleucids, (3) by the Pergamene kings. New cities close to old ones: Laodicea ad Lycum, some distance from Colossae, Apamea from Celaenae, Antioch on the Orontes from Antiochia; Smyrna and Ephesus too were moved to a new site. The Pergamene cities which arise in this way near Seleucid or even older towns are as follows: Apollonia and Stratonicea in the valley of the Caicus near Nacrasa (see above, chap. xiii. note 7), Ramsay, *As. M.* 126; Attalia near Thyatira, Ramsay, 127; Dionysopolis near Blayndus in the upper Maeander valley; Eumeneia near Peltae (chap. xiii. note 7); Apollonia in Pisidia near Seleucia, Ramsay, 44. According to Ramsay 86, Eumeneia, Dionysopolis and Philadelphia were on gentle slopes, and he considers Lysias and Philomelium to be Pergamene cities because they have a similar site. For Lysias, however, see above, chap. xiii. note 7. Subsequently, at the time of the Arabian invasions, the rocky strongholds were again resorted to, to which category Afium Karahissar discussed in chap. xiii. note 7, belongs. If according to the above the Seleucids and the Pergamene rulers did not attach much importance to strength of position in the cities under their sway, this, I may add, was due to the further reason that strong cities had not been so submissive to them as they desired. It was enough that Pergamum, for instance, should be impregnable. Many Pergamene cities were settled with Greeks simply in order to hold neighbouring Macedonian places in check.—In my enumeration of the various cities I follow Radet's *Chronologie*, pp. 55 seq.

1. Period of Philetaerus, or Eumenes I., in whose time they occur in Pergamene inscriptions (Fränkel, p. 14): PHILETAERIA on the Ida range, Radet, 10, and ATTALIA in Lydia, according to St. B. formerly called Agroeira or Alloeira, Str. 13, 607, north of Thyatira, perhaps Gürdükaleh, cf. Radet, *Lydie*, 319 seq. and De colonis, 14; Kiepert, *Kleinas. VIII.* and map in Radet; Head, 548; coins of the empire.—2. Attalus I. (241-197): GERGITHE at the sources of the Caicus, Str. 13, 646, probably therefore near the place

where Attalus had defeated the Galatae ; Radet, *Lydie*, 305 and *De coloniis*, 13 ; Radet's map ; according to him Ghelenbeh.—**DIONYSOPOLIS** on the Maeander, according to St. B. h. v. founded by Attalus and Eumenes at a spot where they had discovered a *ῥέομα* of Dionysus ; Radet, 29, the modern Ortaköi, Kiepert, IX ; Radet's map ; Head, 562 ; autonomous bronze coins of the second and first centuries and coins of the empire.—3. To Eumenes II. (197-159) Radet ascribes the following : **APOLLONIA** in Pisidia, the modern Uluburlu, Radet, 38 ; cf. Pauly, 1, 2, 1308, often visited ; Sterrett (Wolfe Exped.) found many inscriptions there ; see Sterrett's map, Kiepert, IX and Head, 521. In Byzantine times Sozopolis, Ramsay, *As. M.* 400.—**METROPOLIS** in Phrygia, between Apamea and Synnada, now Tatarly ; Kiepert, IX ; map in Radet, 39. Cf. Head, 566, for three places of this name, two in Phrygia, one in Lydia.—North-west of Metropolis was **EUCARPIA**, near the Glaucus, cf. Radet, 32, Head, 563 ; coins of the empire. Site uncertain, cf. Radet, *Lydie*, 324, 325 and p. 18 for the Phrygian Pentapolis : Eucarpia, Hieropolis, Otrus, Stectorium and Bruzus. Maps, Kiepert, IX, and Radet.—Farther east **PHILOMELIUM** ; Pauly, 5, 1524 ; Radet, 41 ; Head, 568 ; coins of the empire ; the modern Akschehr. **APOLLONIS** mentioned in an inscription of 160 B.C., Radet, 57, who assumes that Eumenes II. paid this honour to his mother when he named the city of Stratonicea after his wife in 188. Apollonis, Radet, 16, site near Palamut, west of Thyatira ; according to Schuchhardt Apollonis is identical with Doidye mentioned in inscriptions, according to Radet different from it ; Head, 548 ; coins of the empire ; Kiepert, VIII ; Radet's map. Apollonis guarded the Hyrcanian plains, which were inhabited by Macedonians.—**STRATONICEA** on the Caicus, Radet, 13, first mentioned 129 B.C. in Orosius, 5, 10, now Selerik, Kiepert, V, and Radet's map ; Head, 466 ; coins of the empire.—**EUMENEA** in Caria, St. B., Radet, 27 ; site unknown. 4. Attalus II. Philadelphus (159-138). **HELLENOPOLIS**, Etym. Magnum, h. v. ; cf. Droysen, 3, 2, 275.—**APOLLONIA**, not far from the Rhyndacus in Mysia, on the lake formerly called the Artynian and named the Apolloniatic Lake by Attalus II. in honour of his mother. Radet (11) therefore assumes that the city was also so called by Attalus II. ; the modern Abulliont. If the coins attributed to this city by Six and after him by others, also in the *Cat. Br. Mus.*, Mysia, p. 8, do belong to it, the name Apollonia was older. Head, 447 ; Lebas-Reinach, pl. 45-49.—**PHILADELPHIA**, Droysen, 3, 2, 276 ; Radet, 20 ; now Alaschehr on the north-western slope of the Tmolus range. Often visited by earthquakes. Head, 552 ; autonomous bronze coins of the second and first century ; Kiepert, VIII, and Radet's map. Paper by Curtius, *Nachtrag zu den*

Beitr. zur Geschichte und Topogr. Kleinasiens, Berl. Ak. 1873. Philadelphia kept watch over the Macedonians who lived round Sardes. It is famous for not having capitulated until 1390, when the rest of Asia Minor had long been in the hands of the Turks. The statement as to the founding of Philadelphia by Egyptians, which seemed of importance to Droysen, is evidently due to a confusion of the Pergamene king with Ptolemy Philadelphus.—EUMENEA in Phrygia, Radet, 31, now Ishliki, on the Glaucus; Kiepert, IX, Radet's map; Head, 563; bronze coins of the second and first centuries. "The coins prove that its inhabitants claimed an Achæan origin," Head.—ATTALIA in Pamphylia, see below and Radet, 34; Head, 583, autonomous bronze coins from the second century B.C. onwards.—TERMESSUS and OENOANDA, for the style of fortification, Radet, 34.—According to Plin. 35, 14, Attalus had a fortress near Tralleis.—I may add that a place in Mysia, north of Atarneus, supposed to be Attalia by some writers, was really called Attæa (derived from Attes); cf. Fränkel, p. 146.—The frequency of the reference to Apollo in the Pergamene cities is worthy of note. The motive was supplied by the name of the wife of Attalus I., but there may have been an opposition to the Seleucids, who worshipped Apollo as their original ancestor and yet had not named any city after him.—As regards the interior of the cities AEGAE, the modern Nimrud Kalessi, is of interest; cf. Bohn, *Alterthümer von Aigai*, Berl. 1889 (Ergänzungsheft II of the *Jahrb. d. arch. Instit.*). Another city north-east of Pergamum, Berl. Phil. Woch. 1886, p. 510.—The cities of Pamphylia, for which cf. K. Lanckoronski, *Städte Pamphyliens und Pisidiens*, vol. I, Vienna, 1890, with many plates, the scientific work mostly by Petersen. Cf. the notice by G. Hirschfeld in the Berl. Phil. Woch. 1890, Nos. 48-50. ATTALIA, very picturesque harbour; the city on a rock close to the water. According to Petersen a chain of Pergamene possessions runs from Telmissus, the port opposite Rhodes, given to Eumenes in 189, to Attalia via Oenoanda and Termessus.—PERGE with two streets of porticoes crossing each other at right angles.—SILLYON, finely situated on a plateau; old unintelligible inscription in native dialect, Röhl, *Inscr. antiquiss.* p. 141.—ASPENDUS, large theatre. Aspendia, street in Alexandria. As Aspendian is used for Pamphylian when mercenaries are in question (Xen. Anab. 1, 2, 12, Corn. Nep. Dat. 8), it may be assumed that Pamphylian mercenaries lived in that street.—Just as Aspendus was a centre of mercenaries, so SIDE, by the sea, on a narrow peninsula and unhealthy, was a great market for pirates; two large portico streets and a smaller one. Streets with porticoes still discernible in Syrian cities, also in Seleucia on the Calycadnus and in Soli-Pompeiiopolis.—The

Attalids quarrelled with SELGE, Fränkel, No. 25.—The city of AIZANON on the upper Rhyndacus was remarkable; considerable ruins near Tschafldyr Hissar, Kiepert, VI, Radet's map; described in detail by Lebas, *Voyage archéol.* éd. Reinach, Paris, 1888. Here, in this remote mountain valley, was a sacerdotal principality, probably hereditary, in Asiatic fashion; Head, 556; coins of the empire.—The new cities in Asia Minor had another advantage, which materially enhanced their picturesqueness; there was enough room to distribute the works of art more and so show them off better. People generally do not realize that on the Acropolis of Athens there was a crowd of sculptures which spoilt the effect of the individual works of art. It was the same at Rome in the Forum with the temples and porticoes. Sites with picturesquely distributed buildings and statues were a creation of the post-Alexandrian age. What we rightly demand nowadays, a neutral background from which a work of art stands out, did not exist on the Athenian Acropolis, for instance; one statue stood behind another and one diverted attention from the other. It was like the interior of the ordinary modern museum. Alexander gave the Greeks, the individuals and art, elbow-room; this was the greatest service he rendered to Greece.

7. For culture in Pergamum, cf. v. Wilamowitz, *Ant. von Kar.* 153 seq. The contrast to Alexandria emphasized by him, 161. Aristophanes of Byzantium, the scholar who lived in Alexandria, pronounced the prophecy of Poseidon (Il. 20, 307, 308), from which the Aeneas legend sprang, to be spurious. The recognition of it would of course have raised Pergamum in the eyes of the Greeks. Pergamum at first in connection with the regular Attic Academy, *ibid.* 160. Founding of Panathenaea in Pergamum, Fränkel, *Inscr.* No. 18. Subsequently the Stoa comes there. Chrysippus wrote *περὶ ἀνωμαλίας*, and Crates followed him. The Stoic Panaetius was a pupil of Crates. Apollodorus of Athens was a pupil both of Aristarchus and of the Stoics Diogenes and Panaetius. In general, cf. Christ, § 316.—For the various writers see the respective sections in Christ, esp. § 396 (Crates, etc.), 397 (Apollodorus of Athens), and Susemihl, various passages in vol. 1, *eg.* 1, 5 (the sovereigns and their efforts on behalf of culture), 124 (the Academy), 406 (Musaeus of Ephesus), 617 (Neanthes of Cyzicus), 665 (Polemon of Ilium), 736 (Biton), 749 (Apollonius of Perge), and vol. 2, chap. 26 (the Pergamene school of philologists), pp. 33 seq. (Apollodorus of Athens), 306 (Cratippus of Pergamum), and elsewhere.

8. This is a convenient opportunity for adverting to the history of Greek rhetoric and style in the last three centuries B.C.; they

were developed in various ways in Asia Minor, Greece and Rome, but, according to the theory which prevails nowadays, received a special stimulus from Pergamum. In the beginning of the third century B.C., the so-called Asiatic style came into fashion, to which Cicero, *Brutus*, 325, and *De Oratore*, 230, has referred. Its origin is ascribed by Strabo, 14, 648 to Hegesias of Magnesia. More conjectures have been started as to its character than definite facts established; cf. esp. Blass, *Die griechische Beredsamkeit in dem Zeitraum von Alexander bis Augustus*, Berl. 1865, and Volkmann, in Pauly, 1, 749. In particular this Asianum or Asiaticum genus is credited with a 'bombastic' manner. But there is no trace of this in Hegesias; Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, 317, has best characterized his style by a comparison with Macaulay (short sentences). Then bombast has been supposed to exist especially among the Asiani of the first century B.C. (Susem. 2, 495). The latest criticism, summarized by Susemihl, 2, 463 seq., assumes the following phases in the development of the style: 1. Hegesias begins the Asianum genus, according to Str. l.1. *διαφθείρας* the Attic *ἔθος*. 2. A reaction of Atticism sets in. This was begun, according to Blass (77), by Hermagoras of Temnos, in the middle of the second century. From Susem. 2, 471 seq., however, it is clear that this assumption rests on a very slender foundation. Susemihl himself considers that the reaction began with Agatharchides of Cnidus (1, 692), at the commencement of the second century B.C. But Agatharchides only made occasional digressions on style in his geographical work; they are not the doctrines of an expert. 3. In the latter part of the second century a tendency to compromise proceeded from the Asiani themselves, which had its head-quarters in Rhodes (Susem. 2, 489). A great deal has been written about the character of this Rhodian school, but what is quoted by Susem. 2, 489 seq., shows that nothing definite is known about it. 4. "After the second Mithridatic war" (Susem. 2, 495) a new bombastic tendency appears in Asia. 5. At last we find Atticism making way. The movement comes partly from Athens, and to a great extent from Pergamum (Susem. 2, 482), which Susemihl (483) endeavours to prove by general considerations and (485) by the fact that the Pergamene Apollodorus, the teacher of Octavian, "according to conjecture" helped Atticism to win the day in Rome. (For Apollodorus, Susem. 2, 504 seq.) As a matter of fact, however, all our information about the character of this Atticism comes from Dionysius of Halicarnassus. When we bear in mind that according to Blass (179) an Atticist was a man who imitated any Attic writer, but that Plato, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes, Hyperides, consequently writers of the most varied character, were

Attic, that the alleged head of the Asiani, Hegesias, imitated the Attic writer Lysias, while the leading Atticist Dionysius had a special reverence for Demosthenes, we arrive at the conclusion that this elaborate chapter in Greek literary history is somewhat in the air at present. And how can it be otherwise when we have nothing from the pen of an Asianus, or of a Rhodian, or of an Atticist, apart from Dionysius, and consequently have not the slightest idea how the Asiani and the Rhodians really wrote? Atticism however first carries the day in Rome (Susem. 2, 503), where the best Atticist, L. Licinius Calvus, imitated Lysias, Hyperides and Demosthenes. To which style did he really give the preference? According to Dionysius, however, "the real old eloquence, which had been fading since the death of Alexander, had almost disappeared shortly before his time" (Susem. 2, 487). Who then was an Atticist at all before and except Dionysius himself?

9. Bithynia. Myrlea-Apamea has autonomous coins with the old name as late as after 200 B.C., with ΑΠΙΛΑΜΕΩΝ not till about 60 B.C. (Roman times); Head, H. N. 437. Cius-Prusias has bronze coins under the Bithynian kings; Nicaea, Nicomedia and the other Bithynian cities have no coinage before the Empire. The kings of Bithynia therefore limited the independence of their cities a little; under Rome greater freedom prevailed.

10. Samothrace. Conze, Hauser und Niemann, *Archäolog. Untersuch. auf Samothrake*, Vienna, 1875 and subsequent years, 2 vols. For the coin see *Coins of the Ancients*, IV, B. 17; P. Gardner, *Types*, p. 187 and pl. xii., 4.—Cf. the paper read by Kern in the *Berl. Archäol. Ges.*, May 1893 (*Berl. Phil. Woch.*, 12 Aug. 1893), also with reference to the political position of Egypt about 240 B.C.

CHAPTER XXII

GREEK CULTURE IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

—IV. RHODES

WE now leave the kingdoms and come to the republics. Here we have to deal first of all with Rhodes, which owing to its position and its internal affairs was closely connected with the states hitherto discussed. At the corner of Asia, it looks towards Africa as well as towards Europe, and was for a long time both externally and internally a promoter of useful intercourse between the three continents.

The importance of the island of Rhodes dates from remote antiquity. It is mentioned in Homer; according to Strabo the Rhodians sailed far and wide long before the first Olympiad, "to save men." They founded Rhode in Iberia, Parthenope (Naples) and other places in Italy. It is also stated that they laid out Gela in Sicily in concert with some Cretans, went to Lipara with Cnidians, built Apollonia on the Thracian shore of the Black Sea with Milesians, contributed to the founding of Phaselis and Soli on the southern coast of Asia Minor, and were among the colonists of Naucratis in Egypt. They themselves derived their origin from Argos; but legend also referred to the art-loving Telchines, who had formerly dwelt in the island, and to Phoenicians who had settled there but had been driven out of it. The island had three communities, Ialysus in the north, Lindus in the east and Camirus in the west, which in

conjunction with Cos, Cnidus and for a time also with Halicarnassus formed the Dorian Hexapolis, with its religious centre in the temple of Apollo on the promontory of Triopium, close to Cnidus.

Rhodes had always been of great political importance, but this importance was materially enhanced when, in the year 408, the inhabitants of Ialysus, Lindus and Camirus resolved to unite in founding a new city, Rhodes. The forces which, outwardly at least, had hitherto been divided, were now concentrated, and the good effects of this concentration for the island, as well as for Greece in general, were soon to appear. The new city was not far from the old Ialysus, a little to the east of the northern point of the island. It had two harbours close to one another and open to the north; the citadel was near the west coast. It was evidently this great distance of the citadel from the harbours (it is a long way, about two miles, from the modern city) which had prevented the site being used for an ordinary Greek city of limited extent. This citadel and these harbours required a large town. The new Rhodes, which was planned by Hippodamus with straight streets, rose from the sea in the form of a theatre. The lower quarters often suffered from floods which descended from the mountain, and the whole district was exposed to earthquakes.¹

The great political importance of Rhodes asserted itself gradually in the course of the fourth century; its commercial significance was shown at once by the creation of a new standard of coinage (vol. iii. p. 49). In the time of Alexander Rhodes already stood in such repute that the great king deposited his will there.² Rhodes had joined him, but it refused to submit to any of the heirs of his empire, whence the struggle with Demetrius Poliorcetes, from which it issued with the highest reputation. The peculiar principles of its foreign policy, which were carried out for another century and a half, were as follows: good relations with all peaceable states,

offensive and defensive alliance with none; maintenance of free navigation, in support of which war was to be waged on all who interfered with it and the assistance of all who pursued the same object was accepted. And in return for these services, which were rendered for the general good, Rhodes did not demand tribute from other maritime states, as Athens had formerly done. This was what earned the Rhodians general respect, as was shown on the occasion of the great earthquake in 227, when all the powers did their best to mitigate the calamity by sending gifts.³ In support of free navigation Rhodes opposed even its ally Byzantium (chap. xiii.), and its war with Ptolemy (chap. x.) must have been due to the same reason. It stopped Eumenes when he wanted to close the Bosphorus in the war against Pharnaces, assisted Sinope against Mithridates of Pontus with money and, when Pharnaces pressed Sinope, tried, though without success, to induce the Romans to interfere.⁴ The Rhodians were most zealous in putting down piracy, and they managed to enlist even Cretans (Cnossus and Hierapytna) in this service.⁵ They took great pains to check the encroachments of Philip V. (chap. xv.), and in 205 they brought about peace in conjunction with Egypt and Chios. Subsequently when Philip outwitted and injured them, firstly through Heraclidas and then in the affair of the Cians, they fought bravely against him (chap. xvi.). In the peace between Rome and Philip they did not get all that they claimed on the mainland, where they already had possessed a *peruia*. They were more fortunate after the war with Antiochus, against whom they had given the Romans energetic support. On this occasion they received Caria, with the exception of Telmissus, and even Lycia. When, however, the Lycians complained to Rome of the severity of the Rhodian rule, the Romans declared that they had assigned the Lycians to the Rhodians as friends only, not as slaves. And the Rhodians were no doubt in the wrong. It is true that they prided themselves

on not demanding a tribute from their maritime allies, but if they treated the Lycians as they did Caunus and Stratonicea, from which they extorted an annual contribution of 120 talents (chap. xviii. note 16), this would prove that they liked to have paying subjects on the mainland, and the Romans were consequently right in saying that this had not been their intention. The catastrophe which befell Rhodes in the war between Rome and Perseus has been discussed in chap. xviii. It is permissible to suppose that the gross imprudence of which they were then guilty, and which brought on them the loss of their historic neutrality, was another symptom of the arrogance which had been displayed in the harsh treatment of Lycia and Caunus. Even then, when their political power had declined, they did not relax in their characteristic zeal for free navigation; they still continued to wage war on pirates. And they also showed their sound judgment in declining to join Mithridates Eupator (see chap. xxvi.).

As a rule Rhodes did not fit out large fleets; the object generally was to chase pirates. Every year a small squadron of three or more ships put to sea for this purpose, and occasionally sailed as far as the Atlantic Ocean. But if powerful monarchs had to be opposed, then large fleets were sent to sea. In the year 201 Rhodes, Pergamum and Byzantium contributed together 77 ships; in the war with Antiochus the Rhodians alone despatched 25, then 36, and finally 20 more ships; in the year 190 they had 70 war-ships afloat. Their merchantmen also were armed. The strength of the Rhodians lay, as formerly that of the Athenians, in their manœuvring; they tried to break through the enemy's line and to grapple with their ships from the side and from behind. In the First Punic War the Rhodian Hannibal distinguished himself as blockade-runner against the Romans off Lilybaeum. There was a saying: ten Rhodians, ten ships; so highly prized was the seamanship of a Rhodian sailor.

Their pride in their profession is attested by the story of the Rhodian captain, who, when the ship seemed on the point of sinking in a storm, exclaimed: "You must admit, Poseidon, that I am sending you the ship in a seaworthy condition!"

Rhodes was middleman for the trade between Alexandria and the ports of Europe, and was also a centre for part of the Syrian trade. Like the Piraeus in earlier days, it had its *deigma*, a warehouse containing samples of merchandise. As late as the year 169 Rhodes exported grain from Sicily with the permission of the Roman state. It had a large share of the trade of the Black Sea, to which wine and oil were shipped, and from which slaves, grain, hides, honey, etc., were exported; this accounts for the quarrel with Byzantium mentioned above. After the earthquake of 227 the Rhodians were exempted from duties in Syria. Numbers of foreign merchants lived in Rhodes, and young men were sent there to learn commerce, somewhat as young Englishmen go to Hamburg nowadays. The mercantile code of the Rhodians was a strict one. The son was responsible for the debts of the father to a greater extent than in Rome, and Rhodes was not always willing to take advantage of the remission of debts occasionally granted by Rome. Of the famous maritime law of Rhodes all that is known is that the apportionment among all concerned of loss occasioned by jettison of cargo in a storm was minutely regulated.⁶

The constitution of Rhodes is not so well known to us as we could wish.⁷ Of course there was a council and popular assembly in the capital. The word democracy was used, but it is probable that the influence of the council in Rhodes was greater than in Athens, for instance. The executive authorities were the six prytanes, besides strategi and a nauarch, who could even conclude treaties with foreign powers, subject of course to ratification by the people. At the same time the communities of Ialysus, Camirus and Lindus continued to exist, and resolutions of them have come down to us, dealing

with local, especially religious matters. From this it appears, as indeed is clear by itself, that foreign affairs were settled in Rhodes only. The number of these resolutions is largest in Lindus; Ialysus has the fewest. This makes it probable that most of the inhabitants migrated from the neighbouring Ialysus into the new city of Rhodes, and that a great many remained in Lindus, which has a particularly strong position.

The revenues of the Rhodian state must have been very considerable, to judge by the above-mentioned complaints of the Rhodians about the loss suffered in 168. That the acquisition of citizenship was coupled with a payment to the state, appears from the fact that after the great earthquake Hieron and Gelon of Syracuse sent 10 talents to Rhodes for the express purpose of increasing the number of citizens. As it is impossible that the Rhodians can have sold the right of citizenship to any chance foreigners, we may assume, firstly, that those entitled by their extraction to claim the right obtained it only on payment of a certain sum, and secondly, that any inhabitant of Ialysus, Lindus and Camirus who wished to have the citizenship of the Rhodian state in addition to the local citizenship, had to pay for it. This accounts for the aristocratic character of the Rhodian state. Strabo mentions that the wealthy classes in Rhodes did a great deal for the state and for the poor by means of *liturgiae* and in other ways. It was the same in Cos, as is proved by an existing inscription. According to this a subscription was made, at a date which cannot be exactly ascertained, towards war expenses, and the person who opened it contributed 7000 drachmae, and the others between 5000 and 50. This recalls a well-known incident at Rome in the First Punic War. The prudent attitude which Rhodes observed in her foreign policy is in keeping with the aristocratic character of the Rhodian state. She had to pay dearly for her one departure from it.

Rhodians are also found abroad in important capacities, and not merely in Greek countries. We may mention Timocrates

(vol. iii. p. 36), the well-known brothers Mentor and Memnon, and the Hannibal referred to above.

Rhodes was a particularly religious island.^s The chief deity after the founding of the capital was Helios, whom the famous Colossus represented. Before this the Lindian Athene and the Zeus on Mount Atabyrius stood in higher repute. Ruins of the temple of Athene at Lindus and of the temple of Zeus on Atabyrius are still to be seen. The festival of Helios was celebrated with great splendour in September; the principal victim was a team of four horses, which was thrown into the sea. The cult of Poseidon in Ialysus was performed by Phoenician priests even in historic times; it would appear therefore to be of Phoenician origin. A guild of Asclepiadae was affiliated to the temple of Asclepius in Rhodes. Bodily exercises were zealously cultivated there; many Rhodians acquired great fame by their remarkable gymnastic feats. Among these the Diagoridae came first, whose ancestor Diagoras claimed descent from Heracles and from the Messenian Aristomenes. Associations were highly developed among the Rhodians, an indication of great moral vigour in the people. We know from inscriptions of the *eranoi*, some of which were named after deities, and some after foreign places, of which therefore many of their members were probably natives. We find on the one hand Poseidoniasts and Hermaists, as in Delos, on the other Lemniasts and Samothraciasts. Their activity was of a very varied nature, although we cannot say what actually took place at their meetings; we only know that they held real property and provided for the interment of members, that members gave endowments to the society and in return received the usual marks of honour, such as titles, exemption from contributions to the society, wreaths, statues in temples—in this last case the state had to give its consent. The religiousness of the Rhodians also showed itself in the strict observance of the rule that dedicatory offerings could in no case be injured, for which

the following story vouches. After defeating Rhodes Artemisia had erected a group in the vanquished city representing herself in the act of scourging the personification of Rhodes. When the Rhodians regained their freedom, they did not remove this insulting design; they built a wall round it and a roof over it, and declared the spot forbidden ground. Dedications as tokens of friendly relations were very common between Rhodes and other states. Hieron put up a group in the deigma of Rhodes, the demos of Syracuse placing a wreath on the demos of Rhodes. In the year 167 the Rhodians sent a golden wreath worth 10,000 gold pieces to Rome, and erected a statue of Rome, 45 feet high, in the temple of Athene at Rhodes. They certainly had every reason to try to regain the favour of Rome.

These remarks on offerings and other works of art lead us to the consideration of the art of the Rhodians.⁹ It was of importance even in ancient times. According to the legend the Telchines, sons of the Thalassa who forged Poseidon his trident, worked in the island. Many vases of very ancient style have been found in the Rhodian cemeteries. Rhodian art, however, stood specially high in the period now occupying us, from the founding of the capital onwards. We saw in the preceding volume that south-western Asia Minor was the seat of a high artistic development. Its centre at that time was Halicarnassus. This city, however, lost its importance owing to its opposition to Alexander, and from that time Rhodes is the centre of art and of culture generally in those countries: the republic takes the place of the royal city. Halicarnassus was even, as the coinage shows, for a time directly influenced by Rhodes. Cos and Cnidus were flourishing neighbours of Rhodes, but they too were under its influence. About the year 350 the building and the decoration of the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus had collected a number of artists of repute (vol. iii. p. 431), and one of them, Bryaxis, the same man who was the sculptor of the Sarapis in Alexandria (chap. xiv.) and

of the Apollo at Daphne (chap. xviii.), executed colossal statues of five deities for Rhodes. Lysippus made a quadriga with the sun-god for Rhodes. Among the pupils of Lysippus was the Rhodian Chares, who executed the famous bronze Colossus of Helios, 105 feet high, for his native city, considered one of the seven wonders of the world. After the siege was raised, in 304, it was paid for by the city out of the 300 talents produced by the sale of the war material left by Demetrius Poliorcetes, and it remained standing until the earthquake in 227, after which it was not re-erected. The remains are said to have amounted to 900 camels' loads in the seventh century A.D. The period from the earthquake of 227 up to the end of the war with Perseus (168) is that of Rhodes' greatest prosperity; it was then that most of the works of art, which are known to us from inscriptions, were created. According to these inscriptions the majority of them represented human beings. The Rhodians had a marked preference for the colossal; according to Pliny there were about 100 colossi in Rhodes. This was a defect in Rhodian taste.

In spite of these accounts we should have a very vague idea of Rhodian art if two famous pieces of sculpture had not come down to us, of which one was the work of Rhodians, and the other, executed by artists from Tralles, was originally in Rhodes. We refer to the Laocoon and the Farnese bull. The Laocoon group, evidently the actual work famous in antiquity, was executed by the Rhodians Agesander, Polydorus and Athanodorus. Since the Pergamene sculptures have become known to us, the origin of the Laocoon is clearer than it was; the Athene group in the Pergamene frieze has a giant whose attitude bears great resemblance to that of Laocoon. But it may be asserted that the Rhodian work shows an advance in two ways, externally in the combination of the two youths with the father, and internally in the pathos of the expression. It is Pergamene art, inspired by that of the author of the Niobe. The Farnese bull, a work of Apollonius and Tauriscus of

Tralles, is of far less importance for the reason that the most important parts of the group, *i.e.* everything intended to convey intellectual expression, are modern restorations. The group is rightly called the bull, for only the bull can be pronounced with certainty to be original, and it hardly deserves the lengthy dissertations which writers on the history of art have devoted to it. It may be added here that under the empire the art of south-western Asia Minor was represented by several masters belonging to one and the same city, Aphrodisias in Caria. The best known are Aristeas and Papias, to whom the fine centaurs in the Capitoline Museum are due.

Painting also flourished in Rhodes in the period after Alexander. The greatest of its masters, Protogenes, has already been mentioned (vol. iii. p. 437).

Of Rhodian poets, on the other hand, there is not much to be said. Apollonius Rhodius was an Egyptian. The merchants of the island evidently had less taste for poetry than for painting and especially for sculpture.

But Rhodes was also a seat of philosophy, rhetoric, history and geography.¹⁰ Besides Theophrastus, to whom the preference was accorded, the Rhodian Eudemus was also mentioned as successor to Aristotle in the leadership of the Peripatetic school. Among the later Peripatetics we find a Hieronymus of Rhodes. Afterwards Rhodes became one of the headquarters of the Stoa, which was as much at home in southern Asia Minor as the philosophy of Epicurus was in the north-west. Of the Rhodian Stoics Panaetius was the most important.¹¹ Born about 185 B.C., he attended the lectures of Crates, no doubt in Pergamum, and those of Antipater of Tarsus in Athens; from Athens he proceeded to Rome about the year 156. It was the time when the three Athenian philosophers were in Rome on their diplomatic mission (chap. xix.). They produced an effect on the Roman public in general, Panaetius more on smaller circles. He made the acquaintance of Laelius and of the younger Scipio, and the latter took him under his

roof. In this position he contributed more than any one to the gradual transformation of Roman culture. While the statesman Polybius, who belonged to the same set, provided for the influence of Rome on Greece, the philosopher Panaetius brought to bear the influence of Greek life and character on Rome. He also accompanied Scipio on campaigns and journeys, and travelled with him to Asia and Egypt in 143. Eventually he was head of the Stoa in Athens, from about 124 B.C., and he died about 112. Panaetius combined Academic with Stoic ideas and took probability into account even in practical philosophy. In this way he became one of the founders of casuistry and developed his theory of moral obligation; Cicero adopted his doctrine. His influence and that of the Stoa on Roman law will be referred to in chap. xxiv.

We discuss the most important pupil of Panaetius, Poseidonius, here, although his career belongs to the next epoch. Poseidonius was born about 135 at Apamea in Syria, but he was often described as a Rhodian, because he resided permanently in Rhodes. He attended the lectures of Panaetius in Athens and in 112 undertook a long journey to Italy and Spain. He then became head of the Stoa of Rhodes. But he also took part in the public affairs of the city, he filled the office of a prytanis and in 86 went as Rhodian envoy to Rome, where he came in contact with C. Marius. Cicero heard him lecture in Rhodes and Cn. Pompeius was his great patron. He appears to have died about the year 51. His writings were mostly on historical topics; the most famous was the continuation of Polybius, in 52 books, for the composition of which his culture, which was not merely theoretical, his travels and his relations with leading statesmen well qualified him. He also engaged in geographical researches on the ebb and flow of the tide in the Atlantic Ocean. To judge by a somewhat lengthy fragment on the revolt of the Athenians against Rome at the time of Mithridates,

Poseidonius' style was animated and witty, quite different from that of Polybius, who is always elaborately serious and occasionally somewhat pedantic.

Among a number of other Rhodian historians we may mention Callixenus, who, as we already know (chap. iv.), wrote interesting chronicles about the court of Alexandria, and the chronologist Castor, who, it is true, is less known to fame by his scientific achievements than by the prominent part which he took in the fall of Mithridates.

A Rhodian school of rhetoric¹² was supposed to exist in antiquity, but we cannot ascertain its characteristics. It is traced at one time to Aeschines, at another to Hyperides. The speech which the Rhodian envoy Astymenes delivered before the Roman Senate in 167 was greatly applauded. The Rhodian style of the first century B.C. seems to have been formed by two pupils of the orators Hierocles and Menecles of Alabanda, who were then at the head of the Asiatic school. The first was Apollonius Malacus, who came from Alabanda to Rhodes before 120, the second Apollonius Molon, also of Alabanda, Rhodian envoy to Rome in 88 and 81. Cicero, who had made his acquaintance in Rome, came after his stay in Athens and in Asia to Rhodes for the express purpose of being taught by Molon. At that time Rhodes was a favourite place of study for young Romans. Caesar, Brutus and Cassius learnt oratory there. Cassius' teacher was Archelaus, who afterwards, when Cassius had conquered Rhodes, tried to persuade the conqueror to be more lenient, but without success; Cassius sacked the city in a barbarous manner. That Tiberius spent his exile in Rhodes, is well known; he studied rhetoric there under Theodorus of Gadara.

In Rhodes, as in many other cities, teachers were paid by the city. On one occasion Polybius finds fault with the Rhodians for obtaining money from Eumenes for this purpose, being of opinion that they ought to pay it themselves.

I have been able to give only a very brief sketch of the importance of Rhodes, which deserves to be described in greater detail. Politically it had, as we remarked in chap. xiii., an extremely important position, that of protector of free navigation on the high seas. Its only defect was a certain harshness towards its subjects on the mainland. What Rhodes did in the east was done by Rome in the west. The two states were therefore natural allies, and when Rhodes forfeited her splendid position by her inconsiderate conduct, Rome alone remained of the powers that protected free traffic, and she eventually carried out what Athens and subsequently Rhodes were not allowed to accomplish. In one respect Rome behaved like Athens: she demanded a permanent political alliance, which Rhodes had not done; but she differed again from Athens in not exacting a tribute for some time. The reason was that she had a firmer footing than Athens.

The issue of the last Macedonian war did not bring Rhodes so low as is frequently supposed. The Rhodians themselves asserted that they had incurred enormous losses by the raising of Delos to the rank of a free port. That may have been, but it could not have applied to all branches of trade, as we shall see in the next chapter. The real sinews of commerce, *i.e.* capital and intelligence, could not have been transported bodily to the tiny island of Delos, which moreover did not keep its importance for a hundred years. Intellectually, however, Rhodes hardly suffered at all in the year 168. It remained even after that date the intellectual centre of south-western Asia Minor. We saw how in the departments of art and literature the richly-endowed district of the Maeander, with Tralles and Alabanda, eventually turns its powers to account in Rhodes and seeks and obtains recognition there.

NOTES

1. For Rhodes, see vol. i. p. 145, and the references given on p. 153. To the writings quoted there the following may be added : Hamilton, *Researches in Asia Minor*, 1842 ; Ross, *Reisen auf den griech. Inseln*, Bd. 3 and 4, 1845 and 1852 ; Newton, *Travels and Discoveries in the Levant*, I, Lond. 1865 ; Billiot et Cottret, *L'île de Rhodes*, 1881 ; Bottermund, *De repub. Rhodior. comm.* Hal. 1882 ; Gilbert, *Handb. der griech. Staatsalt.* 2, 174-183 ; Kuhn, *Entstehung der Städte der Alten*, Leipz. 1878, 209-221 ; Schumacher, *De rep. Rhod. comm.* Heidelb. 1886. Rhodes in *Ancient Times*, by C. Torr, Cambridge, 1885, is concise and full of matter and makes use of the inscriptions. Maps : Newton, Kiepert, Kleinas. XIV ; plan of modern Rhodes, useful on account of the harbours, in Newton. Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, chap. xv., has some interesting remarks on Arbitration and Public Credit.—Ancient authorities, esp. Strabo, 14, 652-655.—A summary of the legends is given by Torr, 139 seq.

2. Alexander deposits his will in Rhodes, Diod. 20, 81.

3. See above, chap. xiii.—Yet the Rhodians claimed a sort of *thalassocratia*, of a harmless kind, it is true ; according to Strabo, 1, 57, when in 196 B.C. a small volcanic island had risen from the sea between Thera and Therasia, *ἐθάρρησαν πρότοι Ῥόδιοι θαλαττοκρατοῦντες ἐπιπροσπλεύσαι τῷ τόπῳ καὶ Ποσειδῶνος Ἀσφαλίου ἱερὸν ἰδρύσασθαι κατὰ τὴν νῆσον*. But no ἀρχή was claimed by this ; see the remarks at the end of vol. iii. of this history.—Presents made by the sovereigns to Rhodes after the earthquake, Polyb. 5, 88-90.

4. Rhodes against Eumenes on account of the Bosphorus, Polyb. 27, 6. Rhodes assists Sinope, Polyb. 4, 56.—Rhodes sends an embassy to Rome about Sinope in 183 B.C., Polyb. 23, 9.

5. Rhodes and piracy, Torr, 48, 49, 59, 65. The pirates on the side of Demetrius against Rhodes, Diod. 20, 82. Later on war with Cretan pirates, Polyb. 29, 4 ; 33, 11, 14. The Rhodian Hannibal at Lilybaeum, Polyb. 1, 46 seq.

6. Strict rectitude in business, Torr, 51. Rhodian maritime law, *ibid.* 52. Pündter, *De lege Rhodia de jactu*, Erl. 1891.

7. For the constitution of Rhodes see the above-mentioned authorities.—Antimenes of Rhodes, an able official under Alexander the Great in Babylon, Arist. Oec. 2, 15, 19, 34.—The Rhodian admirals empowered to make treaties, Polyb. 30, 5 ; this is accounted for by the fact that Rhodes only bound herself for particular cases.—Position of Lindus, etching in Newton, *Travels*,

1, 192.—*δημοκρηδεῖς δ' εἰσὶν οἱ Ῥόδιοι, καίπερ οὐ δημοκρατούμενοι*, says Strabo, 14, 652. Solicitude of the rich for the poor, *ibid.*—Finances, Torr, 66; according to Dittenberger the Newton inscription, Inscr. Br. Mus. 343, which contains a subscription for the state, belongs to Cos and not to Rhodes; see Paton and Hicks, Inscr. of Cos, No. 10. Halicarnassus and Cnidus dependent on Rhodes, according to the coinage, Head, H. N. 524, 526.

8. Religion of Rhodes, Heffter, Die Götterdienste auf Rh. im Alterthum, 1827-1837. Torr, 73-93; a strange cult of Heracles at Lindus, *ibid.* 78.—For the *ἔρανοι* Torr, 85-88; Foucart, Les assoc. rel. chez les Grecs, Paris, 1873, 110-113; the *ἔρανοι* of Asia Minor, *ibid.* 114-119.—Fine subterranean aqueduct in Camirus, Torr, 68.—A Rhodian peristyle had columns on all four sides, but those facing south higher than the others, Torr, 68, following Vitruvius, 6, 50. A short time ago one was discovered in Pompeii. The 'sun-island' liked sunshine.

9. Kekulé deals briefly with Rhodian art in Baed. Griechenl.² cxv., cxvi.; see also the respective chapters in Brunn's Geschichte der griech. Künstler, and Torr, 93-118.—Statues in Rhodes, Torr, 89 seq.; Lüders, Der Koloss zu Rhodos, Hamb. 1865.—The number of colossi is evidence of a certain swagger on the part of the Rhodians, and would be so even if it were assumed that most of them were statues of gods, which is by no means certain. The Rhodians wanted to have not only fine statues but large ones; they had the money for it. The number of colossi crowded together in a limited space, probably gods, prythaneis, and worthy merchants, cannot even have produced a good effect as a whole. Coinage of Rhodes, Head, 540; Halicarnassus, Head, 526; Cos, Head, 536; Cnidus, Head, 524. The art of Cnidus, like that of Halicarnassus, must be studied especially in the British Museum, thanks to Newton's discoveries.

10. Literature. Hieronymus of Rhodes, Susem. 1, 148. The Stoa of Rhodes, Torr, 127 seq.

11. For Panaetius and Poseidonius see the article Stoici in Pauly, 6, 2, 1444, 1445.—For Panaetius also Pauly, 5, 1102-1104; Christ, § 372; Susemihl, 2, 63-80.—Poseidonius, Pauly, 5, 1928-1930; Chr. § 367; Susem. 2, 128-147; Reinach, Mithrid. 425; Müller, Fr. 3, 245 seq. The fragment about Athenion in Athenaeus, 5, cc. 48-53.—Dionysius Thrax of Alexandria, a pupil of Aristarchus, who wrote the first Greek grammar, lived in Rhodes. Susem. 2, 168-175.—For Castor, Susem. 2, 365-372.

12. Rhetoric. Cf. above, chap. xxi. note 8.—Censure of the Rhodians, Polyb. 31, 25.

CHAPTER XXIII

GREEK CULTURE IN THE SECOND CENTURY B.C.

—V. ATHENS AND DELOS

IN this period too life in Athens retained its old character. The Athenians of the second century were as much interested in art and literature as those of the fourth; the study of philosophy had the same attraction as in the time of Socrates or Epicurus; greater attention even was paid to the education of youth. True, it is a habit nowadays to speak of the continued deterioration of the Athenian character in this age as well; but this view is as little justified as it was before. No doubt the plundering of Oropus is discreditable. But the Athenians were good hands at 'collecting money' in the fifth century; the only difference was that their allies beyond the sea suffered from it. In the period now under our consideration the Athenians are also reproached with accepting works of art and endowments from foreign monarchs, while they themselves did but little in this respect. In bringing this charge people overlook the fact that according to Greek ideas gifts to Greek shrines—and such offerings were invariably connected with a religious purpose in the third and second centuries also—had been a privilege and an honour for reigning sovereigns since the time of Gyges (vol. i. p. 321). It was expected that the rich should make donations and that the donee should accept them, even if he was wealthy himself.

I may briefly remind the reader that during the greater part of the second century the Athenian state included, besides Attica and the district of Haliartus, Paros, Delos, Scyros, Imbros and Lemnos. Athens therefore still had a territory such as few other states possessed, and its citizens enjoyed many opportunities of growing rich. That it had not declined so much as is generally supposed is shown by the continuance of the coinage.¹

The high repute in which Athens stood is proved by these very endowments from foreigners, for which the Athenians displayed their gratitude by occasionally exaggerated honours. In the year 307 they paid homage to Antigonus and Demetrius by creating two new phylae, Antigonis and Demetrias, and by setting up the statues of their august deliverers by the side of those of Harmodius and Aristogiton. Subsequently they made amends for this by fighting bravely for liberty under Olympiodorus and under Chremonides, which gave them the right of honouring the former as well as other patriotic individuals with statues. The repulse of the Gauls, in which the Athenians took part and which was successful at the outset, was also a legitimate occasion for the erection of monuments. The foreign benefactors rewarded with statues were Lysimachus, Pyrrhus, Audoleon of Paeonia and Spartocus from the Bosphorus. Afterwards Ptolemy II. Philadelphus founded a new gymnasium in Athens, the first within the city, called the Ptolemaeum, with a library, and in return the Athenians created a new phyle, the Ptolemais, which took the place of the Antigonis and the Demetrias; they revered him as Eponymus and did him the favour of introducing the new Egyptian god Sarapis into Athens. After the unfortunate issue of the Chremonidean War a Macedonian garrison remained for a time in the harbours of Athens, and the long walls fell into ruin. The captain of mercenaries Diogenes then rendered a service to Athens by surrendering to her, in the year 229, after the death of Demetrius, the fortified places

in Attica of which he was governor, Munychia, the Piraeus and Sunium with Salamis, for the sum of 150 talents, which Aratus appears to have collected (see above, chap. x.). He received the right of citizenship and the *proedria*; a festival called Diogenea was created and a new gymnasium, the cost of which can hardly have been defrayed by him alone, was named after him. Soon afterwards the Athenians Euryclides and Micion did good service by keeping the walls of Athens and the Piraeus in repair, and they were duly honoured for it. They also took care that Athens did not enter the Achaean League, whereby they preserved the honour of their native city.² For otherwise it would have had to side with the Macedonians in the impending conflict between Aratus and Cleomenes. Now it could remain loyal to the alliance with Egypt, which subsequently expanded into an alliance with Pergamum, Rhodes and Rome. It has been said that this league with the powerful states was judicious and advantageous, but the reverse of what might have been expected from a vigorous government. The truth is really, as it seems to us, just the other way. Nobody in Athens could have then maintained that the distant states of Rome and Pergamum were stronger than Macedon, the king of which shortly afterwards proved his power by laying waste Attica. Consequently the decision to resist Macedonia was simply a matter of feeling. The Athenians honoured themselves by exasperating a man of Philip's stamp to such a pitch that he burnt everything that was combustible and smashed everything else. For this behaviour, which was well-nigh unexampled among Greeks, they revenged themselves on him by destroying his statues and those of his ancestors, by abolishing his festivals and priest-hoods and cursing the spots connected with them. Those who find fault with Athens call this conduct fanatical. That involves an admission that they followed their feelings, and we shall therefore be all the more justified in considering their opposition to Macedonia also as prompted by impulse and not

by calculation. The Athenians showed once more that their heart was in the right place.³ Their ally against Philip V. was Attalus I. of Pergamum, who was among the greatest benefactors of Athens. He endowed the Academy, of which his predecessor had been the friend, with the Lacydeum (see above, chap. xxii.), and set up the famous gift on the Acropolis. Eumenes II. (197-159) proved not less well disposed. He added the Stoa of Eumenes to the theatre of Dionysus, to afford shelter to the public in case of rain. His brother Attalus II. (159-138) erected a Stoa, remains of which are extant, to the east of the agora in the Ceramicus, which was used as a sale-room.⁴ The Athenians named a phyle Attalis after Attalus I. about 200 B.C. In the second century a Syrian ruler steps into the front rank of the benefactors of Athens, Antiochus IV. Epiphanes (175-164), who, as we have seen (chap. xx.), actually figured as a strategus of the city. The Olympieum, which the Emperor Hadrian completed, was, strange to say, built by a Roman named Cossutius in the employ of Antiochus.

Of monuments erected by Athenian citizens in this period there is certainly little known. The choregic monument of Thrasyllus belongs to the beginning of the Macedonian period (320 B.C.); his son Thrasycles restored it in 271/70.⁵

From the fact that the gardens of Epicurus were inside the city it has been inferred that the population had diminished in density.⁶ The reasoning is not conclusive however; they may have been near the wall, where there is often unoccupied space in cities. Nor is there any proof that the rich, who were steadily declining in numbers, were becoming more and more addicted to a life of luxury. On the contrary, it may be asserted that the love of generous culture was on the increase in Athens at this time; this is proved, as it seems to us, by two things, the greater solicitude for the education of youth and the growing importance of the philosophic schools.

The education of young men formed part of the state institution of the *ephebia*.⁷ The young Athenian became *ephebus* in his 18th year (vol. ii. p. 196); he then went through a two years' course of training, to which sons of *metoeci* were also admitted in the Macedonian period. This training took place in the gymnasiums and was continued in a somewhat different form in the open air. But they were not merely taught the exercises included in the *pentathlon*, i.e. jumping, throwing the javelin, running, throwing the discus, wrestling and boxing, which two last were combined into the *pancraton*, but also military exercises, such as archery, slinging (practised by the Rhodians, Dolopes and Baleares) and even the handling of catapults. To these were added riding, driving and swimming. The bodily strength thus acquired and developed was tested by marches and excursions, to Marathon, for instance, also by boat-races, as at the Ajax festival in Salamis and the Artemis festival at Munychia. The addition of military drill to the old gymnastic feats was in harmony with a tendency of the age. Many persons were of opinion that the citizen had more need of the former than of the latter, which turned out finished athletes, but not fighters. That was the view of Philopoemen, under whom the Achaeans had once more become good soldiers, whereas Aratus, who was a master of gymnastics, had not only done nothing in the battlefield himself, but had lowered the fighting power of his people. The intellectual education, which only partly concerned the *ephebi* as such, but which was followed by most of them, was divided into two parts, that of dancing and music, and the literary-scientific. The musical education of the Greeks was based in the main on a close connection of music with the dance. Plutarch describes dancing as a silent kind of poetry, and the dances which the *ephebi* practised had therefore a mimic character. A decree of the city of Teos in the time of the empire, dealing with the appointment by the city of teachers for boys and girls, shows the preponderance of *μουσική* over gymnas-

tics. It may be assumed that there was a general tendency to emulate Athens; Teos, the head-quarters of the artists of Dionysus, may, it is true, have cultivated *μουσική* more than other cities.

In the literary-scientific department of education three stages were distinguished: the grammatical, the rhetorical and the dialectical. The favourite poets were read first grammatically, and then for their subject-matter. This was called the encyclical course. Philosophy, on the other hand, completely outstepped the limits of school learning. The study of it was left to the free-will of the individual, but it was probably at this time neglected by few young men in Athens, whether rich or the reverse. We have already referred to the schools of the philosophers, the Academy, the garden near the Lyceum (*peripatos*), the gardens of Epicurus and the Stoa Poikile. The Ptolemaeum and the Diogeneum, as well as a place of instruction near the Palladium, served for the lectures connected with the *ephebia*.

The importance of the philosophers in Athens appears from the fact that difficult missions were entrusted to them and from the part which, as we shall shortly see, Aristion played at the time of Mithridates.

Of literary works produced by Athenians in this period not much is known to us outside the writings of Philochorus and Apollodorus. We know, however, that Athens was at that time also a favourite residence of foreign writers, and of these we can mention two of note: Timaeus of Tauromenium and Polemon of Ilium. Philochorus, to begin with the Athenians, was the most important of the Atthidæ; he was murdered at the instigation of Antigonus Gonatas as an adherent of Ptolemy after the end of the Chremonidean War. Apollodorus was a pupil of Aristarchus and of the Stoa; among his works were the books on the gods, a geography and a universal history, both in trimeters, the latter dedicated to Attalus II. and of special value; the much used mythological

library, which bears his name, is wrongly attributed to him. Timaeus, who lived from about 345-249, spent the last fifty years of his life in Athens. He was a great scholar, and his history of Sicily and Italy contained an abundance of matter narrated in a studiously clever style. He was occasionally too outspoken in his likes and dislikes, but with his respect for Timoleon and his aversion to Agathocles he hit the mark. Polemon, who lived in the beginning of the second century B.C., was the most important of the so-called *periegetae*, writers who described the curiosities of countries and cities. He travelled a great deal, but liked living in Athens, where he obtained the right of citizenship. He was a great authority on inscriptions. Athens therefore was also a seat of erudition, for all the above four writers were scholars, but this erudition was of a different kind from that of Alexandria. In Alexandria the natural sciences and grammar were cultivated, in Athens historical and geographical research. Anything that bordered on politics could thrive only in a free city.⁸ There is no trace of poetical creations in Athens in this period, nor of any worth mentioning elsewhere; the age of poetry had passed away.

In the province of art Greece had not exhausted itself, and this was specially the case with Athens.⁹ In the fourth and third centuries, and also in the second (Pergamum), Asia Minor was the head-quarters of art, especially of sculpture, and even later art did not die out there. But side by side with this achievement in Asia Minor there is an artistic revival in European Greece, which creates works of beauty and sublimity, and among the notable sculptors of that time many are natives of Athens, and some of Magna Graecia. Not a few of their productions have come down to us. The family of Polyces, which must have turned out many sterling works, is known to us only through allusions in ancient writers. We can form a better idea, however, of another family of artists, which was called after its head Pasiteles. True, all that we know of Pasiteles himself is

that he was a native of Magna Graecia, that he received the Roman citizenship in the year 87 B.C., and that he was a thinker who also wrote on art. Of his descendants, on the other hand, works are now in existence. His son Stephanus created a statue of an athlete, of normal proportions, and Menelaus, the son of Stephanus, executed the tranquil group in the Villa Ludovisi, known as Orestes and Electra. This school is styled the eclectic, but the term is not very apt, for there is no trace of its having combined the peculiarities of various schools. A somewhat different aspect is presented to us by Attic art, which produced some brilliant and still extant works towards the end of the pre-Christian and in the beginning of the Christian era: the famous Heracles torso in the Vatican, by the Athenian Apollonius, the well-known Farnese Heracles in Naples, by the Athenian Glycon, the Medicean Venus by the Athenian Cleomenes, and the so-called Germanicus, a Roman orator in the style of a Hermes, also by an Athenian of the name of Cleomenes. Besides these, we know that the Athenian Diogenes executed Caryatids for the Pantheon of Agrippa about the year 27 B.C., and it would appear that a Caryatid in the Vatican, which strongly recalls those of the Erechtheum, is one of those turned out by Diogenes, while another, in the Villa Albani, by the Athenians Criton and Nicolaus, reveals an attempt to embellish the original type. A marble vase of Sosibius in the Louvre, a rhyton of Pontius in the new Capitoline Museum and a marble bowl of Salpion in Naples show that Athenian artists knew how to treat other motives with skill. This leaning towards ancient art has also been traced in many reliefs of the period, the authors of which are not named. We thus see that as soon as Athens, which had had to undergo many trials up to about 200 B.C., attained some measure of tranquillity, the old artistic skill flourished once more, and we also note the character of this Athenian art, as opposed to that of Asia Minor. It followed the ancient style more, partly in an

imitative fashion, as in many reliefs, partly with more creative freedom, as in the above-mentioned statues.

For the greater part of the second century and for some time in the first the island of Delos was a sort of appendage of Athens, though a very independent one. Its condition during this period, on which light has been thrown by the recent French excavations, is of such great interest for the history of civilization that a brief survey of the results obtained by them may not be out of place here.¹⁰

The rise of Delos begins at the time when it shook off Athenian rule, probably about 308 B.C. At that time the old Delian amphictyony was expanded into a *koinon* of the islanders, mainly at the instigation of the Rhodians and of Ptolemy. This *koinon* had two principal places of worship: the temple of Poseidon and Amphitrite in Tenos, the island which is still the religious centre of the Cyclades (Diehl, 165), and above all the temple of Apollo in Delos. The *sunedrion* of the league met in Delos or Tenos; it seems to have had rather extensive powers, but we have as little accurate information about them as about those of the chief official of the league, the *nesiarch*. In the course of the third century foreign influence varied a great deal in Delos as in the other Cyclades. For a short space Macedonia was powerful there, both under Antigonos Gonatas and under Philip V. (see above, chap. xvi.), but as a rule the members of the peace-league, Rhodes and especially Egypt, were the stronger. When Macedonia was defeated at Cynoscephalae, Delos joined Antiochus for a time, but the Romans had already begun to direct their attention to Delos during their war with Antiochus. So little did the Delians understand the signs of the times that, like Rhodes and Pergamum, they turned towards the apparently rising star of Perseus. They allowed the publication of the decree by which Perseus recalled the exiles; Rome considered this an act of partisanship which could not be passed over, and she deprived the Delians of

their land, which was given to Athenians. But at the same time Delos became a free port, and in so doing entered on the most brilliant period of its existence.

Sovereign power resided in the "Demos of the Athenians dwelling in Delos," which had a special council, just like Athens itself. An *epimeletes* sent by Athens to Delos was there as well, but we do not know what his duties were. As colleagues he had duumvirs for the shrines, other duumvirs for the sacred funds, of whom one supervised the public *trapeza* or bank, and *agoranomoi*. These duumvirs recall the duumviral constitution of the Italian cities. Every fourth year a *theoria* came from Athens to Delos, the so-called Deliaists.

Of more importance, however, than the Athenian land-owners were the foreigners in Delos who had settled there for trading purposes. Among them the Romans and the Italians took the lead. The first Italians make their appearance in the island as early as the third century, beginning with a Novius, no doubt a Campanian, then a Buzus from Canusium; from and after 192, however, a Praetor or Consul appears in Delos almost every year, to pay his own homage and that of Rome to the god. Among the Italians in Delos members of the same gens are found for a considerable time, e.g. the Schii, just as Athenian families can be traced there for generations. The other countries which sent merchants to Delos appear from the inscriptions. According to these but few came from European Greece and Macedonia, and few from the islands of the Aegean Sea and from the cities of Asia Minor, there being no Rhodian among them for instance. On the other hand, relations can be proved with Byzantium, with Heraclea on the Pontus, with Amisus, with Nymphaea in the Crimea, with Nicomedia and Nicaea in Bithynia, with Alabanda in Caria, with Soli and Mallus in Cilicia, with Cyprus, and especially with places in Syria, such as Aradus, Berytus, Sidon, Tyre, Ascalon, Hierapolis, Laodicea, and finally with Antioch and

Alexandria. In the west only Neapolis and Tarentum are mentioned. From the above we see that the trade of Delos went eastwards to the Black Sea, to Bithynia, to part of the southern coast of Asia Minor, and especially to Syria and Egypt, and westwards to Italy. The conclusion which has been drawn from this, viz. that the countries which did not trade with Delos were poorly off, is an erroneous one. Great centres of trade, when they are not universal in character—and there are not many of those—have special connections, in other words they have very important relations with many ports, and quite unimportant ones with others which are just as considerable. A foreign port which does only a small trade with Hamburg is not an insignificant one for that reason; perhaps it has all the more trade with Bremen. This holds good also of Delos and the other ports of the Mediterranean. Delos too had its own special connections, and cities which, like Rhodes, had no dealings with it, might none the less be of great importance. It had its own particular staple of trade, the nature of which accounts for the countries with which it had to keep up intercourse. What coffee is to Hamburg and tobacco to Bremen, slaves were to Delos. It was the largest slave-market in those days. To characterize Delos people said: "land and unload your cargo, and it's sold." The area of Delos is rather more than three square miles; when such a special trade flourishes in so limited a space, there cannot be much room for other articles of commerce.

The fact that Delos was nothing more than a big slave-market fully accounts for the direction taken by its trade. For slaves came from the shores of the Black Sea, from Bithynia, from Cilicia, from Syria and Egypt, and the points in the west with which Delos was in communication were just those to which the Roman merchants shipped slaves. Now we can understand why there was no traffic with western Asia Minor or Rhodes; no slaves came from there. Apart

from this specialization of the trade of Delos the island as a commercial centre which produced nothing of consequence itself—for the fowls and eggs, the unguents and the Delian ores could not supply many cargoes—bears great resemblance to two islands which were of importance as emporia in the Middle Ages and in modern times, to St. Thomas and Gothland. The resemblance to the latter is also marked for the reason that Wisby in Gothland was, just like Delos, the meeting-place of representatives of various trading cities, so that it would be perfectly correct to apply the term 'Delian' Hansa to Wisby, the cradle of the German Hansa. The most important guilds in Delos were the following: the Poseidon-iasts, mariners, merchants and innkeepers from Berytus, who had a sanctuary near the temple of the foreign deities mentioned below and who also worshipped Roma (Berytus was afterwards the head-quarters of the study of Roman law in the East); the Heracleists, who were natives of Tyre; and the Hermaists, *i.e.* the natives of Italy. Owing to the different formation of the names, the Melanophori and the Therapeutae are pronounced to be purely religious associations, the former of the Egyptian and the latter of the Syrian goddess. But as it is clear that Egyptians or Syrians did not go to Delos to worship their native divinities, but to trade, these two last associations must also have been trading guilds, like the others.

The sacred precinct and the city of Delos which adjoined it were on the western side of the tiny island, between Mount Cynthus and the sea. The propylaea were to the south. The road leading thence to the temple was lined with offerings to the god. The temple, which was about the size of the Theseum at Athens, was situated on an eminence and built of Parian marble; its entrance was to the east. Near it were the two smaller temples of Leto and Aphrodite. Artemis, as well as Dionysus, had a special temenos inside the sacred precinct; Zeus Polieus had an altar there. It also contained treasuries, priests' houses and porticoes, some of these being

used as lodgings for travellers. The Stoa founded by Antiochus IV. was specially famous, called the Stoa of the Bulls from the bulls' heads which adorned it. The famous altar decked with rams' horns appears to have stood at one end of it. Near the sacred precinct of Apollo were the dwellings, porticoes and shrines of the merchants settled in Delos. Among these a square space is conspicuous by its extent, considered by some authorities to be a general market, by others the precinct of the Italian Hermaists. South of the sacred enclosure was also a market, as well as a portico, built by Philip V. Then farther up the hill came the theatre, the temple of the Cabiri and the temple of the so-called foreign deities, Sarapis, Isis and Anubis; the grotto of Apollo was just under the summit of Mount Cynthus, on which stood a temple of Zeus Cynthius and Athene Cynthia. Above the theatre a private dwelling has been excavated, resembling those at Pompeii.

The quays extended along the whole of the western shore of the island. Delos was considered a model port; to praise Puteoli it was described as Little Delos.

If slaves were bought and sold in Delos under the protection of Apollo, Delphi was the place where they were set free under the same protection. But the emancipation also was treated as an act of business; the form was a nominal sale to the god.

Amusing specimens of the credulity of the people are to be seen in the shrine of Asclepius in Epidaurus, where a number of votive inscriptions, some of which relate surprising cures, have been brought to light.¹¹

Olympia also experienced the generosity of monarchs of Macedonian extraction.¹²

Now that we have examined Greek culture in its most important centres at home, we propose in the next chapter to consider its influence on the city which the Greeks were bound to recognize as their political arbiter.

NOTES

1. Koehler, Ueber den auswärtigen Besitzstand Athens im 2. Jahrh., Athen. Mittheil. 1, 257 seq.; Hertzberg, 1, 84.—Buildings at Athens in this period, Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, vol. 1, Leipzig, 1874, pp. 608-659; Curtius, Die Stadtgeschichte von Athen, Berlin, 1891, esp. from p. 219 onwards, an excellent sketch.—The gifts by sovereigns to republics, Polyb. 5, 90. Nobody has thought any the worse of Geneva for accepting money from the Duke of Brunswick and erecting a statue to him in return.

2. Euryclides and Micion, Plut. Ar. 41.—New phylae, Hermann-Thumser, § 135.—The holding aloof of Athens from the Achaean League "judicious" and "advantageous" according to Wachsm. 1, 633.

3. The Athenians "fanatical," Wachsm. 1, 639. Polybius, 5, 106 unjust to Athens.

4. Adler, Die Stoa des Königs Attalos zu Athen, Berl. 1874 (Winckelmannsprogr.).

5. The Thrasyllus monument, Verrall and Harrison, Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens, Lond. 1890, pp. 265-271, with plates. Thrasyllus was agonothetes. Horologium of Andronicus Cyrrhestes, Curtius, Stadtgesch. 243-245, "in the beginning of the Roman era."

6. Decrease in the population of Athens, Wachsm. 1, 649. The gardens of Maecenas, which were partly inside the Servian Wall, do not prove any decline in the population of Rome.—Curtius, Stadtgesch. 243.

7. Education. Grassberger, Erziehung und Unterricht im klass. Alterthum, vol. 3, Würzburg, 1881. Mahaffy, Greek Life, c. xvii.—For the *ephebia* see above, chap. ii. note 9.—The gymnasiums in Athens, Wachsm. 1, 634-636.

8. Philochorus. Christ, § 360, Susemihl, 1, 594-599.—Apolldorus, Chr. § 397, Susem. 2, 33-44.—Timaeus, Holm, Gesch. Sic. 2, 266-269 and 480, and for everything ascertained about Timaeus since, Susem. 1, 563-583. Susemihl has on the whole been very just to Timaeus, except as regards Timoleon and Agathocles, a point which I refer to here because two important historical personages are concerned. Susemihl (p. 576) condemns "the exaggeration with which he lauded Timoleon to the skies, especially as a personal motive was involved." He means gratitude. In note 281 he even calls it a "falsification of history." But there is no proof that Timaeus ever recorded untruths about Timoleon, and it is highly probable that Timoleon, owing to his lofty character,

deserves the high praise which Timaeus accords to him. The slender foundation for Susemihl's verdict also appears from the fact that while in Timoleon's case the gratitude which Timaeus owed him is an aggravation of the offence, Timaeus' hatred of Agathocles is pronounced "pardonable" because the latter had banished him. According to this, hatred is an extenuating circumstance for censure, but not gratitude for praise! It is also difficult to see how Susemihl (note 285) could raise the question whether Timaeus really believed what he related of Agathocles. When a tyrant, whose conduct has been about as bad as it can be, is accused of vices which were common among the Greeks, then the writer who brings the charge cannot have honestly meant it. It is the old story—a sovereign cannot possibly be a disreputable individual.—Polemon of Ilium, article by Preller, in Pauly, 5, 1790-1795; edition of his fragments by the same writer, Leipzig, 1838; Müller, Fr. 3, 108-148; Chr. § 393; Susem. 1, 665, 676.—The reason why I have not given a connected account of Greek literature between 200 and 30 B.C. is that the most important points are mentioned in the chapters dealing with Alexandria, Pergamum, Rhodes and Athens. The remaining details can be found in Christ and Susemihl; the latter gives excellent reviews of lyric poetry and epigrams in chap. 36. See also the remarks at the close of this volume.

9. Art. Brunn, *Geschichte der griech. Künstler*, 1, 537 seq. (family of Polyycles), 542 seq. (Athenian artists), 559 seq. (character of Athenian art in this period), 570 seq. (artists of Asia Minor in Italy), 576 seq. (character of art of Asia Minor in this period), 595 seq. (Pasiteles and his successors).—Murray's *Handbook of Greek Archaeology*, Lond. 1892, p. 301, describes "sentimental expression" as the characteristic of the school of Pasiteles.—Hauser, *Die neu-attischen Reliefs*, Stuttgart, 1889; with Brückner's critique in the *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1890, Nos. 1 and 2.

10. Delos. Summary of the important French discoveries in Baed. *Griechenland*, 2nd ed. 142-148, with plan; detailed historical criticism and history of art in Diehl, *Excursions archéologiques en Grèce*, Paris, 1890, pp. 125-188, also with plan.—Schoeffer, *De Deli insulae rebus*, Berlin, 1889.—A connected work is expected by Homolle, who has been the principal director of the excavations; in the meanwhile the papers published, especially those by Homolle, in the *Bull. de correspond. hellénique* between 1877 and 1890, of which Diehl gives a list on p. 125, should be consulted.—The title 'Nesiarch' recalls the Boeotarch, the subsequent Asiarchs, etc.—The decree of Perseus published also in Delos according to Polyb. 25, 3 (26, 5).—Remark on the decline of

Rhodes, to be inferred from the direction taken by the trade of Delos, Schoeffer, 187, 188.—For the guilds, *ibid.*—Slave-market, Str. 14, 668: Δ. δυναμένη μυριάδας ἀνδραπόδων αὐθημερόν καὶ δέξασθαι καὶ ἀποπέμψαι.

11. Delphi. See for the present Baed. 154-158 with plan. Here too the excavations by the French, which have been in progress for some time, will throw the desired light on the subject.—Epidaurus, Baed. 250-252, with plan; Diehl, 311-336, also with plan and the necessary references; Gardner, New Chapters, chap. xii.

12. Embellishment of Olympia by the Ptolemies and the Antigonids, Curtius, Olympia in hellenistischer Zeit, paper read before the Archäol. Gesellsch. in Berlin, 9 Nov. 1894, reprinted in the Berl. Phil. Woch. 1895, Nos. 13, 14.

CHAPTER XXIV

INFLUENCE OF GREECE ON ROME—POLYBIUS

*Graecia capta ferum victorem cepit et artes
Intulit agresti Latio . . .*

is only half the truth. Rome was something better than a rude conqueror, and Greece taught the Romans more than mere arts or art.

The fruitful relations between Greece and Rome are typically presented, so to speak, in the life of a notable Greek, Polybius ; and on this occasion at all events the arts were not the connecting link, but interest in the state.¹

Polybius was a Megalopolitan, son of the much-esteemed Lycortas. He seems to have been born about 210 B.C. It was mainly the intercourse with Philopoemen which made a statesman and soldier of him, and he entered public life for the first time in 183, when he accompanied the ashes of his revered master in solemn procession from Messenia to Megalopolis. Lycortas and Polybius were champions of complete neutrality between Rome and Perseus, and thereby incurred the suspicions of Rome. Polybius was one of the 1000 Achaeans who had to answer for their conduct in Rome. But his lot was a better one than that of the others. He was permitted to live in Rome. Aemilius Paullus received him under his roof, and he initiated Scipio Aemilianus in the learning of the Greeks. His intercourse with Romans of note brought about a material change in his political views.

He arrived at the conviction that the ascendancy of Rome was a blessing for the world, and henceforth he did what he could to promote it and make it useful for the Greeks. In the year 150 he was released from exile with his fellow-countrymen. But instead of taking part in the sterile disputes of the Greeks, like the others, he entered the service of the Romans, accompanying Scipio to Africa. It was in his presence that Scipio applied the famous lines of Homer on the doom of Troy to Carthage. The Megalopolitans even asserted that Scipio owed all the good plans made in the war to the advice of Polybius. Just after the fall of Corinth he arrived at the head-quarters of Mummius. He persuaded the Roman commissioners to be more lenient on many points, and was employed by them to enlighten and tranquillize the Greeks in regard to the new position of affairs, and to carry out the details of their arrangements. He did this and thereby earned the gratitude of his fellow-countrymen. After that he seems to have devoted his time to collecting material for his great historical work and to its composition. He travelled in the East, visited Egypt, where he met Scipio, accompanied by Panaetius, in 143, and also went to Upper Italy, Spain and Gaul. He died in Greece at the age of 82. (123 B.C.)

The greater part of his history, which is divided into forty books, is preserved only in excerpts. The dominant idea of it is the expansion of the power of Rome from 220-168 B.C. The two first books contain the introduction, and in it *inter alia* the history of the First Punic War, the ten last the conclusion, from 168-146 B.C. Polybius' object is to show how fate, *τύχη*, has brought about the extension of the Roman power, and he tries to make this clear by describing what the Romans accomplished simultaneously in different places. Polybius' work is a political history on a grand scale. This history, however, has not merely the theoretical aim of every scientific work, viz. the presentment of the truth; it is also intended to be of practical use, especially to the statesman,

who is to learn from it how to conduct public affairs properly. The standpoint is that of Thucydides, but with this difference, that while Thucydides sees and describes only confusion, Polybius has before him a good aim already attained, the path to which has led through the confusion—the ascendancy of Rome. This ascendancy however is by no means a real dominion. Rome was to be an arbiter placed high above the nations. That was the idea of the Scipios, and was in the main the actual result.

Polybius' practical object—the so-called systematic composition of history—accounts also for some defects, *e.g.* the excessive lengthiness of his polemical matter. The convenient resource of notes detached from the text was of course not yet available. Polybius sees things as they are. When, for instance, in book 31 chap. 8 he reveals the endeavour of the Romans to turn the quarrels of foreign nations to their own advantage, he describes what all statesmen do to the best of their power and are bound to do.

His work is not on a high level in point of style, but all the more so as regards matter. Polybius took a large view of a great subject. It is true that his position was such as no Greek ever held again. No Greek who lived as a tutor in Rome after him had been a general previously; nor was any Greek again employed, like him, as a statesman by the Romans. Perhaps such a thing could not have occurred again, for where could a statesman of mark have been formed in Greece after the year 146? But if Greece did not supply the Romans with another statesman, yet she materially assisted the practical wisdom of Rome in another way, as a comprehensive examination of the intellectual relations between Rome and Greece will show us.²

These relations dated from remote antiquity. Rome had never considered herself a city of barbarians, she had always sought to draw from the spring of Greek wisdom and to enjoy the fruits of Greek civilization. Even under the kings she

had turned to Athens and Delphi, to the city of good laws and the famous oracle. The Republic no doubt was at first more reserved in its attitude towards foreigners, although there must have been an active intercourse with Cyne. Subsequently, when Rome had to deal with more distant and more important Greek cities, the Greek element pressed in with greater force. This was the case in the fourth century with Neapolis, in the beginning of the third with Tarentum. The first half of the third century delivered the whole of Lower Italy into the hands of the Romans, the First Punic War the whole of Sicily outside the kingdom of Hieron. The subsequent capture of Syracuse first brought Greek works of art in considerable numbers to Rome; after that time it became the fashion to adorn the victorious city with booty of this kind. The disputes and wars with Macedonia made the connection between Rome and Greece a very close one; this point has been sufficiently discussed in chaps. xv.-xix. From the foregoing we may distinguish seven periods in the history of the intercourse between Rome and Greece corresponding to the various states and countries which influenced Rome: (1) Delphi and Athens; (2) Cyne; (3) Neapolis; (4) Tarentum and the rest of Lower Italy; (5) Sicily; (6) Greece Proper; (7) Asia Minor. It is not easy to distinguish with accuracy what the individual states contributed to Rome. Yet the cult of Apollo, Artemis and Latona probably came from Cyne, that of Ceres, Liber and Libera from Neapolis or Velia (Elea); the latter was performed in Rome by Greek priests in the Greek language in the temple consecrated on the Aventine by Sp. Cassius in the year 493 and built by Greek architects. During the Samnite War, which began in 325, statues were erected in Rome to Pythagoras and, oddly enough, to Alcibiades. The first sun-dial was brought from Sicily to Rome in 263. The relations with Asia Minor mark the admission of Oriental cults, that of Rhea or Cybele and of Attis in 204, and the establishment of the Ludi Megalenses. It is impos-

sible to specify here all the various kinds of instruments, animals, dishes, etc., which were introduced into Rome from Greece.

But this was not all; the influence of Greek life altered the whole course of thought and feeling among cultivated Romans, a change which found expression *inter alia* in the identification of the utterly different Roman religion with the Greek and in similar deities being placed on a level with each other. This transformation of Roman ways was effected on the one hand by the emigration of Romans of note into Greek countries, and on the other by the influx of Greek envoys, artists and teachers; a man who came to Rome as a slave stood a good chance of exercising considerable intellectual influence there. The upshot eventually was that the national trend of culture was abandoned by the leading circles of Rome. Yet it may be said that if Roman civilization had not been transformed on Greek lines it would have given place entirely to that of Greece. In remodelling the Roman language and literature on the pattern of the Greek, the friends of Greek culture most probably preserved them from extinction.

Many influential Romans showed an inclination to make use of the good things which Greece had to offer. Foremost among them was T. Quinctius Flaminius, then Aemilius Paullus and the Scipio family, as well as M. Fulvius Nobilior and M. Claudius Marcellus. It is clear that the intellectual leaders of the Roman statesmen were so attracted by the good side of Greek civilization that they encouraged it in every way in Rome. This is also a proof of the so often ignored truth, that Greece had by no means deteriorated. Like L. Aemilius Paullus, the famous Cornelia had her sons instructed by Greek teachers, and Tiberius Gracchus set great store by the advice of the Stoic philosopher Blossius of Cumae in Campania. That Roman families derived their origin from Troy was also a consequence of the predilection for everything Greek, and at the same time a proof that Rome felt herself politically superior

to the Greeks. But there was also a party which was in favour of retaining Italian civilization. At its head was the famous M. Porcius Cato, Censor in the year 184, but he was powerless to stem the rising tide. In finding fault with Fulvius Nobilior for taking Ennius with him on his campaign, he went too far. But he was quite right in wishing to send the three philosophers out of the city as quickly as possible in the year 155. This opposition to Greek culture had already led to incidents of a similar kind: in 173 B.C. the Epicureans Alcaeus and Philiscus had been expelled the country; in 161 a *senatusconsultum* had been promulgated regarding the expulsion of the Greek philosophers and rhetoricians who delivered their lectures in Latin, and as late as the year 92 the Censors prohibited the rhetoricians from teaching in Latin. The people at all events were not to learn Hellenic wisdom. But it was of no avail; Greek culture was not to be driven out.

Its influence on that of Rome was so great that the whole of Roman literature, *i.e.* Roman writings exclusive of religious and civil formulas, songs and official records, became simply a transplantation of Greek to Italian soil. Of the men who carried out this process the first was Livius Andronicus, *i.e.* a Greek named Andronicus, who had come to Rome as a boy from conquered Tarentum and entered the family of Livius Salinator, whose children he afterwards taught. He received his freedom and gave instruction in Greek and Latin to others. In order to have a Latin school-book, he translated the *Odyssey* into Saturnian verse. When, in the year 240, the Curule Aediles put on the stage tragedies and comedies in Greek style at the *Ludi Romani*, it was Andronicus who came forward as author of both and as actor at the same time; his pieces were adaptations from the Greek. He was also charged with the composition of poems to be sung on solemn occasions in public by virgins. Thus the literature influenced by Greek models was also turned to official account. On the death of Andronicus at a ripe old age, in 204, Roman poetry had

already put forth a vigorous growth on the lines laid down by him.

Somewhat younger than Andronicus and more important as a poet was the Campanian freeman Cn. Naevius, born about 270, who struck out a new path by his dramas and his epic poem. This composition, written in Saturnian metre, dealt with the First Punic War and had an introduction on the flight of Aeneas, who of course had been in Sicily before he came to Latium. If the Metelli persecuted the poet, yet he was protected by the Scipios. He died in 202, when accompanying Scipio in Africa.

A still greater poet was Q. Ennius of Rudiae in Calabria, born in 239. He was master of four languages, Messapian, Oscan, Greek and Latin. In 204 he went as Centurio to Sardinia, where Cato was Quaestor. The latter who, in spite of his apparent aversion to all novelty, yet encouraged everything new which he approved of, induced Ennius to proceed to Rome, where he lived in the plebeian quarter on the Aventine, engaged in teaching. He was on friendly terms with the Scipios and with M. Fulvius Nobilior, who in 189 B.C. did him the honour of taking him to Greece in his Praetorian cohort. The son of M. Fulvius, Quintus, afterwards procured him an assignment of land in the military colonies and the Roman citizenship. He died in 168 B.C. Of his works the most important was the *Annales*, in which he related the history of Rome in hexameters. By the introduction of this metre he preserved the harmony which the Latin language was already in danger of losing by shedding its terminations. The poem, which went down to the defeat of Antiochus, became the national text-book of Roman history. But Ennius also promoted the diffusion of Greek learning and Greek refinement. He wrote a poem called *Epicharmus*, evidently a translation of Epicharmian maxims, many of which dealt with the origin of the world. He adapted the religious romance of Euhemerus—this belonged more to the

category of amusing literature. He also published a more or less free rendering of a gastronomical poem by Archestratus of Gela. It is worthy of note that in each of these three cases Sicilian literature served the Calabrian poet as a pattern. In the lowest scale of literary production he took the *sôta* for a model, imitations of the poetry of Sotades (see above, p. 311).

The imitation of the Greeks was specially successful in the drama. Of course we cannot give a detailed account of the various Roman dramatists here; it is sufficient to mention the most important writers of comedies, Plautus of Umbria, who up to his death, in the year 184, provided the stage for some forty years with adaptations of the New Attic Comedy; the Insubrian Statius Caecilius (d. 168), who lived with Ennius and adapted mostly originals of Menander; and P. Terentius Afer, who came from Africa as a boy about 180 B.C. into the house of the senator Terentius Lucanus, and was educated and manumitted by him. Terentius had access to the best society in Rome and became a friend of the younger Scipio Africanus and of Laelius. He reproduced the comedies of Menander in a loftier way than Caecilius, interpolating suitable parts from other plays, a 'contamination' which Plautus had practised before him.

The great popularity of Greek literature in Rome (shown not only by the beginnings of classic Roman writing just described, but also by the literary achievements of the age of Cicero and Augustus, on which we cannot dwell here) is in itself sufficient proof of the prodigious influence of Greece on Rome, which is also displayed in the artistic adornment of daily life in the Roman capital from the first century B.C.; but literature, art and daily life are far from exhausting this influence, it is also revealed in the fact that Greek culture contributed in no small degree to one of the most important and beneficial of reforms, a genuine work of Roman civilization.

The great number of foreigners who flocked to Rome after the extension of Roman dominion, firstly from Italy and then from eastern countries, considerably disturbed the legal system of the city. At first the accumulation of non-Romans in Rome was considered dangerous and the authorities resorted to the remedy of expulsion, which was also applied later on. But a city which was arbiter of distant states and tribes was bound, if it did not want to forfeit its position, to provide for the permanent cohabitation of citizens and foreigners within its walls, and it did so. In the same way Athens had already treated foreigners in a friendly spirit by making things pleasant for the *metoeci*. Rome, which accomplished more in public life than Athens had done, also went a step farther than the Greeks in private law. If in the sphere of public law the gradual extension of the citizenship to foreign communities had constituted a great innovation on the Greek standpoint, the creation by the praetors' edicts of the *jus gentium* side by side with the *jus civile*, i.e. of a system of law for non-Romans in Rome, was an equally great and salutary change in the domain of private jurisprudence. The rules of this *jus gentium* were partly founded on what was customary among foreigners, but partly also on general principles inherent in the subject and in reason. As the principles of the *jus gentium*, which was also called *jus naturale*, were applied in cases of disputes between foreigners and Romans, gradually more and more litigation came to be decided by this law, and the foundations were laid of a civil society in which all private rights were fully secured, so long as they were not repugnant to the general custom of nations and to reason. Herein lay the possibility of an unlimited extension of the Roman empire, combined with the maintenance of the rights of all who entered it. The creation of the *jus naturale* was undoubtedly Rome's greatest achievement; her jurists were of more importance than her generals.

There is however warranty for the assertion that this

natural law would not have been able to come into force so quickly and so satisfactorily without the co-operation of Greece. It was the Stoics who helped the Roman jurists in their difficult undertaking, and the Stoa again learnt much from the Academy. The *jus naturale* put the question of what is equitable, *aequum*, in the forefront. To ascertain this a philosophical culture was necessary, not a philosophy which dogmatically sets up something as certain and excludes everything else, but rather one which starts from the principle of probability. For all practical jurisprudence reposes on this principle. The laws themselves, if they are to be rational, can only embody what is probable—it is for this reason that they are liable to periodical revision—and the courts can only arrive at the most probable decision among other possible ones, as almost every application of a general rule to particular concrete cases admits of different solutions, of which one, however, is the most probable. Consequently the philosophy which made probability the centre of its doctrine rendered great service to practical jurisprudence, and that was the Academic. The Academy, however, gave the later Stoa its special character, that Stoa with which the Romans came in contact. It is clear that the Stoa must have assisted the growth of the conception of duty involved in jurisprudence. Panaetius, who was in great repute with the Romans, combined both tendencies, the tendency which aimed at defining moral obligation and that which sought to establish the probable. We may therefore say that Greek culture, by aiding the development of the grandest and most useful creation of Rome, Roman law, did more for the good of the world than by its influence on the origin of many a Latin poem. For the same reason too Cicero's work must be regarded as of great importance.³

Greece had philosophy but no jurisprudence (vol. iii. p. 33). Without jurisprudence public life on a large scale cannot possibly thrive. It was Rome which first introduced

the maxim that judicial decisions must be guided by general principles and not by the impulses of the moment. The Roman praetors were the creators of continuity in law, of the repeated application of the same principles which form the standard for decisions in similar cases. But they decided in the first instance in accordance with the rules of their own law. These were not suitable for foreigners. Thereupon they and the juriconsults created the *jus gentium* or *jus naturale*, which applied to non-Romans, and they did so with the aid of Greek philosophy. The latter therefore rendered a great service for all time. If Rome laid down the proposition that laws were to be applied in accordance with fixed principles, Greek philosophy taught the judges how to group the particular cases under the general rules.

It was to this influence of Greece on Roman private law that I referred when I said at the beginning of this chapter that Greece had done far more than introduce 'arts' into Latium.

NOTES

1. Polybius. Copious literature: cf. Schaefer, *Quellenkunde*, 2, § 17; K. W. Nitzsch, *Polybios*, Kiel, 1842; the article *Polybios* in *Pauly*, 5, 1808-1820 by Fuchs; H. Nissen, *Die 5. Dek. des Livius*, Berlin, 1863; Valetton, *De Pol. fontibus*, Utrecht, 1879; Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, Lond. 1887, pp. 519-558; R. v. Scala, *Die Studien des Pol.*, I, Stuttgart, 1890.—Polybius is a learned historian. We may divide these historians into three categories: (1) Compilers: the school of Aristotle with its special research, *Atthidae*, *chronographers*, *periegetae*, etc. (2) Artists: pupils of rhetoricians, such as Ephorus, Theopompus, Timaeus; afterwards philosophers like Poseidonius. (3) Practical historians: Polybius. The importation of speeches is peculiar to the third category; but Polybius also has speeches (book 9). Herodotus and Xenophon do not belong to the above, they are pure narrators; Thucydides too does not aim at being a learned historian, but has something rhetorical about him (vol. ii. p. 436; Mahaffy, *Problems in Greek Hist.*, chap. v.).—Polybius pursues similar aims to Thucydides; cf. his well-known remarks in 1, 22 with Polyb. 9, 2 in his description of the *πραγματικὸς τρόπος*, with which *ἡμεῖς οὐχ οὕτω τῆς τέρεψως*

στοχαζόμενοι τῶν ἀναγνωσομένων ὡς τῆς ὀφελείας τῶν προσσχόντων entirely agrees.—For τύχη, besides the well-known German treatises, of Rösiger for instance, cf. F. Allègre, *La déesse grecque Tyché*, Paris, 1889; Tyché takes the place in a way of the highest female deity of the Orientals.

2. Influence of Greece on Rome. Mommsen, *R. G.* 3, in many passages; Hertzberg, 1, also frequently. M. Voigt, *Römische Privatalterthümer* in I. Müller, 4, 761 seq., 812 seq. A. Dupuy, *De Graecis Romanorum amicis aut praeceptoribus*, Paris, 1880; Mahaffy, *Greek Life*, chap. xxiii.

3. For jurisprudence see *inter alia* the articles *Jus gentium* and *Stoici* in Pauly, and Momms. *Staatsr.* 3, 603. Mitteis, *Reichsrecht*, pp. 74 seq. traces some attempts at a Greek *jus gentium*; yet, like Voigt, he goes too far in assuming (p. 75) that after the middle of the second century the γῆς ἐγκτησις and the ἐπιγαμία were conceded to all foreigners in Greek states. For every Greek state was independent; if some were as tolerant as this, the others were not bound to be so. A general Greek *jus gentium* could only be based on free recognition, just as people recognize custom without feeling it to be a binding obligation. It is only in this sense and with this limitation that the observation of Mitteis can, in my view, be accepted as correct.

CHAPTER XXV

ASIA—THE KINGDOM OF PERGAMUM BECOMES ROMAN TERRITORY—RISE OF MITHRIDATES EUPATOR OF PONTUS—THE GREEKS OF THE CRIMEA (146-91 B.C.).

THERE is a certain justification for closing the history of Greece with the year 146. In Europe the destruction of Corinth proves the political powerlessness of the Greeks as against Rome; about the same time Greek civilization is driven back by Orientalism in Asia. Nevertheless the political significance of the Greeks does not quite come to an end in that year. It is not till later on in the second and especially in the first century B.C., that Rome becomes master of Asiatic Greece; it is then that she humiliates the old leader of Greece, Athens, and eventually also abolishes the last Macedonian monarchy still in existence, Macedonia. Consequently the Greeks do not lose all their political importance until the year 30 B.C. So far therefore as the period from 146-30 only completes what had been begun before 146 with regard to the Greeks, it may be described as one of transition. It is an age in which a few of the Graeco-Macedonian monarchies survive, but they are dying of exhaustion. Internally the Roman epoch has begun for Asia, outwardly the Macedonian era still exists to a certain extent. We must not, however, lose sight of the fact that it is precisely in the Mithridatic wars that a final reaction of Greek life against Roman ascendancy manifests itself, and there is therefore

ample justification for carrying this history down to 30 B.C., all the more so as the whole empire is not permanently organized until after that year. The period from 146-30 is more of a destructive than a constructive one.

After 146 European Greece gave the Romans no more trouble; the remaining difficulties were due to the state of Asia. Rome's support in this quarter was the kingdom of Pergamum,¹ ruled from 159-138 by Attalus II., who managed to thread the maze of politics with skill. He had promptly repelled the attempt of Pharnaces, king of Pontus, to protect the son of Eumenes, afterwards King Attalus III. — the brotherly affection of a Philadelphus after all deserved a reward in the temporary exclusion of his nephew (or was it his son?) from the throne. He supported Ariarathes V. in Cappadocia (see chaps. xviii. and xix.), and in 156-154 held his own against Prusias II., whose murder by his son Nicomedes in 149 he encouraged. He then helped Alexander Balas to the Syrian throne against Demetrius and assisted the Romans against the pretended Philip of Macedonia and against the Achaeans. He was succeeded by his nephew Attalus III. (138-133), an incapable tyrant, who was fond of gardening and of making wax figures. But he earned the gratitude of the Romans by appointing them his heirs in his will. They accepted the bequest, without troubling their heads about an alleged illegitimate brother of the testator, Aristonicus, and interpreted it as entitling them not only to the treasure of the deceased but also to his extremely vague political claims. This no doubt was Attalus' intention. It is characteristic of the Pergamene dynasty that it concluded its career in the spirit in which it began it. Its rule was of a private origin: Philetaerus had appropriated treasure and treasury. After that the Pergamene rulers had raised themselves to the rank of kings by their money and their clever policy, and as such had achieved much good. The last sovereign of the line, however, reverted to the view that his position was of a

private nature, and he disposed of everything that he claimed as if it were private property. He bequeathed to the Romans not only money and land, but also Greek cities, and Rome had already descended so far from her old exalted position of a protecting power that she accepted without hesitation gifts which ought not to have been made; the state of things lauded as ideal by Polybius now assumed an entirely different aspect. And it was not the oligarchy alone which offended in this way; the popular party behaved just as badly.

Aristonicus refused to be deprived of his heritage. He set up as king at Leucae near Smyrna, and was recognized as such by the Phocaeans. But other communities would have nothing to do with him. The Ephesians defeated him at sea and he fled into the interior. He then fell back upon the oppressed class, the slaves, who about that time were becoming conscious of their rights and of their power in the East as well as in the West (slave-war in Sicily), and took the field at the head of an army of them, who called themselves Heliopolitans, citizens of the sun. They were joined by some Thracians. He conquered Thyatira, Apollonis, Colophon, Myndus, and even Samos. Rome was now obliged to intervene. But the first attempt ended most disastrously. The Pontifex maximus P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus was defeated by Aristonicus and fell into the hands of a party of Thracians. To save Rome the disgrace of having her chief pontiff exhibited as a prize by barbarous hordes, he provoked the enemy, who did not know who he was, and they put him to death (130 B.C.). About the same time Ariarathes V. of Cappadocia fell in an engagement with the troops of Aristonicus. M. Perpenna now appeared on the scene as Roman general and defeated Aristonicus and took him prisoner. The pretender was executed in Rome; the country was settled after Perpenna's death by M. Aquilius. Mysia, Lydia, Caria and the Islands became a Roman province with the name of Asia; Cyzicus and Rhodes of course remained independent, as before; Telmissus fell to the Lycian con-

federacy; the Thracian possessions of the Attalids were added to the province of Macedonia; Aegina was taken by the Romans themselves; Lycaonia and Cilicia Aspera were given to Cappadocia, but Cilicia Aspera was afterwards again taken by Rome, and formed the nucleus of the new province of Cilicia. When this was done, in 103 B.C., on the occasion of the war waged by the Praetor M. Antonius against the Cilician pirates, Pamphylia and Pisidia, which had been left to themselves in 130, were also united to Cilicia. Phrygia Magna, *i.e.* the subsequent districts of Apamea (Celenae) and Synnada, consequently the countries on the upper Maeander and the plateau of Phrygia Paroreus, was claimed both by Bithynia and Pontus. Aquilius knocked it down to the highest bidder, who was Mithridates. But this decision was not approved in Rome; C. Gracchus carried a motion that the country should be free, *i.e.* handed over to the farmers of the revenues of Asia appointed by him. The champion of the poorer classes in Rome could devise no better means of carrying on the struggle with the Optimates, which he held to be necessary and which really was necessary, than that of enlisting the business class, the so-called knights, on his side, and to attain this end he flung to them, besides the Romans who had to appeal to the courts, as many foreigners as possible to be plundered. He not only appointed the equites judges in the place of the Senators, he also took care that the revenues of the new province of Asia, of which Rome claimed the disposal as inherited property, should be farmed out in Rome irrespective of the rights of the Greek communities, by which means the farming-contracts were adjudged to the business class in Rome, the above so-called knights. The consequences of this will appear shortly.

If this prize slipped through the fingers of the king of Pontus, he managed to secure other advantages, which enhanced the importance of his family and his country. We referred to the earlier history of the kings of Pontus in

chaps. xiii. and xviii. We saw how Ctistes was succeeded by Ariobarzanes I. and Mithridates II., how Pharnaces² was the next to ascend the throne and after him, from about 169, Mithridates III. Philopator Philadelphus Euergetes, probably a brother of Pharnaces. We also saw how these potentates gradually obtained possession of the Greek cities of the country: Amastris in 279, Amisus before 245, and Sinope in 183. Mithridates III. (about 169-121) founded a naval power and had a first-rate general in Dorylaeus of Amisus. He removed his capital from Amasia to Sinope, showed his appreciation of Greek culture by making gifts to Delos and Athens, helped Attalus against Bithynia, and was a friend of the Romans, to whom he sent troops and ships in the Third Punic War and for whom he fought against Aristonicus. He indemnified himself for the loss of Phrygia Magna by the acquisition of Paphlagonia under the will of King Pylaemenes and by the prestige which he enjoyed in Galatia; it is supposed that he eventually occupied Phrygia Magna after all. At this point he was murdered by some 'friends,' i.e. courtiers, which put an end to the growing power of the kingdom of Pontus for the moment. According to his will his widow Laodice, a Syrian princess, probably a daughter of Antiochus Epiphanes, was to reign with the sons.³ For a time she governed in concert with the murderers of her husband. She and they were devoted to the Romans; and it seemed as if Pontus was about to become another Roman dependency, on the pattern of Pergamum, Bithynia or Cappadocia. At this juncture the action of the eldest son changed the whole face of affairs.

This was Mithridates Eupator, born at Sinope in 132 B.C.⁴ He was highly gifted intellectually and physically, and an excellent education had developed his natural abilities. He was a master of all bodily exercises, acquired all branches of learning with ease, and spoke every language known in Pontus. His father's death placed his life in danger, as it would appear

that his mother was entirely on the side of the murderers. To protect himself against attempts at poisoning he practised taking poisons and their antidotes. He then saw that he was not safe at the court and withdrew from it, at the age of fourteen years. According to tradition he lived for seven years in the mountains; in reality, however, he seems also to have resided for a time in Amisus. Suddenly he reappeared in Sinope, seized on the government, and put his mother in prison, where she died shortly afterwards. He married his sister Laodice. He found the empire much reduced, the Galatae independent, Armenia Minor and Bithynia aggrandized at the expense of Pontus. But he at once took steps to recover the lost power by employing able Greeks, among them relations of the above-mentioned Dorylaeus, in the creation of an excellent army, the nucleus of which was formed by 6000 mercenaries armed in Macedonian fashion, and an opportunity soon presented itself of using this army to advantage.

The Greeks in the Crimea appealed to him for aid.⁵ In the east of this peninsula was the Milesian colony Panticapaeum, opposite which, on the other side of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, lay the Tean colony of Phanagoria. These two cities, with Theodosia and Tanais at the mouth of the Don, had formed from the fifth century B.C. a state which was first governed by the Greek Archaeactidae, and then by the Thracian Spartocidae, the so-called kingdom of the Bosphorus (vol. ii. p. 248), which was closely connected with Athens. In the west of the peninsula Dorians from Heraclea Pontica had founded, in the fifth century, the city of Chersonesus at a point where the Taurians worshipped their blood-stained goddess Artemis. The power of these Greek colonies however declined from the beginning of the third century. When Athens was no longer a support to them, and Egyptian grain competed severely with that from the Black Sea, the position of the Crimean Greeks was shaken. The barbarians of the peninsula, Taurians and Scythians, pressed them hard. And

the same fate overtook the Greeks in the west of the Black Sea, as is proved by an inscription of Olbia in honour of the citizens who had made great sacrifices for its defence. In Panticapaeum King Paerisades had to bring up the Scythian prince Saumacus as his heir. A life of Oriental grandeur was led by the Scythian monarch Scilurus with his 80 sons, whom he taught to be united by the well-known fable of the bundle of sticks. As a matter of fact they submitted to the eldest son, Palacus. Greek civilization in Tauria therefore seemed to be doomed. No help was to be descried at any point. At this juncture the energy with which Mithridates was organizing his kingdom awakened new hopes, and an appeal was made to him. An active intercourse had long subsisted between the northern and southern coasts of the Black Sea, for Panticapaeum was sister to Sinope, the capital of Mithridates. Chersonesus openly offered to place herself under the protection of the king of Pontus; Paerisades, who was already in the hands of the Scythians, secretly declared his readiness to appoint him his successor. Mithridates determined on a campaign in the Crimea, and entrusted the conduct of it to Diophantus of Sinope. The Taurians were defeated and for their permanent subjection the new city of Eupatoria was founded, after which Diophantus returned to Asia, in 110 B.C. But the Scythians renewed the attack and Chersonesus asked Pontus for aid a second time. Diophantus went back and repeatedly vanquished the Scythians and the Roxolani, so that Palacus escaped to Rome. Saumacus however murdered Paerisades and made himself king of Panticapaeum. But the reaction was not long in coming. Diophantus conquered Theodosia and Panticapaeum (107?), and Mithridates was elected *prostates* of Chersonesus and king of the Bosphorus. He had achieved enormous success of a moral and material kind. He had preserved Greeks from destruction by barbarians, and obtained a yearly revenue of 200 talents of silver and 180,000 measures of corn (worth about 180 talents).

The dates of his next successes cannot be ascertained. They were mostly on the northern shore of the Black Sea. Here the tower of Neoptolemus at the mouth of the Tyras (Dniester) long recalled the name of a general in the service of Mithridates. The Sarmatae who lived in this region (Roxolani, royal Sarmatae and Iapyges) and the Bastarnae became friends with the king, the former supplying him with excellent cavalry (corresponding to the Cossacks), and the latter with good infantry. That the Greeks on the coast of Thrace north of the Balkans were on his side is shown by coins of Odessus and by the subsequent resistance of Istrus, Tomi and Apollonia to the Romans.⁶ East of the Crimea he controlled only the Sindi in the flat country; the precipitous slopes of the Caucasus were left untouched. On the other hand he gained possession of Colchis, of the wooded valley of the Phasis (Mingrelia) with the Greek cities Dioscurias and Phasis on the coast. He made treaties of commerce with the tribes east of Colchis in the upper Cyrus valley, with Armenia Magna and with Atropatene. Armenia Minor, a sort of bastion between the Halys, the Lycus and the Euphrates, passed entirely into his hands by the abdication of its ruler Antipater. On the inaccessible rocky summits of this country he established his treasure-houses. Thus the Bosphorus was his granary, Colchis an arsenal full of wood, tar and hemp, Armenia Minor as it were his acropolis. His ships controlled the Black Sea; Sinope was a naval station and the capital. It was an empire which well deserved the name of Pontus, and Mithridates might have been satisfied with it. But he was like Alexander: he always thirsted for more. His ambition was to extend his dominion westwards and southwards in Asia Minor.

The story went that, before he began war with this object, he travelled over part of the country. What he saw in the various provinces of the peninsula may well have inclined him to attempt the undertaking, even at the risk of a war with Rome, which was no longer the old vigorous Rome,

respected and dreaded far and wide, impressing foreign nations by her civic virtues. The Asiatic possessions of Rome were divided into two districts, Asia and Cilicia. It was the duty of the Proprætor of Cilicia to keep watch and ward against brigands and pirates in the Taurus and in the numerous bays of the southern coast, but as he had no fleet at his disposal he could do nothing. Piracy flourished more than ever, and the pirates might become excellent allies of the king of Pontus. The Proprætor of Asia was equally powerless for another reason. C. Gracchus had made over the courts in Rome and the revenues of Asia to the Roman financiers. In their capacity of revenue-farmers they plundered the inhabitants of Asia, and when proceedings were taken against them in Rome acquitted themselves in their capacity of judges, and seized on any pretext to condemn those who had the hardihood to interrupt them in their extortions. Some of the best Romans experienced this treatment, as for instance Q. Mucius Scaevola, afterwards Pontifex maximus, Proconsul of Asia about 100 B.C., and his legate P. Rutilius Rufus, an ex-Consul. These men had attempted to put a stop to the malpractices of the publicani in Asia, and the consequence was that Rutilius was charged with embezzlement in Rome and found guilty, in spite of his manifest innocence and a defence by Mucius himself. He went into exile in Asia, to men who knew him and appreciated him. Of course it was not only the farmers who ground down Asia. Their officials, the only permanent Roman functionaries in Asia, as the political ones came and went with the governors, harried the people by extorting presents, by making usurious loans, etc. The province of Asia therefore would gladly have shaken off the yoke of Rome, if only a capable deliverer had been at hand. The other states of Asia Minor were at all events not a serious impediment to an enterprising conqueror, who could easily attract some of them to his side on the pretext of protecting them all against Rome. True, nothing was to be done with the free trading

republics of Heraclea, Cyzicus and Rhodes, for they did not suffer so much from the Romans as to feel inclined to rise against them. Little dependence too could be placed on the Galatae, who had not experienced ill-treatment from the Romans for a long time. On the other hand, the semi-barbarian states of Bithynia, Paphlagonia and Cappadocia could be brought over to the side of Pontus by force or stratagem. Paphlagonia was weak, because it had a number of rulers, Cappadocia was so for other reasons. With the death of Ariarathes Philopator Eusebes, who had fallen in the war with Aristonicus in 130, a period of great confusion had set in. His widow Nysa had put to death five of her own sons, to keep the government for herself as long as possible. But in the year 125 the sixth, Ariarathes Epiphanes, whose wife Laodice was a sister of Mithridates of Pontus, came to the throne. He reigned up to about 111, and was then murdered by a certain Gordius, who fled to Mithridates after committing the deed, and was thenceforth in high favour with him, while the government of Cappadocia was carried on by Laodice on behalf of her son Ariarathes Philometor. It was therefore not impossible for Mithridates to secure Cappadocia. There remained Bithynia, where Nicomedes II. Epiphanes was on the throne. In 149 this individual had murdered his father, who wanted to put him to death, and had become king in this way. He was a disreputable creature, ostensibly a friend of the Romans, but in reality bearing them a grudge because they had not given him Phrygia Magna in return for his services against Aristonicus. He had a serviceable army, a fleet and wealthy Greek cities. Nicomedes might possibly be enlisted as an ally against Rome, and certainly against other states of Asia Minor. A war with Rome however, even with these allies, was no trifle. It is true that at the close of the second century the great Republic was pressed so hard by the Cimbri and the Teutones that Mithridates might have taken the field against it then with some prospect of success. But

he had not made all his preparations; he was not even a neighbour of the Romans. The war with Rome did not break out till the year 90. From 105-90 a conflict with Rome was merely an indirect object with him; only Asiatic potentates were directly involved.

In the year 105 Mithridates and Nicomedes came to terms. They flung themselves on Paphlagonia and partitioned it, whereupon the Paphlagonian rulers asked Rome for help. The sons of Scilurus had already applied in the same quarter. The Romans did remonstrate with the two kings, on behalf of the Scythians, by appealing to the principle of "Europe for the Europeans," which recalls the Monroe doctrine.⁷ In spite of this Mithridates and Nicomedes kept their conquests and also took Galatia under their protection. Then however they quarrelled, which turned out badly for Mithridates. Nicomedes invaded Cappadocia and married Laodice, thus making himself king of Cappadocia at one blow. But Mithridates now marched into the country, drove out Nicomedes and replaced his nephew Ariarathes VII. Philometor on the throne. When however he demanded that Gordius also should be allowed to return to Cappadocia, the young king was seized with an apprehension that he would share the fate of his father; he plucked up courage to resist his uncle and led an army against him. Mithridates however inveigled him into an interview and killed him with his own hand. His ancestor Mithridates is said to have murdered the alleged ancestor of Ariarathes, the famous Datames, in precisely the same fashion.⁸ Mithridates now made one of his own sons, a boy eight years of age, who he pretended was a descendant of an Ariarathes, king of Cappadocia, and gave him Gordius as minister. An attempt of a second son of Laodice to conquer Cappadocia terminated with his death. This was the end of the Ariarathes line. It is true that Laodice asserted in Rome that she had a third son and begged the Romans to give him Cappadocia. But they observed very judiciously

that the Paphlagonians and Cappadocians might select their rulers themselves. Thereupon the Paphlagonians reverted to their polyarchy, and the Cappadocians elected Ariobarzanes Philoromaeus, a man of high birth, king in 95 B.C. Under these circumstances Mithridates thought it advisable to submit for the present, and he recalled his son and Gordius.

If he had had no luck in the west, the east was to make up for it. For some centuries the Armenians, who were kinsmen of the Phrygians, had been spreading over the country.⁹ They had long lost their independence; at first they were under Persia and then under the Seleucids. It was not till after the battle of Magnesia that Artaxias and Zariadres made themselves independent, the former in Armenia Magna, where the city of Artaxata arose on a spot designated by Hannibal, the latter in the south-west, in Sophene. Armenia Magna was ruled from 95 B.C. by Tigranes, born about 140, an enterprising but unprincipled individual. He married Cleopatra, daughter of Mithridates, and fell in with his father-in-law's plans, first by conquering Sophene and then Cappadocia and installing Gordius as regent there. Thus Mithridates had got about as far as on the previous occasion. But his success was again not permanent. Ariobarzanes had escaped; he preferred a complaint in Rome and the Senate ordered the Proprætor of Cilicia, L. Cornelius Sulla, to reinstate him. Sulla carried out the order and in the course of his mission came as far as the Euphrates, where a Parthian envoy greeted the representative of the great city. At this meeting Sulla sat on a raised throne between the king of Cappadocia and the Parthian envoy, who was afterwards executed in Parthia, because he had not sufficiently upheld the dignity of his country. Outwardly Armenia only was humbled on this occasion, but in reality Mithridates was so as well, for Gordius had been reigning on his account. Mithridates however concealed his resentment for the moment.

NOTES

Authorities for the period after 146, especially up to 63 B.C.—Poseidonius of Apamea, see above, chap. xxii. note 11.—The poems of Archias of Antioch, the friend of Cicero, on the Cimbrian and Mithridatic wars were of course not confined to facts. He accompanied Lucullus. From Archias later writers took the picturesque details of the exploits of Lucullus; see Reinach, *Mithr.* 427. — What Archias was to Lucullus, the Mytilenaeans Theophanes was to Pompey, his attendant and panegyrist; see Reinach, *Mithr.* 428. Theophanes was inaccurate.—Pompey's bulletins were full of swagger (Reinach, 419), as were the memoirs of Sulla; memorable bulletin from Chaeronea—the Romans annihilate 120,000 men with the loss of 14—*εἶτα καὶ τούτων δύο πρὸς τὴν ἐστέραν παραγενέσθαι*, Plut. Sull. 19. On the other hand, P. Rutilius Rufus, whose memoirs Appian has used, was truthful; the loss of Sallust's *Historiae*, largely used by Plutarch in the life of Lucullus, is to be regretted.—Of the Augustan age the following may be mentioned: Livy in his epitomizers Florus, Eutropius and Orosius; cf. Reinach, *Mithr.* 431 seq.; also the work of Trogus Pompeius in the inadequate extracts of Justinus and the prologi, which supplements Livy by its account of Oriental affairs; Diodorus; Nicolaus of Damascus, writer of King Herod, whose *Ἱστορία καθολικὴ* in 144 books went down to his own time; cf. Müller, 3, 343 seq.; Reinach, *Mithr.* 437; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, 1, 42-46; Strabo of Amasia, whose 47 books of *ὑπομνήματα ἱστορικά* went from 146-38 B.C. as a continuation of Polybius. The ancients valued him less highly than the brilliant Poseidonius or the polished Nicolaus; Judeich (Caesar im Oriente, Leipz. 1885, p. 46) conjectures that he was Plutarch's and Appian's authority for Caesar's war in the East (48-47 B.C.). Plutarch seems to have followed Sulla's memoirs for Sulla, Sallust and Archias for Lucullus, and Theophanes for Pompey. Appian's sources for the Mithridatic war are probably first Livy and then Nicolaus.—Dion Cassius consulted mostly Livy and then Sallust. For the authorities for Syrian and Jewish history see Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, vol. I, Introduction.

The best work on the history of this period is Th. Reinach's *Mithridate Eupator, roi de Pont*, Paris, 1890; I have followed him in his excellent arrangement of the subject-matter. This work gives the authority in every case, and I therefore refer the reader to it. For Syria see Babelon's *Rois de Syrie*, Schürer, *Gesch.*

des jüd. Volkes, and Kuhn, *Beitr. z. Gesch. der Seleukiden*, 1891.—Cf. also Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, 1851; Brunet de Presle et Blanchet, *La Grèce depuis la conquête des Romains*, 1860.

1. That Attalus III. was son of Attalus II. is shown by Koepp, *Rh. Mus.* 48, 154 seq. to be probable.—Warlike achievements of Attalus, Fränkel, No. 246. According to No. 248 Attalus III. had exercised some rights of government in the lifetime of his predecessor. According to No. 249 the will was recognized by the Pergamenians directly after the death of Attalus III.—The kingdom of Pergamum becomes the province of Asia, Hertzberg, 1, 335 seq., Mommsen, *R. G.* 3, 51, 111. The rights which Rome acquired under the will, as also the condition of the province at the outset, are quite uncertain. According to Mommsen, 3, 52, the Romans remitted the old taxation in the country; according to Reinach, *Mithr.* 83, it was only a "promesse"; according to Mommsen, 3, 105, the country was at first "almost" untaxed.—For the fate of Pamphylia and Pisidia, Marquardt, *Staatsverw.* 1, 217, 222.

2. Sketch of Pharnaces in Polyb. 27, 15.—Amisus annexed to Pontus before 245, Reinach, *Mithr.* 40.—For the extraction of the father of Mithridates the Great, Reinach, *Trois roy.* 170 seq.—Reinach (*Mithr.* 54) concludes that Mithridates Philopator Philadelphus Euergetes simply occupied Phrygia Magna from the inscription found in Phrygia, *Append. II.* note 4.

3. For the name and extraction of the mother of Mithridates see Reinach, *Trois roy.* 178, 179 and *Mithr.* pp. 51-54, where he rightly remarks that the city of Ladik, south of Samsun (Amisus) must have been founded by this Laodice; cf. Ritter, 18, 187, and Reinach, *Mithr.* 290. As regards the coins ascribed to the mother of the king on pl. x. 6, it has been pointed out to me by experts that the absence of the adjuncts usually found on coins of Pontus is, to say the least of it, remarkable.

4. That Mithridates lived, not only in the woods, as Justinus (37, 2) relates in his well-known way, but also in Amisus, is shown to be probable by Imhoof-Blumer, *Griech. Münzen*, Munich, 1890, p. 39; cf. *Taf. III.* 1, 2.

5. For the Cimmerian Bosphorus see vol. i. p. 247, to which the following authorities may be added: Thirion, *De civitat. Graec. in Chers. taur. cond.*, Paris, 1885; Boeckh, *C. I. Gr.* 2, 80 seq.; Becker, *Die herakleot. Halbinsel*, 1856; Busolt, *Griech. Gesch.* 1, 588 seq.; Gill et Stephani, *Antiqu. du Bosph. cimmérien*, 3 vols. Petersburg, 1854, new ed. by S. Reinach, Paris, 1892; Kondakof, *Tolstoï et Reinach, Antiqu. de la Russie mérid.* Paris, 1891; Rayet, *Études d'Archéol.*, Paris, 1888, pp. 189-238;

Th. Reinach, *Mithr.* pp. 57 seq.; Latyshev, *Inscr. ant. orae septentr. Ponti Eux.* 1, Petersburg, 1885. The Olbia inscription, *C. I. Gr.* 1, 357 = *Ditt.* 248. See also Marquardt, 4, 150.—Site of the city of Chersonesus, Kiepert, *Atlas v. Hellas*, X.—Tower of Neoptolemus, Reinach, *Mithr.* 78.

6. Coins of Odessus, on which the head of Alexander resembles that of Mithridates, Reinach, *Trois roy.* 196.

7. Monroe doctrine of the Romans, *App. Mithr.* 13. Similar attitude towards Antiochus III., see above, chap. xvii.

8. The history of the murder of Datames by the father of Ctistes in *Corn. Nep. Dat.* 11 corresponds exactly to that of the murder of Ariarathes by Eupator in *Just.* 28, 1. Is one of them an invention?

9. The history of Armenia before Tigranes is quite uncertain. Cf. Reinach, *Mithr.* 104, with Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, cci. and von Gutschmid, *Gesch. Irans*, 80. The last-named says: "At the close of an earlier war the king of the country (Armenia Magna) had been obliged to give his son Tigranes II. as hostage to the Parthians; afterwards the king of Parthia supported this son against king Artoasdes I. (probably the brother of Tigranes), and in 94 B.C. placed him by force of arms on the throne of his fathers." The facts however are that, according to *Just.* 42, 2, Mithridates the Great of Parthia waged war with Artavasdes of Armenia, and, according to *Just.* 38, 3, that Tigranes was hostage in Parthia. All the rest in Reinach and von Gutschmid is combination. Reinach, for instance, makes Tigranes go to Parthia as hostage after the defeat of Artavasdes, and von Gutschmid says he returned just at that time. One is just as likely to be right as the other, and as no dependence can be placed on Justinus, perhaps neither of them is right.

CHAPTER XXVI

MITHRIDATES AND SULLA (91-83 B.C.)

AT the beginning of the year 91 Roman rule in the East appeared to be fairly established. But this was only an appearance. To form a clearer idea of the shock which it soon received, we must examine the condition of the East at that time somewhat more carefully and, as we have discussed Asia Minor at sufficient length, cast another glance at the position of affairs in Syria and Egypt.

In the first of these two kingdoms the disputes about the succession still went on. In chap. xix. we traced these complications up to the point when Antiochus VIII. Grypus was opposed by his half-brother Antiochus IX. Cyzicenus. The former was the son of Demetrius II., the latter of Antiochus VII. Sidetes; their mother was Cleopatra Thea, the daughter of Ptolemy Philometor, who first put one of her husbands and then her eldest son to death, and finally wanted to make away with her other son Grypus as well, but was murdered by him instead about the year 121 B.C. After this Grypus had reigned fairly quietly until Antiochus IX. Cyzicenus rose against him. The result was a partition of the small empire, Grypus retaining northern Syria and Cilicia, while Cyzicenus took Phoenicia and Coelesyria with its capital Damascus. In 96 Grypus was murdered by his favourite Heracleon. Thereupon Cyzicenus tried to conquer the northern division of the kingdom, but he was defeated by Seleucus VI., son of Grypus,

and took his own life. In 95 B.C. he was succeeded by his son Antiochus X. Eusebes. The confusion prevailing in Syria is well illustrated by the fact that this Antiochus X. married Cleopatra Selene, who had first been the wife of Grypus and had then married Cyzicenus, the father of Antiochus X. Syria now presented the spectacle of, firstly, a contest between two branches of the Seleucids, the descendants of the brothers Demetrius II. and Antiochus VII., but both having the same ancestress, and secondly, of squabbles between the members of the first branch, the five sons of Grypus. We cannot dwell any longer on these matters, which are of no interest to humanity, but it is quite clear that Syria was not a source of danger to the Romans.

If the kingdom of Egypt did not also compass its own dissolution, this was due to the fact that disputes about the succession were decided more easily there. Whoever had Alexandria was master of the country, the holder of the palace controlled the city, and to be master in the palace all that was required was to murder one's rivals as quickly as possible. Whoever was most expert in this obtained the palace, Alexandria and Egypt. After the death of Physcon in 117 his widow and niece Cleopatra assumed the reins of government. She preferred her younger son Ptolemy IX. Alexander to his elder brother Lathyrus, and would have liked to banish the latter to Cyprus, where Alexander had been obliged to go. In 107 she managed to bring about the change. But eventually she took a dislike to Alexander as well, she tried to put him to death and was murdered by him, in 89 B.C. When Alexander lost his life in 88, Lathyrus returned to Egypt. After Physcon's death and by his direction Cyrene had been ruled by an alleged son of his, Apion, who bequeathed the country to the Romans about the year 96. The latter however did not take possession of it.¹

If therefore neither Syria nor Egypt was formidable to Rome, and Rome was absolute master in Asia Minor, Mithri-

dates did not appear to have any prospect of success with an aggressive policy. But of course Rome had to maintain her position at home if she wanted to control the East, and this point seemed doubtful precisely in the winter of 91/90, for it was then that the Italian peoples revolted against Rome. As long as the Social War lasted, Rome could not pursue a vigorous policy in Asia. This was the opportunity which Mithridates was loth to let slip. Now or never was the time for carrying out his plans. A handle was given him by the affairs of Bithynia.

In that country Nicomedes Epiphanes had been succeeded, about the year 94, by his eldest son Nicomedes III. Philopator, a cowardly, cruel, thoroughly depraved individual, like his grandfather Prusias II. The second son Socrates had at first received part of Paphlagonia from his father, with the name of Pylaemenes, which was cherished in the country and recalled the days of Homer; but when the Bithynians had to evacuate Paphlagonia in 95, he was indemnified with a sum of 500 talents, on which he lived at Cyzicus. But he was not contented with the money; he wanted a kingdom, and on the score of his brother's notorious worthlessness he tried to persuade the Romans to make him king of Bithynia. But they rejected his petition and he then applied to Mithridates, who took up his cause with energy. The two accomplices thought they could remove Nicomedes by assassination, but the attempt failed. Thereupon Socrates conquered Bithynia with troops from Pontus, and Mithridates, who did nothing without a purpose, occupied Cappadocia and reinstated his son there. Of course Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes appealed to Rome for help, in 90 B.C. If Rome had been still as hard pressed as she was half a year before, she would not have been able to take steps against Mithridates. But owing to her concessions the ranks of her foes in Italy were beginning to thin, and she was therefore able to act with energy in Asia. The Senate declared that Nicomedes and Ariobarzanes

must be replaced on the throne, and entrusted the execution of the order to the ex-Consul M. Aquilius.

The selection was not a good one. Aquilius was a brave man, but one of the greediest of the greedy class of Romans, and not a capable general or statesman. Nevertheless Rome's prestige was such that Mithridates gave way at once; he recalled his son and simply put Socrates to death. This was enough for Rome, but not for the greed of Aquilius. He demanded money as well, and as the enemy Mithridates would not pay it, he extorted it from his ally Nicomedes, who then, to cover his expenses, plundered territory in Pontus. Mithridates preferred a complaint to Aquilius, of course with no result. Thereupon he reoccupied Cappadocia, and war broke out, in the winter of 89/88 B.C.²

The Romans sent four armies to the scene of action, the Bithynian and three composed of a number of Asiatics and a few Italians, under Aquilius and the Proprætors of Asia and Cilicia, Cassius and Oppius. But they were all defeated (88), and Cassius fled to Rhodes, Oppius to Laodicea ad Lycum, Aquilius to Mytilene. Almost the whole of the continent revolted from Rome; only a few cities in the interior remained loyal to her, among them Magnesia ad Sipylum and Stratonicea in Caria; the latter however was taken by Mithridates. Many islands also recognized his supremacy. The Laodiceans gave up Oppius, the Mytileneans Aquilius to the king, who treated the former well, but carried Aquilius about the country like a wild beast and then put him to death in Pergamum; he is said to have poured molten gold down his throat. The peaceable republics of Heraclea, Cyzicus and Rhodes did not join Mithridates; this was a sign that, although Rome had given great cause for offence, sober-minded people were not yet disposed to hail Mithridates as the indispensable deliverer. The king, who was holding his court in Ephesus, was all the more resolved to strike terror into his opponents. There were still about 100,000 Italians in the liberated province of Asia,

all probably more or less engaged in impoverishing the country. If they were expelled, they would return as soldiers ; imprisoning them in the interior would be a trouble and expense ; if they were put to death, and with the aid of the Greek city-populations, then there was an end of them, and the Greeks would be more firmly bound to him by complicity in crime. Mithridates therefore issued an order that all of these Italians should be massacred on a given day, and his officials as well as the city authorities carried it out. Rewards to informants and penalties for those who assisted the victims facilitated the task. The natives of Italy, were so detested that hardly any sanctuary gave them protection. Only a few were spared ; among these was Rutilius, whose punishment consisted of having to put on Greek instead of Roman dress. Eighty thousand Italians were killed on this occasion. The booty in valuables was so great that the cities were able to pay their debts and Mithridates to declare that the inhabitants of the old province of Asia need pay no taxes for five years.³

The king could not rest contented with the conquest of Asia Minor. He wanted to get Greece as well. It is true that he could not here rely on the bitter hatred of Rome which had been his ally in Asia. There was no such thing as extortion by revenue-farmers in European Greece. Yet he did obtain an ally in this quarter, and, oddly enough, the very city which had remained the most independent of all—Athens. Discontent with Rome was rife here, especially among the many influential philosophers and rhetoricians, who could not forget the brilliant past of Athens and persuaded themselves and the people that Rome was to blame for the disappearance of the old state of things. The city moreover seems to have been in the midst of a constitutional crisis at that moment, the solution of which was delayed by Rome. This accounts for the fact that in Athens great things were expected for the Greeks from Mithridates, who had already achieved enormous success, and whose family had long been on the best of terms with the

intellectual capital of Greece. No objection was made when a clever man, Aristion, the head of the Peripatetic School in Athens, offered to put the city in communication with the victorious monarch.⁴ He sailed to Ephesus, where Mithridates loaded him with distinctions. When the ship on board of which he returned ran ashore at Carystus, the Athenians fetched him in a state-vessel, and he made his entry into the city on a litter covered with purple cloth and with silver supports. In his report he drew a glowing picture of the power and splendour of the king.⁵ The old democratic constitution was re-established, the treaty with Rome denounced and an alliance concluded with Mithridates. Aristion was elected first strategus and the emblems of the king of Pontus, a Pegasus or star and crescent, were placed on the tetradrachms as well as on gold staters struck for the occasion. Delos did not follow the example of Athens, as the many Romans living there prevented it; Aristion therefore sent his Peripatetic colleague, Apellicon of Teos, to the island, and the latter occupied it. Thereupon some Romans came and took it away from him again. The Roman ascendancy in Delos however did not last long; the fleet of Mithridates landed there on its voyage to Athens, and its leader Archelaus inflicted a tremendous punishment on the refractory island. Twenty thousand men were put to death, and the women and children sold as slaves—the families of the slave-dealers now learnt what slavery was! The booty was divided between the king and Athens. The city was bound more closely to him thereby, but received a garrison of 2000 men in consequence, whose principal occupation, according to the sarcastic remark of Poseidonius, consisted in catching and chastising the citizens, who fled wholesale. The Piræus, which no longer formed a single fortified place with Athens, was given a separate garrison. Archelaus also subdued the rest of Greece. Of larger islands Crete, the pirates' stronghold, was well-disposed towards Mithridates, while the well-ordered republic of the

Rhodians declined to join him. He tried to take Rhodes, but did not succeed. When the winter of 88/87 set in, he retired to Pergamum, which he had selected for the capital of his empire, a goodly kingdom, which now included the shores of the Black Sea, Asia Minor and Greece. On his fine gold coins which were struck there he inscribed a new era beginning with this date. He was destined soon to revert to the old one.

The Romans were bound to fight Mithridates. But the contest was no easy one. The Social War had left great exhaustion behind it, and besides the parties confronted each other with bitterer feelings than ever. The effect of the exhaustion was that little money and not many soldiers were forthcoming, of the party quarrels, that people were not agreed as to who should have the conduct of the war and the hope of glory and booty connected with it. The democrats wanted Marius, the aristocrats Sulla to be general. Sulla, who was Consul in 88, was according to custom entrusted with the conduct of the war by the Senate, but the tribunos plebis P. Sulpicius Rufus persuaded the people to assert their higher right and give the supreme command to Marius. Sulla joined his legions which were quartered at Nola, led them to Rome and vanquished his opponents. Sulpicius was slain; Marius fled. The victor then, without troubling his head further about what might happen in Rome when he was gone, sailed to Epirus, in the beginning of 87.

The war had now entered on a decisive stage. Rome no longer attempted to overcome Asiatics with Asiatics; natives of Italy put their shoulders to the wheel. There was therefore a prospect of success, especially with such a commander as Sulla, clever, a first-rate organizer, unscrupulous, a man who exacted much from his soldiers and allowed them everything after the victory. He believed in his star, to which he gave the name of Aphrodite. He wished to be called Felix in Latin and Epaphroditus in Greek.

On his arrival in Boeotia after traversing Epirus and Thessaly,

he found that the position had already been improved by Sura, the Proquaestor of the Macedonian governor. Archelaus and Aristion did not venture to encounter him in the field. The former took refuge in the Piraeus, the latter in Athens. Sulla could not take the Piraeus by assault and besieged it in due form; Athens was blockaded. As Pontus had command of the sea, the Piraeus could be provisioned, whereas Athens was soon in distress. Sulla's Quaestor Lucullus set to work to collect a fleet, but it took him a year to obtain one. Mithridates ought now to have thrown an army quickly into Greece, but he sent it slowly by the land-route, under his son, the so-called Ariarathes, and the general Taxilus. Macedonia was not conquered until the end of 87. In the beginning of 86 the cause of Mithridates' opponents received a fresh blow by the democrats once more getting the upper hand in Rome. True, Marius died in a few days, but Sulla was deposed and had to look out for an attack from the side of Rome. Before it came therefore he was bound to do his best to settle with Greece. He made the attempt. On this occasion too he was unable to take the Piraeus at first. But he was more successful with Athens. He got possession of a section of the wall that was badly guarded between the Piraeus Gate and the Sacred Gate, and in the night of the 1st of March 86 the Roman army entered the city.⁶ A number of the inhabitants were put to the sword, but the houses were not burnt, which Sulla took great credit for; constant civil war had brought the Romans so low that slaughter without incendiarism at the capture of a city was considered a proof of clemency. Aristion and his adherents escaped temporarily to the Acropolis. The Piraeus then shared the same fate; it was taken with the exception of the citadel of Munychia, where Archelaus still held out. In the meanwhile Ariarathes had died in southern Thessaly in the spring of 86, poisoned by his father, as was ascertained afterwards.⁷ Taxilus, who was now in sole command of the army, sent for Archelaus. The latter accordingly abandoned Munychia and joined forces

with Taxilus at Thermopylae. The Pontic army marched down the valley of the Cephissus and came upon Sulla to the north of Chaeronea. The Roman army was 16,500, the Asiatic about 60,000 strong. Sulla drove the enemy in an easterly direction, routed them and broke into their camp along with them. The result was that only about 10,000 men escaped to Chalcis with Archelaus. The valour of the Roman soldiers and the greater mobility of the Roman army, combined with better generalship, had defeated the imitation of the Macedonian phalanx. About the same time the Acropolis of Athens had also surrendered for want of water. Aristion was preserved for the triumph. Athens retained her independence, and actually had Delos given back to her, and migration was permitted from the rest of Greece into Athens to fill the ranks of the citizens. The victory at Chaeronea did not even give the Romans Euboea, the reason being that Mithridates had command of the sea.

In the meanwhile the king's cause had ceased to prosper in Asia Minor as well. At first all went swimmingly with the Greeks in that part of the world; clemency and favour were showered upon them by the conqueror. But despotic acts, which were necessary to the existence of the Oriental, soon alienated many of them; and if he scented a tendency to revolt in consequence, then the wild beast within him broke out. The first victims were the Galatian tetrarchs, who were put to death with their wives and children. Then came the turn of Chios, which was attacked by a Pontic fleet because a number of Chians had sided with the Romans. The inhabitants were sold as slaves; the city was called Berenice after one of the king's wives.⁸ The penalty for this ferocity however was soon paid in another place. The Pontic commander Zenobius sailed from Chios to Ephesus and summoned the inhabitants to assemble. The latter, fearing that they were destined to share the fate of the Chians, killed Zenobius, who had been imprudent enough to leave his

troops in the outer city, and took elaborate defensive measures, such as emancipation of slaves, extension of the franchise and reduction of most of the demands of the city on the individual citizens. The Ephesians declared, in a decree which has come down to us, that they had joined the king on compulsion only, and that they now took the opportunity of showing their attachment to the Romans. At all events it was a proof of courage that they revolted while the king's authority in Asia was still unshaken. The Greeks after all were not the degenerate individuals which they are so often represented to be.⁹

One of the principal cities had revolted from the king; others followed its example. Some of them he reconquered, and to gain more adherents he declared that all the cities should be independent, all the *metoeci* citizens, the slaves free, and all debts cancelled. Of course the propertied classes now became more hostile to him than ever, and even the courtiers of Greek extraction formed a conspiracy against him. After having convinced himself of its existence by concealing himself under a bed and listening to the deliberations of the conspirators, he put to death about 1600 persons who were supposed to be implicated in it.

In the meanwhile the development of Roman affairs had again brought about a change in his favour. L. Valerius Flaccus, who had been appointed Consul in the place of Marius, crossed the Adriatic with two legions, to take the supreme command from Sulla and continue the war against Mithridates. He was greedy and incapable; in cleverness, and especially in impudence, he was surpassed by his legate C. Flavius Fimbria, the same man who had tried to murder the Pontifex Scaevola at the funeral of Marius, and who afterwards complained that Scaevola would not let himself be killed.¹⁰ Flaccus could not persuade his troops to fight against Sulla in Greece and led them northwards, against Mithridates it is true, but the want of unity among the

Romans was nevertheless an advantage for the king. The latter despatched a fresh army 80,000 strong under Dorylaeus to reinforce Archelaus, and the Pontic generals again selected Boeotia as their battle-field, but on this occasion the plain of Orchomenus, where the 10,000 cavalry could deploy with greater effect. Sulla tried to paralyze them by bringing his army up to the enemy's camp in trenches. In spite of this the Asiatic horse repulsed the Romans, and Sulla himself had to plunge into the fray to stop the flight of his men. A second attack of the Pontic cavalry was repelled, and in the course of the following night the trenches reached the enemy's camp, the rear of which rested on the Copais Lake. The Pontic army was surrounded, the Romans stormed the camp, and but few escaped, among them the two generals, Archelaus hiding for two days in the swamp (85 B.C. ?).¹¹

Greece was now lost for Mithridates, and he had to prepare to meet an attack in Asia.

His principal consolation was that Sulla, his most dangerous opponent, was still without a fleet and therefore could not even occupy Euboea. Flaccus inspired him with less apprehension. The latter had marched northwards, his attempt to restore order among his followers only bringing more odium on him, but it was a long time before the army arrived in Asia, and a conflict broke out there between the Consul and the legate. Valerius removed Flavius from his post, but the latter stirred up a mutiny and the Consul was murdered at Nicomedia, early in 85. The soldiers made the successful mutineer general and the Senate ratified the appointment. He marched through Bithynia, ordering executions to his heart's content.

In these circumstances both Sulla and Mithridates were inclined for peace, and Fimbria too, but he did not count. As things stood Sulla and Fimbria were each for himself against the king. The king however was in a dangerous predicament; if one of the two Romans obtained the army

of the other as well, then Mithridates was in all probability lost. This was a reason why he should accept any tolerable conditions which might be offered him by either of the two. Both were of course disposed to make such offers, for whoever concluded peace with Mithridates had a good chance of overcoming the other with or without him, and thereby securing the control of Rome. But Sulla's prospects of a peace with Mithridates were better than those of Fimbria. The latter was a kind of robber chief, who had won his spurs only in massacre and pillage; Sulla was a victorious general and a tried statesman. An understanding with Sulla might therefore be of use to the king, one with Fimbria hardly so. Again, by a treaty with Mithridates, which would necessarily entail the destruction of Fimbria, Sulla secured the possibility of returning to Italy. Archelaus grasped this situation and determined to try if he could not come off best as mediator in the dispute, in which he succeeded. He asked Sulla to grant him an interview, which took place at Delium on the Euripus. The following terms were agreed on: Mithridates was to give up all conquests made since the year 89 and become an ally of the Roman people as plain king of Pontus. He was to pay 2000 talents and surrender 70 ships of war with their crews and provide pay for the troops. The prisoners on both sides were to be set free, including Aquilius, who was referred to as if he were still alive. The Greeks in Asia who had joined the king were to be amnestied. Archelaus regarded the ratification of this arrangement by Mithridates so much as a matter of course that he at once delivered up Chalcis and part of the fleet to Sulla. He received an estate in Euboea and the title of friend of the Roman people. Soon afterwards he openly went over to the Romans, and it is supposed that he was then secretly on their side. That may be, yet Mithridates still considered him as in his employ and entrusted the further negotiations with Sulla to him.

The king in the meanwhile had been hard pressed by

Fimbria, and was in all probability really glad to have made terms with Sulla. Fimbria defeated the young Mithridates at Miletopolis on the Rhyndacus and moved farther south, whereupon the old king fled from Pergamum to the coast. This nearly proved fatal to him, for while Fimbria was besieging him in the maritime city of Pitane, Lucullus appeared with some ships which had been at last got together, and Fimbria proposed to his fellow-countryman that they should join in attacking the king, who perhaps could be made prisoner. But Lucullus replied that he would have nothing to do with a robber and went on his way; of course the upshot would have been a quarrel with Fimbria, who would then have seized Lucullus' ships. Consequently the king escaped to Mytilene, where he collected the remnants of his forces. When Archelaus came there to persuade him to accept the conditions of peace agreed on with Sulla, Mithridates instructed him to propose a personal interview to the Roman general, which took place at Dardanus south of Abydos. After some hesitation Mithridates accepted the peace as concluded by Archelaus, surrendered the promised ships and then sailed home.

This peace however was only a truce, it was never ratified by the Senate, not at that time, because the Senate was hostile to Sulla, nor subsequently, because Sulla did not seriously insist on it. Sulla now had an easy task to perform in Asia, that of overcoming Fimbria. No fighting was required for this. Fimbria's soldiers went over to him in crowds and eventually Fimbria killed himself at Pergamum, in the autumn of 85 B.C. The whole of Asia Minor now submitted to the conqueror, only a few islands held out for a long time and the pirates were left quite unmolested; they even became bolder than before and plundered Clazomenae, Samos and Samothrace. Sulla however took no heed of these matters; he had a remarkable power of invariably discerning what was the main point at the moment, and of directing all his energies

to it alone, while leaving everything else to take care of itself for the time. There was only one thing of importance now : to let the army have money and rest, so that later on it would follow the general to Italy with enthusiasm to combat the democrats ; in the meanwhile the pirates might do what they pleased. In the comfortable quarters of Asia Minor each soldier received sixteen drachmas a day from the citizens, four times his usual pay, besides food for himself and for all he might choose to invite ; the centurions got fifty drachmas a day. This in six months would come to about £4,800,000. As much again had to be paid to Rome, i.e. to Sulla, as a war indemnity. The only good thing was that the money did not pass through the hands of revenue-farmers. The following cities received their independence in return for their loyalty to Rome : Ilium, Chios, Magnesia ad Sipylum, Stratonicea, and Tabae in Caria ; Rhodes received Caunus and a few small islands.

At the end of the summer of 84 Sulla sailed to the Piraeus, leaving the Valerian legions, with Licinius Murena as Propraetor and Lucullus as Quaestor, behind him. He went through a course of baths at Aedepsus in Euboea for his gout, took some art treasures and books with him from Athens, and in the beginning of 83 proceeded with 40,000 men *via* Patrae and Dyrrhachium to Italy, where he overthrew the rule of the democrats and gave Rome a new but ephemeral constitution.

NOTES

1. Syria. A. Kuhn, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Seleukiden von 125-164 v. Chr., Altkirch, 1891. — Victory of Antiochus VII. over the Parthians, von Gutschmid, Iran, 75, 76. — For Egypt down to the reign of Cleopatra (51 B.C.), Mahaffy, Empire, 405-444.

2. Mithridates pointed out to the Romans that the trade of the Black Sea was interrupted by the depredations of Nicomedes which they tolerated, App. Mithr. 12, 14.

3. For the 800 talents deposited by Jews in Cos and taken by Mithridates see Reinach, *Mithr.* 131, note 6.—The energy with which Mithridates pursued his enemies is shown by his letter to the satrap Leonippus setting a reward of forty talents on the head of Chaeremon of Nysa, who had saved the lives of some Romans: inscription of Nysa, published by Hiller von Gärtringen and Th. Mommsen in the *Athen. Mittheil.* 16, 95 seq.; cf. *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1891, No. 36. For Leonippus cf. Reinach, *Mithr.* 355; in the winter of 71/70 he commanded 10,000 Cilicians in Sinope.—For coins of the Italians which refer to Mithridates, Reinach, *Mithr.* 132, note 1.

4. Aristion, Reinach, *Mithr.* 139, note 1, as regards the name (our principal authority for this section of Athenian history, Poseidonius, calls him, oddly enough, Athenion); 140, note 1, for the coins; 141, note 2, for Apellicon, also from coins; for Apellicon see also Susem. 2, 296-299. Aristion's attitude towards Mithridates is an unsuccessful imitation of that of Demosthenes towards the king of Persia. Aristion combated Rome as Demosthenes did Macedonia. I cannot dwell on the points of resemblance and difference in the situations and the characters here.

5. If we want to make something of the much-discussed *πρέσβεις παρὰ Καρχηδονίων* (*Ath.* 5, 213) in Aristion's speech to the Athenians, we may say that it was a deputation from Carthaginians who were living somewhere or other as refugees. In the same way deputations from Poles made their appearance in various places in 1848.

6. The Long Walls in ruins, Reinach, *Mithr.* 154; walls of the Piræus, App. *Mithr.* 30; Reinach, *Mithr.* 155.—For the *Ἱερὰ πύλην* in Plut. *Sull.* 14 see Wachsmuth, *Stadt Athen*, 1, 346, 657, 2, 223; Milchhöfer, in Baumeister, 1, 149; Lolling, in I. Müller, 3, 303; Harrison and Verrall, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, p. 9 (the same as the Dipylon); Curtius, *Stadtgeschichte*, 201 (south of the Dipylon). A colony of Romans in Athens; the most important of them was T. Pomponius Atticus; cf. Curtius, *Stadtgeschichte*, 252. Priesthood of the Charites, of Demos and of Roma in Athens, Curtius, 248. Sympathy of the Cappadocian king Ariobarzanes II. for Athens, Curtius, 237; he restores the Odeum.

7. Poisoning of the so-called Ariarathes, Plut. *Pomp.* 37.

8. Chios called Berenice, Koepp, *Syr. Kriege der ersten Ptol.*, *Rhein. Mus.* 39, 216.

9. Decree of Ephesus, now in the *Recueil des inscript. jurid. grecques*, Paris, 1891, No. 4.

10. Fimbria and Scaevola, Cic. *pro S. Roscio*, 12, 33. Of

course it was only an impudent joke of Fimbria's, a point which is occasionally overlooked.

11. Date of the battle of Orchomenus, Mommsen, *R. G.* 2, 283, and Reinach, *Mithr.* 189, both equally brief; according to the general view, 85, acc. to Reinach, 86. The question requires further consideration.

CHAPTER XXVII

MITHRIDATES AND TIGRANES AGAINST LUCULLUS AND POMPEY —DEATH OF MITHRIDATES—END OF THE SELEUCID EMPIRE (83-63 B.C.)

MITHRIDATES found plenty to do in his kingdom.¹ He sent his son of the same name, who had already been viceroy in Colchis, back to that country, but then recalled him again and threw him into prison, where he died. The kingdom of the Bosporus was in a rebellious state, and when the king was on the point of going there the war with Rome broke out again. On the advice of Archelaus, who had gone over to Rome, Licinius Murena invaded Pontus, in 83; as the treaty of Dardanus had not been ratified by the Senate, Murena could coolly maintain that as far as he knew the Romans were still at war with Mithridates. The king, it is true, defeated Murena on the Halys in 82 and also drove the Romans out of Cappadocia, but his political existence had become quite insecure, so far as Rome was concerned with it, and this state of things continued under Murena's successor, Gabinius. So long as Sulla lived, Mithridates could still look forward to the ratification of the treaty of Dardanus; but when the Dictator died in 78 without the Senate having ratified it, Mithridates saw that he must give up all hope of the ratification taking place, and he prepared for a fresh war with Rome. If in spite of this the outbreak of it was delayed for five years longer, that was due on the one hand to the absence of any definite external

motive for it, and on the other to the fact that Rome had to deal with three other enemies at that time, with the Thracians, with Sertorius in Spain and with the pirates. These latter had increased considerably in number owing to the swarms of malcontents and exiles of every description. They now possessed arsenals, maritime fortresses and mountain strongholds, and interfered with traffic in an intolerable way. Rome was at last obliged to take steps against them. Murena had suppressed the kingdom of Cibra, which was in alliance with them, and from 78-75 the Proprætor of Cilicia, P. Servilius Vatia, destroyed a number of robber states in Lycia, Pamphylia and Isauria, for which he received the surname of Isauricus. In spite of this they remained as powerful as before at sea, to which the fact that Syria had then ceased to exist as an empire contributed, the country having, strange to say, fallen into the hands of the king of Armenia.

That the old rival of Syria, Egypt, did not succeed to the heritage of the Seleucids, who were successfully engaged in the work of mutual destruction, is accounted for by the ever-increasing rottenness of the last-named empire. After the death of Ptolemy Lathyrus in 81 his nephew Alexander II. reigned for a short time, and when the latter was killed by the populace, two alleged bastards of Lathyrus, Ptolemy Auletes and another Ptolemy, were able to get possession of Egypt and Cyprus in spite of a will made by Alexander in favour of Rome. As individuals of this stamp had no ability for foreign enterprises, it might have been expected that, if the Seleucid empire was to come to an end, the Parthians would have become the rulers of it; they had gradually advanced from Hecatompylus to Ecbatana, from Ecbatana to Ctesiphon, and inspired great fear under Mithridates the Great, at the time when Mithridates of Pontus was master of Asia Minor and residing in Pergamum. But with the death of the former sovereign, in 86, the whole position changed. The Scythians, who had annihilated the Graeco-Bactrian

empire some time before (see above, chap. xix.), had also subdued Parthia, where, oddly enough, they eventually put a man of eighty years of age, named Sinatroces, on the throne. The influence of Scythia however destroyed the power of Parthia for the moment. This enabled Tigranes of Armenia, a conceited and untrustworthy, yet enterprising individual, to play a brilliant part and to extend his rule up to the coast of Syria. He took northern Mesopotamia, Mygdonia and Osroene from the Parthians, forced his way into Media and burnt the palace of Ecbatana, while the kings of Albania, Iberia, Atropatene and Media Magna, of Gordyene and Adiabene became his vassals. In this position he became master of Syria as well. First of all, in 83, he took upper Syria, with the exception of Seleucia ad Mare, and Antioch actually struck coins with his head on them. Then, about the year 74, he obtained the greater part of Phoenicia with Ptolemais. He also conquered Cappadocia, and with the inhabitants of Mazaca and eleven other cities on the Armenian frontier founded his capital Tigranocerta. The Romans did not interfere. His wife Cleopatra encouraged Greek culture. Metrodorus of Scepsis, a writer, lived at the Armenian court, and Greek dramas were performed by artists of Dionysus at Tigranocerta. Artavasdes I., the son of Tigranes, actually became a Greek writer.

The aggrandisement of Tigranes was of course of enormous advantage to his father-in-law Mithridates, who was nursing great designs at that time. He made overtures to the two Ptolemies; they were to marry two of his daughters. Besides this, he was still on good terms with the pirates, he renewed his relations with the inhabitants of the province of Asia, who had once more become the prey of publicani, and—a very serious matter for Rome—he concluded a treaty with Sertorius in Spain. He thus, as the Italians had made their peace with Rome, secured the support of the Marian party. Sertorius agreed to let Mithridates have Bithynia, Cappadocia

Paphlagonia and Galatia; and sent him the able general Marcus Marius. In return for this he received 3000 talents and 40 ships from the king. Mithridates was decidedly preparing for war.

The Romans had an idea of what was going on, but, as usual, had no inclination to begin the war. As in the year 88, the affairs of Bithynia gave the signal for it.

In that country King Nicomedes Philopator, an utterly disreputable individual, died towards the end of the year 74. Like his grandfather, he called himself a freedman of the Roman people, and as such bequeathed to them his kingdom. As there was a son living, Rome ought not to have accepted the bequest, but the revenue-farmers wanted a new field for their labours, and the son was therefore declared to be illegitimate. Mithridates was determined not to allow the Romans to get the Bosporus as well as the Hellespont, and as this was known in Rome preparations were made for war. The province of Cilicia was assigned to L. Lucullus, who was Consul then, and besides the two legions quartered there and the one he brought with him, he was given the two Valerian legions, those which Fimbria had commanded at the end of his career. The other Consul, M. Aurelius Cotta, was sent to Bithynia. Mithridates began the war. He defeated Cotta at Calchedon and besieged Cyzicus. Lucullus however came to the rescue and cut off Mithridates, who was on the peninsula of Arconesus, from the mainland. The king had to fight his way through with great loss and withdraw into his old kingdom.

Things now looked badly for him. Marcus Marius was killed in the island of Neae near Lemnos, and the death of Sertorius in the year 72 B.C. deprived Mithridates of his last support in the west. In his own country too he was unfortunate in the war now continued there (71). Part of his cavalry was destroyed, and he decided on a retreat into Armenia Minor. But when the march began by the 'friends' depositing their treasures in a place of safety, the army viewed

this as an attempt at treachery and mutinied, and the king could only make his escape with 2000 horse and the treasure-chest, an incident which recalls the history of Agathocles (see above, chap. vii.), who in energy and cruelty bears a great general resemblance to Mithridates. Pontus, the ancestral home of the dynasty, was lost. The king hoped to recover it, but his first idea was to show in what an Oriental despot's sense of honour consists, when he has been driven out of his kingdom. His harem was not to fall into the hands of the conquerors. He therefore sent orders to Pharnacia that the inmates of it should be put to death. This fate overtook his sisters Roxana and Statira and his wives Berenice and Monime, in the summer of 71. Some of his wives however were still with him.

He fled to his son-in-law Tigranes, who with his enormous army, said to number 500,000 men, must have been in a position to help him. But at first the Armenian monarch would have nothing to do with him; he assigned him a remote fortress as a residence. While Mithridates was living there in inaction, his cities fell into the hands of Lucullus, Amasia, Amisus and Sinope however only after a long defence, which proves at any rate that the king was not altogether unpopular with his Greek subjects. The cities were partly burnt, but Lucullus treated them well, and generally incurred the hatred of the Roman financiers by the protection which he extended to the inhabitants. Lucullus demanded the surrender of Mithridates through his brother-in-law Ap. Claudius, but Tigranes refused it. On the other hand Machares, son of Mithridates, who was viceroy of the Cimmerian Bosphorus, sent Lucullus a wreath valued at 1000 talents, in return for which he was admitted to the friendship of the Roman people. Subsequently, in the spring of 69, as Lucullus was preparing to cross the Euphrates and invade Armenia, Tigranes came to terms with his father-in-law. Lucullus advanced to Tigranocerta and defeated Tigranes,

who had hastened to its relief without Mithridates, on the Tigris. He is said to have attacked 250,000 men with 16,000 and to have slain 100,000 with a loss of only five! Tigranocerta was surrendered by the Greek and Cilician troops of the garrison. The booty in coined money alone amounted to 8000 talents. Each soldier received 800 drachmas. The inhabitants returned to their homes. Commagene submitted to the Romans; Antiochus XIII., son of Antiochus X. and Cleopatra Selene, became king in Syria. But he was soon murdered.

In the winter of 69/68 Tigranes and Mithridates re-organized their armies. Lucullus now wanted to attack Ctesiphon, but the troops refused to follow him. He then, in 68, marched into the heart of Armenia and defeated his two opponents on the river Arsianias; when however he wished to advance on Artaxata in the Araxes valley, his soldiers a second time declined to obey him. On his return to Mesopotamia, he took Nisibis, and as the Valerian legions, incited by the notorious P. Clodius, his younger brother-in-law, now declared their resolve to make no further effort at the expiration of their twenty years' servitude (87-67), he remained inactive in Mygdonia up to the spring of 67, while his subordinates had a hard time of it against Mithridates, who reconquered his old kingdom. People now became impatient in Rome. Lucullus was always gaining victories and yet did not annihilate the enemy. He was replaced by the Consul M. Acilius Glabrio. Lucullus would not obey the Senate and kept the supreme command, but this did not avail him, for his soldiers would not obey him either, and as he would not leave Asia and yet could not make a campaign with the troops, he retired into the Trocmi country, where the army did nothing, while Mithridates recovered Pontus and Tigranes Cappadocia. When at last the ten commissioners arrived, who were to organize the territory supposed to have been conquered by Lucullus, there was none forthcoming, and

eventually not even an army commanded by him, for some of his troops joined Glabrio and the rest went home.

Thus Mithridates' star seemed to be once more in the ascendant. The king was again in possession of his country and Glabrio did nothing. But a momentous change was impending, of a threefold kind. First of all, Tigranes deserted him again. Secondly, in the year 67 his good friends the pirates were crushed. They had finally become so audacious as to capture cargoes of grain destined for Rome, and that could not be tolerated. Cn. Pompeius, the idol of the democracy, was entrusted by the Lex Gabinia with extensive powers for three years by sea and land, and in three months put an end to the worst of the mischief, taking 1300 ships, and capturing or killing 30,000 pirates. Many of them were settled in thinly populated cities, *e.g.* in Dyme in Achaia, and Soli in Cilicia, afterwards called Pompeiopolis. The most serious thing for Mithridates however was that in January 66 the Lex Manilia assigned to the same Cn. Pompeius, who was still in Cilicia, the provinces of Bithynia and Cilicia, with full powers for the war against Mithridates and Tigranes. Mithridates now sought the aid of the Parthians, but their king Phraates preferred to assist his son-in-law young Tigranes, who had revolted from his father, and invade Armenia. While Lucullus returned to Rome, where he had to wait three years for his triumph, Pompey assembled an army of over 60,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, in which the soldiers of Valerius gladly enlisted. Pompey had the reputation of being lucky; Lucullus was said to be unlucky himself and to bring other people bad luck. He was evidently the first notable example of the men whom modern Italians call *jettatori*, people who always save their own skin but invariably get their friends into trouble. Mithridates could only collect half as many troops as Pompey, and negotiations with this general merely had the dangerous effect of alienating the Italian deserters in his army. He quelled discontent by

terrible punishments, but this only increased the aversion of his soldiers. His generalship was good, but unlucky. Eventually he was surprised in the night by Pompey and his army completely annihilated. With his wife Hypsicratea and two other companions he reached the mountain fortress of Sinoria on the Armenian frontier. Here he learnt that Tigranes had set a price of 100 talents on his head. Young Tigranes had deserted to Pompey, but to lay the blame of it on Mithridates, as the king of Armenia did, was a piece of great folly. Mithridates rapidly altered his plans. He marched with a handful of troops across the district of Erzerum through the valley of the Akampsis (Tschoruk) to the coast and along it to Dioscurias in Colchis, where he enlisted the Iberians and Albanians, who lived in the valley of the Cyrus (Kur), on his side. Both tribes had become subject to Armenia, but were now free, because Armenia was weak. Pompey, escorted by young Tigranes, had marched towards Artaxata and had received the homage of the old king, who paid a sum of 60,000 talents, and was rewarded with the friendship of the Roman people. After that however young Tigranes had fallen into disgrace with Pompey, and the Roman general had treated the old man with contempt. The Albanians now attacked Pompey in the valley of the Cyrus, but were defeated, and subsequently the Iberians were also vanquished. This convinced Mithridates that he must evacuate Dioscurias. He marched along the coast by a narrow path to the Cimmerian Bosphorus, and Machares, seeing that he could expect no mercy from his father, took his own life. Panticapaeum surrendered; Mithridates had once more recovered a kingdom, in 65 B.C. Pompey heard of it in Phasis. He returned to the south, captured the king's mountain fortresses in Armenia Minor and settled the conquered territories in the spring of 64 at Amisus. Some of them were bestowed on potentates, as for instance the Galatian Deiotarus, who received Pharnaceas and Trapezus, and young Archelaus, who became sacerdotal

prince of Comana; the rest was distributed among cities, old and new. The following received territory: west of the Halys Pompeiopolis, a new city on the Amnias; then, between the Halys and the Iris, Neapolis, formerly called Phazemon; then Amasia, Zela and Megalopolis, formerly Sebastea, now Siwas, on the upper Halys; in the basin of the Lycus Nicopolis, Diospolis (Cabira, afterwards Neocaesarea) and Magnopolis (Eupatoria, which Mithridates had founded and then destroyed); on the coast Amisus, Sinope and Amastris. Here again was an application on a grand scale of the Greek principle of government by the *polis*.

Pompey rejected Mithridates' overtures for peace. He was simply to surrender to the Romans.

The Roman general then proceeded to Syria. "I leave Mithridates," he said, "to a more formidable enemy than myself—to famine." Strange remark—famine in the Cimmerian Bosphorus! But Mithridates compassed his own destruction.

By the end of 64 he had collected a fresh army of 36,000 men and a new fleet. He wanted to descend on Italy through Scythia and Pannonia like a second Hannibal, and might count on being joined by Sarmatae, Bastarnae and Gauls on the way. Italy was still in a ferment, as Catiline's conspiracy proved in the year 63. It was therefore not beyond the bounds of possibility that he might succeed, if his troops remained loyal to him. But this very condition was wanting. The Rhodian Castor, who was evidently one of his confidants, started the rebellion in Phanagorea; Theodosia, Nymphaeum and Chersonesus joined in it, and at last Pharnaces, who had just conspired against his father and, contrary to the latter's usual custom, had been pardoned by him, headed a rising of his soldiers at Panticapaeum, where the king was residing. As he was going into the street to quell the revolt, the mutineers fell upon him, and he escaped with difficulty into his house. There he and his daughters Mithridatis and Nysa

drank poison, but it took effect on the women only, and he himself ordered Bituit, one of his Gallic guards, to run him through the body. The next moment the insurgents burst into the room and vented their fury on the corpse (63 B.C.).

Pompey received the news in Syria. The exultation was great in the army as well as in Rome, where a ten days' thanksgiving festival was held, on the motion of the Consul M. Tullius Cicero. Pompey returned to Amisus, and here an embassy of Pharnaces brought him the corpse of the old king. He had it interred in the royal vault at Sinope. Pharnaces received the kingdom of the Bosphorus; the other children and Mithridates' chief officials were sent to Rome, to be kept there for the triumph.

We now take up the narrative of Pompey's achievements in Syria after the summer of 64. In this part of the world there was no end to the disputes of the sovereigns and the cities. After the murder of Antiochus XIII. by the prince of Emesa, Pompey abolished the rule of the Seleucids altogether and made Syria a Roman province. The Jews proved the most refractory element. Pompey had to conquer Jerusalem. He confined the Jewish kingdom within the limits of the Jewish nationality.

The countries in Asia subject to Roman influence were organized in the year 63 as follows. The provinces, *i.e.* districts under administration or supervision, were Asia, Bithynia and Pontus, Cilicia, Syria; the kingdoms: Cappadocia; north of it the territory of the Galatian Deiotarus, which included part of Galatia and Pharnaceia and Trapezus belonging to Pontus; in the south Commagene, under rulers descended from Persian nobles on the male, and from Seleucids on the female side. I pass over smaller principalities, among which were some sacerdotal ones; I shall revert to these matters in chap. xxix. Of great importance for civilization were the cities, the independence of which

was encouraged in every way by Lucullus and Pompey; the latter founded no less than thirty-nine cities in Asia.²

The organization of Asia, which thus became a kind of Holy Roman Empire, with temporal and spiritual princes, and free cities, was very beneficial for the country itself. It is true that it had to pay large sums. Pompey brought 200 million sesterces (about £2,080,000) into the Roman treasury; the army received 1600 talents (about £4,000,000). The triumph which Pompey held on the 28th and 29th of September in the year 61 B.C. was a very brilliant one.³

NOTES

1. Empire and government of Mithridates. All the facts in the following sketch are taken from Reinach, *Mithr. Eup.* pp. 213-300; the comparisons with Egypt and with Alexander are my own.—The empire was a maritime one, it included the shores of the Pontus Euxinus, which the king's fleets had commanded for nearly forty years. It was only towards the west that other states bordered on this sea, Bithynia, Heraclea and Byzantium, but their power was not to be compared with that of Mithridates. The empire however was divided into three sections, which communicated with each other only by sea: Pontus, Colchis and Bosphorus, separated by the steep slopes of the Paryadres range and the still steeper ones of the Caucasus, where Mithridates had only a few isolated fortified points, such as Trapezus and Dioscurias.—The Crimea was much more thickly populated then than it is now, the disafforesting having ruined a great part of the country; it contained an agricultural and fishing population. Of the Greek cities Panticapaeum (the modern Kertch) had a circumference of 20 stades; Phanagoria was the depot for the merchandise of the Maeotic tribes, Tanais was the point of departure and arrival of the trade with the north and the east.—Colchis formed only a satrapy. It contained the Colchians, some of whom lived in pile-dwellings, some alleged Egyptian colonists in the valley of the Phasis, other aboriginal inhabitants in the south, and in the north some Greek settlers who lived mostly in Dioscurias and carried on trade through Iberia and Albania with the Caspian Sea. Seventy dialects were spoken and 300 interpreters were required in Dioscurias.—Pontus proper contained three zones, that of the coast, that of the rivers inland which at first flow parallel to the

coast and then force their way north, and the mountain ranges of the interior (see above, chap. xiii.). The most fertile part of the country was the plain in which the Iris and Lycus unite, and in which the cities of Comana, Amasia and Cabira were situated. The hunting and fishing, especially of the tunny, were of importance. The Chalybes, workers in steel, were famous for their mining. If the harbours were good, especially the double harbour of Sinope on each side of an isthmus, like those of Cyzicus, Clazomenae and Cnidus, on the other hand the communications with the interior were less satisfactory, especially from the coast, as the rivers are not navigable. Yet Amasia and Comana were important centres of trade; the old Persian royal road indeed went through Comana, and the principal route to Armenia started from there. Articles exported from Armenia and Mesopotamia to Comana, and worked up there by the artificers round the shrine, found their way farther west *via* Amisus and Sinope to Athens, Delos and Rhodes.

As regards civilization, the greatest variety prevailed among the inhabitants of Pontus proper. There were tribes which still lived in trees (Heptacometae), others who practised the *couraie* (Tibareni); there were races which were mainly hunters and shepherds. In Cappadocia the feudal lords still had the right to sell their serfs. I have already referred to the culture of Cappadocia and Pontus in chaps. xiii., xviii. and xxv.; I may add here that the highest female deity of Pontus and Cappadocia, Mâ, was worshipped in the two Comanas, that on the Sarus and that on the Iris. The high-priest of Comana in Pontus was the first personage in the realm. Owing to the many *hierodulae* this Comana was called the Pontic Corinth. Comana is close to the modern Tokat (name derived from Eudosia), a place where important roads meet. The Persians who settled in Pontus practised their cult in sacred precincts, which contained Magian monasteries. Their principal place of worship was Zela, near the Iris.—The Greek element became more and more important on the coast. Amastris was an elegant city; Sinope with its two harbours of great consequence. Amisus, in close relations with Athens, even had the name Piraeus for some time (Head, H. N. 424, coins with owl); adjoining it was the suburb of Eupatoria with its special wall of fortifications. Trapezus is little mentioned. Mithridates had a high opinion of able Greeks. Gaius and Dorylaeus of Amisus were his comrades. Diophantus, who conquered the Bosphorus, was a native of Sinope. Mithridates also hellenized in the interior. He founded Eupatoria at the junction of the Lycus and the Iris. Amasia became a Hellenic city; cf. Strabo, 13, 614, Reinach, 249. The geographer Strabo

of Amasia had Greeks (Dorylaeus), Persians and Paphlagonians among his ancestors. Under Mithridates cities of the interior struck copper coins with Greek inscriptions and types (Reinach, 249, 255, note 2). Mithridates in this respect pursued the same aims as Alexander and the Seleucids.

Pontus was not a natural, national empire; the name, which is just as little local as that of Epirus, is enough to show this. But Mithridates made the name an appropriate one by creating a great maritime kingdom, which resembles that of the Ptolemies. Just as the latter included the south-west, so Pontus took in the north-east, of the Mediterranean. Both had two dependencies, with which they communicated by sea only, the one Cyrene and Cyprus, the other Colchis and Bosphorus; the coast of Paphlagonia corresponds to Phoenicia. The comparison might be pushed further. Sarapis came to Alexandria from Sinope.—Administration. Council of state, composed of the so-called relatives and friends (Reinach, 253, note 1). Ministers: *τραπεζίται* *ἐπὶ* c. gen. mentioned: a war-minister, a minister of justice, a secretary of state. Mithridates was so far above the various religions that he made his friend Dorylaeus high-priest of Comana. The provinces: *strategiae*, *eparchiae*; yet cities which were independent in other respects had garrisons under *phrurarchs* (Reinach, 256). Metrodorus was chief justice for some time. The administration of the finances was just as good as that of the Ptolemies. As late as the year 66, and after perpetual warfare, Mithridates had a treasure of about £7,000,000, which was distributed among seventy-five strongholds.—The coinage of Mithridates was in gold and silver; copper coinage he left to the cities, of which Amisus especially issued a great deal with emblems of the king (twelve cities, Reinach, 260). Panticapaeum, Phanagoria and Chersonesus, as entirely independent cities, coined gold and silver. Since the time of Ctistes (Unicum, Reinach, *Trois roy.* 162, pl. x. 2) the kings of Pontus had ceased to coin gold; the Seleucids, as is well known, coined it, and Mithridates Eupator did so after the year 88, when he felt himself master of Asia. Query whether he gave up coining gold after 84? Cf. Reinach, 261, and *Trois roy.* 198. His gold pieces, struck in Pontus and Pergamum, are of the Attic standard; they weighed 2 dr. and were worth 20 dr. of silver. The commonest silver coin was the tetradrachm of the Attic standard. Mithridates also had coins struck in camp: in 88 by Archelaus in Greece, in 87 by Ariarathes in Macedonia; in 72 he did so himself in Parium (Reinach, 262). The type on the face of his tetradrachms was the portrait of the king, idealized after 88, a sort of Alexander head, the last masterpiece of Greek coinage. On the reverse were the

Pegasus (Perseus—the Persians), the star and crescent, the arms of the king (now those of the Ottoman Empire and in the same order). After 96 the Pegasus is encircled with a wreath; resemblance to the cistophori (see above, chap. xxi. note 4). After the conquest of Anterior Asia the stag, the animal of Artemis, takes the place of the Pegasus. From 96 onwards the coins have the era of 297 B.C.; for the other eras see above, chap. xxvi. The calendar of the coins is the Macedonian.

The army of the earlier kings of Pontus had contained mostly Greek and Galatian mercenaries in addition to the natives. Mithridates Eupator enlisted the northern tribes, Scythians, Sarmatae, Celts and Thracians. He also had many Italian emigrants, at last a whole army corps of them. His best engineers were the Thessalian Niconidas and Callimachus of Amisus. He created a large fleet, the material and crews for which he obtained in his own country, and the leaders from Phoenicia or from among the pirates. In 73 he had 400 triremes or quinqueremes and a vast number of other vessels. In the course of his reign Mithridates abandoned the Asiatic for the Macedonian military system, and at the close of it he wanted to introduce the Roman organization (of cohorts)—undoubtedly a proof of genius. Three generals of the stamp of Sulla, Lucullus and Pompey were unable to annihilate him; he had to do it himself.

I have already referred to his extraordinary natural gifts. He was of gigantic stature and remarkably active; he once rode 1000 stades (about 150 miles) in 24 hours; in the last year of his life (at the age of 69) he could vault fully armed into the saddle; his face was handsome, quite different from that of his ancestors (Imhoof, *Griech. Portr.* and Reinach, *Trois roy.* pl. x.). He was cunning, energetic, a good speaker, versatile, and never gave up hope if there was the slightest chance of success. Some good scholars fled to his court: Diodorus of Adramyttium, Academician and statesman, Metrodorus of Scepsis, Misoromaeus, honoured by Mithridates as 'father of the king' (a Syrian title, Reinach, 282), chief justice; eventually he fell into disgrace and died soon afterwards. Mithridates made a special study of medicine and of toxicology, and corresponded on the subject with the best physicians, such as Zacharias of Babylon and Asclepiades of Prusias. He discovered remedies, Mithridatias, which were used after his time. His physician Papias of Amisus was also a judge of appeal; the Ptolemies and the sovereigns of Pergamum also employed physicians in matters of state. Mithridates was a patron of the arts; his Dactyliothea was removed by Pompey into the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter at Rome (Reinach, 286). He was fond

of handsome furniture: his throne and state-beds were of gold; a month was spent in making the inventory of the contents of his treasure-house at Talaura; among them were 2000 onyx dishes set in gold. Mithridates sent offerings to Delos, Nemea and Delphi, and paid honours to Artemis in Ephesus, and to Demeter in the Bosporus. His special sacrifices however were to his god Ahuramazda. In the year 81 he offered him a huge sacrifice on a mountain peak, the flames of which were visible 150 miles off. He had palaces in Sinope, Amisus, Pharnacia and Eupatoria, a summer palace on Lake Stiphane; the empty tombs of his family are still to be seen at Amasia.

Mithridates had a large retinue: slaves, freedmen, court jesters, physicians, bodyguards; many well-born Greeks and Romans lived at his court, and exiled kings as well. The life was a gay one, with such amusements as hunting, the theatre, the stadion, long banquets accompanied by music, with prizes for the best drinker, singer or wit. But the king was on his guard. Before he went to table he took his counter-poison (?). He never took off his sword. His family was very numerous; from time to time he had occasion to make a clearance among his wives and children. Of the former only those of Greek extraction are known, because they alone showed character, which Eastern-bred women are generally without. The following are mentioned: Monime from Stratonicea, Berenice of Chios, Stratonice of Pontus, Hypsicratea, a regular Amazon. Of his sons described as legitimate, *i.e.* born in the harem, reference has been made to Mithridates and Ariarathes, probably killed by their father, to Xipharex, who was undoubtedly put to death by him, Machares, who committed suicide, Pharnaces, who caused his father's death; an illegitimate son, Mithridates of Pergamum, played an important part in the history of Caesar. Four others are still children in the year 65. They all have Persian names, some of the daughters Greek ones. Among them Cleopatra was the wife of Tigranes; Athenais was to have married the prince of Cappadocia, Mithridatis and Nysa the kings of Egypt and Cyprus. Both of these perished with their father. Eupatra and Orsabarix adorned Pompey's triumphal procession.

As in Alexander the Great, so in Mithridates two things are interesting: the man and his aspirations. Personally he has little of Alexander, at all events in character, for his features on the coins recall that monarch (see also chap. xxv. note 6). The barbarian element is too prominent in him. Moderation is unknown to him. His will is law; whoever presumes to disobey him is crushed. He destroys cities which he has founded if they revolt against him; under similar circumstances he puts his own children to death.

Yet he is capable of gratitude and occasionally gives his confidence. Alexander was great, because he was able to repent; of this there is not a trace in Mithridates. Secondly, his aspirations. Here he has considerable resemblance to Alexander, especially as regards their boundlessness. Just as Alexander wanted to penetrate into the remote East, so did Mithridates into the distant West, and both without urgent need. And the consequence of these enterprises is characteristic in both cases. Alexander, whom all know to be a humane individual, is disobeyed by his soldiers, but they remain attached to him and he to them. Mithridates, who is known as a cruel egoist, is betrayed by his people and killed forthwith when he wants to launch into the unknown. Mithridates, it is true, was not a national monarch like Alexander, and his soldiers, especially towards the close of his reign, were only mercenaries. Mithridates also, like Alexander, wanted to blend the East and the West; only he started from the Persian side, Alexander from the Greek. In spite of this Mithridates had the great advantage of being able to come forward as defender of the Greek nationality, just like Alexander. Only his misfortune was that he had Rome for an antagonist. Rome represented the cause of freedom in this struggle, and the champions of personal rule have in the end always had to succumb among civilized peoples. Napoleon was victorious only so long as he represented the principle of liberty; Cromwell died at the right moment.

Mithridates promoted the cause of Greek civilization in Asia, and for this reason is entitled to a prominent place in Greek history. If he had held his own, perhaps what is known as the Byzantine Empire might have arisen a few centuries sooner. At all events emperors like Leo the Isaurian, who was born in Commagene, and Nicephorus, who was a native of Seleucia in Pisidia, not to mention many earlier ones, have less Hellenic civilization than Mithridates, and the kingdom of the Byzantine emperors, like that of the sovereign of Pontus, was around the littoral of the Black Sea.

Mithridates moreover is in one respect a completion of Alexander, for he ruled over the very countries which remained outside Alexander's empire, and yet were within the sphere of the old Persian monarchy or adjoining it. The Greek Alexander conquered the greater part of the Persian empire and tried to hellenize it. The Persian Mithridates controlled the section of the Persian empire which was left untouched by Alexander and annexed the Greeks of the extreme north to it, while liberating them from the pressure of the barbarians, and he imparted a Hellenic character to his whole kingdom. But he was not able to stand against Rome, which had also become hellenized. Greek civilization combined

with despotism had to succumb to Greek civilization accompanied with self-government. The character of Mithridates, as Reinach rightly observes, has much that reminds us of Russian sovereigns. This being so, it is remarkable that Vladimir I., the founder of the Russian empire, was converted to Christianity in 989 or 990 at Chersonesus in the Crimea. Reinach (*Mithridate*, p. xiii.) remarks on the day of Vladimir's baptism: "Ce jour-là, si l'on peut dire, naquit l'âme de la Sainte Russie. C'est ainsi que par delà les siècles et les races Mithridate donne la main à Pierre le Grand, le souverain moderne dont le caractère présente le plus d'analogies avec le sien."

2. The encroachment of Armenia up to the Gulf of Issus occurred again in the Middle Ages: *Königreich Kleinarmenien*, Die Organisation Syriens durch Pompejus, Marquardt, *Röm. Staatsverf.* 4, 236; Pompeius recognized as a statesman by Mommsen, *R. G.* 3, 139.—Commagene. Th. Mommsen, *Die Dynastie von Kommagene*, *Athen. Mittheil.* 1, 27-39; Mommsen, *R. G.* 5, 454; Humann und Puchstein, *Reisen in Kleinasien und Nordsyrien*, Berl. 1890. The monument on the Nemruddagh, of which an illustration and thorough explanation is given in this last work, had already been published by Hamdi-Bey; Th. Reinach, *La Dynastie de Commagène*, *Rev. des Études grecques*, 1890, pp. 362-380.—This dynasty descends from Orontes, the well-known Persian satrap of the fourth century B.C., a Bactrian. The connection of the last sovereigns of this house, which Babelon (*Rois de Syrie*, pp. ccviii. seq.) left unsettled, has been established by Reinach on a probable basis. The governor of Commagene, Ptolemaeus, who occurs in *Diod.* 31, 19 a, belongs to this family. His son was Samos (-es), founder of Samosata, of whom there are coins (Babelon, ccviii.). His son Mithridates Callinicus married Laodice, daughter of Antiochus VIII. Grypus. Her son was Antiochus I., who reigned from before 69 down to at least 38 B.C. This is the monarch who erected the huge monument on the Nemruddagh. The remaining kings of Commagene are given in Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, pp. ccxiii. seq.; they ruled at last over part of Cilicia and over Lycaonia. In the year 72 A.D. the kingdom was put an end to by Vespasian. The son of the last king withdrew to Athens, where he became Archon Eponymus. The ruined monument on the Museum at Athens, the inscriptions of which have been preserved, was erected to him; cf. *Baed. Griechenl.* 92. His ancestor Orontes also had the Athenian citizenship (*C. I. A.* 2, 1, 108). Reinach remarks very appropriately: "La vieille famille iranienne, ballottée par les nécessités de l'ambition et les caprices de la fortune de la Bactriane jusqu'aux flots de la mer Egée et aux montagnes du

Taurus vint enfin s'échouer sur une colline solitaire vis-à-vis du rocher sacré de Pallas Athéné. Là repose ce roi en exil, plus sûr de la durée de sa mémoire que bien des monarques morts sur le trône, car tant que le culte de la beauté amènera des pèlerins en Grèce, quelque chose de la lumière qui descend de l'acropole s'arrêtera sur la tombe du seizième descendant d'Oronte le Bactrien." This Philopappus is in fact an excellent symbol of the attraction of Greece for the East. Philopappus was also a Roman consul and one of the Arvales Fratres.

3. For the condition of European Greece between 83 and 31 B.C. I must refer the reader to Hertzberg, 1, 386 seq. I mention a few leading points. Story of the robber Peripoltas in Chaeronea, Plut. Cim. 1, 2. The bad Proprietor of Macedonia, L. Calpurnius Piso, 57-55, according to the description of Cicero in *Pisonem* a sort of Verres. The latter carried on his depredations in 80/79 under Dolabella in Asia and afterwards as Proprietor in Sicily.—The Romans study rhetoric at Rhodes, philosophy in Athens. Ariobarzanes I. and III. adorn Athens (Hertzberg, 1, 436). Pompey presents the Athenians with fifty talents for the embellishment of the city. Benefits conferred on Athens by the banker T. Pomponius Atticus; like Cicero he is initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries. Cicero lived in Athens for six months; Horace and Virgil were there too. Very remarkable is the increase of the authority of the Areopagus in Athens, which now had importance in police, judicial, educational and religious matters (Hertzberg, 1, 144), evidently established by Rome in the interests of conservatism. Athens becomes more and more the city of culture, the University town.

CHAPTER XXVIII

POMPEY, CAESAR AND CRASSUS—PHARSALUS—CAESAR IN EGYPT—PHILIPPI—ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA—POSITION OF EGYPT (63-30 B.C.).

THE remainder of our story must be told quite briefly.¹ Pompey had settled matters in Asia according to his own good will and pleasure. But his arrangements, to have the force of law, required confirmation by the Senate, and the latter put off giving it. The offended conqueror therefore combined with the popular leader Caesar and the wealthy Crassus, and effected his object by this means. But by this very step he contributed to the rise of his most dangerous rival, the cleverer and more energetic Caesar. The latter slowly conquered Gaul, and created there, at a short distance from Rome, an excellent army wholly devoted to his interests. In the meanwhile Crassus sought renown in the distant east against the Parthians, who were threatening Syria. But he was defeated by them at Carrhae, south of Edessa, and slain at a meeting with the Parthian commander-in-chief, Surenas, in a quarrel which was no doubt purposely brought about by the Parthians, in 53 B.C. At a performance of the *Bacchae* of Euripides at the Parthian court in Ctesiphon, Agave appeared with the head of Crassus instead of that of Pentheus before the semi-Greek audience, who broke out into loud applause at the sight of this bloody token of victory. In the year 51 the conquerors actually appeared in Syria, but C. Cassius made

a skilful defence of the country. Pompey and Caesar now confronted each other alone. Pompey had once more joined the party to which he had devoted his early career, the aristocratic side; Caesar seemed to aim at exchanging the position of popular leader for that of master of the whole state. In the year 49 the conflict between the two men broke out. Caesar took Rome, defeated the Pompeians in Spain at Ilerda, and made himself Dictator; then he proceeded eastwards and defeated Pompey at Pharsalus, in 48 B.C. The Greek world of the East becomes of marked significance for the settlement of the great crisis of the Roman Empire at this very moment. In it the most important scenes are enacted; in it the opposition firstly to Caesar, then to the Triumvirs, and finally to the adopted son of Caesar found its main support. But the West turned the scale, and if the Greeks were mostly against Caesar and Octavianus on principle, yet the wrongheaded measures of their antagonists, of Pompey, of Caesar's murderers and of Antony, soon cured them of their taste for opposition.

Pompey fled from the mouth of the Peneus *via* Amphipolis, Mytilene, Attalia in Pamphylia and Cyprus to Egypt, where he hoped to find protection or at all events a welcome. He had been guardian of the brother and sister then reigning in Egypt, Cleopatra VII., aged one-and-twenty, and Ptolemy XIV., aged thirteen, children of Ptolemy Auletes, an unprincipled and cruel individual in the style of the last Ptolemies, with whom the Romans had trifled, as he had done with the country. As usual a quarrel had arisen between the pair, who were to marry each other, and Ptolemy's advisers had driven Cleopatra out of the country and were waging war with her on the Syrian frontier. When Pompey appeared on board ship off the hill of Casium near Pelusium and asked to be received by Ptolemy, the ministers Pothinus and Apellas persuaded the little king that his best way out of all difficulties would be to have

Pompey assassinated. The fugitive was induced to get into a boat, which was to take him to land, and was murdered in it, in sight of his wife and his son Sextus, who had remained on board the ship. Caesar came to Alexandria *via* the Hellespont and Rhodes, and turned away deeply moved when his rival's head was brought to him—a curious counterpart to the scene in the theatre at Ctesiphon. The Egyptians had hoped that he would leave the country at once, but two things detained him, the wish to amass money in Egypt and the charms of Cleopatra, who came to Alexandria. As he had but few troops, Ptolemy's ministers came to the conclusion that it was perhaps better so, as they might be able to make away with him. They instigated a revolt of the population of Alexandria and of the Roman garrison which had been in Egypt since the year 55, and Caesar was actually in such imminent danger that it seemed as if the third Triumvir also would lose his life in the East. On one occasion he had to escape by swimming from a sinking ship. It was with difficulty that he held a small section of the city and kept open his communications with the sea by the large harbour. The energy of the revolt which he encountered was no doubt due to the Roman soldiers. At last he was saved by Mithridates of Pergamum, a son of the famous king, who advanced with a miscellaneous force from Asia. He took Pelusium and marched up the eastern bank of the Nile. Caesar now embarked his troops, sailed round the Pharos, landed west of the city, marched round the Mareotis Lake, joined forces with Mithridates, and eventually defeated the enemy on the Nile, Ptolemy being drowned in the battle. Caesar then took possession of the whole of Alexandria, and now Egypt was his. After having made over the government to Cleopatra and her second brother Ptolemy, he went to Syria, where he rewarded Antioch, Ptolemais, Gabala, Laodicea ad Mare and Rosus for their loyalty and confirmed the exemption of the Jews from a Roman garrison and Roman taxes.

Thence he proceeded to Asia Minor and defeated Pharnaces, the son and murderer of the old Mithridates, at Zela; this was the battle after which he wrote the famous *veni, vidi, vici* to the Senate. Pharnaces was put to death in the Bosphorus by his governor Asander. Caesar of course now took in hand some changes in the organization of Asia Minor. His giving Cyprus to two Ptolemies, after it had been independent under Roman protection, was a prelude to the subsequent un-Roman behaviour of Antony in the East.

This is not the place to describe Caesar's further achievements in the civil war. Thapsus and Munda lie outside the scheme of this history. Nor can his partly executed and partly unexecuted plans for the reorganization of the great Empire, which was so urgently required, be discussed in detail here. If these plans actually resulted in the undisguised despotism which has been attributed to him with some show of reason, it is clear that such a constitution could not have the permanence which his adopted son, who had grown wiser by experience, managed to give to his. The oligarchy had to be put an end to, for it had utterly degenerated. But despotism pure and simple could not take its place. At any rate Caesar's degradation of the Senate, which had so long been all-powerful, into a merely consultative body, shows that he was not the far-seeing politician which many writers make him out to be, and this, looking to the ideas which prevailed at that time, makes his assassination intelligible. The tyrant was put out of the way in Greek fashion just as he was on the point of conquering the Parthian empire like another Alexander.²

The wars which now ensue and continue up to the final settlement are waged mostly in the East or in Greek countries. First of all Caesar's murderers, and then Antony, rely on the East, Sextus Pompeius on Greek Sicily. Brutus was to have received Macedonia as his province by Caesar's wish, and Cassius Syria. As a matter of fact they both seized the

provinces destined for them after a stay in Athens, where statues were erected to them near Harmodius and Aristogiton, Cassius defeating Dolabella, who had occupied Syria, and then plundering Laodicea and Tarsus. Cassius then marched into Asia Minor and sacked Rhodes. Brutus also came to Asia, where he devoted too much time to the subjugation of the valiant Lycians and thus forfeited the sympathies of the inhabitants of the province. The first enthusiasm for the murderers of Caesar began to decline very considerably throughout the East. But this had little to do with the final result, which was decided by arms. The die was cast at Philippi, where the folly of the republican leaders (Cassius killed himself quite unnecessarily) contributed almost as much to the issue as the valour of the conquerors (43 B.C.). The sole support of the aristocratic party was now S. Pompeius, who founded a sort of pirate kingdom in Sicily. For a time Sextus had much luck and considerable power, especially as he managed to cut off supplies from Italy, and thus worked on the feelings of the Roman populace. Octavianus and Antony were therefore obliged to recognize him as an independent sovereign in the year 39. But the naval battle off Naulochus in Sicily (36 B.C.), in which he was defeated by Agrippa, put an end to his sovereignty. He fled to Asia and perished there. It was in Sicily too that the third Triumvir, Lepidus, fell from power through his own folly. Thus Octavianus was left in sole possession in the West.

In the East this position was held for a long time by M. Antonius, a brave and experienced soldier, but just as frivolous as, and far more unprincipled than, Demetrius Poliorcetes, with whom Plutarch compares him. He let slip golden opportunities of keeping a hold on power, and allowed himself to be fooled by a disreputable and *passée* woman in a manner almost unprecedented for a man of such commanding influence and so much natural energy. Cleopatra caught him in Tarsus in the year 41, let him go for a time on his

marriage with Octavian's sister after his reconciliation with the latter in the year 40, but took possession of him again in 37, when he was about to march against the Parthians, and kept her plaything in her hands until she thought fit to break it. In 41 B.C. the Parthians had conquered Syria and even Asia Minor as far as Laodicea, but had then been driven out again by P. Ventidius Bassus. Antony now wanted to finally subdue them. But he set about it very unskilfully, pushing across Armenia from the north into Atropatene and lingering over the siege of Phraaspa (east of Lake Urmia, the modern Takht Sulciman), and on his communications with the west being cut off, retreating to Syria by the same circuitous route with enormous loss. Of course he sent lying bulletins to Rome, on the strength of which the usual honours were decreed him by the Senate at the instance of the obliging Octavian. Antony might have renewed the war, if he had been willing to obtain Octavian's help by a reconciliation with Octavia, but he repudiated her (35) and confined his activity to a triumphal procession in Alexandria. The victory which he celebrated was the treacherous capture of his alleged disloyal ally Artavasdes of Armenia, and the strangest part of the triumph was that Cleopatra was proclaimed queen of kings with her son by Caesar, Caesarion, as co-regent. Her son by Antony, Alexander, received Armenia; other countries were given to various Egyptian princes; Octavia was divorced.

The Romans were indignant at these disgraceful proceedings, but Antony tried to conciliate them by holding out hopes of a restoration of the Republic, *i.e.* the fall of Octavian. A conflict was therefore inevitable, and Octavian was clever enough to begin it by a declaration of war on Cleopatra. Antony was only deprived of his offices. He wasted the best of his time in revels in Samos and at Athens in the company of Cleopatra. The loss of the decisive battle off Actium (2nd Sept. 31 B.C.) through the treachery of Cleopatra and the wretched conduct of Antony is a matter of history.

The pair, who were not on very good terms, proceeded to Alexandria, where Antony awaited his fate, while Cleopatra planned further treachery. She made over Pelusium to Octavian and, to make Antony commit suicide—this was the simplest way of getting rid of him—circulated a report of her death. Antony did destroy himself, and Cleopatra now hoped that she would be able to fascinate Octavian as she had fascinated Caesar and Antony. But the middle-aged Egyptian siren tried her arts in vain on the cool-headed young general, and she died by her own hand, the only creditable action of importance which is recorded of her public or private life.³

Egypt became a Roman province, which involved little change in its legal position. And a change of this kind was not necessary. The country had had no communities or peoples like Syria; its inhabitants could not part with any rights, for they never possessed any. It had been a large landed estate, and such it remained. The only difference was that the owner no longer resided in Alexandria, but in Rome, and that he administered his property better than the Ptolemies had done. The owner was the Emperor himself, the administrator always a Roman knight. Senators were not even allowed to set foot in Egypt. The prosperity of the country now revived. Cleopatra had, like her predecessors, governed so badly that the country did not produce enough corn for its own wants, for her ministers had not even taken the trouble to regulate the overflow of the Nile. Intellectually too Egypt remained much the same as formerly. The Museum continued to exist; true, it was no longer the head-quarters of erudition, for now there were more facilities for study in Rome than in Alexandria, apart from the intellectual stimulus offered by the capital. On the other hand, a natural literature grew up more and more in Alexandria, and under Roman rule a heathen, a Jewish, and a Christian philosophy were able to develop there.

Soon after his victory Octavian gave the Roman Empire

the constitution under which it long continued to exist. He retained what was right and discarded what was wrong in Caesar's innovations and—most important point of all—allowed the Senate a due share in the government of the great whole. Of course he took the lion's share for himself.

We have now arrived at the conclusion of our narrative. It only remains for us to give a brief description of the political and a glance at the intellectual condition of the Greeks at the moment when they passed under the protection of Rome.

NOTES

1. For the history of the period from the outbreak of the civil war the following works may be consulted, besides the standard histories of Rome: Judeich, *Caesar im Orient*, Leipz. 1885, and especially Gardthausen, *Augustus und seine Zeit*, 1, 1 and 2, 1, Leipz. 1891.

2. Site of Casium, Baedeker, *Aeg.* 1, 452.—Gabalá, Head, 659; Baed. Pal. 386.—Caesar gives Cyprus to Ptolemaean princes, Dion Cassius, 42, 35. I am not aware that Mommsen mentions this characteristic fact.—CAESAR. A brilliant picture has been drawn of him by Mommsen, who assumes that his aim was the "political, military, intellectual and moral renaissance of his own degraded nation and of its near kinsman, the still more degraded Hellenic race" (*R. G.* 3, 431). And on p. 524 he says that Caesar with the "unerring genius with which he refashioned the Roman state, also undertook the regeneration of the Hellenes and resumed the interrupted labours of the great Alexander." This would make him a prominent figure in Greek history. I see no reason however for crediting him with such lofty aims and such extraordinary results, and am all the more inclined to substantiate my own verdict because Mommsen's sketch of Caesar at the beginning of his 11th chapter has already passed into German school text-books. Mommsen, as it appears to me, has not proved his propositions, and it is desirable to demonstrate this very point. Other writers have disagreed with his view of Caesar, but I believe that if the premises adopted by Mommsen himself, *i.e.* the description of the individual achievements of Caesar, are shown not to justify his conclusion—and that is what the above-mentioned sketch really is—this will help us to set the matter in its proper light and to form a more correct opinion of the Romans and Greeks of that

day, who had not yet fallen so low as to deserve the constitution devised by Caesar. In Mommsen's account the reorganization of the city police comes first. Here Caesar's action was no doubt beneficial. Mommsen then passes to the wretched economic condition in which the Dictator found Italy, and describes it in detail (pp. 479-491), adding the following words: "The root of this disease was incurable, and such remedies as could be applied had to come mainly from the efforts of the people themselves and from the influence of time; even the wisest government is as powerless as the most skilful physician to change bad blood into good, or to do more than avert the mishaps which retard the healing powers of nature." In this direction and with this very considerable limitation laid down by Mommsen himself Caesar undoubtedly achieved great things. After Rome and Italy come the provinces. Here Mommsen remarks that before Caesar's time the view prevailed in Rome that the provinces were estates of the Roman people, but that Caesar "did away with" this view (p. 504). This however does not agree with Mommsen's opinions expressed elsewhere. For, as we saw in chap. xix. note 5, Mommsen himself states not only in his history of Rome, but also in his book on Roman public law, that the estate theory obtained from the time of C. Gracchus down to Gaius. Now I do not in the least believe (chap. xix. note 5) that it originated with C. Gracchus nor that Caesar did away with it, but Mommsen himself cannot well make this assumption, for in that case how could the theory reappear in Gaius? It might indeed be said that the Empire re-introduced it contrary to Caesar's intention. But what proof is there that Caesar did away with it? Of tangible facts in support of this hypothesis Mommsen only quotes the settlement of Italians in the provinces, and the question arises whether this is to be regarded as an improvement of the provinces or as an exploitation of them. It is noteworthy that Mommsen adduces the colony of Carthage as the most prominent fact of this nature (511, 513), and remarks (p. 511) that here as in general Caesar carried out the ideas of C. Gracchus. We have seen however that according to Mommsen, *Röm. Gesch.* 2, 111 (120) C. Gracchus, when he founded his colony in Africa, propounded the new theory that the soil of the subject communities was the "private property" of the state. That is the old 'estates' theory, consequently exploitation. When Caesar does the same thing, it is supposed to be with an ideal object. This is not likely. So much only is clear from the foregoing, that Caesar treated the provinces in precisely the same way as C. Gracchus, and that he did not "do away with" any less generous views. The next point in Mommsen is the general legal reforms in the Roman Empire.

Here Mommsen has shown that something was done by Caesar, but in this department too the praise is somewhat excessive for the actual achievement, for according to him Caesar "sketched the plan of a new code" (p. 519), which was to settle what was "necessary." That consequently was the main point, and it would entitle Caesar to high praise. But in the first place the plan was never carried out, the "necessary" reform never came to pass, and in the second place its laudable nature is only a conjecture of Mommsen's—"this was Caesar's intention, for it must have been so." Unfortunately men are only too often prevented from carrying out their good intentions; but after all we can only write on the credit side what is accomplished, or at least expressed as an intention, not what a man "must have" intended. Finally, Caesar promoted the improvements which had been "started" in the coinage, and re-organized the calendar. All these things appear to Mommsen as parts of a fabric in which he discerns "no gaps of any importance"; "each stone enough to make a man immortal." Immortality however is rather too high a reward for carrying out other people's ideas (reform of the coinage); "each" stone therefore was not "enough." Consequently as Caesar treated the provinces in much the same way as some of his predecessors, as the nature of his plan for a general code is unknown, and as all he could do for the economic condition of Italy was to "avert mishaps," his actual performances are reduced to reforms in the police and in civic government, in the coinage and the calendar. All this was good and useful work, but it is far from justifying the enthusiastic praise above quoted. I have now however to draw attention to an important point, which makes these eulogies appear altogether inappropriate. What constitution did Caesar wish to give to the Roman Empire? According to Mommsen he wanted to be sole magistrate, after the fashion of the old kings, *i.e.* dictator (pp. 450, 451). Legislative power no doubt he was willing to share with the people; but according to Mommsen himself this popular power was only an "unsubstantial shadow," a "formal sovereign," with which every government could "easily come to terms." The Senate was to be nothing more than an adviser, but even this modest rôle was not on a very satisfactory footing; "sometimes resolutions of the Senate were promulgated, of which none of the Senators stated to have been present when they were drawn up had an idea" (Mommsen). Consequently absolutism pure and simple combined with gentle mockery of the auxiliary bodies! Was this the policy which was to inaugurate a "regeneration" of men who were not inferior to the autocrat in morality? Are isolated reforms of a gifted individual, who treats those on whom

he showers his blessings as beings on a lower scale than himself, sufficient to produce a regeneration among self-respecting men? Mommsen himself is of opinion (2, 109) that "an absolute monarchy is a great calamity for a nation." As however he adds, "but not so great as an absolute oligarchy," Caesar according to him must still be regarded as a "great" but yet "lesser calamity." But even this proposition is a dubious one. In an absolute oligarchy one of the rulers can always restrain the other (in the Consulate, for instance), but if there is only one ruler and he loses his reason, then there is no peaceful way of getting out of the difficulty. The merit of the constitution devised by Caesar would therefore be a sort of casting out of devils by Beelzebub, which may be a useful proceeding under certain circumstances but does not prove the excellence of Beelzebub. What Caesar's intellectual standpoint was according to Mommsen himself, is shown by the latter's remark (*Staats*. 2, 716) that if Caesar wanted to be recognized as a god, this proves eminent consistency in thought and action. I do not hold that such a wish even in Caesar's case was a necessary consequence of his conduct in other respects; I consider it an inconsistency in him as in Alexander (vol. iii. pp. 355, 356); but if Caesar really did prove his consistency by it, then it was the consistency of madness and it would be impossible to condemn him more severely than by such a remark. This kind of consistency is generally attributed to the later emperors; if Caesar was afflicted with it, then Lange's theory (*Röm. Alt.* 3, 456) of his eventual mental derangement would be correct. If a man of this stamp is credited with aiming at "the political, military, intellectual and moral regeneration" of the Romans and the Greeks, it must be said that the contemplation of this aim (which the individual achievements of Caesar, as we saw, do not prove) is not proved by the fact that he wished to be regarded as a god. The gods of Greece and Rome were not generally credited with the aspiration of effecting a regeneration of mankind, and not even Alexander wished to become a god for the purpose of morally improving any one. This much only is clear in Caesar, that he wished to make himself absolute ruler of the Romans and of their empire. Inasmuch as his acts done with this object were useful in themselves, owing to the decided harmfulness of the oligarchy in those days, he indirectly also aimed at a political and military regeneration of the empire. But what these aspirations have to do with an intellectual and moral regeneration of peoples, even in the mind of Caesar, is not apparent. And here another remark may be made. The intellectual and moral regeneration of a people has been the aim of great legislators, such as Solon, for instance. Caesar however

was far from being a Solon, because he lacked an essential qualification for it; he was not moral enough himself. No argument is needed to prove this. Mommsen merely remarks on this point that Caesar began his *liaison* with Cleopatra out of policy only. If so, why did he make her join him in Rome? Policy had not so much to do with this connection as pleasure. He gave her little brothers a small kingdom to play with. Were the Cypriotes to be morally regenerated in this way? Besides, according to Mommsen, Caesar was a man of "geniale Nüchternheit." This describes him admirably. But a man of this stamp does not try to regenerate a nation intellectually and morally, for he is aware that, if it can be done, he is not the man to do it. Enthusiasm, idealism, are required for this. Pericles and Cromwell, whom Mommsen compares with Caesar, were not "nüchterne" individuals. That is a proof of the psychological impossibility of Mommsen's picture of Caesar. It may therefore be asserted—and this is the *raison d'être* of the whole of the present note—that there is not a trace of regeneration of the Hellenes, even in the way of intention, by Caesar. Two things, to pass from the negative to the positive, have to be considered in him, his personality and his work. Personally he is highly attractive. He is an amiable, humane man, independent and prompt in action, a great organizer and general; as an individual he is almost on a level with Alexander, from whom he is distinguished only by less morality and lack of idealism. When he wanted to put his absolutist theories into practice he had ceased to be a real student of human nature, or at all events he considered it superfluous to observe his fellow-creatures, or he would not have been put to death by the whole troop of his ostensible friends. His statesmanship was partly good and successful and partly a failure. The tranquillization of the Empire and the inception of reforms were good; the failure was the attempt to found an absolutism in which according to Mommsen (pp. 453, 454) he was to play the part of master, and his assistants, who were not even to be "colleagues" but simply "helpers," that of freedmen or slaves who manage the estate. It is needless to dwell on the position left in it for Roman citizens. This arrogance was his ruin. The case is different with Augustus. He is calculating, is aware of his own shortcomings and of those of others, and knows how to turn both to account. In case of need he shrinks from no atrocity. But he is clever enough to see that absolutism pure and simple cannot last with subjects whose culture is on a par with that of the ruler and in a state which has been governed for a century by an oligarchy, and he takes the Senate, the old representative of the oligarchy, as co-ruler, he creates the *dyarchia* (Mommsen), the only constitution suitable for

the Roman Empire at that time. Caesar never put to death an opponent, but he tried to substitute pure absolutism for the aristocracy, and the aristocrats made away with him. Augustus butchered thousands of his opponents, but then gave the aristocracy the share in the government of the Empire which was due to it, and the consequence of this combination of cleverness and cruelty was that he was able to die a natural death at an advanced age and that his work outlasted him.—Caesar and the Jews, Mommsen, 5, 501.

3. Cleopatra, Gardthausen, 1, 437-445, with the notes. That she was not beautiful is now proved by the Denderah portrait published by Gardthausen, 2, 1, 227; it is not quite true to nature, yet, as the coins show, thoroughly characteristic. With her long Egyptian nose she is a regular contrast to her kinswoman, Cleopatra Thea (see above, chap. xxvi.), who was morally on her level, with the turned-up one. On certain coins (Imhoof, *Porträtk.* VIII, 15) she is even strangely like her lover Antony. Her title of queen still makes such an impression that she is called a "woman of many truly royal qualities" in I. Müller, 3, 681. At any rate she did not use them in governing the country; Gardthausen, 1, 456. And what these qualities were is not mentioned. Many of her vices are too well known to be enumerated. Besides, she was cruel (*e.g.* to her younger brothers, whom she put to death), faithless (to Antony), stupid from excess of cunning (her flight at Actium). Her life was disreputable, like that of almost all the Ptolemies from about 220 B.C.; her death was not so. She was great only as an actress; but in this respect too Augustus was her master. There are some very good psychological observations on Cleopatra's conduct at Actium in Mahaffy, *Empire*, 476. He rightly points out (p. 445) that the bad Cleopatra (on p. 455 he calls her "the beautiful fiend") was really not worse than the Cleopatras and Arsinoes of Egypt before her. This confirms my verdict on the moral worthlessness of the Ptolemies from 280 onwards, so far as the women of the family are concerned.—Egypt a Roman province, Gardthausen, 1, 446-458. I refer the reader to this writer for all the details in this chapter; he has also studied the geography of the whole subject (*cf.* for instance the map of the country round Lake Urmia for Antony's campaign, 2, 1, 155, the view of the Gulf of Ambracia, 1, 369, and the map of the battle of Actium).

If the Greek world, which certainly could not have continued to exist as it hitherto had done, was to be preserved for a time without excessive change, then hardly any other organization of the

Roman Empire was conceivable than that created by Augustus, and generally speaking that Empire could not reasonably have been better organized. The following considerations will show this. 1. The Greek cities were not able to bring about a general constitution either alone among themselves or in concert with Macedonian sovereigns; consequently, if they were not to go to ruin, the remedy had to come from outside, *i.e.* from Rome. 2. The constitution devised by Caesar, as Mommsen describes, could not provide this remedy, because Rome would not have it. According to Mommsen (p. 456) Caesar wanted to make Rome "the first among the many municipalities of the Empire," that is, put it on the same level as Naples, Athens and Antioch; he wanted to let the Roman aristocrats as consuls, etc., govern only the city of Rome and himself control each individual organism, cities, peoples, leagues with his 'assistants,' slaves and freedmen. This was an imitation of Alexander, but with no possibility of success, because the necessary instrument of rule, which created difficulties even for Alexander, the people, actually refused to work for Caesar. Alexander was the popular king of the Macedonians, and yet the latter, and they alone, put difficulties in his way; Caesar however was only a usurper in Rome. The Cornelii, Claudii, Livii were not going to be degraded to the position of municipal councillors of the city of Rome, with the function of looking after sewers and street-cleaning and the whitewashing of the temple façades. 3. On the other hand, the constitution devised by Augustus fulfilled its purpose for a long time. Augustus accomplished the following results: (a) he secured the unity of the Empire, the basis of universal peace, by keeping the army and general supervision in his own hand; (b) he let Rome remain the leading city and gave its great families a share in the government of the whole Empire, with honour and power, in the capital as well as in the provinces (the Senate). Even this position would not have satisfied them, but the proscriptions opened their eyes to the reality. (c) He not only left the *poleis* their autonomy—this was Caesar's policy too—he not only enabled their prominent citizens to rise to power in the service of the Emperor—Caesar was in favour of this—but he also enabled them to become members of a really influential Senate, and as such co-regents of the Emperor. He consequently contented (1) the whole, (2) the leading community, (3) the subordinate communities as much as could be reasonably expected. 4. That this constitution was on the lines of the past of Greece was proved by the fact that Greek city life developed still further under it. It was in fact an appropriate climax of the history of ancient Greece.

CHAPTER XXIX

POLITICAL CONDITION OF THE GREEKS UNDER THE EARLY EMPIRE

THE political condition of the Greek world in the reigns of Augustus and his immediate successors is often viewed with more technical correctness than real accuracy. In discussing it we begin by recalling the organization of the Roman Empire, into the provinces of which the Greek communities were incorporated.

As is well known, these provinces were from 27 B.C. onwards partly under the supervision of the Emperor, partly under that of the Senate, according as they appeared more or less to need the military protection afforded by the Emperor. The assignment might vary with circumstances. The frontier provinces acquired after 27 B.C. were all imperial, as were especially Syria and Egypt among the older ones with which we have to deal. The senatorial governors were of higher rank, the imperial ones had greater power, owing to the military authority entrusted to them.

Of the provinces which contained a great number of Greek-speaking inhabitants the oldest was Sicily; next came Macedonia. Under Caesar the greater part of the territory of Massalia was included in Gallia Narbonensis. In 27 B.C. Achaia became a province, and Moesia at the beginning of the Christian era. In Asia Minor the kingdom of Pergamum, as we have seen, first became a Roman province with the

name of Asia (133 B.C.), then Cilicia from 103 onwards (see above, chap. xxv.), Bithynia through the bequest of Nicomedes in 74, and in 64 B.C. the western part of the kingdom of Pontus was annexed to it. The province of Galatia dates from 25 B.C.; it includes Pisidia and eastern Phrygia up to Aizanoi, and subsequently cities of Paphlagonia and Pontus. Then Pontus was united to Cappadocia, which had no more kings after 17 A.D. Lycia did not become Roman until the reign of Claudius, in 43 A.D., and Pamphylia shared the same fate at that time. It was also through Claudius that Rhodes first lost its independence; it was added to the province of Asia, which included the Aegean Islands as well. Syria, as we are aware, passed under Rome in 64 B.C.; Judaea did not become a separate province until 70 A.D.; up to that time it was a dependency of Syria. This enumeration is enough to show that the provinces changed a good deal, and that was far more the case than can be indicated here. Provinces were made smaller, increased, created, abolished, and this could easily be done, as they were not so much administrative areas as districts under supervision. There was no regular staff of provincial officials, the functionaries came and went as assistants of the governor. Rome allowed the component parts of the provinces as much independence as possible. I shall revert to this point shortly; I now give a brief survey of the various countries in which Greek life flourished at that time.

In the west Massalia retained its independence when it had to submit to Caesar in the year 49, but lost part of its territory. It preserved its Greek civilization for some time to come.¹ In Italy the Greek element is still specially vigorous in Naples. True, the city received a Roman colony, but it kept the Greek language and offices with Greek names, as for instance the *demarchia*, which had supplied the Romans with the Greek equivalent for their *tribunatus plebis*. The Romans tried to latinize Sicily. Caesar is supposed to have wished to give its inhabitants the *latinitas*, Antony even the full citizen-

ship ; but these plans were not realized. Augustus placed Roman colonies in various cities of the island. In spite of this Greek culture held its ground in Sicily, and was subsequently strengthened by the Byzantine occupation.

In Greece two states were quite independent, Sparta and Athens, the old abodes of Greek renown, and the latter was even permitted to keep its tributary subjects, the inhabitants of Seyros, Lemnos, Imbros and Delos. But the other Greek communities were also self-governing, and continued to live under their own laws. They were only somewhat more liable to changes in their institutions at the hand of the governors than Sparta and Athens. Just as in most of the Greek districts of the East, so in European Greece Rome allowed the formation of *koina*, that of the Achaeans among others. Augustus even reorganized the Amphictyonic League, and strengthened it by founding the city of Nicopolis opposite Actium. Thessaly and Epirus were added to the province of Achaia.²

In Macedonia Thessalonica, Amphipolis and Dyrrhachium were recognized as independent cities by the Romans. It is true that the first-named was the head-quarters of the Roman Propraetor and therefore specially liable to tutelage by Rome.

In Thrace the Romans admitted the independence of Abdera, Aenus, Byzantium and Samothrace. The Chersonese had passed into the hands of Agrippa, subsequently it became imperial property. At various points in the interior too, at Philippopolis for instance, flourishing Greek communities grew up.

In Moesia there were ancient Greek cities on the coast, in the rear of which the Romans planted colonies of people speaking their language. The governors of Moesia also had to look after the Greek cities on the northern shores of the Black Sea, which, while independent internally, were obliged to pay tribute to Sarmatian sovereigns.³

The internal affairs of the various provinces of Asia were of the most varied nature. As a rule the Romans had left their institutions as they found them, and in so doing had preserved the autonomy of the cities; Pompey had even made the city communities more important and thus decidedly encouraged the Greek element. In the province of Asia a certain unity in taxation had already been introduced by the kings of Pergamum, just as by Hieron and the Carthaginians in Sicily, and the Romans not only retained this more direct mode of government, but actually made the system worse by the disastrous measures of C. Gracchus. The independence of the communities could not help suffering from this, although the revenue-farming was afterwards abolished. In the province of Asia we find the system, which appears in other parts of the Roman empire, of judicial districts, *conventus*, in the chief towns of which the Proconsul held his court, a kind of jurisdiction which on the one hand clearly shows the original significance of the office of Proconsul, as a supervising non-administrative authority, and on the other hand enables the Proconsul to intervene with greater effect in the affairs of the various communities. This system was not introduced everywhere, in Syria, for instance, such districts are not mentioned. In spite of the calamities which the province of Asia had had to undergo, its famous cities were still important and flourishing. In Bithynia too we find cities of note, especially Nicomedia and Calchedon, and it is significant that the whole country was divided into city districts. The same arrangement existed, to the advantage of Greek civilization, from the time of Pompey in Paphlagonia and Pontus, where Sinope, Amastris, Amisus and Pompeiopolis on the Amnias were considered the most important cities. The position was different in Galatia and Cappadocia; there country life still predominated, and Galatia had retained its old tribal constitution, while Cappadocia was divided into administrative districts under strategi. Yet here too the divi-

sion into *strategiae* was replaced in later times, between Alexander Severus and Constantine, by city districts, to such an extent had the cities—at first only Tyana, Mazaca (afterwards Eusebia and then Caesarea), Ariarathea and Archelais—increased in number, *i.e.* the Greek element been strengthened. There were no independent cities in Galatia, the city life of this province was supplied by its Pisidian section with Termessus and Sagalassus.

The position of Lycia was peculiar. This country had sided with the Romans against Mithridates and then made a brave resistance to Brutus; it therefore retained its independence, of which it was not deprived until the reign of Claudius. It consisted of a league (*systema*) of twenty-three cities with voting power, divided into three classes, according as they had three, two or one vote at the yearly assemblies, in which the head of the league, the Lyciarches, was elected. The cities of the first class were Patara, Olympus, Myra, Tlos, Xanthus and Pinara. The Romans did not disturb this organization. In Pamphylia the most important cities were Side, Perge and Aspendus. In Cilicia, which included Isauria, there were six independent cities: Tarsus, Anazarbus (Caesarea), Corycus, Mopsus, Seleucia on the Calycadnus and Aegae. The *koinon* with a Cilicarches at the head of it met at Tarsus. Augustus also left two principalities in Cilicia untouched, that of Olba and of Tarcondimotus in the Amanus range. Cyprus and Crete also had *koina*. Paphos was the sacred metropolis of Cyprus; Cyrenaica was united to Crete, where a Cretarches is mentioned.⁴

Syria remained as Pompey had organized it, divided into cities and principalities. In northern Syria independent city communities were formed by the four cities of the Seleucis, also by Cyrrhus, Hierapolis, Beroea, Epiphanea, Balanea (Banijās, Baed. 385), farther south on the coast by the well-known Phoenician cities, as well as by Joppa, Ascalon and Gaza, and

the inland towns of the Decapolis and Samaria. A handbook of reputed views the "concession of independence" to so many cities as an administrative measure of Rome. The idea is that the Romans wanted to save themselves the trouble of appointing a number of officials in this way. The converse is the truth. Because the Romans remained faithful to their principle of leaving everything as it was and therefore did not disturb the independence of friendly cities; they were able to dispense with the appointment of a number of officials—a class of men with which they were not very familiar. The fact that so many communities lived peaceably side by side without Roman functionaries in each of them is moreover a proof of the sterling qualities of the Syrian city folk, on which stress should be laid as well as on the much discussed and undeniable luxuriousness of the Syrians and on their refractoriness, which is often so strongly marked. Of late it has been shown to be probable that Greek private law was in force in the Syrian cities; in this respect too the Greeks of Asia had not been untrue to their principles. Of independent principalities the following remained standing for a time in Syria: Commagene with its splendour-loving sovereigns of Persian extraction and Greek culture (see chap. xxvii. note 2); the dynasties of Chalcis on the Lebanon (the modern Andschar, between Beyroot and Damascus, Baed. Pal. 305); those of Abila east of Chalcis; those of Arethusa and Emesa (see above, chap. xx. note 14); Damascus, which for two centuries, down to about 106 A.D., was ruled by Nabataei, who resided in Petra; Judaea, where the famous Idumaeen, Herodes, son of Antipater and minister of Hyrcanus the Maccabaeen, became successor of the Maccabees, in 37 B.C. He encouraged Hellenic culture and founded many cities, which governed themselves in Greek fashion, *e.g.* Caesarea Palaestinae, formerly called Stratonis Turris (see above, chap. xx. note 17). Palmyra was independent. Of these principalities Marquardt makes the same assertion as

he does of the cities, viz. that the Romans tolerated them as a means of collecting revenue until their complete union with the province had become feasible. Here we clearly see the mistaken nature of his view of Roman policy, a view which must be refuted if serious errors are not to gather round one of the most important facts of history, the character of this unique state. The principalities, says Marquardt, were to be completely united to the province later on. But what was the rest of the province according to Marquardt himself? Simply independent cities, which governed themselves. To unite the principalities to the province would consequently have been equivalent to putting indirectly governed states in the same position as other states just as little directly governed, in other words, converting principalities into republics, and in the matter of revenue leaving everything as it was before. This "complete union" therefore is a term to which nothing corresponds in fact. Syria of all countries is a proof that the modern definition of a province as an administrative area does not quite hit the mark. Syria was a province, and yet consisted only of cities and districts which governed themselves. All that Rome did in Syria was to exercise supervision and raise taxes. In the province of Asia things may have worn a somewhat different aspect. The truth is that the Roman Empire was not constructed on theories, no more than the British Empire of our own day.⁵

Apart from Egypt, the Greeks of the Roman Empire are everywhere collected into *poleis*. What was their political position? In point of principle the same as that which we have described for the third century in chap. v.: they are autonomous. But just as the kings influenced them at that time, so does Rome now, and as much as she pleases. The real improvement is that they are no longer exploited to serve the ambitious aims of perpetually quarrelling kings. Important resolutions of a community are subject to con-

firmation by the governor of the province. He of course decided what was important or not. The cities still administer their own laws. Of course building, police, education and religious worship are within their province; they even impose dues, if Rome allows it. A treatise of Plutarch's shows that as late as the second century A.D. the Greeks felt that they governed themselves. And this applied just as much to the tribute-paying as to the entirely independent cities.

The cities however also have the right of combining with one another. On these *koina* too, which we have mentioned several times, mistaken views, due to exaggerated systematization, have arisen in the present day, with the same tendency as those refuted above. It is asserted that they discharged only religious functions. No doubt the resolutions which have been preserved relate mostly to honours and festivals. But that does not prove that no others were passed. That it was possible for *koina* to exercise political rights in the Roman Empire is shown in the first place by the *koinon* of the Lycians. Marquardt himself says (4, 22) that the federal constitution of the old days continued to exist in Lycia under Roman rule, "only that foreign policy and undoubtedly taxation were withdrawn from the confederation." The first restriction is improbable, the second decidedly erroneous. If the league existed, it must have had relations with people outside it, *i.e.* with other communities or sovereigns, and there is no reason why these should not have found expression in direct intercourse. Of course the league could not wage war, although even this was not legally excluded. The league could not manage its internal affairs without spending money; it is therefore clear that the cities must have contributed funds which the league administered. Even administrative districts of modern states, which are after all far more highly centralized than the Roman Empire, manage their own finances. What was left however for a confederation in the interior to do can be gathered from a consideration of the

state of Asia Minor in general, in the greater part of which the dependence on Rome was more considerable than in the case of Lycia. In the whole of this region, outside the imperial provinces, there were only 5000 auxiliary troops under the early Empire. The whole public security therefore rested mainly on the inhabitants themselves. It follows from this that the latter must have kept a police force, and this necessitated an administration, which obviously must have been partly a joint affair. The *koina* also had to keep up many roads and bridges. They even had the right to pass complaints of the Roman governor. In a word, they had a great deal more to do than merely to arrange festivals and make out decrees of honour.⁶

If then the Greek cities under the Empire managed their own police, building, public worship, instruction and subordinate legal administration, either singly or in common, in what respect did they fall short of the freedom enjoyed by a Swiss canton, a State of the North American Union or of the German Empire? in hardly anything but the guarantee that the Emperor or the governor would not occasionally interfere where they had no right to do so. And interference of this description was undoubtedly not uncommon. Only we must not count the frequent decisions of the Senate in disputes between communities as belonging to it. In those cases Rome acted as supreme arbitrator, of the kind which must always be forthcoming when war is to be avoided. In former days impartial neighbouring cities had been looked to for a decision (see above, chap. x.); now Rome appeared as the invariably impartial state. Real encroachments of Rome, who reserved to herself the power of "increasing or lessening" the rights of the individual cities, just as the council of many a mediaeval city did with the privileges of the guilds, were no doubt of pretty frequent occurrence. But similar things happen elsewhere also. Even under written constitutions of the present day complaints are heard of violation of rights and

coups d'état are experienced. The civic status of the Greeks under the earlier Roman Empire was therefore relatively speaking not a bad one. It is true that a great authority has asked in all seriousness whether in those days it was worth while living for the cities for which there was no opportunity of dying.⁷ The remark is witty, but highly exaggerated. Is everybody in a much better position nowadays? In many European states, thanks to the centralized bureaucracy and the laws in force ('*Städteordnung*' in Prussia for instance) throughout large countries, people cannot now do as much for their community as a citizen of Alabanda or Tralles could for his in the first century A.D. True, we have a compensation for this in political rights, which the inhabitants of the Roman Empire did not possess. But it is notorious that in our day great affairs of state, even in model constitutional countries, are managed by a few big personages, in spite of all the apparent control afforded by popular representation. There was less conventional unreality in politics then than there is now. In those days people deliberated about and arrived at decisions on matters with which they were acquainted and which personally concerned them, the affairs of the *polis*. Taking everything together, the political activity of a citizen of Alabanda or Tralles amounted to more than that of a citizen of Naples does nowadays.

There is a certain interest in trying to realize the condition of the early Roman Empire, so often viewed from the standpoint of a well-born Roman, for once in a way from that of the citizen of a Greek community. We see in the east of the Empire a great number of communities, almost every one with a somewhat different, more or less aristocratic constitution, grouped into provincial confederations which manage the most varied affairs, nearly everything in fact which interests mankind, at their own discretion, and controlled by Roman proconsuls, who interfere more or less in the concerns of the cities. The requirements of the communities are

met not merely by the proceeds of taxes, but also by free gifts of wealthy citizens, who are duly honoured for them. The old custom of the *liturgiae* still flourishes. Prominent and opulent inhabitants who have obtained the Roman citizenship give their sons a Roman education, and the latter then pursue an official career and end by becoming Senators. The educated and well-to-do Greeks enjoyed the advantages of both nations.

European Greece had lagged behind in material prosperity, but there can be no doubt that few countries either then or in any other age were as flourishing as Asia Minor and Syria under the early Empire. The remains of the cities are enough to prove this, as is the coinage. The small foibles of the Greeks, which are most conspicuous in the thriving communities of Asia Minor, supply some darker sides to the picture. Among them is the municipal vanity which the cities exhibit in disputing each other's right to titles. I refer to this point in a note. Every stage of civilization has its ridiculous features. But worse no doubt remains to be mentioned. There is a very dark side to the picture, and that is the worship of the Emperor.⁸

Augustus allowed the provincial assemblies of Asia and Bithynia to erect temples to him in Pergamum and Nicomedia and to pay him divine honours. This practice soon spread over the other provinces, and the blending of the religious with the administrative institution became, according to Mommsen's significant expression, a leading idea of the provincial organization of the Empire. Every temple of the Emperor had its high-priest. But the president of the provincial assembly, the Asiarches, Lyciarches, or whatever his title was, had functions connected with the worship of the Emperor, *e.g.* the management of certain festivals. Roman citizens were not originally expected to adore the living Emperor; of living persons only foreigners could be worshipped as gods (see above, chap. vi. note 1). The cult of

the Emperor was the pernicious price which the Greek communities paid for their civic independence. That the Greek religion should permit such an abuse, was highly injurious to the Greek people, from the age of Lysander through that of Alexander and the Diadochi down to the times of the Roman Emperors.

The Roman Empire had no direct popular representation. But it had an indirect one in the Senate, into which the leading men of the provinces gradually found their way, and which in the main made good its own deficiencies. It was a first Chamber without a second one beside it, but with more rights of government than modern first Chambers have. It certainly cannot be called a representation of the communities; like the Emperor, it stood rather for the idea of unity. Yet it is significant that countries without any freedom whatever, such as Egypt, were not represented in the Senate; it therefore after all contained the element of liberty in the State. The task of the Emperors was the protection of the various component parts of the Empire. With this object they in course of time created an official class, which gradually became more powerful, and eventually did great harm to the autonomy of the cities. In the end municipal offices in the Roman Empire become only a burden to their holders, because they involve responsibility for the payment of the taxes of the community. No doubt the worship of the Emperor, by the opposition which it provokes on the part of the Christians, precipitates the fall of Paganism, and that in itself was a blessing. But it was not an unmixed blessing. For the Empire, which declines to surrender its control over religion, soon provides itself with a State Christianity, and henceforward three scourges, absolutism, a State Church and excessive bureaucracy, form the distinguishing features of Byzantinism, which has once more undeservedly become somewhat popular in the present day.

The intellectual condition of the Greeks under the early

Empire must be described in a very few words. Athens retains its importance, which is also recognized by the Romans. Brutus, Cassius and Horace resided there, it was the head-quarters of the first institution for the study of philosophy in the Empire. Rhodes exercised great influence by its schools of rhetoric, Alexandria's importance we have already referred to in the preceding chapter. But Greek science is cultivated in Rome also. The universal history of the Sicilian Diodorus was mainly composed there. The first two centuries of the Empire witness an after-bloom of Greek literature and art.

Of great importance is the fact that Alexandria, in conjunction with Palestine, Syria and Tarsus, founded the moral regeneration of the world by means of religion, and that the Greek language was the medium through which the deepest thoughts sprung from Semitic soil were conveyed to mankind.

We are therefore justified in saying that at the Birth of Christ the Greeks are politically not quite extinct, that in point of art they are still on the old level, and that as regards literature and philosophy they are once more in the ascendant.

I have now arrived at the conclusion of the task which I set before myself, and am only too well aware that the performance is not worthy of the subject. Much that should have been said I was not able to insert in its proper place, and it has therefore been omitted. But it is almost impossible for a writer of the history of Greece to give a complete picture of all the great achievements of this unique people. I for my part have especially endeavoured to show how the Greeks brought into striking prominence the notion of the State identical with the community, an idea which is peculiar to antiquity and in modern Europe has been realized almost only in Germany and for a time also in Italy. In the Greek state the individual citizen puts forth all his powers for the

good of the whole ; he makes his state and himself a work of art. Great men render signal services ; but conversely it often happens that the people is superior to its leaders. In the Roman Empire the *polis* actually acquires an ever-growing importance. Greece conquers victorious Rome not only by its art and its literature, but by its lessons in civic wisdom.

And Greek life does not come to an end with the year 30 B.C., which we cannot overstep. For in the first place the Greek people maintained its national existence to such an extent after this date that before long half of the Empire became Greek politically as well, and, after Constantine the Great had transformed Byzantium into Constantinople, a Greek Empire existed for more than a thousand years. In the second place, Greek culture proved a power in the world for a far longer period. When the Byzantines had neglected their most precious treasures, the West collected them again, so far as it was possible, and surrendered to their influence more than Byzantium had been able to do. Then it is true a period of servitude set in for the Greek East, which did not give place to a better state of things until the present century. Greece rose again, a phenomenon unique in the history of the world. Its new life is a political as well as an intellectual one. In the latter respect it clings as much as possible to the traditions of antiquity. In politics no doubt the case is somewhat different. Greece is a state under a modern parliamentary government, like France, Italy, Spain, Roumania and other countries. This is the price which it has had to pay for attaining the unity desired in antiquity. But in another respect there is an unmistakeable analogy with the old days. The diffusion of the Greeks over the shores of the Aegean Sea and beyond it recalls the history of the sixth century B.C. And the obstacles which impede the political development of these settlements are also of a similar nature. The Turk corresponds to the Persian. But

it will be more difficult for the modern Greeks to take the place of the Turk than it was for the ancient Greeks to supplant the Persian. For there is now a group of states whose policy is to preserve everything that exists, provided it can get along, and consequently the Turkish Empire. It is true that this empire is constantly losing territory, but even the continuance of this process will not always prove advantageous to the Greeks. For in these days every nationality, even the smallest, claims the same rights as the large ones.

Greece therefore has a hard task in prospect if she would gather her scattered sons around her. But that many islands and maritime tracts will be annexed to the Greek state is beyond a doubt. Greece must only continue to cherish culture, which is the undying glory of the ancient Greeks and the brightest jewel in the crown of honour of her modern citizens. For where the mind is, there is also the victory.

NOTES

1. Massalia, Mommsen, *Staatsr.* 3, 669.—Influence of Greek culture diffused by Massalia on the Rhine countries proved by Löschcke, in his paper read at the Winckelmannsfest in Bonn, *Griechische Elemente in der Kunst des Rheinlandes*, Berl. Phil. Woch. No. 7, 1893.

2. Athens, Mommsen, *Staatsr.* 3, 668. Athens socia even under Tiberius, Tac. Ann. 2, 53. Possessions of Athens, Mommsen, R. G. 5, 254. Athens improved by Augustus, Curtius, *Stadtgesch.* 254-261; marble gate and agora, 255-257; Agrippæum and tower of Agrippa, 257; King Herod, 260. *Koina*, Mommsen, R. G. 5, 243.—Amphictyones, Mommsen, R. G. 5, 232, 271 to 273. A Helladarches occurs in Greece, and even Panhellenes. Mendicity in Greece, *ibid.* 255; correctores (government commissioners) at an early date in Greece, 256.

3. Macedonia, Mommsen, 5, 274-276. Thrace, Marquardt, 4 156; Momms. 5, 277-279; Philippopolis, Momms. 5, 282. Cities of the northern coast, Marq. 4, 150; Momms. 5, 283-294.

4. For conventus and provincial cities, Pauly, 6, 1, 145, 147; 32, 65. Conventus, *διοικήσεις, κοινά*, Marquardt, 365.—The

travelling proconsul analogous to the German Kaiser, who was also only inspector and supreme arbitrator.—City districts in Bithynia, Marq. 4, 198, 199. Galatia, Marq. 200-207, Mommsen, 311-315. Cappadocia, Marq. 207-216. Lycia, Marq. 216-220. Pamphylia, Marq. 220, Momms. 5, 307. Dynasties in Cilicia, Marq. 221-232, Momms. 5, 307. Cyprus, Marq. 232. Crete, *ibid.* 298-304. In Cyrene the Jews formed a special *πολίτευμα*.

5. Hellenism in Judaea and the neighbourhood, Schürer, 2, 9-46. Influence of Hellenism on the Jews apparent in the adoption of Greek expressions, Schürer, 2, 30 seq.—A Syriarches in Syria, Marquardt, 273. The motives of the Romans in their treatment of Syria, Marq. 238, 239. If Marquardt believes that the Romans could, if they had wished it, have abolished city autonomy and removed the sovereigns and administered Syria by means of Roman officials, he is importing modern ideas into antiquity. Ideas of this kind never entered their heads, nor was such a thing possible.—Chalcis, Marq. 243; Schürer, 2, 91-93. The name Lysanias, which occurs in rulers of Chalcis and Abila at that time, appears as early as 220 B.C. (Polyb. 5, 90) in the same region. The occurrence of a Ptolemaeus, son of Mennaeus, in Chalcis about 70 B.C. (Jos. Ant. 13, 16, 3) and of a Menneas in Abila about 220 (Polyb. 5, 71) is a similar case. The ruling families maintained their position in those countries for a long time (cf. Schürer, 1, 593-608).—Damascus, Marq. 246; Schürer, 2, 84, and 1, 609-622: history of the Nabataean kings.—Hellenism in Syria, Marq. 270; Kuhn, *Städteverf.* 2, 314 seq.; Schürer, 2, 50-143.

6. Cities submit resolutions to the governor for approval, Momms. 5, 326; administer their own laws, 238.—The position of the Greek communities in the Roman Empire has been illustrated by Mommsen in the 3rd vol. of his *Staatsrecht* from the standpoint of Roman law, and on the basis of this he has attempted a classification of those communities and generally of the communities forming part of the Roman Empire, which results in the following division: autonomous subjects (3, 645 seq.) and non-autonomous subjects, which latter however were really autonomous on sufferance (3, 716 seq.). But these categories can only be considered as correct if they are obvious in themselves or can be inferred from the Roman law, which Mommsen is discussing, and if in addition to this they make the actual condition of the individual communities intelligible. This seems however not to be the case. Are they deduced from the Roman law at all? Mommsen says (p. 717): "If in the dependent federation two strictly speaking contradictory legal notions are blended with one another, the status of subjection

is a hybrid institution in a still higher degree." That is to say, the actual relations between the Greek cities and Rome, which Mommsen characterizes as "dependent federation" and "subjection," cannot be brought into any rational connection with the principles of Roman law. The question however becomes still more complicated. Mommsen says (p. 723): "A simple and adequate definition is wanted still more for the unconditional than for the autonomous dependence. The clear legal relation is rather veiled by than expressed in ambiguous and partly contradictory terms." In other words, the legal terms used by the Romans for the Greek communities under their absolute control often say the contrary of what according to Mommsen is the truth. In this way Mommsen arrives (p. 657) at an antithesis between "staatsrechtlich" and "terminologisch," and in his view the Romans made a system of "Verhüllung." On p. 658 however he himself uses the word "titular," not, as might be supposed, for "terminologisch," but for "staatsrechtlich"; even titles and terms therefore are still different. On p. 664 he refers to the "timid official style." It follows of course from this, in the first place that according to Mommsen the terms used by the Romans to describe the status of dependent communities are of no use for defining their legal position, and secondly, that this legal position cannot be ascertained at all. For the terminology adopted by the Romans "veils" matters, and is therefore no help; and if it were said that the acts of the communities themselves would after all remain as a means of ascertaining the truth, they are of no assistance either, for Rome observed the principle of "toleration." We are therefore unable to discern the "clear legal relation," of which Mommsen assumes the existence, with any certainty in individual cases. But does such a clear legal relation exist at all according to the Mommsen doctrine? I believe not. If the "dependent federation" implies two "contradictory legal notions" it cannot be a "clear legal relation," and the case is just the same with the status of subjection ("still more," see above). The "subject autonomy" is a "hybrid" from the point of view of Roman law, i.e. legally non-existent, at all events not "clear." If a "subject autonomy," which is also called an "autonomous subjection" (p. xvii.), were something that could be grasped by the lay intelligence, then the theory might pass muster, but it is not so. When genus and species can change places *ad libitum*, then no clear notion can be conveyed to the layman. The only thing that is clear in the whole matter is the actual fact: the Romans do what they like with many communities. The upshot of this criticism, which might easily be extended further (see, for instance, pp. 655, 656), is therefore as follows:

according to Mommsen the Greek cities, like others, stood in various relations, which he describes at length and defines, to Rome; these relations however could not be reconciled with Roman public law, for which reason the Romans, in order to bring them within it, created "hybrid," i.e. un-Roman institutions. Besides this, they took pains to obscure the few rays of light which might still have illumined these relations by deliberately using a terminology which misrepresents the truth. Our verdict on this theory can only be that it is possible, but not probable. What necessity is there for making a classification which is neither recorded, nor an explanation of what exists, nor clear in itself? Of course it may be pointed out here that Mommsen himself has characterized all this as mere hypothesis by the expressions of uncertainty which continually recur on those pages (such as "possible," "might be," etc. etc.), so that only the fact that he could not manage to bring these relations within the purview of Roman law can have made him start such hypotheses. But was it necessary to bring them within it? In our view there is no reason for doing so. The facts are that the communities were influenced in various ways by Rome. But this need not be explained at all hazards by means of Roman legal notions. The communities had joined Rome either by compulsion or of their own accord. In the first case Rome could do what it liked with them; they were bound to carry out her orders; their "unconditional subjection" did not require any definition; this relation is part and parcel of the law of nature. In the second case however there is a more or less clearly expressed or tacitly presumed agreement, which of course was more advantageous for Rome than for the other side. This is part and parcel of the law of nations. The terms of such agreements may be of endless variety, and it is not to be expected that people with such varied legal positions should fit into a definite category of subjects of Rome. Each was treated according to its particular circumstances. Of course in certain respects the treatment of a good many was similar, but the classes so formed were purely practical creations; it is not necessary to explain them by the nature of Roman law and to create "hybrid" legal institutions for this purpose, because there is no other way of getting out of the difficulty. Public law in Rome (as has already been remarked in chap. xix. note 5, and may be briefly repeated now, because it is specially applicable here) fared in the same way as private law. In the latter the *jus civile*, which was intended for Roman citizens alone, was supplemented by the *jus gentium*, and eventually both were blended into one. So too the notions of public law, which is mainly

concerned with commands and obedience, existed at first only for Roman citizens. But at an early stage other communities entered into relations with Rome. As long as they were Italian ones speaking Latin or kindred languages, the problem was met by forming a mixture of rights, some privileges being accorded to the members of these communities, and others withheld from them. Then Rome came into contact with Greek communities. The system of half-concessions was now inadequate, and there was no inclination to extend even the limited citizenship over too wide an area. Rome therefore adopted a purely international standpoint in dealing with these communities, and the conditions varied according to the circumstances of each case. Some were entirely at the mercy of Rome; with others it was settled what services they had to render to her. Eventually, under the Empire, these distinctions, which it would be impossible to classify completely, ceased, and a general political law was formed for all subjects of the Roman Empire. At the Birth of Christ however the Empire is still in the stage of an aggregation of separate political entities bearing an independent character, monads so to speak, which are guided and supervised by one great monad, Rome.—Cf. in general Kuhn, *Die städtische und bürgerl. Verfass. des röm. Reichs bis Justinian*, 2 vols. Leipz. 1864-65.—The condition of the independent and non-independent cities actually almost alike, Marq. 4, 170, 171, 353, 357. Few troops in Asia Minor, Mommsen, 5, 323.—Plutarch's *Πολιτικά παραγγέλματα*—*Praecepta gerendae reipublicae*—treat the institutions of the republics of his time just as if it was the age of Pericles and Epaminondas. The only difference is that now the statesman *ἀρχόμενος ἀρχεῖ ὑποτεταγμένης πόλεως ἀνθρώποις*, c. 17, 4. This clearly shows that the character of the *polis* had remained the same throughout all these centuries. Strabo (14, 670) says of the philosopher Athenaeus in the time of Augustus that he *ἐπολιτεύσατο καὶ ἐδημαγωγῆσεν* in his native city Seleucia on the Calycadnus.—For the *κοινά*, Momms. Staatsr. 3, 744. The Lycian federation has legally not lost the power of waging war, Momms. 3, 671 following Str. 14, 665.—The independence of the cities in the Roman Empire has been emphasized specially by Duruy in his history of Rome.

7. Mommsen (5, 262) lays great stress on the melancholy position of the cities. The Greeks of this age are pitied because, as it is said, they were no longer independent. On the one hand it may be rejoined that the Italians were not much more independent. They had ceased to be so since the Gracchi. After that time the policy of the State was directed by only a few persons. But these few were Italians, and so in this respect the Greeks were in an

inferior position to them. And this, it is said, was a step backwards: the Greeks no longer influenced the politics of the world. Thus Freeman (Sicily, Lond. 1892, p. 323) speaks of "the full freedom of other times, when each city could itself play a part in the affairs of the world." In theory they could do so, but the practice was different. What is asserted of all, applies in reality only to Athens and Sparta. The rest of the Greeks for the most part of the time did nothing but attend to their internal affairs, and after they were annexed to Rome they continued to do so in much the same way as before. True, a Phocian, a Sicyonian, or a Messenian did not have so much influence on the decision of great political questions at the Birth of Christ as about the year 400 B.C.; but this was due not so much to the decline in freedom as to other matters. It was not so much the institutions of the Greeks that had changed as those of the world. The world had grown larger. When its compass was from Corecra to Rhodes for the Sicyonian, he could play a part in it; not so, when it extended from the Pillars of Hercules to Alexandria. The Greeks had remained standing politically, and were not able to cope with the altered circumstances of the world. No doubt this change had restricted the freedom of individual Greek communities, and in particular we are not concerned to deny that the cessation of military service was attended with certain consequences, nor that the feeling of being able now and again to defend his city in the battle-field gives the citizen a higher consciousness of his dignity. But the right of waging war must sooner or later be given up by all who wish to form part of a great whole; the German states too have had to surrender it. In that case two different kinds of compensation are available, of which one was enjoyed by the ancients, while the other falls to the lot of the moderns. In the Roman Empire the former retained the unfettered control of their own business and the shaping of their city constitution, which was uniform only in its main outlines, but obtained no share in the conduct of great affairs, of which, moreover, they had no comprehension. Owing to administrative uniformity the citizens of modern states have lost much of their freedom of movement in local matters, and in return have obtained the right, an illusory one for most of them, of having a voice in great affairs, and a share in framing laws for people whom they know very little about. Of course their position is the loftier one, because it stimulates interest in great problems. But that is no reason for despising the other. It had the merit of sincerity.—Titles of the cities summarized by Head from the coins H. N. lxxiv.: ἀρχονσα, ἀσὺλος, etc. (see above, chap. xx. note 18), ἀτελής, αὐτόνομος ἐβδόμη τῆς Ἀσίας

(Magnesia on the Maeander), *ἐλευθέρα μητρόπολις* (several cities in the province of Asia, probably as seats of certain festivals), *ναύ-αρχις* (Nicopolis, Tomi, Side, Corycus, Sebaste, Aegae, Dora Sidon, Tripolis), *νεωκόρος* (also *δῖς*, *τρίς*, *τετράκις*), *πρώτη*. Nicaea and Nicomedia contended for the *πρωτεῖον* in Bithynia, Ephesus and Smyrna in Asia, Smyrna calling itself *πρώτοι Ἀσίας*, Ephesus *πρώτη πασῶν*, *μόνοι πρωτοὶ Ἀσίας*; Mytilene is *πρώτη Λέσβου*, Samos *πρώτη Ἰωνίας*, Tralles even *πρώτη Ἑλλάδος*. In Pamphylia Side is *πρώτη*, in Pisidia Sagalassus, in Pontus Amasia, in Syria Laodicea ad Mare. These city rivalries were laughed at by the contemporary historian Dion, and Mommsen (5, 303) repeats the ridicule. Rightly enough, so long as it does not involve the opinion that the Asiatics of those days were more ridiculous and foolish than men are in all countries and in all ages. If nowadays a city wishes to be called "Haupt- und Residenzstadt," although the kingdom to which it belongs already has others with the same title, it is much the same thing. It seems very ridiculous that Smyrna should call itself the first of Asia and Ephesus the first of all Asia. But we have an analogy for this very thing in our own days among extremely serious people. In England the Archbishop of York is officially Primate of England, and the Archbishop of Canterbury officially Primate of All England, and in the same way the Archbishop of Dublin is Primate of Ireland, the Archbishop of Armagh Primate of All Ireland. We make fun of well-born Asiatics for calling themselves Asiarchs after the expiration of their year of office, and forget the attraction which the title of Mayor, Consul or Colonel has for modern republicans. The passion for titles among Asiatics in the first century A.D. does not prove that they had less sterling qualities than the Swiss or North Americans of our own day. —The prosperity of the cities is demonstrated by the coinage. True, Mommsen (R. G. 5, 302) points out that Asia Minor of all countries is "the paradise of municipal vanity," and that "by far the greater part of the coinage" is due to the fact that the Roman government let this vanity have "free play." But the first of these remarks is not proved, as we have seen above, and modern researches in Thrace show that a similar wealth of fine types of coins is to be found there; it would therefore be more correct not to allow vanity a greater part in these matters than it generally plays in human affairs.

8. Cult of Roma and of Augustus in Athens, Curtius, *Stadtgeschichte*, 255. Cult of the Emperor generally, Drexler, in Roscher, 2, 901-919. — Correct remarks by P. Gardner (New Chapters, p. 216) on the decline of the old Greek religion; cf.

also my own in vol. iii. of this work, p. 189.—The continuance of Greek law in the Syrian cities is shown by L. Mitteis, *Reichsrecht und Volksrecht in den östlichen Provinzen des römischen Reiches*, Leipz. 1891.—Influence of Greek culture on India, Weber, *Sitzungsber. der Berl. Ak.* 1890, pp. 901-933; Mahaffy, *Greek World under Roman Sway*, chap. ii.; Gardner, *New Chapters*, pp. 434, 435.—Rise of official rule, lamented by Lactantius (about 300 A.D.), *De mort. persec.* 7, quoted by Marquardt, 4, 422.

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE CULTURE OF THE AGE

1. LITERATURE

(a) *General observations.* — A twofold current can almost always be discerned in the literature of every people. Of the more important writers some express the feelings of the majority of their contemporaries and so achieve success. Others oppose them, either by proclaiming entirely new ideas or by harking back to the past, which in their opinion deserves to live on, and efforts of that kind may also be very successful. This twofold current can be traced in the Greek literature of the period under our consideration, and in the places which are the scene of its most important manifestations, in Athens and Alexandria. In Athens the Comedy expresses the feelings of the majority, philosophy those of the opposition, *i.e.* of progress. In Alexandria most of the poets are champions of tradition, they amuse the court, while Theocritus makes an impression with his originality, but does not receive the desired reward from the monarch. Of the learned class the natural philosophers belong more to the innovators than do the grammarians. Grammar was studied as a sort of sport by the worst Egyptian kings.

(b) *Reasons for the decline of Greek literature in this period.* — After literature had flourished, mostly in Athens and Alexandria, up to the year 200 B.C., a rapid change takes place. Pergamum never had a great literature. About 150 B.C.

Polybius is almost the only writer of note, and he is defective in point of form. He represents the literature of a traditional period, in which the political community, the old headquarters of the intellectual life of the Greek people and the source of its intellectual greatness, could not help despairing of itself, and in which its members found themselves obliged by the logic of facts to give up many a lofty aspiration and to content themselves with the more modest lot assigned to them by the ascendancy of Rome. It was then that Polybius tried to explain the alteration in their position to his fellow-countrymen. This state of affairs lasts till about 80 B.C. Up to that time the situation was still uncertain. The Greeks in the first place had not the means of knowing what Rome intended to do with them, and they could not have any idea what shape the social and political movement would assume, and whether a general collapse of all existing institutions might not supervene, to which the disturbances of the Gracchi and the Servile Wars seemed to point. All this took away the pleasure in literature, and few literary works were produced. It was not till Mithridates was driven out of Europe and western Asia that a change took place. People saw that society still worked in the old grooves, that Rome it is true claimed a dictatorship, but that influential Romans were becoming warmer and warmer friends of Greek culture, and they plucked up courage to cultivate letters and beauty of form once more. How great the change was appears, for instance, from the difference between Polybius, whose matter is good but style bad, and his elegant and lively successor Poseidonius. Greek poetry of course had come to an end; only smaller branches of it, such as epigram, still flourished. Poetry is a more sensitive plant of national life than prose, and with the submission to the ascendancy of Rome the lofty flights which had inspired the poetry of the Greeks were a thing of the past. It is true that there was another reason for it. If the Romans had exhibited any

taste for new Greek poems, the Greeks would probably have continued to compose poetry. But the Romans were practical people. They had created a literature of their own of high perfection on Greek models, and consequently their love of Greek poetry showed itself more in a wish to see it brought nearer to them by means of imitations in the Latin language. There was therefore not such a large public for Greek poems. The case was different with prose; its development was not impeded by obstacles of this kind. Hence Greek prose took a fresh start after the middle of the first century B.C., and history and moral philosophy, grave as well as gay, still put forth good fruit.

2. THE STATE


(a) *Nature of the Polis.*—The state in antiquity, even in its final shape of a combination of states, viz. the Roman Empire, is a more accurate imitation of the natural condition of man than the state which constitutes the ideal of the present day. This latter in the form of large states under a parliamentary government and with a written constitution is developing more and more into a piece of mechanism. It is only a pity that men are not wheels. The modern state of the kind described works from above downwards; the ancient one from below upwards. There is but little administration in the ancient state; the individual does what he likes, but as soon as he infringes the rights of others, the judge, who is the leading personage in the *polis*, intervenes. The citizens form associations, which are useful to their members and are strictly controlled by them. The state, *i.e.* the city, provides for tranquillity, order and security at home and in the neighbourhood. Peace over the whole area occupied by the grouped communities is in the end guaranteed by the largest of them, by Rome, the central monad which supervises the other monads. This system eventually failed,

but it has not been proved to be intrinsically wrong. The administrative centralization so popular nowadays is not a brilliant success either. After all, the most flourishing states in the present day are not those governed on the modern French pattern of parliament and administrative centralization, but those in which the component parts are allowed a wider field for their activity. The *polis* is a form of government from which the present day can still learn many a lesson.

(b) *Political progress in antiquity recognizable by attempts at unity among the communities.*—The *polis* is independent in itself; yet the various communities wish to unite among themselves, because otherwise they are unable to cope with the kingdoms. What form of unity is to be adopted? Shall religion constitute the basis of it? The attempt is made in the Amphictyonies, but it is inadequate. It does not bring about greater unity in political matters. Athens and Sparta therefore make the experiment with disguised or undisguised domination. But the free spirit of the Greeks revolts against this. Thereupon the Aetolians and the Achaeans lay down the principle of equal rights for all concerned, who pass majority resolutions in some fashion or other on a representative basis. But this is not successful either; the Achaean League in particular cannot keep its members together without using force. Rome now appears on the scene. She makes the attempt with the principle of supervision, the *patrocinium*. She allows the communities to manage their own affairs; as a rule they need not even contribute money or troops, but they must remain at peace with one another. General peace however is more easy to maintain at this time, because there are no powerful kings left to disturb it. The rule of Rome is an improved Athenian one. Athens itself is perhaps somewhat more independent under Rome than Rhodes or Chios had been under Athens. This period of history therefore may be said really to move in a spiral. Roman rule was more durable than that of Athens, and it

would have lasted even longer if it had not revived another old practice by reintroducing the Graeco-Oriental abuse of the worship of living beings, and in an intensified degree. This spiral, which was small when it began with Lysander, had become of considerable importance through Alexander, and attained such dimensions under the Emperors that, like a huge serpent, it threatened to stifle all healthy growth.

(c) *Town and country.* — The *polis* is confronted by the country, which is the stronghold of monarchy, as is proved by Macedonia and Persia. In the Macedonian period the country appears to win the day; but this is only an appearance, in reality the *polis* is victorious, as in Syria for instance, where the republics disintegrate the kingdom. And this state of things is upheld by Rome, in fact actually introduced into the West, which at the outset was composed of tribes only and had no cities. With the advent of the Middle Ages a reaction sets in: the country gets the better of the city. The Germanic kingdoms rest on the rural population, which first entered the service of the Roman Empire and then made itself master of it. This rural population produced feudalism, which reposes on the principle of loyalty. Yet city life could not be crushed, and gradually it regained importance. The cities once more grew independent. This is brought about mainly by powerful individuals, Emperors, Kings, Bishops, protecting them, of course only to enhance their own power, and thus, from an external point of view, the free cities of the Middle Ages are a product of Germanic institutions. But inwardly they are a reflection of the spirit of antiquity, which revolts against the ascendancy of the country people and of their masters. In our time the relations between town and country have become so complicated owing to the prodigious growth of the cities that the subject has to be considered from fresh points of views; but here too a knowledge of antiquity, Greek as well as Roman, will always be profitable.



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
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